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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This is not a typical historical study. It is a study aiming at understanding the 
historical development of a world power within the capitalist world-system
1
, which is 
also a would-be general perspective or framework of analysis to fathom how a world 
hegemon emerges out of the history of its own. In a nutshell: it is to be argued that the 
hegemon is a regime of accumulation wherein state, capital and society work hand in 
glove with a particular degree of coherence developed within the legal boundaries of its 
territorial sovereignty. This internal structure of power breeds hegemony, that is, the 
projection of power unto and onto world space, and into the international system of 
states and markets. Hence, this study represents an attempt to glean the connection 
between the internal composition of a regime of accumulation and the propensity and 
force of the same regime to expand its scale and scope of operation in world space – 
what Joshua Goldstein calls «lateral pressure»
2
. However, what will be essayed is not 
the customary inquiry into the projection of power onto the system which a powerful 
regime engendered, and whose manifestation is what we call hegemony, but an 
investigation into the inner source and morphology of power whence such a projection 
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primary feeds off. The nub of this study is the hegemon: to understand its path of 
development, its composition and  how it works.  
More to the point, we will delve into Dutch history to substantiate historically 
such a perspective. At the end of the sixteenth century a new state called United 
Provinces stepped into the limelight of European and world history. It emerged out of 
the war for the independence from the most powerful Empire of the early modern era, 
the Spanish world power. This war contributed to shape Dutch history. But the United 
Provinces were more than a development of the sixteenth century. Their historical 
complexion, as it is to be argued, originated from a past made of unruly ecology and 
incipient ecological and human commodification. The historical foundations – not their 
operational organization – arose during the late middle ages, and more precisely in the 
span of time that went from the XIV to the XVI century. The Dutch Republic, as it was 
called, became thereby the first hegemon of the modern era through the organized 
expansion and sovereign structuring of the medieval space of wealth, accumulation and 
power. In particular, it was the first hegemon of the modern world-system, a capitalist 
world-economy, the current world historical-social system
3
. The present study is, in 
general, a very long-run analysis and synthesis of Dutch history to understand the 
overall movement of power, wealth and capital that characterized the Northern Low 
Countries from the XIV century to the XVII. The analysis will focus on the power 
relations, structures, processes, networks, institutions, agents and agencies which 
developed, operated and changed during this span of time. As a consequence, the level 
of the événementielle is to be omitted outright.  
As a whole, this study takes inspiration and attempts to assume, expand, or answer 
to, some of the suggestions important scholars have launched in the course of the last 
three decades of research on Dutch history. The first suggestion to be considered is 
made by Leo Noordegraaf in a noteworthy study on the industrial landscape of the 
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Dutch Republic. It pertains to, and emphasizes, the importance of the longe durèe for an 
understanding of Dutch power in the XVII century: «The basic assumption – 
Noordegraaf says – […] is that if the effect of the medieval inheritance is counted, the 
rise of the Dutch Republic and Holland's advantage in the seventeenth century lose 
some of their enigma»
4
. Or, more precisely, we need to «tackle issues relating to the 
influence of Holland’s medieval history, and whether it created some kind of path 
dependency»
5
. We will try to eviscerate Dutch path-dependency and then incorporate 
the medieval inheritance to explain the rise of the Dutch Hegemon in the XVII century.  
We need also to recall a great challenge issued by Oscar Gelderblom in the 
Introduction of The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic : «It is a major challenge 
for students of Dutch history to explain the rise and the decline of the Dutch Republic 
within one conceptual framework»
6
. Alas, herein we will delve only into the rise of the 
Republic, we try to put this within one conceptual and historical framework of longue 
durèe. However, within the same organic framework, the Republic’s decline might be 
later investigated, thereby sealing the entire history of the rise and decline of Dutch 
power into this one single conceptual and historical framework of longue durèe.  
By paraphrasing Philip Gorski’s words, it is to be argued that the Dutch Republic 
was a strong organization of state, society and economy, «and I hope that they will be 
persuaded by the evidence that I present to support it. [To understand this] I will argue, 
we must shift our focus from the central to the local, and we must broaden it to include 
a wider range of institutions»
7
. Finally, such a perspective, and historical explanation 
and analysis, aims at answering to a question raised by Jan De Vries in his critique to 
Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System – a central inspiration to the present writer: 
«how do countries find their appropriate niche in this world economy, and on what basis 
do countries move from one to another of the zones?»
8
. This study would aim at 
elucidating the inner conditions according to which a country finds its appropriate niche 
 11 
 
in the capitalist world-economy: our case concerns the way a state and a regime become 
hegemonic, that is, go up at the heights of the hierarchy of world power.  
What I set out to do is to seek out a historical explanation that encompasses the 
most comprehensive historical ensemble of social, economic, political, institutional and 
ecological factors and vectors that, in their organic and seamless interlocking, bring out 
a causal-historical dynamic. In this regards hence, history turns into a tool, a means of 
analysis, not the objective thereof. Only a further step may turn such a causal dynamic, 
premised on the analysis of power relations, structures, networks and processes, into a 
more accurate historic explanation of the dynamic itself. In short: to join structural 
history with the history of the événementielle. 
Of course, historians are already turning their noses up for such a mode of 
approaching history calls for a different typology of sources, a different use of the 
sources, different objectives and different mode of operating compared with the 
customary historical method
9
. Macro-analysis of this sort, which aims at probing the 
longe durèe of history, imposes painful choices which hamstring historical method and 
procedures, and also demands great patience and even more broad-mindedness for those 
scholars who read it: archival collections begrudgingly have to be put aside – since a 
four century long gaze on Dutch history as a whole would require an immersion into the 
archives that outreaches the time given to the present writer to round off such a study; 
then, names, faces, protagonists, events, are not taken into primary account if not by 
using primary sources such as coeval treaties, essays and pamphlets to uphold the 
analysis and the explanation. The problem of sources and method will be treated in the 
second section 
Section 3 will in short take into account the basic literature on Dutch hegemony 
and state power. The fourth and last section puts forth a short portrayal of Dutch history 
to contextualize the historical analysis. The first section instead posits an overview on 
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the method to be employed in the following pages which will be carried on and 
expanded also across section 2. It comprises a preview of the contents of the study. 
However, the most important thing to bear in mind in such a reading is the 
following: the present investigation seeks new possibilities not final conclusions. It is an 
attempt to seek out different, lifelike way of analyzing and explaining history, which is 
a continual, shifting, uneven and seamless process of development and change. Hence, 
this approach refuses the scientific fantasy of final theoretical and historical closure in 
favor of a perspective which opens up questions on the actual interlocking complexity 
of historical-social developments, endeavors to build a different historical-social angle 
of analysis and new opportunities for different historical understandings. Hence, the 
hegemon’s perspective is not to be considered a model since a theoretical model is not a 
lifelike picture of history. It artificially dissects history. The present perspective is 
simply a conceptual track for investigating structural-historical relations
10
. 
Needless to say, the perspective to be argued is ridden with shortcomings and 
incongruences, both in history and in concept. For example, we will evade the role of 
nobility because anonymously integrated in what we shall call urban-rural syndicates 
(or in a different context, rulers) – the point will be the movement of historical-social 
power and its governance, not the specific role of one social class or another. We evade 
also, for example in chapter 4, the role of Dutch banks, incorporated into what we shall 
understand as governmental-business agencies – the role of Dutch banks, the 
Wisselbank (1609) for example, is well-known, as well as the resounding activities of 
the Bourse (1607). Therefore it has been a deliberate choice to disregard them
11
. By 
contrast, what is to be investigated in this respect will be the interconnections and 
linkages among, and the overlapping spatial relations in, finance, taxation and the 
industrial-commercial accumulation in and over Dutch space. For this reason we will 
evade also the world operations of accumulation of VOC and WIC. At the center of the 
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investigation will be the internal structure of power of the Dutch hegemon with its inner 
resonance. Dutch multinational corporations were integral to the Dutch systemic cycle 
of accumulation as «leading agencies [which] promoted, organized, and regulated the 
expansion or the restructuring of the capitalist world-economy» as a whole
12
. Their role 
was with no doubt important also to the Dutch space of accumulation
13
, but the real 
motor force of it was of different kind, historical magnitude and sociospatial 
penetration. 
In all this, the present writer does not know if some or none of the referred-to 
cherished hopes – the opening up of different questions, opportunities for different 
historical understandings, different historical-social views – will be fulfilled. But this is 
intrinsic to the intellectual posture that seeks out new possibilities not final conclusion. 
 
1. Tracking down Dutch power across history  
 
Charles Tilly argues that an excellent strategy to probe history is to track down the 
master processes that mold the structure(s) of an era
14
. Herein, the master process of our 
concern is the historical formation of Dutch space – historical structure and networks of 
power and accumulation – that goes from the XIV to the XVII century. From this 
historical path of development, a strict dependency to the historical unfolding of Dutch 
life will emerge. The historical formation of Dutch space led to the development of 
conditions that enabled the construction of the Dutch hegemon – the Dutch regime of 
accumulation. The Dutch regime of accumulation is to be explored in chapter 4, 
whereas the definition of regime of accumulation will be posited in Chapter 2. Both 
Dutch space and regime will be probed by tracking down patterned relations of power, 
and their horizontal and vertical interlocking in space.  
 14 
 
Power is to be understood in Parson’s vein: it is «generalized means» to attain 
goals
15
, which in Dutch space, as we shall argue, were capital, wealth and productivity. 
In chapter 3 we shall see that Dutch power was premised on, and deployed according to, 
the capitalist logic:  
 
this logic dictated that capital should be invested in trade and production only as long as returns in 
these activities were not only positive, but higher than whatever rate justified the exposure of capital to 
the risks and troubles inseparable from its employment in trade and production and, secondly, 
compensated its owners for the returns that capital could have earned in financial deals
16
 
 
The capitalist logic of power, or logic of capital accumulation, entails a wider 
organization and movement of value in space which unfolds within market – but which 
is not only contained into the markets, although implicated – and which is to be 
centered upon processes of commodification and appropriation of land, labor, and 
nature. The commodity-centered pattern of value re/production or value’s logic 
«encodes labor productivity as the decisive metric of wealth and mobilizes Nature to 
advance labor productivity». In so doing, capitalism, and herein “Dutch capitalism”, 
becomes value-in-motion by which «Power [..] is at the center of every moment of 
value» as well as value is at the center of every moment of power (chapter 3)
17
. The 
formation of Dutch space and structure of accumulation during the late middle ages, it is 
suggested, responded to the capitalist logic of power premised on a commodity-centered 
pattern of value re/production. We try to explain how and why in chapter 3. Hence, the 
perspective to be argued rebuffs the formal scheme, in terms of historical evidences and 
narratives, according to which pre-capitalist formations are defined by production for 
use (of use-value) in contrast to capitalism, in which production is fully-fledged 
commodity production within market – chapter 1. 
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The general approach stems from Michael Mann’s The Source of Power and the 
underlying concept of society, from which deriving our method. According to Mann, 
«Societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks 
of power».  
 
A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the 
interrelations [between]ideological, economic, military, [financial-fiscal], and political […] relationships. 
These are (1) overlapping networks of social interaction, […]. This follows from my first statement. (2) 
They are also organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals. Their primacy comes not from 
the strength of human desires for ideological, economic, military, or political satisfaction but from the 
particular organizational means each possesses to attain human goals, whatever these may be
 18
. 
 
The next chapters will probe historically and extensively the sociospatial and 
organizational complex of power relations deployed over and within Dutch space across 
four centuries. As Mann, the kernel is concerned with organization, control, logistics – 
«the capacity to organize and control people, materials, and territories, and the 
development of this capacity throughout history». As it to be argued, the Dutch source 
of power emanated from an early development and entrenchment of the logic of capital 
accumulation which enabled a specific organization of socio-ecological control (chapter 
3). In the course of the four centuries here under exam, it offered capacity to organize 
Dutch space, enabling the form of this organization to dictate the form of society at 
large – and thus to permeate the unfolding of the ensuing Dutch history. The present 
analysis rests on understanding sociospatial capacity for organization and explaining its 
development
19
. 
Whereas the Dutch space of accumulation until the XVI century was characterized 
by the historical scattering of the capitalist logic on the societal ground, and its 
historical entrenchment within institutions, public and private sphere, markets, and 
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human beings on the societal ground, the structuring of the Dutch state during the XVI 
century spelt the historical concentration and expansion of power, wealth and 
accumulation previously formed and rooted within society. In Parson’s vein, this 
general movement was distinguished by features that were both collective – cooperation 
allows for the expansion of the capitalist power vis-à-vis others and over nature – and 
distributive – a zero-sum game where a fixed amount of power can be distributed 
among participants. Their uneven and shifting combination allowed for the societal 
expansion of the socio-ecological alteration of capitalist sort that typified Dutch history 
since the late middle ages (chapter 3) – although, by way of the construction of the 
Dutch state, the collective moment of Dutch power turned out to be the prevalent 
feature of the Dutch regime of accumulation (chapter 4). 
 
Power – Parsons says – is a generalized facility or resource in the society. It has to be divided or 
allocated, but it also has to be produced and it has collective as well as distributive functions. It is the 
capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general "public" 
commitment has been made, or may be made. It is mobilization, above all, of the action of persons and 
groups […].The capitalist version is, with all the qualifications which such an assertion must occasion, 
primarily production-oriented [or, according to the present perspective, commodity-centered]
20
. 
 
The Dutch regime deployed its historical power as no jurisdictions in early-
modern time did through the most coherent, efficient and effective redeployment and 
organization of what Michael Mann calls extensive and intensive power. The hegemon 
is the most powerful regime in the international system. The interstate system which 
Westphalia sorted out in the XVII century crowned the Dutch Republic as leading 
national organization, despite its human and material limits compared with other 
regimes. As we shall argue, this was the outcome of what is to be understood as 
“internal coherence” of Dutch regime’s structure and operations (chapter 2-4). The 
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Dutch regime conflated the ability to organize the largest numbers of people over the 
territory in order to engage in stable cooperation (extensive power) with the ability to 
organize tightly and command the highest level of mobilization or commitment from 
the participants (intensive power). The Dutch Republic was thus an organization of 
human space that enabled human beings to extensively and intensively cooperate in 
order to fulfill their goals – the primary goals of the Dutch were independence and 
capital accumulation, both inextricably interlocked in their achievement (chapter 4)
21
.  
However, the concrete method of tracing historical relations of power, which 
hence are commodity-centered value relations, is premised on a more general 
understanding of human reality which the world-systems analysis – along with its 
obverse, the world-ecology perspective – brings with it as method to probe human 
reality itself, and which the present writer embraces.  
WSA is neither a theory nor a paradigm but «call for a debate about the 
paradigm», according to Immanuel Wallerstein
22
. It argues that the foremost analytical 
level to understand human reality is “complexity”. It rebuffs hence the consolidated 
nineteenth-century Newtonian mode of scientific production – what the astronomer 
Arthur Eddington termed «microscopic dissection of objects»
23
. To grasp complexity 
therefore, WSA tears down any disciplinary barrier and rebuffs the concept of discipline 
as a relatively self-contained domain as well as the related concept of interdisciplinarity 
which, pivoting on the idea of discipline, tends to focus more on the reproduction of 
knowledge within a comfortable and cozy ensemble of categories and concepts than on 
its production. Thereby it is denied the customary nineteenth-century analytic 
segmentation and separation of human domain – the so-called «dogmatic trinity», 
state/market/economy – for a more organic, complex and lifelike inquiry into human 
reality. «The whole is a seamless skein»: 
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The three presumed arenas of collective human action – the economic, and the social or socio-
cultural – are not autonomous arenas of social action. The do not have separate “logics”. More 
importantly, the intermeshing of constraints, options, decisions, norms, and “rationalities” is such that no 
useful research model can isolate “factors” according to the categories of economic, political and social, 
and treat only one kind of variable, implicitly holding the others constant. We are arguing that there is a 
single “set of rules” or a single “set of constraints” within which these various structures operate24  
 
Indeed, the present writer believes that to have a better grasp on human realm we 
cannot separate the economic from the social or from the political and the ecological. 
We cannot rely only on figures and series to produce quantitative analysis. Their 
conceptual premises are exactly the «artificial dissection of objects». Hence, we have to 
pay attention also to “quality”, that is, the historical panoply of factors and vectors 
which are accountable for a historical-human phenomenon – in our case, historical 
power
25
. 
Borrowing from the great British historian Jonathan Israel,  
 
I do not believe in 'economic history' or in 'political history'. What I try to do is write general 
history, […] shaped by a complex mixture of economic and political factors as well as some social and 
cultural factors which are not properly either 'economic' or 'political'. Human thought and activity is a 
single continuum in which economics, politics, culture, religion, and social life are always involved and 
always inextricably interacting. The question which had primacy, the economic or the political, […] is, to 
my mind, entirely meaningless since what matters is precisely the complex interaction between the 
spheres. […] Moreover, most of these so-called 'political' factors, when analysed, are seen to be an 
inextricable mix of the political and economic which are ultimately rooted in economic reality
26
 
 
These assumptions are central to the present writer and to his intellectual posture.  
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2. “The Revenge of the Repressed”27 
 
«What is the use of social theory to historians, and what is the use of history to 
social theorists» Peter Burke asks in the introduction of History and Social Theory. 
Burke’s answer is: we are unlikely to understand either the past or the present without a 
combination of theory and history
28
. 
 Already in the 1970s, Anthony Giddens answered the question in his highly 
influential Central Problems in Social Theory: «What history is, or should be, cannot be 
analyzed in separation from what the social sciences are or should be […]. There simply 
are no logical or even methodological distinctions between the social sciences and 
history»
29
. 
What was at the origin of the nineteenth-century general debate on method that 
counterposed, in general, theorists and empiricists and which the Germans termed 
Methodenstreit
30
? This harsh dispute between students and scholars embodied the 
intellectual-structural divide formed during the XIX century between what has been 
called «the Two Cultures»
31
. The growing scientific hierarchical divergence between 
nomothetic and idiographic disciplines and the consolidation of the Newtonian mode of 
knowledge production in XIX century stimulated what Burke calls «the return of the 
repressed»
32
. As far as the writer is concerned here, the issue is understood as the 
general, long-standing – but non totalizing33 – scientific compression of history, theory 
and sociology, which has been constantly reproduced during the XX century through 
the structural fracture between synchrony and diachrony in the historical-social 
sciences. 
 
On the basis of this division sociologists have been content to leave the succession of events in 
time to the historians, some of whom as their part of the bargain have been prepared to relinquish the 
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structural properties of social systems to the sociologists. But this kind of separation has no rational 
justification with the recovery of temporality as integral to social theory [and social theory as integral to 
history]; history and sociology become methodologically indistinguishable
34
 
 
Philip Abrams concurs with Giddens. Indeed, Abrams says, we need 
 
a more radical recasting of problems, a deeper and subtler modification of styles of analysis, a 
more open and thorough-going recognition of the extent to which in some fundamental respects the two 
disciplines [history and sociology] are trying to do the same thing and are employing the same logic of 
explanation to do so. The argument rests on the claim that at the heart of both disciplines is a common 
project: a sustained diverse attempt to deal with what I […] call the problematic of structuring [which not 
to keep] either the anti-theoretical fetishism of history-as-evidence […] or the a-historical fetishism of 
theory-as-knowledge […]35 . 
 
Structuring is process of spatio-temporal construction which owns and displays a 
specific form of causation which is manifold, sequential and cumulative, Abrams says. 
Historians, sociologists and historical-social theorists alike, according to Abrams, are all 
engaged in demonstrating the meaningful patterning of historical-social reality
36
. To do 
so they need to put at the center the «continuous confrontation and interweaving of 
narrative and theoretical matter», Abrams contends. «What is involved [especially in in 
works of long-range history and historical theory] is a breaking of the bounds of 
conventional distinctions between types of explanation» and their analytical movement 
towards processes and structural changes across history
37
. What we will attempt to do 
herein is to show, through the continuous confrontation and interweaving of historical 
and theoretical matter, the structuring of Dutch space in its longue durèe. It displayed a 
form of historical causation which was manifold, sequential and cumulative. 
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Burke, Giddens and Abrams sum up the essence of the framework that props up 
history and development of Historical Sociology, and especially Grand Historical 
Sociology – spatially comparative and/or embracing the longue durèe alike38. However, 
this essence shows limits and contradictions in relation with the established historical 
(and sociological) method and mode of analysis
39
. Many students inveighed against it.  
The most violent attack was launched in 1991 in The British Journal of Sociology, 
an article by John Goldthorpe
40
. The scholar thinks that in «grand historical sociology 
the links, that are claimed, or supposed, between evidence and argument tend to be both 
tenuous and arbitrary to a quite unacceptable degree». According to Goldthorpe, this 
weakness stems precisely from the fact that historical sociologists based their analysis 
on secondary rather than primary sources. Hence, the sources are not relics but 
historians’ interpretations of relics:  
 
In effect, then, what grand historical sociologists seem to me to be generally doing is not 
developing an argument on the basis of evidence – in the manner of 'primary' historians or again of 
sociologists working on their 'own' research data – but rather, engaging in interpretation that is of, at least, 
a second-order kind: […]. And in consequence, I would maintain, the connection between the claims they 
make about the past and relics that could conceivably serve as warrant for these claims is often […] quite 
impossibly loose 
 
Such a looseness involves, according to Goldthorpe, degrees of «arbitrariness» 
and «tendentiousness» which the historical-sociological method pushes forward by 
putting aside relics, primary sources, to develop encompassing theoretical frameworks. 
In view of this, Goldthorpe strongly endorses the necessity to retrieve and maintain a 
clear separation between the two disciplines since «the question must remain of how far 
[GHS] does possess a real basis in the relics of the past –  or merely an illusory one in a 
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scattering of footnotes». Hence the scholar asserts, history and sociology are «different 
intellectual enterprise»
41
.  
This conclusive assertion hamstrings the entire structure of critiques and 
evidences Goldthorpe puts forth. In fact, he does not develop a systematic definition of 
structural and motivational differences intrinsic to the investigation which would move 
historians, theorists or sociologists alike towards separate and diverging intellectual 
directions – thereby gainsaying Giddens, Burke or Abrams. He merely beats around the 
bush assigning utter centrality to an apocryphal utilization, an abuse or non-use of relics 
and data, that is, of primary sources whatsoever, which brings out operative 
idiosyncrasies not structural-intellectual divergences.    
Giddens’ observation, according to which there simply are no logical or even 
methodological distinctions between the social sciences and history, is not premised on 
a necessary overlapping of research tools – sources, typology, data and their uses, etc. – 
but, as in Abrams, on a convergence of analytical and scientific objectives which 
marshals methodologically the investigation towards a disciplinary synthesis. In this 
respect, such a perspective slips over that of what the late Fernand Braudel used to call 
“total history” – Burke aptly describes it: total history is «not an account of the past 
including every detail, but one which emphasizes the connections between different 
fields of human endeavor»
42
. Fernand Braudel is the greatest champion of grand 
historical sociology which is total history in its essence. Total history, Braudel says, «is 
not a pretension to write a complete history of the world. It is not such a puerile, funny 
and lunatic pretense. It is simply yearning to face a problem by systematically 
overstepping limits»
43
. 
In defense of Grand Historical Sociology, a brief but noteworthy contribution was 
published in 1994 in The British Journal of Sociology by Nicos Mouzelis
44
. There is no 
doubt, Mouzelis says, that in grand schemes of history – such as in world-historical 
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comparative investigations and in the long-run historical analyses, or both – the scale 
and the scope in time and/or in space of the perspective constraints, frustrates or 
impedes the use of primary data, and «this is obviously a disadvantage».. 
 
But given that we live in an imperfect world and that all methodologies and approaches to history 
entail advantages and disadvantages, it is absurd to see this disadvantage as a reason for rejecting […] 
macro-historical comparisons [or investigations]. And it is equally absurd not to realize that there are a 
variety of ways of minimizing the risks of not using primary sources
45
. 
 
We can substantiate this claim by calling on two cases of distinguished 
scholarship: Charles Tilly and Perry Anderson. These are leading scholars in sociology, 
historical sociology, history and political science at world level. Both are integral to 
historical, sociological and political debate alike
46
. If we take into consideration their 
most important works
47
, we note scanty presence, if complete absence, of primary 
sources – Anderson and Tilly were professor of both history and sociology during their 
carriers. Both scholars disregarded the classic historical (sociological) methodology to 
understand human reality in favor of an encompassing, wide-ranging, long-run 
observation of history and world backed by the widest study of literature.  
Charles Tilly developed a gripping analytic vision to investigate human 
development across history
48
. Tilly says: 
 
We should build concrete and historical analyses of the big structures and large processes that 
shape our era. The analyses should be concrete in having real time, place, and people as their referents 
and in testing the coherence of the postulated structures and processes against the experiences of real 
times, places, and people. They should be historical in limiting their scope to an era bounded by playing 
out of certain well-defined processes, and in recognizing from the outset that time matters – that when 
things happen within a sequence affects how they happen, that every structure or process constitutes a 
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series of choice points. Outcomes at given point in time constrain possible outcomes at later points in 
time
49
  
 
A great part of the present study is premised on this order of ideas – although the 
present writer is perfectly aware of the difficulties and contradictions such an analytic 
movement may bring with it. The present long-run observation of Dutch history 
endeavors to understand the big structures and the large processes that shape the Dutch 
era under examination by testing the coherence of the postulated structures and 
processes. They will be historical in limiting their scope to XIV-XVII centuries of 
Dutch History, bounded by playing out of certain well-defined processes – as instance, 
the capitalist transformation of human behavior and landscape – and in recognizing 
from the outset that time matters – that when things happen within a sequence affects 
how they happen. Outcomes at given point in time constrain possible outcomes at later 
points in time – Dutch late-medieval path dependency. 
Tilly’s scientific imagination offers a precise methodology which seizes his 
historical sociology, and in general, represents the major example of Grand historical-
sociological method. Tilly calls it «encompassing comparisons» – the historian jests on 
it: «Lovers of risk should try encompassing comparisons»
50
. Encompassing 
comparisons can produce alternative explanations that other analytic strategies seem not 
to be able to grasp
51
, since its analytic fluidity enables to pinpoint effects and properties 
of change of structures, processes and system in their mutual interplay. The larger the 
level of analysis, the greater the power and utility of such a strategy of inquiry
52
. 
Tilly envisages four levels of investigation:  
 
At world-historical level, we are attempting to fix the special properties of an era and to place it in 
the ebb and flow of human history. Schemes of human evolution, of the rise and fall of empires, and of 
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successive modes of production, operate at world-historical level. At world-systemic level we are trying 
to discern the essential connections and variations within the largest sets of strongly interdependent social 
structures. […]. At the macro-historical level, we seek to account for particular big structures and large 
processes and to chart their alternate forms. At the micro-historical level, we trace the encounters of 
individuals and groups with those structures and processes, with hope of explaining how people actually 
experienced them
53
  
 
Tilly does not believe at any rate that the only historical patterns worthy of being 
investigated are the biggest ones. He believes in the thorough relevance of the past for 
the understanding of the present time and that in turn the present must be investigated 
through a long-run historical perspective: «while the argument is eminently historical, it 
brings us right up to the present»
54
. By way of these four levels, according to Tilly, we 
can trace the boundaries of the historical-social inquiry: variations among networks, 
operations and operability of specific networks, variations between structures and 
processes within specific networks and the ensemble of experiences people go through 
within specific networks with common features. We will tap into the macro-historical 
level to seek to understand and explain the big structures and large (long) processes of 
Dutch history through variations or continuity among networks, through the operations 
and operability of specific networks, and through variations or continuity between 
structures and processes within specific networks. 
Tilly ensconces himself in the macro-historical level: «they are the attainable “big 
structures, large processes, and huge comparisons” I actually have in mind. Their 
systematic study within specific world systems but not necessarily throughout an entire 
world system constitutes the historically grounded treatment of structures and processes 
I advocate as our surest path to knowledge»
55
. 
Perry Anderson is one of the most groundbreaking historians of the XX century. 
In a nutshell: he evened out the customary conceptual boundaries and methodological 
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edges that separate history from sociology and theory. In his double volume on the 
historical formation of modern Europe, Passages from antiquity to feudalism and 
Lineages of the absolutist state
56
, he proceeds to nail down an «intermediate conceptual 
plane» of investigation which constitutes the bridge between factual evidences and 
explicit theoretical infrastructure, weaved within the historical dissertation itself by 
means of spatio-temporal comparisons. In so doing, Anderson gains a major hold on the 
perennial tension between «necessity and contingency» that inherently characterizes the 
study of human reality in space and time: 
 
The premise of this work is that there is no plumb-line between necessity and contingency in 
historical explanation, dividing separate types of enquiry – 'long-run' versus 'short-run', or 'abstract' versus 
'concrete' – from each other. There is merely that which is known –  established by historical research –  
and that which is not known: the latter may be either the mechanisms of single events or the laws of 
motion of whole structures. Both are equally amenable, in principle, to adequate knowledge of their 
causality. (In practice, the surviving historical evidence can often be so insufficient or contradictory that 
definite judgements are not feasible: but this is another question – of documentation, not intelligibility.) 
One of the main purposes of the study undertaken here is thus to try to hold together in tension two orders 
of reflection which have often been unwarrantably divorced in Marxist writing, weakening its capacity for 
rational and controllable theory in the domain of history
57
. 
 
On these bases thus, we will try to make Dutch historical contingency our 
analytical necessity. To broaden our view of time in space helps in limiting the impact 
of such an ambiguity on the research: «In itself, the effort to describe or understand very 
broad historical structures or epochs needs no undue apology or justification: without it, 
specific and local research fall short of their own potential significance»
58
. Anderson 
outlines and elaborates on the jigsaw and complex pattern of history as a path unfolded 
in the long run to point out and infer the uniqueness or distinctiveness of historical 
 27 
 
developments. We will operate in the same fashion to understand the uniqueness of both 
origin and development of Dutch capitalism and power, as well as the construction of 
the Dutch hegemon
59
.  
For the present study, no another point can be pulled by Anderson’s work, 
although many other challenges the British historian lends to the historical method and 
vision
60
. Both Tilly and Anderson become the clearest example of influent scholarship 
which stretches the limits of knowledge and transcends the borders of method and 
tradition. Their scholarship and their immense scientific production, whose impact on 
the world academic territories is extraordinary, demonstrate how fallacious 
Goldthorpe’s overly severe reservations on method and results can be. History, 
sociology and any other discipline pertaining to the historical-social sciences need 
«sociological imagination» as propellant towards different landscape of knowledge and 
modes to produce it. Charles Wright Mills depicted such a scientific imagination: it 
 
in considerable part consists of the capacity to shift from one perspective to another, and in the 
process to build up an adequate view of a total society and of its components. It is this imagination, of 
course, that sets off the social scientist from the mere technician. […]. Yet there is an unexpected quality 
about it, perhaps because its essence is the combination of ideas that no one expected were combinable, 
[making a] sense of the world, which the technician as such usually lacks. Perhaps he is too well trained, 
too precisely trained. Since one can be trained only in what is already known, training sometimes 
incapacitates one from learning new ways; it makes one rebel against what is bound to be at first loose 
and even sloppy
61
. 
  
In keeping with this, the grand historical sociology calls for a «macro-sociological 
imagination», as Theda Skocpol terms it
62
, in order to unfold its analytical power in 
long-run investigations, and the use of secondary sources as possible research tools: «If 
a topic is too big for purely primary research – and if excellent studies by specialists are 
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already available in some profusion – secondary sources are appropriate as the basic 
source of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analysts 
reworking the results of previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew»
63
.  
At any rate, if secondary evidences seem shaky, Mouzelis then aptly points out, 
historical-social scientists have not to avert them but step into their shakiness to 
envisage and raise new questions which in turn lead to a more careful examination of 
both secondary and primary sources – «And it is precisely through such a dialectic 
process, in a context of relatively open communications between scholars (some 
working more with primary and others with secondary sources), that our knowledge 
about long-term historical transformations can advance»
64
.  
As Anderson points out also, the surviving historical evidences can often be so 
insufficient or contradictory that definite judgements are not feasible. Thereby, the 
intelligibility of the relics comes to be questioned, making documentations ambiguous 
and open to a wide range of interpretations – even figures and numbers can be construed 
in contradictory, if opposite, ways according to intellectual orientation, leanings and 
interests of those who read them. Goldthorpe «does not seem to realize» Mouzelis says, 
«that both 'relics' and the empirical data that a [scholar] generates are themselves 
interpretations of interpretations. They are second-order interpretations referring to 
those of the first order that individuals generate when they act and interact»
65
. 
Mouzelis gets to the point by questioning Goldthorpe’s scientific approach, and above 
all else, intellectual posture, and the tremendous constraints in and of knowledge which 
ensue from it:   
 
Is Goldthorpe suggesting that one should give up not only the type of work [the grand historical 
sociologists are] doing, but also the attempts by historians to provide an account of how whole societies 
or groups of societies are changing in the longue durèe? And if we do this, what shall we put in their 
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place? Should we simply turn our backs on the type of problems that both grand historical sociology and 
'synthesizing/grand' history generate? Should we indulge into the type of methodological perfectionism 
that fetishizes 'relics' and stresses their importance to such an extent that one is unable to examine the type 
of problems that macro-historical comparisons generate? Should we also ignore the obvious fact that 
macro-historical interpretations, however 'tenuous and arbitrary', do generate new hypotheses which often 
lead to new interpretations of relics or, even to the discovery of new relics?
66
 
 
The present study gives negative answers to the last three questions above 
mentioned. Hence, we will try to envisage different hypotheses, both in method and in 
visions, and different interpretations of both history and method. By using Abrams’ 
words, this attempt «involves us in superimposing structure on history with a view to 
recovering the way history superimposes structure on us. It crystallises as a negotiation 
of concept and evidence in the concrete study of structuring»
67
.  
 
3. Dutch hegemony and world power 
 
The world system we live in came into existence during the long sixteenth 
century. It is a world-system, a capitalist world-economy which is a capitalist world-
ecology
68
. The Dutch Republic came to dominate the capitalist world-system in the 
seventeenth century and slowly but steadily declined during the XVIII. The story of 
such a rise and decline has been recounted, explored and analyzed several times and in 
several fashions
69
. We will evade such historical narratives across this study. By 
contrast, we will pull the general WSA historical-theoretical framework in which this 
rise occurred
70
. That is, the reader must bear in mind that our analysis and explanation 
of the rise of the Dutch is installed within such a cultural framework, general view of 
the world, and also mode of approaching human reality
71
. However, differently from 
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world-systems analysts, we will not discuss the rise of the United Provinces at the 
commanding position of the seventeenth-century world-economy and their world-
systemic operations, wars and interactions, but how the Dutch regime developed power 
to carry out that rise. 
 Here instead, it is important to touch upon in very brief the main explanations 
accounting for the rise of the Dutch at the commanding heights of the world-economy 
to introduce questions in order to contrast the historical perspectives already argued and 
the perspective to be argued herein. In general, the rise of an international context which 
links world capitalism with war and state formation was at any rate central to any 
scholar engaged in understanding Dutch power – and in general the modern world. 
There is unanimous consensus on the fact that the Dutch was the most efficient 
economy in the seventeenth century and that this, above all else, bestowed the greatest 
capability to wage war on the Dutch. Both, along with limits to competitors and their 
mutual rivalry, allowed for rise. What changes in this explanations is the timing of such 
a rise (and decline) and/or the foremost factor triggering power.  
According to Wallerstein, the Dutch developed the greatest efficiency and 
coherence of their agro-industrial and financial complex in the brief period that goes 
from the end of the Thirty Years Wars, 1648, to 1670s. This was, according to the 
American scholar, the historical bout of Dutch Hegemony. After that point, England and 
France challenged, and surpassed in the first decades of the eighteenth century the 
Dutch
72
. Giovanni Arrighi instead put forth Dutch hegemony as part and parcel of a 
wider systemic cycle of accumulation of about 220 years ca. in which the Dutch led and 
drove the capitalist world-economy forward. It went from 1560 to 1780. Within the 
Dutch systemic cycle, their bout of hegemony unfolded from the end of the XVI century 
to c. 1740. In this long period of leadership in the world-economy, the Dutch were the 
leading agents with the leading agencies (i.e.: VOC) running the systemic processes of 
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capital accumulation. The foremost trigger of Dutch hegemony was an ongoing 
dominance on the systemic networks of commercial accumulation – systemic 
transactions, carrying trade, banking. Especially the VOC, according to Arrighi, was the 
agency which enabled the Dutch to maintain their hegemony for long time. Only when 
systemic conditions changes, pressures escalated, and the power of the VOC, and as a 
consequence the strategy and priority of Dutch capital set about changing, the power of 
the Dutch Republic began to wane
73
. Some of the most eminent historians such as 
Ruggiero Romano, Bernard Slicher van Bath, Violet Barbour, Fernand Braudel, and 
Jonathan Israel would shore up the general historical instantiations of both
74
. 
Notably Arrighi’s historical periodization draws heavily on Jonathan Israel who 
posited his own framework of rise and fall of Dutch power in Dutch Primacy in World 
Trade. In this important volume, Israel challenges, above all else, Braudel’s dictum of a 
«rise-and-fall rhythm linked to the ups and downs of the Baltic grain trade» and 
maintains that the Dutch hegemony in the world economy was historically patterned 
after seven phases that goes from phase one 1590-1609, the inception of Dutch world 
expansion, and ends with phase seven 1713-1740 which starts off the relative decline of 
the Dutch. According to Israel, the decline was due to the disintegration of the world 
trading organization put into place by the Dutch owing to the new mercantilist politics 
and the accrual of capital and war-making capability of England and France above 
anyone else. The prime mover of Dutch hegemony is thus commerce, buttressed and 
bolstered by the high-value trade in Europe and Asia
75
. 
Israel’s book brought about great commotion among Dutch historians whose 
harsh critiques involved specific aspects of Israel’s historical findings and narratives. In 
particular, Israel gainsays the classic thesis argued by Dutch historiography pertaining 
to the climax of Dutch economic hegemony and commercial expansion in the world 
trading system during 1621-1647
76
. Central, in Israel’s book, is the impact of political-
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military factors and events on economic trends and power. Economic historians like Jan 
Luiten van Zanden, or Leo Noordegraaf, rebuff this interpretation especially in relation 
to phase III 1621-1647. Van Zanden bashed both Israel’s phasing and the underlying 
interpretation of the convooien en licenten (customs)
77
. In phase III, the British historian 
put at the center the importance of the Spanish Embargo against the Dutch whose 
commercial-industrial accumulation thereby came to be greatly constrained and 
impaired. Van Zanden, backing his assertion with statistical data on economic trends, 
rejects strongly the embargo’s effectiveness and the consequent constraints to the Dutch 
trading system. Van Zanden uses the convooien en licenten for the period 1621/1647 to 
argue that customs rose by 52% for the Amsterdam admiralty college, 64% for that of 
Rotterdam, and 90% for that of Zeeland. On the other hand, van Zanden views 
industrial production growing during 1621-1647, reaching the peak during the 1630s. 
 
Van Zanden's contention does not stand up for one moment – Israel asserts. Every year from 1635 
to 1647 Leiden's laken output was below, usually far below, 16,000 pieces annually; from 1647 until 
1672, laken output exceeded 16,000 pieces in every single year. His contention is even more palpably 
wrong in the case of camlets. Camlet output at Leiden was of little significance before 1647, climbed to 
around 30,000 pieces yearly by the late 1650s and then climbed to its zenith, 50,000 pieces yearly which 
was consistently sustained in the years 1667-1671 12. If Van Zanden looks again at the total value of 
Leiden's textile production in the middle decades of the seventeenth century, he will see that it did not fall 
after 1654 but continued to rise. Far from the years before 1647 being part of the high-point of Leiden's 
performance as a textile producer, Leiden only began to assume her classic role at the end of the 1640s.
78
 
 
The debate on the economic power of the Dutch Republic stands out as pivotal to 
understand the history of Dutch hegemony in the world-economy, but, as it has always 
been, interpretations and figures diverge highly79. It is question of method, but also of 
views of world and knowledge80. However, it is peacefully accepted the economic 
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power of the Dutch in the XVII century. Timing and trends do not scratch Dutch world 
economic primacy.   
A different story concerns the Dutch state. Within the historical rise of European 
states and world capitalism, the Dutch Republic has been viewed as an anomaly. Recent 
scholarship re-evaluates such a judgment. The power of the Republic now is also linked 
to the typology of state, to the structures and institutions of the Dutch state, and to the 
state ability to manage warfare processes, wage war and profit from it. To say that 
economic primacy and wealth accretion stemmed from composition, quality and 
structure of the Dutch state. 
During the 1970s, impelled by Gabriel Almond, a political scientist and leading 
member of the influential Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science 
Research Council, Charles Tilly put into place a research group and program to 
understand the political development of national states in Europe
81
. What he called 
«process of state formation» was to became one of the most fruitful general strands of 
study in twentieth-century scholarship
 82
. It can be summed up through the well-known 
Tilly’s maxim «war makes states, and states make war»83. The seminal book that ensued 
from this early research explored and expanded in time and space the historical link 
between state, capital and war
84
. Coercion, Capital and European States gave rise to an 
even larger spate of studies, which also involved directly Dutch scholarship. The 
tremendous heuristic value of Tilly’s reflections was thereby tapped to understand and 
explain analytically also Dutch power
85
.   
Coercion and capital probes how different trajectories of state formation were 
influenced or driven by the ongoing state of European warfare and competition, and 
how state formation impacted on the mode of warfare and competition in turn. 
According to Tilly, the ongoing process of change and adaptation which ensued took 
the entire high middle ages to modern times and paralleled what he calls «the master 
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process of modernity», that is, the formation of an interstate system in Europe with a 
network of capitalist accumulation on a world scale centered in north-west Europe
86
. 
Both forced states to adapt and learn to profit from the struggle for power and stability 
in Europe
87
. «Through the interplay of competition, technological change, and the sheer 
scale of the largest belligerent states, war and the creation of coercive means became 
immensely more expensive over time. As that happened, fewer and fewer rulers could 
create military means from their own routine resources». This made for capital and 
coercion concentration in specific loci of accumulating power within some state 
jurisdictions, that is capital and coercion became, more than ever, spatially uneven. 
What Tilly calls patrimonial states, that is, state structures which enabled rulers to 
extract and appropriate value to wage war in the form of tribute and rent from society, 
did not withstand the impact of the increasingly violent warfare and its larger scale. 
Around 1400, all-out violence started off the process of structural change and accretion 
whence eventually surfaced the early-modern «brokerage» state organization, 1400-
1700 – after 1700 the constant process of adaptation to historical movement and change 
brought about another major re-structuring, what Tilly calls the «nationalization» of 
society, here however not pertinent
88
.  
At each stage «more than one combination of capital and coercion appeared» and 
this led in fact to different developments and combinations of developments. Factors 
such as markets, cities and intercity competition, industrial, financial and commercial 
powers, bureaucracies, socio-cultural institutions, local framework of potency and early 
centralizing state structures and interests were always present but unevenly reshuffled 
and recasted according to historical conditions in space
89
. The outcome was power 
unevenness, uneven concentration of power and qualitatively differentiated 
concentration of power. Tilly singles out three general modes of «reshaping of relations 
 35 
 
between ruler and ruled [which] produced new, contrasting forms of government, each 
more or less adapted to its social setting»: 
 
- In the coercion-intensive mode, rulers squeezed the means of war from their 
own populations and others they conquered, building massive structures of extraction in 
the process. Brandenburg and Russia were the case. 
- In the capital-intensive mode, rulers relied on compacts with capitalists whose 
interests they served with care - to rent or purchase military force, and thereby warred 
without building vast permanent state structures. The Dutch Republic, according to 
Tilly, slips over such a mode.  
- In the intermediate capitalized coercion mode, rulers did some of each, but 
spent more of their effort than did their capital-intensive neighbors on incorporating 
capitalists and sources of capital directly into the structures of their states. Holders of 
capital and coercion interacted on terms of relative equality. According to Tilly, France 
and England
90
.  
 
The formation of national states, premised on a differentiated combination of 
capital and coercion which adapted to their social setting, allowed for the rise of an 
interstate system of relations in early-modern Europe (1400-1700) working on a shifting 
balance of power between states that were qualitatively different but similar in the 
capacity to move war and to vie for dominance. On these bases, European inter-state 
military and economic war became the universal plane over which the forces of 
historical change raged. The «Military revolution» of the sixteenth-seventeenth century 
was an outcome of the historical contingencies and necessity that this two-pronged but 
single process of historical formation in Europe – states and system – brought with it. 
Military science, scientific management and organization of troops and drills, gun-
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powder, the utilization of trace italienne for siege constituted the nub of the army 
reforms of the XVI and XVII century
91
.  
At the same time, the state was to be restructured to manage the new wars and 
armies. Larger-scale conflicts demanded ever-larger capital accumulation: the 
organization of military power thereby was to incorporate processes of 
commercialization and monetization of warfare operations and the expansion of the 
market logic to them. States needed money and needed a more efficient management 
thereof. Philip II became bitterly aware of this fact in the course of the war against the 
Republic. What has been called «fiscal-military state» was substantiated by an intra-
spate of state reorganization in the course of the second historical phase of state 
formation singled out by Tilly which entailed the creation of new fiscal institutions and 
strategy to extract increasing quantity of value and resources. The new level of 
extraction all-out war required implicated thus a reorganization of the relations between 
state, public agents and private actors, and a different entanglement between state 
bureaucracy, markets, financiers and the commercial-industrial combines. This 
movement of restructuring of relations in time gave primacy to the cash nexus and the 
monetary factor within both state structures and institutional frameworks
92
. In this way, 
the state became also a «contractor»: «the pressing need for military supplies […] 
spurred, shaped, and constrained an emergent military-entrepreneur market and how 
state and contractors influenced each other’s development and ipso facto the nation as a 
whole»
93
. Networks of contacts and market/monetary relations began to expand as a 
consequence within the state. Rulers began to check these networks more strictly in 
order to tap into the economic opportunity their territories offered, and to redeploy more 
efficiently value and resources throughout the state organization of army and society
94
. 
This process occurred for the most important European states during the last part of the 
XVII and especially in the XVIII century – England, Spain, Germany and France. The 
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entire twentieth-century scholarship until the last decades viewed these countries model 
of modern state, concerning both the historical path of formation and the historical 
composition of structures, institutions and networks. However, they were not 
trailblazers in any of these revolutions. 
In fact, the Dutch came at the forefront at the end of the XVI century in both 
organization of warfare and capital through their particular articulation of capital and 
coercion within a unique state, which was an early and unique fusion of the referred-to 
features. In these respects, Dutch and non-Dutch scholarship now posits Dutch 
hegemony as a combined outcome of state structure and state institutions, state 
organization and state commercialization of warfare, state protection of trade and state 
finance and fiscality. Recent researches single out the state as an early determinant of 
Dutch power across the XVII-XVIII century
95
. Correct, but to the present perspective, 
partial.   
Few pieces of the most recent scholarship tends to credit what the present study 
will attempt to argue
96
: seventeenth-century Dutch power originated from a historical 
structure of patterned relations and power dating back to the late middle ages. Such a 
structure of accumulation then expanded in the XVI century by means of the 
construction of a capital-intensive state which as such emanated from and slipped over 
Dutch “traditional” society and economy through which a marketized organization of 
military power and a capital-oriented welfare organization was put into operation. It is 
believed that a long-run perspective allows to appreciate the Dutch unique fusion and 
historical spatial articulation. Regardless, this begs a question. 
If the Dutch state, unique in its historical composition and operative structures and 
institutions, is stepping into the limelight as main factor of Dutch power, we should 
dismantle the twentieth-century articles of faith which views the experiences of France 
and England as main paths of modern development. The roots of this stance stems from 
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the 1950-1960s developmental studies; the teleological reading of Tilly’s works then 
greatly expanded their academic imprinting through spates of publications. In fact, 
Tilly’s research group did not find a general model of modern development or general 
sequences of political development patterned after western Europe. This was a 
teleological translation of Tilly’s research in the 1970s inherent in the original 
Almond’s quest to seek out strong historical evidences to bolster the post-war studies 
which posed at the center the historical experiences of France, England or Germany, 
and thus western history. Teleology aimed at propelling Western influence throughout 
the academic world and hence in world politics. Tilly’s early book on state formation in 
the 1970s –  as well as the following one – in fact gainsaid and disappointed these ideas 
and hopes. Indeed it opened up manifold questions on the same trajectory and stages of 
development it was supposed to endorse
97
. It does not find solutions. Hence Coercion 
and Capital tells us that there was no single solution to the conundrum of historical 
power, European dominance and world hegemony, but that many paths were opened 
and overlapped, and many different ones could be, and sometimes were undertaken: 
Europe’s chaotic unbridled development was integral to western dominance. Power was 
the outcome of ability and prowess of human beings to adapt to history and harness its 
potential through practical, although flowed, solutions. This was true in the XVI century 
and in the XIV as it is in XXI. 
The most recent historiography on Dutch state and power purports to endorse 
Tilly’s real intentions. The work of the Dutch historian Pepijn Brandon does exactly 
this. As for the present perspective, in Brandon’s painstaking historical-archival 
research, the state assumes a different function and form. It becomes vector for 
expanding power, not factor of Dutch power. The real factor of Dutch power was social 
relations according to Brandon. They allowed the historical construction of the Dutch 
state as it was, and through the Dutch state the same historical-social relations could be 
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stretched furthest within Dutch space and over world space. Premised on a correct 
understanding of Tilly’s findings, Brandon posits a perspective that put at the center 
social relations through the study of what he calls Dutch «federal-brokerage» solution to 
the problems the Dutch were faced with in the factual construction of their state in the 
XVI century
98
. The federal-brokerage character of the Dutch state mirrored the 
historical process of bargaining which had characterized Dutch society in the long-run, 
that is, it slipped over both the deep-seated historical nature and organization of Dutch 
society. Such a social-historical coherence between state and society was a crucial part 
of Dutch hegemony – at the same time, Dutch decline in the eighteenth century was part 
of their relational detachment. In very short: society’s complexion – no matter the state! 
– endured, in its own essence, mostly unchanged throughout the XVIII century and this 
resilience begot decline. The world rotated and went forward; Dutch capital, flexible as 
always, went forward, flew away and adapted to the new conditions
99
. Dutch society 
lagged behind however, nailed down to its own historical ground, dragging with it, in 
the political-social conflict that emanated from such a stasis, the state and its power. In 
the end Capital, state and society disembedded themselves from each other and this 
slow process during the XVIII century exasperated Dutch power.  
Regardless, the Dutch state became a device to propel social relations, and the 
underlying logic which gave lively colors and formal body to those social relations, and 
thus to state power. For Brandon, similarly the present writer, the Dutch logic and 
power were those of capitalism that as a consequence determined and defined rulers’ 
behavior and contributed to shape the state structure. But as Brandon suggests in 
passing, Dutch social relations had their origin in a different point in time. Brandon’s 
perspective is embraced here, stretched back in time and then re-projected forward up to 
connect what the present writer argues to be the true origin of Dutch power in the XIV 
century to the formation of the Dutch state and its organization within society through 
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capital in XVI-XVII century. The Dutch world expansion and European hegemony of 
the XVII century, it is argued throughout this study, was the result of a very long-run 
process of interlocking embeddedness between capital, society and state which in the 
end spawned the hegemon, whence, indeed, hegemony and world power fed off. 
 
4. A brief history of the Low Countries, XIV-XVII centuries  
 
To contextualize and introduce the analysis that follows, it is pertinent and useful 
to give a brief overview of the history of the Low Countries in the XIV-XVII centuries 
– the span of time under examination – with a relative focus on Holland and Zeeland100.  
By the end of the thirteenth century, agricultural expansion had transformed the 
ecological landscape by putting under cultivation a quantity of land never seen before. 
There was less woodland than at any time before the nineteenth century. To check the 
movement of deforestation that the need for timber and firewood had brought, lords, 
abbeys and village communities abandoned marginal lands wherein yield was getting 
scanty. The landscape was also transforming owing to flooding, and to sand drifts: on 
the Flemish coast alone over 1000 hectares of agricultural land disappeared beneath the 
dunes. Territorial transformation and soil deterioration begot malnutrition, occasional 
famines and epidemics. In 1302 as a result, the peasants of Flanders revolted. From 
1323 to 1328 peasant struggles wiped out maritime Flanders. The Black Death reached 
Flanders in 1349 and the rest of the Low Countries in 1350 but mortality was far lesser 
than in the other countries. There were nine serious floods in the course of the century, 
three in the years 1373-1376 that hit strongly Holland and Zeeland. On 19 November 
1421, flood submerged 34 parishes in the vicinity of Dordrecht. Flooding, famine and 
disease, with war and economic downswing, characterized the fourteenth-century  Low 
Countries
101
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During the XIII-XIV centuries, towns were caught in the crossfire of craft guilds 
and patricians who struggled for power. In Flanders such a struggle was a success for 
the economic powers and the guilds compelled the patricians to share, or even 
surrender, civic power – in 1312 in Liège the patricians’ claim to power turned into a 
coup d’état in which the Butchers Hall was set on fire. The coup failed and the 
conspirators ran away in the tower of the church of St Martin which the artisans set fire 
to in turn. Patrician power “died out” in Liege. In Brabant artisans obtained similar 
results and gained power as early as 1303. In Utrecht the artisans seized power in 1304. 
This historical movement of artisan empowerment swept across the entire territory of 
the Low Countries with diverse moments and degrees of success. By virtue of the 
artisans’ ascent to power, city laws and civic militias were used then to propel the 
sphere of interests concerning capital holders, and in Flanders, notably to master 
craftsmen and their families. This gave rise to a polarization of economic-political 
power whose core was continuously riven by factional struggles – in Ghent in 1345, for 
instance, fighting broke out between weavers and fullers. Notably in Holland, trade 
expansion in the late 1300s gave rise to deep rivalries between towns, but once capital 
holders took a firm hold on government, civic militias battled to put down competition: 
the internal power struggle in Holland was checked by the institutionalization of the 
Hooks and Cods factions which for a century or more regulated and normalized the 
conflict between the towns and noble families of the county. 
The government became thus a business of the upper echelons of these groups 
whose governmental dynamics was phased by the alternation of patricians and craft 
guilds to power. Power polarization was accompanied by the formation of town 
bureaucracies and professional administrators which constituted a permanent layer of 
civil servants that gave continuity to the administration – differently from the referred-to 
rulers whose fate was decided by elections. One of the most famous was Jan van 
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Boendale, clerk to the aldermen of Antwerp who was writer and historian. Clerks 
supported the secretary who had important tasks such as drafting edicts, keeping records 
and managing the official correspondence; finally, the pensionary or syndic, who were a 
lawyer, had the assignment to advise the magistrates and represent the town.  
This economic-like governance had the result of expanding the economy of the 
Low Countries, especially Flanders – notably in Bruges and its fair102 – and Holland 
with Zeeland. Brewing and Fishing – hopped beer and salt herring – were the stronger 
suits of what became an internationally-oriented economy. The Dutch advanced in 
brewing in the early fourteenth century, when hopped beer replaced spiced ale. By 1340 
the Dutch were exporting beer and after 1396 they were the leading merchants and 
producers in the international market – such a dominance lasted until the seventeenth 
century, when brandy and gin began to displace beer. Already in the late thirteenth 
century, Dutch fishermen adopted and perfected a Swedish technique for salting 
herrings. They shipped their products across Europe by way of the development of 
special boat, the buis. This allowed for an unprecedented market expansion which 
brought the Dutch to the shores of north and south Europe.
103
.  
 All the while, the counts and dukes of the Low Countries tied up their networks 
of international power by means of an intertwining of marriages, crown purchases and 
inheritances which spelt continual aggrandizement. Since the 1290s, this was the case 
especially with the English royal family. Edward III in 1328 married Philippa of 
Hainaut, a daughter of William of Avesnes, count of Holland, Zeeland and Hainaut. By 
contrast Edward never allied with the count of Flanders, Louis of Nevers. This 
occurrence had important consequences concerning international commerce for both 
Flanders and Holland for it tipped the scale of English wool trade against the Flemish 
cloth industry in favor of the textile industry of Holland. In the same year William 
married off another daughter, Margaret, to Louis of Bavaria, Holy Roman Emperor, and 
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his own brother-in-law, Philip of Valois, unexpectedly inherited the kingdom of France. 
In 1345 William IV of Holland and II of Hainaut died, opening up the succession to 
Holland, Zeeland and Hainaut. In the end these territories were ruled by the House of 
Bavaria from the 1350s to the 1430s. 
This was a century of great importance for Holland and Zeeland, in which the 
intelligent rule of the Count paralleled and spurred on the growth of towns with their 
hinterland. The international policy of the Prince implied wars and prestige which was 
braced by a fiscal-financial strategy based on the support of a self-governing towns-
countryside network and of nobility, both underpinned by a formal recognition of the 
so-called Privileges
104
. These represented a true contract between rulers and subjects in 
which for the first time came to be implemented representative assemblies – the earliest 
of which however was the Council of XXII in Liège and the Council of Kortenberg in 
Brabant. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries representative organisms took the 
form of actual parliamentary institutions, the so-called States or Estates. In Brabant 
indeed, the Duke was compelled to cooperate with the great abbeys, the nobility and the 
four cities Leuven, Brussels, Antwerp and s-Hertogenbosch, especially in fiscal matters; 
in Holland both cities and nobility instead gained great influence and power; in Utrecht 
and Liège, as well as in Luxembourg after 1378, cities and nobility shared power with 
clergy whereas In Hainaut, Namur and Guelders the nobility won the day 
Since 1379, the aims of Urban VI in Rome and Clement VII in Avignon, the 
rebellion of Ghent and the English attack to Flanders in 1383 destabilized the power of 
the rulers. In 1384 Louis of Male died. His daughter Margaret succeeded, but power laid 
with her husband Philip of Burgundy. This House became in fact the most important 
force of rule in the history of the Low Countries since the Carolingians. In one form or 
another, the link between the Low Countries and the Burgundy was to last for 300 
years. The power of the House of Burgundy was greatly expanded by Philip whose 
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strategy combined military supremacy and generous clemency. This represented the 
actual first step that allowed for the Burgundian power extension, thereby enabling the 
consolidation of the House’s rule over most of the Low Countries. The historical 
reorganization that ensued from centuries of tug-of-war between rulers and subject 
literarily reshaped the balance of power, and the typology of such a balance, in Western 
Europe. In short: the rule of the dukes of Burgundy implied a movement of territorial 
agglutination and a process of power unification and absolutist expansion throughout 
the fifteenth – then carried on with the Hapsburg in the sixteenth century – whose apex 
by contrast ended to tear the Low Countries asunder with a historical-structural and 
relational fracture between historical rulers and historical subjects. 
After a web of marriages across decades, Philip’s elder son, John the Fearless 
(1404-1419) inherited Burgundy and Flanders; then Philip the Good (1419-1467) turned 
the kingdom into a European power. This turn paralleled the acquisition in 1433 of  
Holland, Zeeland and Hainaut – forerun by a dynastic struggle for the inheritance of the 
Low Countries branch of the House of Bavaria, rulers of Holland and Zeeland, whose 
last independent ruwaard was Jacqueline of Bavaria. This political move brought about 
financial-economic consequences of great relevance for the economic infrastructure of 
the Low Countries: in 1434 the first common currency was minted, the vierlander, 
which was to be of the same size, weight and value in Flanders, Brabant-Limburg, 
Holland-Zeeland and Hainaut.  
The financial restructuring started off in 1386 with Philip the Bold who began to 
consolidate the administration of Burgundy’s finance. This process kept going through 
the politics of dynastic expansion that aimed to unify the numerous counties and 
duchies into a loosely federalized state (1464). This was indeed the year of the very first 
meeting of what was to be called the Estates General: that committee gathered 
representatives of the Estates of Brabant, Flanders, Walloon Flanders, Artois, Hainaut, 
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Valenciennes, Holland, Zeeland, Namur, Mechelen and the Bourbonnais to Bruges for a 
joint consultation. Such meetings became increasingly frequent, and were held almost 
annually from 1477 to 1576. 
Charles the Bold (1467-1477), Philip’s son, inherited Burgundy, Flanders, Artois, 
Namur, Brabant, Limburg, Holland, Zeeland, Hainaut and Luxembourg at the father’s 
death. Charles, a ruthless ruler and warmonger, launched an ambitious program of 
territorial expansion – he took Sundgau and Breisgau in 1469, Guelders in 1473, 
Lorraine and Bar in 1475 – and power consolidation – in December 1473 the Edict of 
Thionville created four central institutions: the Parlement (supreme law court) at 
Mechelen, the Chamber of Accounts, the Chamber of the Treasury and the Chamber of 
Subsidies. The centralization and rationalization of the financial administration of the 
state was the obverse side of Charles’s endless pursuit of power through war that 
demanded an incessant stream of resources to be carried on.  
And this pursuit eventually slew him in 1477. His death allowed several towns to 
rebel in order to garner power against the central institutions and organisms. The potent 
thrust of revolt from towns and countryside brought Mary of Burgundy, Charles’s 
successor, to abolish the centralizing institutions and to invigorate the old privileges:  
states and estates won the right of gathering on their own initiative and the power of 
veto related to war. The towns obtained amplest privilege as well. It was the Groot 
Privilege.  Mary obtained formal recognition thereon but at the cost of weakening the 
central power against both internal contenders and external enemies – the duke of 
Guelders, the city of Liège and the king of France. Mary died in 1482, leaving 
Maximilian as regent to ferry the boat in an interregna of ten years until their son Philip, 
born in 1478, came of age in 1493 (1493-1506). Philip managed to put into place a new 
program of centralizing policies, at the same time giving up the historical warlike 
complexion of the Burgundian Politics in favor of a retrieved peaceful strategy of inter-
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marriages. The retrieved policy had great results. In 1496 he married Joanna of Castile, 
heiress to the Spanish kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. Dynastic overturning led 
Maximilian’s grandson, Charles (1500), to power. Charles’ era (1515-1559) was to be 
one of most splendid ages in the history of the Low Countries in which the arts and, 
above all else, science flourished: Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, Rudolph Agricola 
(grammarian), Andreas Vesalius, one of the most remarkable figures of Renaissance 
science, along with Rembert Dodoens, a great physician; great cartographers such as 
Gerald Mercator and Abraham Ortelius, all lived under Charles and embodied the bright 
lights of Renascence.  
Since 1515, Charles V ruled the largest world empire in history, becoming one of 
the most successful protagonists of the entire human history. He was the heir of 
Burgundy and Habsburg; by his mother, Joanna, he inherited the Spanish kingdoms of 
Castile and Aragon, and their imperial appendages in the Americas and in southern 
Italy. About Low Countries, Charles wiped out any would-be competitors to power 
thereby completing the Burgundian conquests. In 1515 he had the lordship of Friesland 
and in 1524 that of Frisian; in 1528 he won the resistance of the bishop of Utrecht and 
in the end, after duke of Guelders’s death, Charles of Egmond, in 1538, he garnered the 
rule of the lands of Utrecht. Only the prince-bishopric of Liège escaped from his grip. 
After bitter religious struggles against the reformation, he, in 1550, managed to impose 
a unified heresy law on the whole territory of the Low Countries. Before retiring in the 
end, in 1555, he obtained to bequeath his entire empire – comprised of the Netherlands, 
formerly recognized as independent jurisdiction in 1549 – to a single heir. The 
Pragmatic Sanction of 1549 ensured the continuity of his power and unity thereof. His 
heir, Philip, indeed was to rule the most powerful composite agglomerate of territories, 
powers and resources in history. 
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However, in this age, something less resounding than artistic masterpieces, 
scientific knowledge and the Emperor’s winning bid for universal power transformed 
the world. It stepped silently into the «hidden abode» of history since the sixteenth 
century in Europe, and through Europe throughout the space of the world. It was 
something more opaque but by a great deal “formative”. It was the universal bid for 
world capitalism
105
. As far as it is concerned here, on the one hand, Holland’s towns 
steamrolled the European competition in northern commerce and production and 
became active centers of exchange, production and capital accumulation; Antwerp, on 
the other side, gained the upper hand against Bruges which relinquished the crown of 
center of capital and commercial gathering in Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. 
Both performed a different but crucial role in propelling the European structural 
transformation
106
. Postponing Holland’s role to chapter 3, from 1501 Antwerp became 
the northern staple for the colonial goods of Portugal simply because it managed the 
largest quantity of bullion – emanating from the mines of central Europe –  that was 
required to propel Asian trade, especially spices. Antwerp was also an important market 
of exchange for wines from France and the Rhineland, nonprecious metals from the 
German mountains, sugar after 1508, grain and timber from the Baltic, Spanish leather, 
and soon Spanish colonial goods. Since 1520s, Antwerp was also a major centre of 
international finance which gathered merchants and financiers who traded in credit, 
loans and maritime insurance. It was also an industrial center especially for cloth-
dyeing, fish-curing, soap-making and sugar refining and for printing. 
The development of printing industry made the religious texts and literature 
available for anyone. The expansion of this market was cause and consequence of an 
expanding demand of books, which was related to the religious transformations of that 
time, and despite the anti-heresy law. This law, as well as the restructuring of the 
Bishoprics in 1559 allowed an intensification against the reformed people, utterly 
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violating the historical civic privileges that the Dutch had garnered and jealously 
maintained. Malaise swept over society which was also hit hard by the already 
commenced economic decline of the Southern Netherlands. The decline of wealth 
provided the material thrust to rise up against the thrust of inner disciplining of the 
Catholic church
107
. A retaliation was in sight. 
In April 1566 a petition was presented by a group of lesser noblemen to the regent 
Margaret of Parma. The main request was the abolition of the heresy laws. The Beggars, 
as they were called, encountered however the support of the most important nobles. One 
of them, the count of Egmont, moved to Madrid to win Philip II’s resistance, but to no 
avail. The heresy laws were further reinforced. In August 1566, the Iconoclastic Fury 
was the natural upshot of the blind politics of the Spanish rulers. The King’s rejoinder 
was blinder than ever: Alva. Alva’s arrival marked a crucial moment in the history of 
the Low Countries since the violence of his operations was geared, not only to wipe out 
those responsible for the major assault on royal authority – the Council of Troubles, or 
Council of Blood, sentenced thousands of people to death: it was in essence a Massacre 
of the Innocents – but above all else, to tear down the constitutional framework 
shielding the Dutch since the middle ages. This was an unbearable provocation for the 
Dutch.  
The Revolt thus took off in 1568 when William Orange, Dutch Pater Patriae,  
invaded the Netherlands from Germany. The rebels’ first victory on 23 May at 
Heiligerlee in Friesland was only a false dawn. Alva turned the situation and set about 
towering through unprecedented terror and coercion. Religious repression now coupled 
with economic oppression: the new fiscal policy was inordinate and unconstitutional at 
once. New taxes – the most infamous 10 per cent sale tax, the so called “Tenth Penny” –  
were planned, imposed and made permanent without the Estates’ consent. In the end, 
 49 
 
the intolerable fiscal pressure alienated any support for the royal cause. The revolt 
entered in its most acute phase
108
.   
In 1579, an important step followed. The provincial States of Holland and Zeeland 
joined with Utrecht, Friesland, Gelderland and Groningen in the Union of Utrecht. To 
this first union of forces also joined some towns in Flanders and Brabant which came 
under Calvinist control in those years, including Antwerp, Brussels and Ghent. The 
Union covenant became thereby the true constitution of the fledgling Seven United 
Provinces. They were indeed wobbly. After the perilous descent of the great Parma who 
exposed their weakness, throughout the 1580s and especially after the abjuration of 
1581 of the Estates General – the act of Philip’s deposition –, the Dutch – Holland and 
Zeeland first – quested for protection and rule of would-be “suzerains” – the duke of 
Anjou and Leicester on behalf of the Queen of England – but, in fact, the Dutch demand 
never encountered the foreigner supply
109
. In so doing, the monarchical bid for power 
withered away, and sovereignty came to be embedded into the very fabric of the 
historical process of coagulation of the Provinces and formation of the Dutch state. 
Formal sovereignty lay in the Hague, the decisional center wherein the Estates based. 
Orange was elected Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, and captain-general of the 
Union – the stadholder was now not the lord lieutenant of the king, but executive officer 
of the sovereign States. Political and financial power was in the hands of the States, 
made up of representatives of the nobility and the towns. The Regents (urban capital) 
maintained substantive sovereignty. This patrician oligarchy indeed was to rule the 
Republic, as the United Provinces were called, with or without a Stadholder, for the 
next 200 years. 
Contrary to the North which continued the trajectory of development that had 
started centuries before, centered on towns and countryside as sparring partners
110
, in 
the Habsburg Netherlands a new noble layer arose while the traditional one came to be 
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displaced from the governing councils: the historical layer of bourgeois which bought 
the status and shifted its interests and activities. 
The arrival of the archduke Albert of Austria paralleled a Dutch invasion of 
Flanders. After an initial involvement of the Archduke Albert in person, in 1603 
command was handed over to Ambrogio Spinola. Spinola was a Genoese nobleman 
from a banking family who was determined to use his wealth to seek military glory – in 
pure medieval style. He remained the foremost military commander in the Low 
Countries until 1627. By 1605 the war was depleting the forces of states and armies. 
The States General were in financial dire straits. No allies now supported the Dutch 
publically for the same reason. France had made peace with Spain in 1598 and England 
in 1604, although volunteers from France, Scotland and England continued to fight in 
the Netherlands. Spanish royal treasury was even more exhausted. In 1607 a truce came 
in sight but with specific conditions: the Dutch demanded formal independence; on the 
other side, the Spaniards demanded a colonial empire free from the Dutch and freedom 
of Catholic worship in the Republic. In 1609, in Antwerp, a Twelve Years Truce, then 
ratified at The Hague few months later. But it honored the Dutch resistance not the 
Spanish power. 
Thanks to English and French interposition at the negotiations, seven Provinces 
united by war forced a world emperor to recognize their sovereignty; they compelled a 
world emperor to tolerate Dutch world trade in the Spanish overseas possessions; at the 
same time the Provinces presented themselves to Europe as a protestant country, and the 
freedom of catholic worship was denied – this stance in fact was reinforced in 1618-
1619 with the National Synod of Dordrecht. Furthermore, the wartime politics 
concerning the Scheldt lasted unchanged: the States of Zeeland declared the closure of 
the inter-regional commerce from Antwerp. This was a hard blow to Antwerp and the 
South Netherlands from which they never recovered to the full. It also demonstrated the 
 51 
 
political power and determined self-interest of the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, 
already making the Dutch Republic the leading commercial power in Europe
111
.  
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century financial and commercial 
concentration in the North marked the emergence of new industries and financial-
commercial operations – an instance of the former is Tin-glazed pottery: it had been 
made in Antwerp since before 1512. By 1670 there were 28 faïence factories in Delft 
alone, with more in Haarlem, Rotterdam, Gouda, Dordrecht and elsewhere. As we have 
already said, the medieval expansion completed in the sixteenth century enabled 
Holland and Zeeland the dominion of international shipping and fishing: the cod and 
herring fisheries supplemented with whaling in northern waters became unrivaled. At 
the same time, Dutch linen weavers and brewers were already exporting internationally: 
Leiden was the largest centre for handcrafting and manufacturing woolens in Europe, as 
Haarlem was for linen. They also developed new technologies such as the ribbon frame, 
an improved loom. Dutch cloth, especially worsteds and linens, became also an 
important bargaining chip for exotic products and slaves in the Americas and Africa.  
By the middle of the seventeenth century, Dutch cheese and butter dominated the 
related market in Europe.  
Dutch dominance in shipping resolved into the command of a Dutch-made 
European trading network, from the Baltic to Western and Southern Europe and the 
Levant: the international grain trade was the lynchpin and the flat-bottomed fluyt its 
main carrying device. The Dutch were among the best fed populations in Europe
112
.   
After 1585 Amsterdam became its core and node of redistribution, world entrepot 
of colonial trade, financial center on which Kings and states relied, and a cosmopolite 
metropolis in which the bright lights of the arts shone along with the more opaque 
twinkling of money
113
. The Wisselbank (1609), the first central bank in history, 
established a new financial world order; the layer of industrialists and traders came to be 
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bankrolled by the Amsterdam Bank van Lening (loans bank) which provided the whole 
of individual credit integral to the world development of the Dutch economy. Banks and 
insurance were however a refinement of Antwerp’s techniques – stemming from the 
Italians in turn. Now, at any rate, the financial organization of Dutch trade took a 
different shape, scale and scope through the foundation of long-term joint stock 
companies, that is, listed multinational corporations. Amsterdam became the propelling 
core of an expanding world system of  capital valorization
114
.  
In 1596 The Dutch arrived in Indonesia. In 1602 the very first multinational, 
Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie, VOC, set forth. The pursuit of power and capital 
the state company embodied made it master of the Moluccan spice trade. Jakarta, 
Batavia, in 1619 became Dutch wherein was established the administrative centre of the 
Asian trade. The Portuguese were driven out. Ceylon and Malacca were seized by 
Anthony van Diemen. By the end of the century the main Asian centers of exchange and 
production were Dutch, all under the direct or the indirect control of the VOC. Pepper, 
nutmegs, cloves and other spices were in the hands of the Dutch. In 1624 the VOC 
founded Fort Zeelandia on Formosa (Taiwan). In 1636 the VOC seized trading posts in 
Bengal, thereby the trade of silk and opium felt under the command of the VOC. 
Portuguese were completely expelled when in 1658 the Dutch captured the Sri Lankan 
coast. In Japan, the only European traders admitted were the Dutch. They gathered in 
the island of Deshima in Nagasaki. Japanese silver was the main business
115
. 
In 1621 the second greatest multinational was launched: the WIC, the West India 
Company. Its operations headed westwards explicitly to contrast and dismantle the 
Spanish power in the Americas. The first settlement was New Amsterdam in 1624 on 
the Hudson river; then WIC seized Bahía on the Brazilian coast (before long lost) and 
during 1630s the Caribbean space became a Dutch network of trading and productive 
posts – Guyana (1625), Brazil (1630-1654), Surinam (1667) and Demerara (1667) 
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became commercial plantations. What had brought the Dutch was salt, but what kept 
them there was sugar. From 1663 to 1701, the Dutch commanded the network of 
Atlantic exchanges and transportation of slaves to the Spanish colonies, both to supply 
the commercial plantations with labor and to make money directly from the sale of 
slaves
116
. 
World economic expansion bounced back home. The more visible side of the 
Golden Age was of course Dutch painting, architecture, arts, philosophy, literature that 
polished money; and meanwhile war started over.  
The lapse of the truce started the other round of Dutch wars. From 1621 to 1648, 
the Dutch battled at home as well as abroad, since the Siege of Breda in 1624-25 and 
the battles the WIC was engaged in across the Atlantic and on the American ground. 
The Spanish strategy of commercial warfare proved unproductive if not 
counterproductive: Spanish silver was even captured off Cuba in 1628 by a WIC flotilla 
commanded by Piet Heyn. The loss of the silver in turn bred a deep crisis of credit in 
Antwerp by which the Spanish Army was financed: it was paralyzed as a result. Hence, 
In 1629 Frederick Henry, the stedendwinger (forcer of cities), began a series of 
conquests and dealt a hard blow to the Spaniards by re-capturing ‘s- Hertogenbosch. 
France entered war in 1635, in the moment of major crisis of Spain. This was a crucial 
step towards the Hapsburg’s defeat which was in sight already in 1643-1644 –  the 
international conference began at Münster in those years – but eventually sealed only in 
1648
117
. Admittedly, peace was not a straightforward decision for the Dutch. Zealanders 
refused to sign, but the peace was a fait accompli which they would have to accept.  
The First stadholderless period, 1650-1672, began. Frederick Henry died and  in 
1647 his 20-year-old son, William II, succeeded him as stadholder of five provinces and 
captain-admiral-general of the union. Constitutional problems concerning his power and 
position within a Republic in peace surfaced as well as Holland’s obstreperousness 
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against him. At the stakes was money and finance: the costs of the army in peacetime 
had to be cut down.  The States of Holland disavowed the stadholder, and by-passed the 
States General by calling a Great Assembly in The Hague, where cities and provinces 
were represented directly. The States of Holland made their intentions clear, so their 
financial-economic dominance forced the other provinces to ratify the decision. The 
stadholderless period from 1653-1672 saw the rise of the Pensionary of Holland Johan 
de Witt.  
While the Anglo-Dutch rivalry peaked, the economic recovery in the Habsburg 
Netherlands pressured the North. Rural industrial expansion and agriculture upswing 
made the countryside the new lynchpin of the southern economy. Economic 
competition coupled with politico-military pressures. France’s territorial aims since 
1668 forced to constitute an international Triple Alliance consisting of the Netherlands, 
England and Sweden but French territorial expansion was relentless – Louis XIV also 
forged alliances with the bishops of Münster and Cologne, the eastern neighbors of the 
Republic. In the Rampjaar (Year of Disaster) 1672, the Third and victorious Anglo-
Dutch conflict on the sea paralleled the disastrous French and German invasion of the 
Republic on land: the eastern provinces were overrun and Utrecht was occupied. This 
invasion called for new military powers. 
William of Orange, aged 22, became stadholder – named William III – and 
admiral-general. Both appointments were ratified by the States of Holland and by the 
States General. The “prime minister” De Witt and his brother Cornelius were both 
lynched. The new stadholder began to win and retrieve Dutch space. He defended 
Holland, and lured Spain and Austria against France. He overran the lands of Cologne 
and took Bonn, cutting the logistic link between French and German, forcing the French 
withdrawal from the Netherlands. Peace with England was made in 1674. Utrecht in 
1674, and in the following year, Gelderland and Overijssel, declared William 
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Stadholder whereas the States of Friesland maintained their separate stadholderate. The 
Stadholder’s power was expanded like never before within the Republic. The next 
Anglo-Dutch engagement since 1688 topped off his power and an age of unprecedented 
accomplishments: the Dutch William became ruler of the United Provinces and of the 
British islands at once. From a space with no sovereignty to a space with inter-national 
sovereignty. 
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Chapter 1 
Debates on the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism 
 
 
 
The third chapter will show the patterned network of wealth, production and 
exchange, formed during the late middle ages, which constituted the basic matrix of 
value relations whence the Dutch hegemon fed off.  
The second chapter will posit the Hegemon’s perspective. Within the capitalist 
world-system, the historical uniqueness of a hegemon does not stem merely from its 
capability to develop the most efficient capitalist economy, and/or from the capacity to 
master the world economy or the world of international relations. It is to be argued that 
capitalism itself is not mere power of market and production. The hegemon’s overtness, 
that is, hegemony, is the historical product of an internal coherence of power which 
distinguishes the hegemon. Hegemony will be thence the projection thereof throughout 
the system. We elaborate on these concepts in the next chapters.  
To do so, we need to explore the theoretical-historical controversies pertaining to 
capitalism and capitalist development. The attempt to understand the Dutch hegemon 
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within the capitalist world-system calls for the exploration of the hallmarks of the 
historical-theoretical debate related to the transition from feudalism to capitalism; then, 
it will be showed briefly how scholars addressed the conundrum of Dutch capitalism 
and Dutch “transition” to introduce the lineages of the Dutch hegemon. 
 
1.1 The general debate on the transition to capitalism 
 
In the early academic fray concerning the transition in Europe, two general 
theoretical-historical stances pitted against each other, representing the kernel of the 
issue. From Dobb to Sweezy, up to Brenner, the question was: which was the «prime 
mover» to “capitalism”118? Was it a historical transformation in relations and forces of 
economic exchange in Europe or a historical change of relations and forces of 
production in some European states? Regardless of the vector of transition, both stances 
asserted that, at any rate, capitalist relations and forces rose once the fetters of feudalism 
were weeded out
119
. Only later, a third, seditious position, that put forward by Immanuel 
Wallerstein, became integral to the intellectual struggle. 
The mind-bending relationship between the structures of daily life – the feudal 
“rules” – and the sphere of circulation came at the forefront120. One of the most eminent 
Marxist observers seems to cast serious doubts on the fact that «the transition from the 
old order to the new […] finds the dominant causal sequence within the sphere of 
exchange between manorial economy and the outside world». The very core of the 
question for Maurice Dobb lies «in the internal relationship of Feudalism as mode of 
production»
121
. His thesis is phased. In very short: petty production progressively grew 
eroding the foundations of feudal society from within. The growth of productivity broke 
down feudal obligations engendering the gradual system’s disintegration, that is, the 
dissolution of the manorial system and the collapse of the system of direct exploitation 
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of the seigneurial demesne. Upon such a basic economic framework of analysis, a wider 
historical dynamic is grafted: demographic trends and migrations, systemic production 
inefficiency and a downswing of ruling class revenues compounded together drove the 
system to failure. According to the American student, the feudal system fundamentally 
lacked the overall momentum to expand itself
122
.  
A crux remains: what the role of the factual «increasing percolation of money into 
the self-sufficiency of manorial economy»? According to the scholar, trade seems to be 
a vector of change, but insufficient to make a qualitative shift by itself. Nonetheless a 
contradiction stands out in his musings: the sphere of circulation is mere ancillary to the 
feudal system – «an alien body within the pores of feudal society» – and yet, in fact, 
Dobb says, it comes «to sap the strength of feudal economy», dragging it to demise
123
. 
This is an inconsistency altogether reasonable which does not undermine the importance 
of Dobb’s analysis. By contrast, it has the virtue of exposing a fundamental problem 
upon which the entire debate implicitly is to pivot: the conceptual and analytical issue 
concerning the unit of analysis taken into account to fathom the transition. That is, 
Dobb’s inconsistency exposes the historical and conceptual issue of singling out the 
relational plane over which the forces of historical conflict and change rage. Reverting 
to the point in short: the lack of focus upon the unit of analysis muddies Dobb’s 
argument
124
. 
Robert Brenner stepped into the academic fray and reinforced the Marxist-derived 
rationale. Heedless enough thereof, he simply got rid of the market percolation problem 
by cleansing the logic from its circulationist impurity, narrowing the analytic focus on 
lord-serf relation, rate of exploitation, class struggle and state’s role in late medieval and 
early modern times – rather than on developments in forces of production in pure 
Marxist terms
125
. For Brenner in short, transition was a conflict upon the structural 
politics of feudal economy
126
. Whereas money percolation is not seriously taken into 
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consideration in his frame of musing, neo-Malthusian models get caught in his 
crossfire
127. Upon the blind spots of such a demographic history, Brenner’s thesis avers 
that 
 
the breakthrough from "traditional economy" to relatively self-sustaining economic development 
was predicated upon the emergence of a specific set of class or social-property relations in the 
countryside – that is, capitalist class relations. This outcome depended, in turn, upon the previous success 
of a two-sided process of class development and class conflict: on the one hand, the destruction of 
serfdom; on the other, the short-circuiting of the merging predominance of small peasant property
128
. 
 
How did such a historical watershed come about? In central-east Europe, 
according to Brenner, motionless economic forces inherent in the feudal system brought 
to the effacement of the privileges and liberties previously enjoyed by peasants, and to 
the wringing of their relation of power and extraction with the lord. In the stall of 
natural economy, lairds longed for far more revenues that were raked by squeezing the 
rent out of peasant communities, too weak to resist against the landowning class’s 
thrust. «In sum, the contradictions between the development of peasant production and 
the relations of surplus extraction which defined the class relations of serfdom tended to 
lead to a crisis of peasant accumulation, of peasant productivity and ultimately of 
peasant subsistence», and, in the east, landowners overruled harshly
129
. By contrast, the 
intensification of class conflict within the crisis of medieval economy brought about 
different upshots in the west for they turned out to be contingent to the balance of forces 
within the western class struggle and «certain historically specific patterns of the 
development»
130
.  
Considered that, in early modern France, peasant communities were strong and 
such a strength came to be bound up with «the particular form of evolution» taken by 
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the French state: the monarchy was to set up itself as an independent extractor of 
surplus, and to expand its own agency against the landowners’ class by binding their 
rents and rights to the growth of monarchical taxation. «Thus in France strong peasant 
property and the absolutist state developed in mutual dependence upon one another. The 
state increased its own power by virtue of its ability to get between the landlords and the 
peasants, to ensure peasant freedom, hereditability and fixed rents, and thus to use 
peasant production, via non-parliamentary taxation, as the direct source of revenue for 
royal strength and autonomy»
131
. The outcome, according to Brenner, was not 
capitalism but  
 
renewal of the old Malthusian cycle of underdevelopment [:] given the strength of peasant property, 
supported by the exploitative state, the landlord could not usually take advantage of increasing prices for 
land and agricultural products by improving and by increasing output, because this usually entailed the 
very difficult task of consolidation. The landlords therefore took the only course generally open to them: 
to try to obtain an ever greater share of a constant or even declining total product.
132
 
 
In England, the developmental path diverged greatly due to the different 
composition of structures of power and property relations. The diversion began after the 
Black Death, when lords, in the attempt to sharpen rents and payoffs, saw their power 
crumbled away by peasants’ revolts and flight. The conflict brought English serfdom to 
an end in the course of the XV century. However, peasant unrests failed to gain 
independent access to land. Indeed, at the end of the XVII century, lords garnered 
control of 70-75 per cent of the land, a fact that, according to Brenner, constituted the 
condition to the development of capitalist class relations and the self-sustaining growth 
of economy in the long run. «The landlords were able to engross, consolidate and 
enclose, to create large farms and to lease them to capitalist tenants who could afford to 
make capital investments [the introduction of new technologies and a larger scale of 
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operation]». Such a scenario entailed exactly a shift in lord/peasant relationships unto 
capitalist forms of farming
133
. The new form of farms, larger and more efficient, broke 
down the constraints of feudal economy in England. «It was indeed, in the last analysis, 
an agricultural revolution, based on the emergence of capitalist class relations in the 
countryside, which made it possible for England to become the first nation to 
experience industrialization»
134
. If so, the English state advanced as a “partially-
dependent” structure of value appropriation whereof the landowning class was the 
centre of the dynamic. Such a dependency thwarted the attempt of the English state to 
play the role the French one did in the struggle for freehold during the long sixteenth 
century
135
. 
Yet, both lines of argument blatantly shun delving into the problem of the 
historical role of money and market in Europe. Moreover, they dodge the undisputable 
fact that extensive trade aided in constructing, shaping and expanding market-based 
social relations and competition within and among jurisdictions. Both intra- and inter-
state competition and market-driven agency petered into centrality for Europe’s world 
supremacy to be sure. With important variations, Sweezy and Wallerstein tackled the 
impasse inherent in the traditional Marxist interpretation – according to which only a 
change in relations of production and/or in organizing production was to make the 
transition to capitalism – by hauling in trade and market forces as part and parcel of the 
constitutive process of capitalism
136
.  
In his analysis, Paul Sweezy argues the resilience of feudalism to change
137
. 
Counterintuitively, the feudal system proved resilient to collapse precisely owing to its 
own contradiction, thus the prime mover to dissolution had to stem from a surfeit of 
forces alien to feudality. Trade and feudalism were consistent with each other up to the 
extent that the former, engendering «production for the market», did not overrule the 
«production for use» inherent in the dynamics of feudalism
138
. According to the 
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American economist, the expansion of towns and long-distance commerce set in motion 
a process by which centrifugal forces of market and money – notably the search for 
luxuries – pushed the system far from equilibrium139. Such a thrust was essentially 
«external to the system»
140
. The upshot of this disequilibrium was not to be capitalism, 
but a «pre-capitalist commodity production» in the transitional phase during the 
thorough demise of the feudal system. It eventually led to the reorganization of social 
space towards capitalist forms of production in the seventeenth-eighteenth century
141
. In 
particular, for Sweezy, capitalism and industrial capitalists did not originate from 
medieval merchants and petty producers but from a process which «starts out as both a 
merchant and an employer of wage-labour». Such a combination permitted to set up 
fully-fledged capitalist enterprises
142
; all the while, commodity production was not to 
inevitably entrain “modern capitalism”, even if highly developed. At odds with Dobb, a 
concrete incentive to the dissipation of feudalism in western Europe was «the inability  
of the ruling class to maintain control over, and hence to exploit, 
society's labour power»
143
.  
Whereas Sweezy did not delve into the new phase of historical development to 
account for the actual dynamic of transition, his supposed heir was to focus almost 
exclusively on the very new phase of historical development instead.  
Several are the general, prefatorily (and treasonous), contentions which Immanuel 
Wallerstein contends by way of his different mode of analyzing world social history, 
but only one here is strictly pertinent: the centrality of the systemic unit of analysis as a 
variant leading to the understanding of the foremost historical-social issue in his agenda, 
the modern world, the capitalist world-system
144
. The terms of the question came to be 
entirely twisted thereby: «Discussion of the so-called transition from feudalism to 
capitalism is confused because three separate phenomena are compounded together: the 
initial and unique transformation of the feudal variant of a redistributive world-empire 
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into a capitalist world-economy, subsequent incorporations of outside arenas into this 
latter system, and the extension of the proletarization of labor and the 
commercialization of land within the ongoing capitalist world-economy». Words, 
concepts and meanings changed outright, turning the classic debate into something 
different
145
.   
As far as the question of transition is concerned, under the rubric of «world-
systems», Wallerstein attempts to understand feudalism and capitalism in Europe, not as 
separate, contrasting and subsequent forms of human organization merely based on 
different logics, rationalities and rules, but as one seamless geo-history. In short: 
according to Wallerstein, there was no “transition”, but «transformation»; there was no 
a “world transition” but an «incorporation» into the expanding European network of 
capitalist world accumulation; and, sequentially, there was no a “world social 
transition” but a destructive «extension» of, and forceful submission to, the logic of the 
ever-expending capital. I set out to narrow the focus on the first issue
146
. 
Wallerstein argues that the modern world system is a capitalist world-economy. A 
world-economy is a particular variety of world-system. A world-system is a historical-
social system which displays a specific logic of historical development and a specific 
historical nature. A world-system which is a world-economy is a historical-social 
system which is driven forward by its systemic economic development. That is, in a 
world-economy, the economic plane of systemic interaction becomes structurally all-
pervading and all-binding
147
. According to Wallerstein, several world-economies 
existed during history, but, owing to their own nature or logic of operation, these world-
economies were swiftly shifted into what the American scholar calls «world-empires», 
that is historical-social system characterized by redistributive logics of power and 
wealth – i.e. China or the Roman empire. By contrast, what allowed for the rise and 
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world expansion of the world-economy in early-modern Europe was its capitalist nature 
(or systemness). Capitalism enabled this world-system to survive and thrive
148
.   
The «medieval prelude» to modern world witnessed the gradual transformation of 
feudal Europe into the center of expansion of such a capitalist world-system, between 
1450-1650 ca
149. In Wallerstein’s scheme, feudalism «was not natural economy, that is, 
an economy of self-subsistence». Feudalism in western Europe was a «civilization» 
growing out of the implosion of the foregoing Roman world-empire. This 
characterization of feudalism compels Wallerstein to move on the problem of 
“transition” in its classic form. In keeping with the logic of world-systems analysis 
according to which the unit of historical analysis is crucial to understand development, 
units of historical development which are not world-system cannot accomplish a 
historical transition in classical terms. In other words: there was no world-systemic 
transition in Europe because feudalism was not a world-system, but a general 
civilization. Something different happened
150
. 
Wallerstein sees the surfeit of trading forces as something subversive of feudal 
dynamics, but not long-distance commerce as such. Feudalism and expanding trade are 
consistent with each other inasmuch as long-distance commerce does not overcome the 
local one. The Fernhandel has always been trade in luxuries, propelled by the whetted 
appetite of wealthy and rulers, notably in towns, but limited in social scale and scope. 
With the rise and world expansion of a European-based system of capitalist world 
accumulation – which, according to Wallerstein, was the main outcome of the inter-state 
competition escalated during the long 16
th
 century in Europe – long-distance trade 
began to change. It began to involve and include increasing quantities of bulks and 
staples, thereby feeding into and boosting the «process of expanding production» at 
world-systemic level. According to the scholar, «Food needs dictated the geographical 
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expansion of Europe» and the expansion of the structural network of the economy as a 
whole
151
.  
In other words: capital accumulation started out being replenished to the full 
through basic products, thereby extending incrementally the web and the processes of 
capital accumulation to primary resources, that is, unto and onto society as a whole. In 
Europe, feudalism was displaced owing to the historical proneness of European capital 
breeding centrifugal thrusts of accumulation for solving the continental dearth of 
resources. In this respect, according to Wallerstein, world-social spaces which were 
characterized by different logics of social reproduction became capitalist inasmuch as 
they were bridled by, and incorporated within, the world-system of capitalist 
accumulation in expansion. They thereby were compelled to operate according to the 
systemic logic of social reproduction – the logic of endless capital accumulation – to 
feed the European world-economy. 
 
In view of this overview, we can summarize three general levels of analysis that 
came up during the debate on the “transition from feudalism to capitalism”152. The first 
level pertains to Dobb-Brenner who regard: trade and town growth as outgrowth and/or 
integral constituents of feudalism; the response of nobility to the growth of trade and 
towns as highly uneven in space; the structural compulsion to increase surplus when 
lords coped with market as minimal – by contrast the upshot was the squeezing out of 
peasants. If the transition is to occur, such an interpretation implies a confined alteration 
of local historical structures and processes internal to the dynamics of feudalism, within 
rising national frames. Transition stems from: class struggle; the thrust of peasants to 
increase productivity; nobility competition for power against other nobles as well as 
against peasants.  
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Questions arise: How did such local alterations crumble away the feudal 
framework of Europe? How have localized changes of structures succeeded in building 
up the globally-integrated world system we live in? Which was the belt which 
connected the space of historical change of a nation to the other one?
153
 
 The second kind of analysis, the one offered by Sweezy, made a spatially-
unidentified vortex of accumulating trading forces the main vector of feudal dissolution. 
This solution comes with the theoretical and historical concept and definition of social 
system, an issue which the scholar actually does not address. However, by not delving 
into the “second phase of development”, the Marxist economist does not single out the 
unit of analysis in which the change operates and this fact hamstrings his imposing 
analysis. In the same vein as Henri Pirenne, towns were the centres wherein the drive to 
hoard and expand was highly sharpened; by the same token, the far-flung web of trading 
towns accounts for the rise of a continentally-integrated commercial economy. Trade 
was a «creative force» to be sure
154
. Although trading economy is not enough to 
understand the transition to capitalism
155
. While Sweezy suggests as crucial the lack of 
landowner’s political power to immobilize and force peasants to land in an ever-
increasing exploiting pattern leading to feudal dissipation, how both political power – 
essential device to the development of the capitalist system – and the logic of capitalism 
crisscrossed remains untold. By the same token, the role of capital in the process of 
submission of workers to the logic of capitalism remains untold as well
156
.  
Wallerstein, taking Sweezy’s lead, views the expansion of trade, exceeded a 
certain amount, an important vector of feudal dissolution, but, as far as the terms of the 
debate are concerned, what led to historical-social change was the entanglement in, and 
the growth of, world-systemic processes of production, that is, the incorporation of sites 
of agro-industrial production throughout the world into a systemic network and logic of 
capital accumulation. Such a mechanism of development was to bring about different 
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social outcomes – as well as different political and economic upshots – in the several 
regions of the modern world-economy according to their relation of power with the 
capitalist core of the system. This was, according to Wallerstein, the basic (not the only) 
workings of capitalist expansion of (and within) the modern world-economy
157
. 
Swelling trade was only half of the mechanism to the development of the structural 
networks of capitalist accumulation, on the other side based on world-systemic, core-
oriented, chains of productions
158
.  
Both scholars, albeit in different fashions, disregard a crucial fact: if patterns of 
historical development came up pursuant to the combustion of exceeding (non-feudal?) 
forces, how did those forces take off? Where did they come from?
159
   
In short: we can say that the general theoretical-historical conundrum, which is 
untold, and upon which the entire debate has unfolded is: capitalism as mode of 
production or capitalism as system of accumulation
160
? As far as we are concerned, the 
way we address this dilemma determines and shapes Dutch history and the history of 
“Dutch capitalism”, and how such a story is told – admittedly, also the entire history of 
the capitalist world system as well.  
Marx answers in Capital’s third volume – albeit his argument and argumentations 
are both quite muddy: commodity production or capital accumulation by themselves are 
not enough to jam the functioning – «the solidity and the articulation» – of a previous 
mode of production. Regardless, «The economic structure of capitalist society has 
grown out of the economic structure of feudal society»
161
. To Marx, the United 
Provinces were not (properly) “capitalist”162. After all, they were a «land without 
feudalism».  
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1.2 The Dutch transition in the scholarly debate 
 
Apart from Marx
163
, we have seen in general terms the hallmarks of the debate 
concerning the transition from feudalism to capitalism – and which whoever is engaged 
in untangling such a conundrum has to come to terms with. Posing the question of how 
has the Dutch enigma been tackled by the scholars? For the most, it had theretofore 
been dodged.  
 Eric Hobsbawm – a Marxist practitioner –, by focusing on the economic side of 
the analysis, famously termed Holland as a «feudal business economy». The Dutch 
economy was not the first capitalist economy for «Dutch profits did not depend greatly 
on capitalist manufacture. Hence the Dutch economy to some extent did a disservice to 
industrialisation in the short run: to their own, by sacrificing Dutch manufactures (until 
1816) to the huge vested interests of trading and finance; to that of the rest of Europe, 
by encouraging manufactures in feudal and semi-colonial areas where they were not 
strong enough to break out of the older social framework»
164
.  
An analysis akin to this one led Wallerstein to the opposite end: capitalism grew 
and expanded exactly for its own capacity to generate ongoing profits – accumulation 
and expansion – by exploiting productions “in feudal and semi-colonial areas”, by 
contrast immediately converted and turned into capitalist periphery and filled with the 
capitalist law of motion
165
. Was Holland not capitalist but the world-economy, pursuant 
to its own political-economic-social structure and geographical structural 
differentiation. According to Wallerstein indeed, talking of capitalist states is total 
nonsense; only the capitalist system is the unit of capitalist expansion and analysis. 
Therefore, taking Hobsbawm’s story as valid, i.e. that the Dutch were merchant 
capitalists at most, for the American scholar merchant capitalism is “Capitalism” – 
«historical capitalism». Nonetheless, this is not enough. Not only “merchant capitalism” 
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is “Capitalism”, but for its own historical development and dynamics toward 
semiproletarianized relations of social reproduction at systemic level, merchant 
capitalism is the “most efficient form” of capitalist historical development166. The 
Dutch, in very short, were capitalists by virtue of their position of greatest exploiters 
strictly abiding by the general rule of the ever-expanding accumulation of capital 
whereon the European world-economy had been established and developed.  
Dobb, for his part, deals very rapidly with the Dutch in his imposing Studies in the 
Development of Capitalism. The only notice worthy to be reported is related to the 
classical Marxist stance according to which the primacy of commercial-financial 
interests in Holland were to obstruct the growth of industry and the “transition to 
capitalism”. Indeed, «The fortunes to be made from dealing in foreign stocks seems to 
have diverted capital and enterprise from industry». Holland was «entirely eclipsed» by 
the progression of industrial production in England in the XVIII century. By using 
Charles Wilson’s investigation on the Anglo-Dutch connections, Dobb asserts that the 
Hollanders doomed their industrial sector to a dynamic of submission to overwhelming 
trading and financial interests, and to their relationships with foreign rulers and states
167
.  
Sweezy references Holland even less
168
. Brenner, in his original contribution on 
the Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 
barely mentions Holland
169
, whereas in his following in-depth examination, he devotes 
some more pages to the issue, alas with no news to offer. His framework had been 
already set and its rationale deployed. As he correctly noted, the agrarian structure of 
Holland – foundation of any capitalist development according to the scholar – was 
largely different from the one developed in Europe, even in the West. It lacked fully-
fledged manorial demesnes to exert pervasive extra-economic power of extraction, and, 
pursuant to this, the landowning economic function became highly dependent upon 
economic rents. Market-based relations were broadly developed within society, even in 
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the rural areas, «enforcing the tendency to competitive market production» for tenants 
and farmers that catered to their subsistence needs through market. This non-dependent 
tenancy-based structure, in close association with the trading bias, thwarted any chance 
to develop capitalist property relations. Moreover, structural brakes were to be 
reinforced by the crucial fact that, according the scholar, any Dutch development had 
been externally-induced, that is, «spurred by and dependent upon the general growth of 
the European economy during the sixteenth and into the seventeenth century». In sum, 
the Dutch «hardly constituted an economy in its own right [for] it grew up as an integral 
part of the overall European economy and naturally shared its fate»: once the European 
economic downswing (the so-called Phase B) materialized in the seventeenth century, 
self-sustained growth was a historical chimaera for the Dutch
170
. 
 
Quite recently Dutch history has been discussed at length instead. The 
Netherlands came to the fore as the actual contender of England for the designation of 
“first historical capitalism” 171. Brenner would have had a lot to say about that new 
strand. We shall briefly refer to some parts of it, and notably to two leading Dutch 
scholar.  
Jan de Vries calls attention to what appears to be crucial in explaining “Dutch 
capitalism” in the light of the Brenner’s theses: the character and dynamics of feudalism 
in the Northern Low Countries, notably Holland; the character of peasants-
householders; consequently, the role of small peasant property and the trajectory of 
rural economic development; in the end, the role of towns and cities
172
.  
Feudal constraints had always been rarefied and during the XVI century they 
broke down well-nigh completely. Serfdom, if it existed at all, vanished in the XVI 
century: peasants were free. The feudal rule of lords over territory politically weakened 
and economically disappeared for they lacked concrete and enforceable landownership 
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and a fully-fledged manorial demesne backing their power; by the same token, extra-
economic means of subjugation gave way to property rights and widespread market-
based and businesslike relationships, affecting both peasants and lords’ behavior alike. 
The colonization movement unto the virgin lands of the region was an important vector 
to feudal dissipation through drainage, livestock raising and urbanization. The new 
settlements were entirely premised on peasant farms, and parcellization of land was an 
outgrowth of such a peasants “expansion”. Especially in such new areas of dwelling, 
«society […] offered no significant role for noblemen»173. All the while, important role 
had the inconsistency of communal institutions such as open fields and guilds. This 
feature was conducive to peasants’ full freedom and feeble institutional limitations. 
«We do not exaggerate much in asserting that the only factors they had to take into 
account were nature and the market» since the late middle ages
174
.  
In particular: according to de Vries, the embeddedness of peasantry in a thick 
network of (internal and international) markets, and the strong market bias, stimulated 
what for Brenner were factors conducive to capitalism: specialization, innovation, 
accumulation in agriculture toward industry and trade, pushing maximized value at the 
center. In short, what de Vries calls «specialization model»: market dependency, capital 
investment (productive factors innovation), specialized productive units (specialized 
household agricultural productions) and occupational differentiation. On such bases, 
favorable historical-institutional settings were conducive to social differentiation. 
Specialization and social differentiation fed into processes of polarization and 
proletarization in the countryside that were sharpened by the farmers’ bias toward 
capital-intensive investments that eventually led also to the expansion of protoindustry. 
Greater and wider run of outputs came out from investment and specialization in the 
rural areas
175
. The outstanding rate of urbanization of Holland endowed in turn the 
region with extraordinary market possibilities feeding an «healthy» relation between 
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towns and countryside, that, differently from the rest of Europe, was premised on «the 
avoidance of a polity of urban exploiters» and of strong monopolistic policies 
subjugating rural areas
176
. According to De Vries, this led to the development of a 
regional economy of capitalist sort
177
. 
For his part, van Zanden articulates a different «road to capitalism», based on the 
advancement of proto-industrialization as a consequence of ecological crises in the 
period 1350-1550 that impeded the medieval agricultural trajectory
178
. Since the 
fourteenth century, but especially starting from the fifteenth, ecology and soil compelled 
Holland to rely heavily on grain imports and to commercialize the remaining lands
179
. 
Agriculture – especially for subsistence – was getting increasingly sidelined180. As a 
result non-agricultural energies were freed, preparing the ground for capitalism. Non-
agrarian activities like fishing, shipbuilding, spinning, and particularly in Holland after 
1400, international carrying trade and peat cutting, became mainstays upon which the 
rural (and urban) work and life subsisted on. Strengthened by demographic growth
181
, 
the combination of wage-based industry and agriculture sparked off profitable dynamics 
whereby the rural industries «neither imitated nor competed with the urban export 
industries […] because the almost complete absence of sharp social tension between 
town and country», thereby bolstering the economy as a whole
182
. According to van 
Zanden, Dutch protoindustrial dynamic – in combination with the dense market world 
linkages – is the key to fathom Dutch capitalism, i.e. merchant capitalism: «Merchant 
capitalism is […] the phase in the development of capitalism in which the […] 
entrepreneur combined commercial activities with intervention in the production 
process, and thus in labor relations, although the commercial activities (still) 
outweighed the latter». In view of this, the secret of the Dutch economy was the 
capacity to realize surpluses from production thanks to the ability to keep labor costs – 
the remuneration of labor – at bay, that is, below the reproduction costs of labor and not 
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(only) from mere price differences
183
. According to van Zanden , the unfolding of Dutch 
capitalism was therefore entirely premised on semiproletarized labor. 
However, if the foundations for the Golden Age were to be laid by this very 
process, the Golden Age demise was part and parcel thereof at the same time. At the end 
of the sixteenth century «the marginal peasant class that had been the base of proto-
industry» disappeared
184
. Dutch protoindustrial mechanism gave rise forcefully to a 
process of enlargement of market-oriented capital-intensive farms and to a remarkable 
increment of the pace of urbanization, followed by further concentration and 
centralization in non-agricultural lines of production. Both continued to accelerate the 
rate of proletarization that in turn was replenished by demographic concentration
185
. At 
some point of the process, the surplus extracted from the initially merchant-capitalist 
chains of production came to deplete itself because the same process of 
protoindustrialization, that pushed unto full proletarization, ate away the margin of 
profit inherent in the exploitation of partially proletarianized laborers. That is, profits 
generated were not high enough to cover both the production and reproduction cost of 
labor. In other words, this specific mechanics of development turned out to be self-
defusing
186
. 
In the light of this
187
, Brenner comes to refining his argumentation on the Low 
Countries. As far as his conceptual framework is concerned, it has been reframed as 
follow: the feudal system is resilient to change. It is a self-reproducing system whose 
rules are consciously implemented by lords and peasants, and, for it is «in their own 
interest», they tend to behave according to feudal social-property relations. Feudal rules 
of reproduction – premised on the logic of “safety first” (peasants), and on political 
accumulation and productive extension (lords) – thus tend to be self-sustaining. Towns 
play the role of feudal actors that, on the one hand, endow lords with means to 
reproduce the polity of political accumulation, and, on the other, facilitate the 
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reproduction of peasants by feudal rules
188
, since commercial agriculture and 
protoindustries, in the context of self-conscious reproduction and enforcement of feudal 
social-property relations, Brenner says, represent «an unavoidable outgrowth and 
expression of their fundamental rule for reproduction, viz. to produce for subsistence». 
Therefore, in view of this, Brenner contends now that the emergence of capitalist 
social-property relations from feudalism can only occur «as an unintended consequence 
of lords and peasants pursuing feudal type economic behaviour in order to achieve 
feudal goals». In short: pursuant to its own self-reproductive thrust, feudalism tears 
itself asunder. Upon the economy of feudalism, the outcome of (Brenner’s) class 
struggle inherent in the reproduction crises of feudalism itself was to unintentionally 
break down, at some point, any structure of surplus extraction by extra-economic 
means, promoting in turn the peasants’ dispossession of their full means of subsistence, 
leading to Brenner’s original scenario. As a consequence, this was to give rise forcefully 
to new rules of reproduction, that is, «on pain of extinction», social actors now set about 
systematizing their productive efforts by means of economic rules of production within 
market – competition, profit maximization, specialization, innovation and profit 
investment for further productive expansion. In other words, at this point they find «in 
their own interest» making accumulation by production via economic compulsion and 
market framework; they now set about rationalizing the economic behavior, propelling 
the «positive correspondence between what is required for the ongoing, economy-wide 
increase of agricultural productivity, indeed modern growth more generally [self-
sustained growth], and what economic actions individuals find it in their own self-
interest to choose». The reproduction of feudality was stopped thereon and the self-
sustaining mechanism of feudalism broken. Capitalist social-property relations and a 
new kind of general market dependency emerges out of the self-broken feudal structure 
of social-property relations and feudal market dynamics
189
. 
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In view of this refinement, Brenner is now poised for analyzing the Low 
Countries. Were they, and notably Holland, capitalist before England? By contrasting 
north and south, inland and maritime spaces, the student brings out the divergent paths 
undertaken in the historical process of structuring and evolution of the social-property 
structure of relations, and of the economy as a whole – i.e. the «subsequent agrarian-
productive trajectory». In short: inland southern and inland northern Low Countries did 
not develop the aforementioned positive correspondence since both, according to 
Brenner, maintained a structure of social-property relations of feudal sort, constituted in 
essence by parcellization, diversification and labor intensification, making for declining 
labor productivity, poverty and restricted rural markets, despite the proximity of the 
latter to ample market networks
190
. By contrast, maritime northern Netherlands came to 
develop a situation in which producers lost their means of subsistence but retained their 
means of production – protoindustry; this made for socio-economic differentiation, 
specialization and investment, the growth of labor productivity and rural markets. By 
the same token, in maritime southern Netherlands (Flanders, as well as Zeeland), the 
agrarian-productive trajectory consolidated the dominion of large landowners who 
rented large plots to big tenants, complying essentially with the original scenario 
sketched out by the scholar. But to Brenner, capitalism is first agrarian capitalism 
wherein the production of surplus in grain-producing areas is crucial to spawn the 
framework for «modern growth».  
Did Holland abide by Brenner’s path of development of agrarian capitalism? 
Ecological problems were the main drive that, combined with the weakness of Dutch 
feudal dynamics, made easier to the Hollanders extending their field of operative 
subsistence. However, arable farming was getting increasingly restrictive and hard to 
put into operation to make a living. Thereby, contrary to early Brenner’s theory but 
according to the last findings, «as an unintended consequence of the acts of 
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reclamation» abiding by the self-conscious thrust to extend feudal social-property 
relations onto the margin of the European terrain, at some point, they were compelled 
both to give over the means of subsistence and to enter the transformative path towards 
capitalist relations, that is, they became «market-dependent capitalist farmer» with high 
intensity of capital investment, Brenner says
191
. But farming also came to be hampered 
by ecology. This further limit shoved farmers toward a broader market dependency 
because it forced their entanglement with the wider urban complex of regional industrial 
and commercial activities
192
. Protoindustrial development was hence complement of the 
particular capitalist structure of Dutch agriculture, and whereby the expansion of 
regional and international trade became at one time necessity and propellant. «The 
subsequent process of interconnected agricultural, industrial and commercial 
development, in which the expansion of one industry tended to bring increased demand 
and lower costs for others, could hardly have been more capitalist in its essence». 
Nevertheless, since, in Brenner’s theory, the presence of ever-bigger landowners in 
junction with dispossessed peasants and tenant farmers stands out as the operative 
precondition to a proper capitalist society, and Holland in actuality lacked the former 
the scholar says, did Holland develop capitalism in fact?
193
  
 
the fundamental point is that the rise of regions dominated by such small-scale [such as Holland], 
specialized production would have been unthinkable without the production of surpluses in grain-
producing areas, which implied, on a system-wide scale (though obviously not in those relatively small, 
privileged regions that had access to cheap grain imports) the growth of labour productivity in food 
grains, and thus the transformation of agrarian social-property relations somewhere in the system
194
.  
 
For the American scholar, as a result of the constraining ecology that impinged on 
the activities of the agriculturists by forcing them «to maximize exchange value through 
specialization, accumulation and innovation […], subordinating all other goals to 
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exchange value maximization», what allowed for (and impelled) Dutch change towards 
capitalist dynamics – pivotal to the overall development of the Republic as well – was 
the easy access to cheap grain imports
195
. In view of this, cities and towns were pivotal 
pursuant to their role of centres of concentrated market relations, and expanding centers 
of market economy in the region.  
What may seem an abrupt turn in Brenner’s ideas, it is not in the end. Holland was 
not the first capitalist “society” Brenner says. The historical path of Holland’s decline 
comes up against the articles of faith of capitalism as ever-mounting, state-contained 
industrial-based, economic growth. Despite his broader premises, and in keeping with 
his Marxist credo, Brenner remains loyal to his early assessment: an exporting economy 
articulated with and within feudal spaces across Europe made unfeasible national self-
sustaining industrial growth in the long run:   
 
The ability to complete successfully the cataclysmic transition from arable subsistence economy to 
market dependent, export-oriented economy was greatly facilitated by the spectacular growth of grain 
imports from the Baltic [But at the same time,] it was fatally bound up with the surrounding European 
economy that remained unshakably Malthusian […] it could not achieve self-sustaining growth because 
its fate was inextricably bound up with a European economy – and especially a European agriculture – 
that was almost entirely pre-capitalist. […] but, articulated as it was with an untransformed trans-
European economy […] it lacked the capacity to transform its own ultimate foundations in Europe’s pre-
capitalist economy
196
. 
 
And yet, this seems to be a logical straining in view of his new analysis of 
capitalist development based on unintended consequences and changed social-property 
relations: since an unintended change in property relations towards capitalist ones 
occurred in Holland, a path unto self-sustained growth should have occurred regardless. 
In other word, for Brenner, capitalism is, first of all, self-powered growth on national 
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scale; the base of capitalist self-powered growth is premised on a specific structure of 
social-property relations; According to Brenner, the qualitative leap forward towards 
such a structure did occur in Holland, regardless of how it came about in actuality; 
nevertheless, Dutch growth manifested impassable limits due to European feudality, he 
argues. But in view of his historical mechanics, theory and conceptual premises, this 
historical turn of events is unworkable, notwithstanding the Dutch engagement in 
European feudalism
197
. 
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Chapter 2 
Hegemony or Hegemon? 
 
 
 
Today, the historical-social sciences acknowledge three historical instances of 
world hegemony in the history of the modern world system: Dutch hegemony, generally 
during the XVII century; British hegemony, in the XIX century; and US hegemony in 
the Twentieth. Compared with the British and the US one, Dutch hegemony is depicted 
as a pale version of power deployed throughout the world by the next two. Precisely this 
alleged paleness – whose obverse is the uneven role and importance given to the Dutch 
in world history – signals a crucial feature of the way the concept, the analysis and the 
history of modern hegemonies have been addressed: hegemony has been analytically 
defined by the degree of power projected unto the system. Thus, hegemony has 
heretofore been treated as a projection of power in world space, that is, the way a state 
or a group influences and/or dominates the world of inter-national relations. This is of 
course true but downright partial if we are to understand a world hegemony. Rarely 
indeed, the framework of the analysis is pushed so farther to encompass the hegemon 
itself by way of a systematic theoretical-historical explanation and exploration of 
internal factors and vectors engendering hegemonic power. In this respect, what is 
seldom acknowledged is that a hegemon, before projecting power outward, must 
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develop an internal formula. In other words: it is «not overt power that defines a 
hegemon but its infra-structural power». Hegemony, before being a projection of 
power, is an inner social formula
1
. This chapter attempts to elaborate a perspective of 
analysis to elucidate the referred-to suggestion. To do this we are faced first with the 
issue of hegemony as a projection of power and to probe the most relevant theories of 
hegemony. This avails us to better contrast the established perspective on the hegemony 
and the perspective to be posited. It behooves to stress that both of them are not at odds 
with each other or mutually exclusionary, but they describe the two different facets of a 
single process. The latter is the obverse of the former and vice versa.   
The second section sets forth the hegemon’s perspective. This perspective argues 
that hegemonic power within the modern world system is the product of the trialectic 
unity of state, capital and society (in nature) constituted and defined through relations of 
power, accumulation and wealth premised on the commodity-centered logic of power 
re/production or, borrowing from Miachel Mann’s The Source of Power, on «multiple 
overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power» of capitalist sort
2
.  
In the next chapters, this perspective is to be rephrased historically to explain the 
Dutch regime, and thus to understand the Dutch hegemon. 
 
2.1 Hegemony as projection of power 
 
The word “hegemony” stems from the ancient Greek “heghemonìa”, namely, 
“rule” or “leadership”. Thucydides was the topmost analyst and interpreter of hegemony 
and of its significance in ancient times applied to relations among independent city-
states within their inter-state system. Its classical meaning was essentially of politico-
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military domination of one state on another. State inter-relations are the locus and focus 
of analysis
3
. 
 Present-day studies have broadened such a concept to encompass, in general, the 
unrivaled control of the economic networks of the world economy (i.e. control over raw 
materials, markets, and capital, and competitive payoffs in highly valued productions), 
or a power or control of cultural-political sort on international relations. In whatever 
approach, hegemony is always a relational concept, an advantage and an asymmetry of 
power in the relations among subjects, a peerless power factually deployed and/or 
perceived by the actors in the system of international relations. 
Hegemony pertains first to the sphere of IR as academic subject, but involves 
many other academic territories such as the world-system analysis (sometimes 
formalized as IR’s systemic school). Herein, the formal academic partitions are to be 
disregarded
4
. The narrative is phased in two sections, both comprising four instances of 
hegemony. 
 
2.1.1 Pattern of hegemony 1 
 
Four leading IR theories of hegemony are taken into account in this section: the 
one of Robert Keohane, Robert Cox, Robert Gilpin, and John Ikenberry with Charles 
Kupchan
5
. Let me introduce the subject. 
The classic perspective on post-war IRs was coarsely realistic. Realism affirms 
the autonomy of the political sphere from the economy because it aspires to understand 
world politics – a realm of rules based on interests and power which are not either 
economic or moral. The economy serves politics in sum
6
. Crude realism sees, in 
essence, international conflict as natural outgrowth of the pursuit of power which is the 
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ultimate goal of states themselves. In this context, political hegemony – organized 
violence, both normative and physical – is the stabilizer of the international system.  
Nonetheless, the very first attempt to systematize the issue comes from 
Economics. The early formulation of the so-called Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) 
is our case. HST argues in sum that hegemony is pure dominance in the sphere of world 
economy. Such thorough material power by itself would enable the hegemon to bolster 
and run the system of rules in the international relations. Charles Kindleberger can be 
accounted the father of such an insight of hegemony. First elaborated in the 1973 book 
The World in Depression: 1929-1939, the eminent American economist argues the utter 
necessity for the world to have a «stabilizer» (a state) which runs the world economy, 
thereby stabilizing the interstate system within its own «life cycle of growth and relative 
decline». With no hegemonic control or primacy in world economy, the interstate 
system is bound to plunge into chaos
7
.  
To the present writer this materialist version of HST – as well as Realism – proves 
to be simplistic and reductive to understand both hegemon and hegemony as well as the 
modern world system and the impact of a hegemonic lead on the historical trajectory of 
it. Both early perspectives indeed came challenged and surpassed.  
Realism was under attack in the late 1970s by an approach that, according to its 
proponents, came «closer to reality than does realism» itself. It was called «complex 
interdependence». Keohane and Nye developed such a ideal type of «seamless web of 
world politics» in the attempt to account for the factual growth and the material 
necessity of interdependence among core countries – transnational, intergovernmental, 
and transgovernmental interrelationships. Hegemony in the context of international 
interdependence is not structured power but situational power, that is, a situation in 
which a state «is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate 
relations, and willing to do so»
8
. Elaborating on this early theoretical framework, Robert 
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Keohane set forth his own theory of hegemony in the 1984’s book After Hegemony. 
This came to challenge the first HST formulation instead.  
The kernel of Keohane’s argument is «hegemonic cooperation», premised on 
capability and willingness as foundation of any stable international regime. Hegemonic 
cooperation is interlocking interaction of cooperative behaviors and behavioral frictions 
whose balance rests on the asymmetry of relations. «Asymmetrical cooperation» is thus 
the source of hegemonic power. Cooperation, in this respect, is not absence of conflict – 
harmony does not foster cooperation Keohane says – but controlled discord, that is, a 
process that taps the inter-state frictions to create international agreement around core-
values. Hegemony thus is not simply asymmetric power but a shifting ensemble of 
leadership and deference, consent and threat, leading to a driven definition and 
concerted application of the international system’s rules. Against the early IR theories 
such as realism and first HST, material supremacy by itself does not give rise to a stable 
system nor an effective leadership. The would-be hegemon needs to invest resources, 
both material and ideological, in the building of an apposite institutional scenario to 
ensure the other countries will follow its preferred rules. To do so, he is to translate its 
power into a research strategy of shared interests and mutual advantages which curtails 
inter-national transaction costs, mitigates uncertainty, and bolsters the stability of the 
system. In sum, cooperation, and hence hegemony, rests on «expectations, on 
transaction costs, and on uncertainty» all at once. Therefore, «Hegemony and 
cooperation are not alternatives; on the contrary, they are often found in symbiotic 
relationships with one another»
9
.  
It seems clear that Keohane’s hegemony comes not to be engendered by peculiar 
structural and organizational features of the hegemon itself whose organic deployment 
gives rise to the greater power, material and cultural-ideological alike. The kernel of 
Keohane’s theoretical framework pivots on the translation process of resources, both 
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material and ideological-cultural, into international rules that foster the «right kind» of 
cooperation for the Hegemon itself. Hegemony is the best translation process.  
Robert Cox headed another direction instead. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci, Cox 
conceptualized the first overt instance of hegemony in IR as value-based leadership. 
The nub of Gramsci’s musings, referred to class or national hegemony, is the following:  
 
the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as "domination" and as "intellectual 
and moral leadership". A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate", or to 
subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed 
must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the 
principal conditions for the winning of such power) ; it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises 
power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as well
10
. 
 
In a nutshell: Cox applies such a concept of hegemony to states and world order. 
Hegemony is a condition in which a state sorts out and protects a world order of states 
which find – or believe so – useful and profitable the hegemonic order itself because of 
in line with their own interests. But, according to Cox, world order is «universal in 
conception». It comprises international system + civil society, therefore hegemony does 
not proceed to regulate inter-relations among states alone but it must penetrate and 
permeate global civil society as well. World hegemony, «in its beginning», is the 
projection of the hegemon’s social structure of power and production relations, consent 
and coercion, that becomes «pattern of emulation abroad»
11
. This projection is to set the 
world parameters of international behavior, accepted and adopted both at the core and at 
the periphery with different degrees of penetration, adhesion or contention.
 
Hegemony 
is first «a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links 
into other subordinate modes of production». It conjoins then the social classes of 
different nations by way of the (re-)formulation of a whole set of economic, social and 
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political – «universal» – values and norms, institutions and mechanisms – «the 
intellectual and moral leadership» – according to which states and civil societies are to 
behave. The international organization is the means whereby «la direzione» comes 
spread out on universal plane. The international organization is both product and 
expression of «the rules which facilitate the expansion of the hegemonic world orders», 
a device of legitimation, the instrument for elites’ cooptation, notably in the periphery 
(trasformismo), and the first and foremost barrier against counter-hegemonic thrusts
12
.  
Hegemony «means dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an 
order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to 
general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or 
states and leading social classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of 
satisfaction to the less powerful»
13
.  
In essence Cox’s hegemony resembles a historical bloc on a world scale: the 
projection of power unto and onto the web of state relations stems from the articulation 
of social and power relations of production which involve the further and consequent 
projection of the «contradictory and discordant ensemble of superstructures», that is, of 
values and norms which ultimately are to define a world hegemony. But no systematic 
theoretical-historical analysis and explanation of articulation of social and power 
relations of production, and of the intertwined fabric of “structural and superstructural” 
constituents, both internal to the hegemon and integral to a world hegemony, is 
provided
14
.  
Some years later, Robert Gilpin put forth a theory of hegemony which is instead a 
theory of systemic change in world politics, that is, of the dynamics of international 
governance’s change. In essence, according to Gilpin, at the roots of a hegemony, and 
of a hegemonic order, lies «the differential growth of power in the system». To Gilpin, 
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hegemonies rise and fall pursuant to changes in the differential among unities, whose 
oscillation in time causes challenges, disorder and war
15
. 
The core of the process of hegemonic constitution and succession lies in the 
underlying process of power distribution, concentration and redistribution on 
international scale which is entrained by competition through emulation
16
. Once a 
hegemony is established, an international heiarchy of power comes into existence as 
well. But such a system of competition through emulation is bound to generate in time a 
slow but inescapable process of power de-concentration and hierarchical destructuring. 
The scattering proceeds from the hegemonic center to the system, and notably to those 
states which successfully succeed in emulation. Emulation sets about destabilizing the 
international order by giving rise to a mounting «incompatibility» between the world 
structure of the established hegemony and the new formations of power which 
commence putting forward. The international arrangements thus become progressively 
unstable owing to the narrowing of inter-state differential gaps. «In time, the differential 
rates of growth of declining and rising states in the system produce a decisive 
redistribution of power and result in disequilibrium in the system»
17
.  
The incipient redistribution of power gives rise to an incremental cost escalation 
for the retention of the international order to the incumbent hegemon, and the 
progressive cost curtailment for the making of a new international configuration to the 
would-be hegemonic states or, arguably, to the better equipped state which leads the 
confrontation. Within a destabilized order, the latter hence «begins to appreciate that it 
can increase its own gains by forcing changes in the nature of the system»
18
. As the 
equilibrium of forces peaks, the disequilibrium in the international order climaxes. This 
contradiction is bound to create in time the further intensification of challenges and 
disorder whose resolution is found in the outbreak and intensification of what becomes 
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a war for hegemony, «a hegemonic war», a systemic war for power that alters the 
international order in depth. 
 
The most important consequence of a hegemonic war is that it changes the system in accordance 
with the new international distribution of power; it brings about a reordering of the basic components of 
the system. Victory and defeat reestablish an unambiguous hierarchy of prestige congruent with the new 
distribution of power in the system. The war determines who will govern the international system and 
whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order. The war leads to a redistribution 
of territory among the states in the system, a new set of rules of the system, a revised international 
division of labor, etc. As a consequence of these changes, a relatively more stable international order and 
effective governance of the international system are created based on the new realities of the international 
distribution of power. 
 
In sum: the hegemonic war is the value carrier of the order that is to come and 
hegemony is the bringer of the «ideas and values [that] will predominate, thereby 
determining the ethos of succeeding ages»19. In essence, this final remark places the nub 
of Gilpin’s hegemony near to Cox’s one. Gilpin views a systemic hegemony as 
structured on power deployment, on material incentives and payoffs, but also on the 
values which it brings with it and radiates. In other words, it is by means of the 
intermeshing of coercion and consent at international level that a hegemony rises and 
endures
20
. 
Thus far, the research queries which lie at the roots of all these accounts have 
been in essence the following: 
 
How do hegemons assert control over other nations within the international system? Through what 
mechanisms does control get established, and by what processes does it erode? How is compliance 
achieved, and how is it maintained?
21
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The question of how the hegemon generates power – internal factors, vectors, and 
inner dynamics – to assert this control over other nations is completely ignored. The 
above questions are archetypical. They conceptualize the power of the hegemon as 
given, that is, the hegemonic power is already there and the problem is to see how the 
hegemon will project his power to master the other states as well as the hows, and in 
what measure, the other states will accept his power.  
Ikenberry-Kupchan’s theory of hegemonic socialization is the blatant instance. 
The core lies on the process of socialization – i.e. cooptation – of the other state’s 
leaders to the «substantial beliefs» which the hegemon has produced, and the degree of 
hegemonic values internalization and factual re-articulation, both at home and on the 
international stage – «acquiescence». It is a process of inter-national learning in essence. 
As Ikenberry-Kupchan say, «The exercise of power […] involves the projection by the 
hegemon of a set of norms and their embrace by leaders in other nations». Power as 
socialization, normative or material alike, is the source of hegemony.  
The two students probe the workings by which hegemonic values and behavioral 
norms come to be accepted and then embedded into societies and elites. The theory 
posits that such a process occurs notably within periods of crisis (i.e. war), both national 
and/or international, in which states, governments and masses are destabilized and 
weak, and thus fertile enough to be receptive to new and alluring prospects of 
prosperity. The instability hence makes the international system prone to structural and 
normative alterations. Indeed, hegemonic socialization is premised on it and by way of 
it that the hegemon succeeds in swiftly establishing and consolidating its position within 
the interstate system. A new international order gets established based on the new set of 
institutions, norms and values formulated and put forward by the hegemon and which 
are to structure international relations and elites’ behavior. But socialization needs 
material inducement to come about: «That is, socialization is distinct from, but does not 
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occur independently of, power manifest as the manipulation of material incentives». 
Material manipulation and beliefs implementation are the two constituents of 
hegemony.  
The hegemon buys into systemic material inducements which in turn entice 
masses and elites to buy into the hegemon’s vision of world order and order of society. 
Therefore, material power is the obverse of hegemonic values and normative leadership 
at systemic level, and both of them are part and parcel of the same process of 
hegemonic international ordering. But only once values become internalized by the 
secondary states’ elites, that is, once those states set about operating according to the 
hegemonic rules, socialization is fulfilled. «Power is thus exercised through a process of 
socialization in which the norms and value orientations of leaders in secondary states 
change and more closely reflect those of the dominant state». In turn, international 
socialization consolidates hegemony: «rule based on might is enhanced by rule based on 
right»
22
.  
Ikenberry-Kupchan posit three mechanisms through which socializations works: 
normative persuasion, external inducement and internal reconstruction. All three of 
them work by way of an uneven amalgam of coercion and consent. Normative 
persuasion is put into operation by means of ideological thrusts and diplomatic agencies 
– «cooperation through legitimate domination». It operates primarily when hegemonic 
power succeeds in presenting itself as alluring and masses see the hegemonic pact as the 
way of seizing wealth and stability. In this case then, secondary states’ elites wittingly 
set about aligning themselves to cater to the masses’ expectations and to achieve the 
opportunities of payoff the hegemonic power offers; in the second case, material 
incentives are needed if elites are to adopt the “upright” hegemonic policies and to 
adjust their relational strategies – «compliance through coercion». In this case, «Belief 
in the normative underpinnings of the system emerges gradually as elites seek to bring 
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their policies and value orientations into line»; finally, internal reconstruction involves a 
direct intervention of the hegemon which reorganizes the secondary state’s structure and 
institutional infrastructure. This form of coercion implies a compliance through 
imposition, whereby the process of socialization takes place once elites in the secondary 
state become accustomed to the new institutions and gradually come to accept them as 
their own
23
. 
 
For the present discussion, the purport of Ikenberry-Kupchan’s theory is crystal-
clear on its own and no further elaboration is called for. What is arresting in such an 
ensemble of remarkable studies is that all the theories of hegemony are not any different 
in their conceptual core. All of them profile hegemony as a projection of power; all of 
them profile hegemony as an uneven and shifting conflation of consent and coercion in 
essence. What truly changes is the process – and the description thereof –  according to 
which this power projection is put into operation, that is, the hows hegemony is 
projected towards and into the international system, states, elites and masses. But this is 
only the overtness of a hegemony. It is the hegemony perception. 
 
 
2.1.2 Pattern of hegemony 2 
 
Whereas the focus of the foregoing has been on the theories developed, all in all, 
within the political sciences and IRs studies, the present section probes the theories of 
those students which are engaged in world-systemic studies, within and without the 
political sciences and IR. Four leading scholars shall be taken into account: George 
Modelski, Joshua Goldstein, Giovanni Arrighi and, finally, Immanuel Wallerstein. As 
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we shall see, whereas the first three of them deploy a conceptual framework in essence 
akin to the one already discussed – although premised on different bases and developed 
through which a different theoretical articulation –, Immanuel Wallerstein lends a 
different characterization of hegemony. The American scholar shall be thus the stepping 
stone to argue the hegemon’s perspective24. 
System perspectives posit that the most useful unit to investigate the framework of 
human relations in time – political, economic, social, and so forth – is the social system, 
in brief, an arrangement or organization of human space which typifies the reality 
within and over which it unfolds. Here, we are interested in two specific ways to see an 
organization of human space: the first one views it as spanning the world as a whole by 
its own. This is a world system, or global system, an open-ended system with no given 
spatial boundaries if not the limits of the planet itself, and whose functioning – cycles, 
trends, rhythms and workings – is not strictly defined by an all-encompassing self-
contained logic (nature); by contrast, we can view such arrangements as though 
encompass and characterize only a part of world space (and time): within given, but not 
fixed, spatio-temporal limits, such an organization is to deploy its logic of operation, 
mechanisms of functioning and patterns of development. This is a world-system in 
essence, a social system whose internal reality operates as mostly self-contained and 
governed by a specific logic (nature) which defines its functional and spatio-temporal 
movements and workings as a whole. Regardless, the focus of the analysis is 
organization: parts, trends and cycles are investigated to elucidate the whole. 
Regardless, the world(-)system hegemony is viewed as part and parcel (property) of the 
same historical process of systemic development, and important, if crucial, moment in 
the systemic functioning. As epitomized by a state, hegemony is a part of the system; as 
depicted by a curve of historical power, hegemony is a trend; as distinguished by the 
trajectory of its own rise and fall, hegemony is a cycle. 
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George Modelski falls into the first category of WSA. According to the American 
scholar, hegemony is, in a nutshell, legitimate leadership of a global power within the 
modern world system and its organizations of global interactions. Legitimate power 
thus enables to run the so-called global polity – upon which Modelski’s analysis is 
focused. Differently from Hegemony 1, Modelski’s pattern of hegemony can be seized 
only in the intertwining of global powers and system dynamics. In this respect, the 
history of the modern world is thus molded by the unfolding and the demise of global 
powers’ cycles whose succession in time defines the shape and history of the modern 
world system and its sub-systems.
25
.  
Within the modern world system, global powers have always been nation-states
26
 
integral to the global political system, «the topmost political structure» of the world 
system. The global polity is «the structure for the management of global 
interdependence» among nation-states, and as a whole, the global political system is a-
territorialized – a global power is «weakly institutionalized», that is, the global political 
system has never had an overriding authority able to deploy centralized politics within a 
centralized polity. In other words, world powers have never produced world states
27
. 
The global powers are «entities uniquely dominant» which lead the global polity, and 
whose cycles of power and patterns of interaction structure the global polity and 
constitutes a long systemic cycles of global politics – Modelski’s hegemonic cycle. The 
cycles are an inherent property of the system which builds up itself through their own 
succession in time. This is what distinguishes Modelski’s theory: the cycle of global 
politics and power «is an endogenous model of periodicity in the global system; 
explicating how cycles in effect are the product of the structure and properties of the 
system itself rather than of the environment within which it operates»
28
.  
Therefore, the cycle – a time bout defined by regularity and evolution – is the 
basic functional-temporal unit of the system and pattern of systemic order. It comprises 
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two systemic long phases, the ascending and the descending one, which move the 
system through time. The two phases are parted into four intra-phases of leadership 
constitution and dissolution: global war, world power, delegitimation and 
deconcentration. As for Ikenberry-Kupchan, and in essence like Gilpin
29
, any long cycle 
of world politics is sorted out in periods of international weakness and instability, and 
sealed in a global war which eventually crowns a new world power, and lays the 
foundations for a new order of world politics. The global war – akin to Gilpin’s 
hegemonic war – is thus crucial because it represents a «systemic decision» and a 
creative political-systemic moment
30
.  
As in any hegemonic cycle, also a cycle of power concentration spawned 
emulation and thus competition which in time undermines the foundations of the order 
and wears out the capability of the global power to run the system. It is in this moment 
that «the system moves into multipolarity. Rivalries among the major powers grow 
fiercer and assume the characteristics of oligopolistic competition. Gradually, as order 
dissolves, the system moves toward its original point of departure, that of minimal order 
and a Babel of conflicting and mutually unintelligible voices»
31
. Oligopolistic rivalry, 
impelled by the structural inability to redistribute systemically the proceeds of global 
status, is bound to create in time the conditions for the next global conflagration. Or, in 
other words, the cyclical fluctuations that move the system from periods of power 
concentration to periods of power deconcentration are the outgrowth of «the most vital 
of all secular» tendencies of the modern world system and world politics: the cyclical 
(because a state rises and falls within cycles) and the incremental (as world system 
trend) formation and strengthening of nation-states.  
Differently from Gilpin and Ikenberry, underlying the rise and fall of a leading 
power lies thus the oscillation in time of the systemic differential as a whole. For 
inherent in the oligarchic and hierarchical system’s logic of development, it is the 
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system itself which in essence breeds its own leading powers, because it is the system as 
a whole which demands leadership. That is, the system needs a leading power to 
develop and endure, for a global power itself responds to systemic problems and 
functions that must be confronted if the system is to work
32
. The system thus selects 
leadership Modelski says. The systemic fluctuations as overall dynamics engender 
hence the conditions for the birth of a leading global power, whose order displays four 
recurrent, and thus historically proven, properties: global ordering from global war; 
monopoly rents from global military-coercive leadership; functional specificity from 
specific global assets and operations
33; the global power’s functional network – that is, 
«maximum global functions with minimal territorial burdens»
34
. Such properties depict, 
in actuality, the global power’s scheme of systemic operations, its historical nature as 
well as the nature of the global power’s leadership. 
The systemic school of the political sciences lends thickness and striking 
complexity to the analysis of the dynamics of the modern world. Joshua Goldstein is 
arguably the foremost instance. Despite such an extraordinary complexity, the concept 
of hegemony remains, in essence, the same: «hegemonic power is a core state that 
commands an unrivaled position of economic and military superiority among the core 
states and is thus able largely to shape the operation of the international system»
35
.  
Hegemonic power is a systemic commanding relation in an ensemble of inter-
national relations which mold the operational structure of the modern world system. 
More specifically, hegemony is one of the two end points of a systemic «sequence» of 
power relations among states defining the power continuum within the interstate 
system, and within which the interstate power oscillates according to a pattern that 
historically ranges from hegemony to rivalry. The systemic fluctuations own an inherent 
cyclical scheme also: the time span that goes from a situation in which power is 
systemically polarized – hegemony – to a situation in which power is systemically 
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scattered – rivalry – encompasses and defines an entire hegemony cycle. But cycle is 
not synonym of mere repetition: any historical cycle owns its own structural, relational 
and operational features. Evolution and repetition are systemic feature of hegemonic 
cycles whose developmental «spirals embodies both types of motion cyclical and linear. 
The end point of a long cycle is not the same as its beginning . Long cycles are not a 
mechanical process but a repetition of themes, processes, and relationships along the 
path of an evolving social system. The world system itself is not only changing through 
time in a quantitative sense but also passing through qualitative stages of development 
over time»
36
.  
What truly distinguishes Goldstein’s theory however – regardless of the historical 
instantiation which is not the point of this chapter – is the time scale according to which 
a hegemonic cycle unfolds, and the historical pattern that intertwines a hegemonic cycle 
and long waves of economy and politics. According to Goldstein, the span of time that 
uses up and rounds off a hegemony cycle – that is, the peak in the process of power 
scattering – tends to outreach both political and economic long waves inherent in the 
same cycle (Kondratieff – Modelski as instance). Indeed, Goldstein numbers the 
hegemonic cycles at three in the history of the modern world system (Holland, Great 
Britain and US), of roughly 150 years each, comprising in fact nine cycles of political-
economic long waves in a span of time that goes from the end of the XV century to 
1945
37
. Interestingly, Goldstein does not find any strong historical evidence to assert a 
direct connection between the causal dynamics of a hegemony cycle and long waves. 
«They are not synchronized, and there is no exact number of long waves that “makes 
up” a hegemony cycle. Rather – Goldstein says –  I see the two cycles as playing out 
over time, each according to its own inner dynamic but each conditioned by, and 
interacting with, the other»
38
.  
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Different systemic outcomes originate from the end of a long wave and the 
depletion of a cycle. According to Goldstein, the end of any long wave, economic or 
political alike, tends to bring on a power fluctuation which in turn tends to breed a kind 
of war that simply readjusts the international power structure and the polarization of 
power in the continuum «without bringing in a new hegemony»
39
. The kind of war that 
starts at the end of a long wave is not a war for hegemony such as the one starting at the 
end of the cycle – it is qualitatively different since the fluctuations have not peaked yet 
as well as the process of rivalries’ accretion and hegemonic decline. As a result, the 
structure of international relations succeeds in re-balancing itself around the incumbent 
hegemon that keeps wielding power. Only once the power fluctuations make the system 
of hegemonic relations completely unstable and destabilized – namely, hegemony is 
irretrievably worn out and (as) the process of rivalries’ accretion climaxes – hegemonic 
war begins. A hegemonic war is to be the historical peak of the process of hegemonic 
decline and moment of systemic change in which a new configuration of power sets 
about unfolding and a new would-be hegemon arising.  
Goldstein insightfully does not regard power, and hegemonic power for example, 
as something that is generated in self-contained realms – economic, political, military, 
and so forth – but as an entwined domain of politics and economy that bestows the 
ability and capability on the hegemon to formulate and dominate in turn norms and the 
international arrangements. Premised thus on the greater military-economic power, 
hegemony becomes systemic ability to arrange international relations to cater to the 
hegemon’s interests, that is «the ability of one country to center the world economy 
around itself [and] to dominate the world militarily». This capacity is deployed 
unevenly accordingly to the up and downswings of systemic long waves and the related 
wars. Also, it is not possible to pinpoint a single trigger factor to account for a 
hegemony, but economic and military power concentration is regarded as a single 
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though differentiated bundle of power relations
40
. However as in all the previous 
instances, Goldstein provides no systematic theoretical-historical explanation of such 
bundled trigger factors breeding hegemonic power (from the inside). 
We have just seen the two main instances of systemic studies in IRs, and, along 
with the previous four, they arguably represent the main studies on hegemony – and the 
most influential ones as well – pertaining to the sphere of the Political Sciences. The 
ensuing, instead, represent the main instances of hegemonic theory pertaining to the 
world-system analysis. We begin with Giovanni Arrighi. 
Giovanni Arrighi conceptualizes world hegemony in its Gramscian purport. But, 
differently from Robert Cox, he views a hegemony explicitly as a way to account for 
expansion and change of the capitalist world-economy as a whole. He thereby aims at 
illuminating the mechanism through which the structure of the modern world-system 
changes over time. A world hegemony becomes thus integral to the mechanism of 
structural change inherent in a structurally variant capitalism
41
.  
 
The concept of "world hegemony" […] refers to the power of a state to exercise governmental 
functions over a system of sovereign states. In principle, this power may just involve the ordinary 
management of such a system as instituted at a given time. […] however, the government of a system of 
sovereign states in practice always involves some kind of transformative action that changes the mode of 
operation of the system in a fundamental way.
 
 
 
Hegemony becomes thus the «additional power» that enables to undertake such a 
profound transformative action. Arrighi elaborates on the Gramscian complexion of 
world hegemony to understand what such a additional power implies and where it 
comes from
42
.  
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Arrighi is pure Gramsci. Hegemony is leadership. Hegemony is a function of the 
world-system operations: a hegemonic state leads the system of states in a direction that 
allows to cater to hegemonic interests and aims, whose pursuit are perceived as 
universal – that is, as fulfilling the general interests of the system of states as a whole. 
By virtue of this perceived universality, such a status turns out to be self-defeating for 
«over time it enhances competition for power rather than the power of the hegemon» – 
the Schumpeterian «leadership against one's own will», Arrighi says
43
. Hegemony is 
thus power deployed, self-replenished by systemic perception and defused by its own 
projection. Hegemony becomes a condition of «power inflation», whose unfolding 
within the modern world-system is always bound to produce the condition of its own 
«deflation» (Talcott Parson). Whereas the latter entails forms of coercion and material 
violence which evade the hegemonic function, the former «ensues from the capacity of 
dominant groups to present with credibility their rule as serving not just their interests, 
but those of subordinate groups as well»; or, more precisely, it ensues from the 
hegemonic achievements which lend the status of “model” to a world power, triggering 
emulation and thereby drawing the other states onto the hegemonic path of 
development. In short, world hegemony is the world credibility of a model of 
development and power. «A state may therefore become world hegemonic because it 
can claim with credibility to be the motor force of a universal expansion of the 
collective power of rulers vis-à-vis subjects»
44
. As a consequence, a hegemon will lead 
the system and this lead will heavily mark the time ahead – the transformative action –  
(Gilpin-Modelski-Cox). 
In this respect, world hegemony is part of a systemic mechanism that drives the 
capitalist world-system forward. The systemic trajectory of world hegemony consists of 
two interlocking moments or joints that permitted the articulation of the phases of 
hegemonic rise, decline and breakdown, and the succession of cycles. As a whole, it is 
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integral to the overall systemic cycles of power accumulation, change and expansion 
that characterizes the history of the modern world-system – and that pivoted on the 
Dutch, the English and the US hegemonic complexes
45
. Herein, we can only sketch 
them out roughly
46
. 
The first moment is characterized by a systemic shift: from a general condition of 
power inflation to a general situation of power deflation. This marks the historical 
pattern and path of world hegemony. The initial condition of hegemonic power is 
characterized by a structural weakness of competitive pressure buttressed thanks to the 
universal reach and perception of the world power that enables and underpins the 
hegemonic function. However, in time hegemony stirs up competition and emulation 
that set about defusing the same function at world-systemic level by intensifying 
systemic pressures, interstate rivalries and social conflicts on world-systemic scale, 
thereby spawning new interstitial configurations of power – a general condition of 
structural intensity of competitive pressure on the hegemonic power which the same 
pattern of power inflation-deflation activates. In sum, such a condition signals the 
scattering of the hegemonic power and peculiarities towards the system as a whole
47
. 
The conjunctural shift from one situation to another marks the historical-systemic 
trajectory of ascent and wane of world hegemony
48
. 
This shift occurs within the recurrent systemwide financial expansions of the 
capitalist system
49
. They are integral part of hegemonic crises and hegemonic collapses, 
but they have a contradictory impact on the power of a world hegemony and on its 
crisis. The pattern of power inflation-deflation owns a tendential and uneven character 
in fact:  
 
on the one hand, [financial expansions hold crises and collapses] in check by temporarily inflating 
the power of the declining hegemonic state. As the "autumn" of major capitalist developments, financial 
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expansions are also the autumn of the hegemonic Structures in which these developments are embedded. 
They are the time when the leader of a major expansion of world trade and production that is drawing to a 
close reaps the fruits of its leadership in the form of a privileged access to the overabundant liquidity that 
accumulates in world financial markets. This privileged access enables the declining hegemonic state to 
contain, at least for a time, the forces that challenge its continuing dominance.  […] Thanks to its 
continuing centrality in networks of high finance, the declining hegemon could turn this competition to its 
advantage and thereby experience a reflation of its waning power
50
.  
 
This reflation enables the declining hegemonic state to contain, at least for a time, 
the forces that challenge its continuing dominance. But, 
 
On the other hand, financial expansions strengthen these same forces by widening and deepening 
the scope of interstate and interenterprise competition and social conflict, and by reallocating capital to 
emergent structures that promise greater security or higher returns than the dominant structure. Declining 
hegemonic states are thus faced with the Sisyphean task of containing forces that keep rolling forth with 
ever renewed strength. Sooner or later, even a small disturbance can tilt the balance in favor of the forces 
that wittingly or unwittingly are undermining the already precarious stability of existing structures, 
thereby provoking a breakdown of systemic organization
51
. 
 
Hegemonic transition – the second moment – is the turning point for the systemic 
change instead – that is, it not a conjunctural moment. It is the point in which 
hegemonic organization and hegemonic command disintegrate and systemic chaos sets 
in. But it is also the moment in which a new hegemony comes to be forged: 
 
Increasing systemic disorganization curtails the collective power of the system's dominant groups. 
And the greater the curtailment, the more widely and deeply felt the demand for system-level governance. 
Nevertheless, this demand can be satisfied and a new hegemony can emerge only if increasing systemic 
disorganization is accompanied by the emergence of a new complex of governmental and business 
agencies endowed with greater system-level organizational capabilities than those of the preceding 
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hegemonic complex. […]therefore, the ensuing self-reinforcing disorder can be overcome, and the 
conditions of a new systemic expansion can be created, only if a new complex emerges that is endowed 
with greater systemic capabilities than the old hegemonic complex
52
. 
 
When a new hegemony arises, the cycle dynamic winds back. But any new cycle 
represents a completely new chapter in the history of the capitalist world-system, 
premised on completely new operational and organizational foundations. According to 
Giovanni Arrighi, the dialectic state-system is intrinsic to the history and dynamics of 
the modern world, and world hegemony is, at one time, the greatest lead, a systemic 
condition of order and relation and a leading pattern of system dynamics. As such, 
hegemony spurs on the capitalist world-system as a whole to change. This is to be led, 
structured on and organized by, hegemonic complexes whose growing historical 
complexity, scale and scope is the obverse of the greater historical complexity, scale 
and scope that the capitalist world-system shows in the succession of its phases of 
historical development, and vice versa
53
. A systemic phase of development, and the 
spatio-temporal trajectory thereof, comes thus to be defined by the general 
organizational characteristics that distinguish a hegemonic bloc of governmental and 
business agencies and by the operational «strategies and structures through which these 
leading agencies have promoted, organized, and regulated the expansion or the 
restructuring of the capitalist world-economy»
54
. Such a dynamic, for the Italian 
scholar, is part and parcel of the historical pattern of power accumulation, change and 
expansion which distinguishes the history of the capitalist world system.  
Thus far we have discussed three instances of hegemony theory: Modelski detects 
the political complexion of global power’s hegemony which is inertial derivate of the 
global system and of its dynamics; Goldstein maintains that hegemony is a relation of 
command entailing polarized power within a fluctuating sequence of systemic power 
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relations; Arrighi posits hegemony as additional power that universally legitimates the 
pursuit of its own interests and underpins and leads the dynamics of historical-systemic 
development. Arrighi alone argues the centrality of hegemonic organizational and 
operational capacities, but both always remain function and relation of the world system 
as a whole. All three of them are then anything but different in their conceptual core: 
hegemony is primarily if not entirely function of the world(-)system and it can and must 
be analyzed only as such: it is power projected towards the system and through the 
system. It is correct of course, but, again, partial; a moiety of a more comprehensive 
ensemble of power relations which envelope territoriality and globality
55
. Arrighi enters 
the issue but does not delve into it. His focus is and remains the investigation of the 
history of the world capitalist system and its structural-historical development as a 
whole. 
Arrighi homed in on the direction that Wallerstein had already taken more than a 
decade ago. Although, with his coworker and friend, the prime mover remains the 
understanding of the modern world-system as a whole, Wallerstein emphasizes the 
whys and the hows a great power becomes an hegemony from within
56
.  
According to Wallerstein, hegemony is firstly inner power and then capacity to 
funnel the same power unto the system, representing «a way of organizing [the] 
perception» of world-systemic processes
57
. The key to unfold hegemony is the internal 
«degree to which the political rules reflect the balance of interests among owner-
producers such that a working “hegemonic bloc” (to use a Gramscian expression) forms 
the stable underpinnings of [a] state». Likewise to Cox, hegemonic power can unfold as 
a result of the more suitable political agreement between the state and its capitalist bloc, 
making «the politics of the class struggle» crucial
58
. In fact, according to American 
student, the hegemonies of the capitalist world-system are primarily the result of an 
internal conglomerate of economic factors that provide motor force to deploy state 
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power over space. By virtue of such an internal arrangement, hegemonies manage to 
organize and run world trade, production and finance. At its roots, hegemony demands 
the greater efficiency of the agro-industrial complex of a state. This leads to world trade 
supremacy. Supremacy in world trade enables ultimately to control world finance – 
banking (exchange, deposit, and credit) and investments (direct and portfolio). «These 
superiorities are successive, but they overlap in time» 
59
. The politics of class struggle 
stands out as decisive to produce such successive superiorities. The agro-industrial 
productive bloc constitutes condition for dominance at large, notably in the sphere of 
economy, albeit the pre-condition to constitute a hegemony lies on class struggle
60
. 
Therefore, agro-industrial efficiency, premised on a proper balance of interests among 
capital and labor within the state, is condition to hegemony in the world-economy
61
.  
From the perspective of the world-system as a whole, Wallerstein, before 
Goldstein, sees hegemony as a systemic relation of command, the end of «a fluid 
continuum which describes the rivalry relations among great powers to each other», 
oscillating from power balance to hegemony, whereof the latter is an unstable and 
momentary condition
62
. Hegemony is a temporary situation in which a single great 
power overrules any other rival so largely to impose its command in any domain of 
human experience (economic, social, cultural, political and so forth). But, regardless, 
«The material base of such power lies in the ability of enterprises domiciled in that 
power to operate more efficiently in all three major economic arenas-agro-industrial 
production, commerce and finance. The edge in efficiency […] is one so great that these 
enterprises can not only outbid enterprise domiciled in other great powers in the world 
market in general, but quite specifically in very many instances within the home 
markets of the rival powers themselves»
63
. Rivalry is therefore wiped out because such 
an inner arrangement of forces bestows power to overrule any competitor. In sum: 
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hegemonic power – the efficiency edge – begets systemic hegemony. Without the 
former the latter cannot exist. 
Wallerstein poses an apt question to elucidate this equation state-system: 
 
What is there in the functioning of a capitalist world-economy that gives rise to such a cyclical 
pattern in the interstate system? I believe this pattern of the rise, temporary ascendancy, and fall of 
hegemonic powers in the interstate system is merely one aspect of the central role of the political 
machinery in the functioning of capitalism as a mode of production. […]. In fact, capitalism is defined by 
the partially free flow of the factors of production and by the selective interference of the political 
machinery in the "market." Hegemony is an instance of the latter. What defines capitalism most 
fundamentally is the drive for the endless accumulation of capital. The interferences that are "selected" 
are those which advance this process of accumulation
64
.  
 
The process of state interference sets the conditions for systemic hegemony which 
in turn rests on the internal efficiency edge. Transitively, the efficiency edge allows an 
effective interference in the world market that ultimately enables to run world-systemic 
processes of capital accumulation. State interference has tremendous costs which only 
by way of the amplest edge of efficiency can be carried out.  
To sustain a systemic process of hegemonic constitution, the state is to rake and 
organize resources from its national economy; it is to re-employ them by putting into 
operation the most efficient political-economic strategy in order to select the best 
entrepreneurs and to foster the more efficient capital accumulation, Wallerstein argues. 
The state must manage thus internal flows of capital, goods, prices and labor, and create 
the best fiscal base to operate more efficiently – subsidies, restraints of trade, tariffs,  
guarantees, maxima for input prices and minima for output prices, etc., are instances of 
internal interference. If state fiscality and management of flows, that is, the political 
economy of a state, is so efficiently activated to succeed in affecting the internal rate of 
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accumulation to bolster processes of competitive selection, the more efficient 
oligopolistic agro-industrial bloc is to form. The combination of competitive thrust and 
constant state interference is to give rise to continuing pressures towards capital 
concentration that will provide the capabilities to interfere effectively in the world 
market.  
This very process is of course a systemic process of power production, that is, 
many core states employ, in different ways, the best strategy to gain power. And it is in 
this way that rivalry escalates and a world war is bound to start. A world war, that 
usually lasts thirty years ca., will decide which state has put into operation the best 
strategy of power re/production. To be sure, the struggle can be «very dramatic 
militarily and politically. But the profoundest effect [is] economic. The winner's 
economic edge is expanded by the very process of the war itself, and the post-war 
interstate settlement is designed to encrust that greater edge and protect it against 
erosion». Such an encrustation, according to Wallerstein, is premised on the most 
efficient strategy to maintain order and peace (within a capitalist world-economy), at 
systemic and state level: global and internal liberalism: 
 
A given state thus assumes its world "responsibilities" which are reflected in its diplomatic, 
military, political, ideological, and cultural stances. All conspires to reinforce the cooperative relationship 
of the entrepreneurial strata, the bureaucratic strata, and with some lag the working-class strata of the 
hegemonic power. This power may then be exercised in a "liberal" form given the real diminution of 
political conflict within the state itself compared to earlier and later periods, and to the importance in the 
interstate arena of delegitimizing the efforts of other state machineries to act against the economic 
superiorities of the hegemonic power. 
 
However, the appeasement has its obverse: the diffusion of hegemonic 
peculiarities and strategies. Once the process of emulation starts, the hegemon is bound 
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to decline for its own edges vis-à-vis the other core states set about vanishing – notably 
with the  diffusion of technology, the economic and then the military edge are both 
strongly flattened. The decline is inevitable at systemic level but also at level of the 
hegemon’s organization: «the internal political price of liberalism, needed to maintain 
uninterrupted production at a time of maximal global accumulation, is the creeping rise 
of real income of both the working strata and the cadres located in the hegemonic 
power. Over time, this must reduce the competitive advantage of the enterprises located 
in this state. Once the clear productivity edge is lost, the structure cracks» and, in doing 
so, hegemony comes to be eroded at any level. 
In essence, Wallerstein argues that the economic edge, which is encrusted at 
world-systemic level through the world war, engenders the necessary political edge to 
expand the material power of the state. It comes about by way of a mixture of consent – 
«global liberalism» and internal liberalism – and coercion – military power and 
“legislative” threats – which boost in turn the internal and systemic economic 
advantage. Such a mixture breeds hegemony and simultaneously its own demise. 
Hegemony is thus a «process in time» whose payoffs are obtained not simply by means 
of the most efficient processes of capital accumulation, both internal and systemic, but 
also through strong political pressures and cultural sway. It combines the internal 
organization of the state and the external leadership in the system as dialectically 
constituted – the former, requirement for the latter65. 
From the most strenuous proponent of the world-systemic gaze comes the most 
comprehensive perspective on hegemony. Wallerstein’s framework outlines the 
complexity of a historical phenomenon that, for its own character, needs to be 
investigated as «seamless» to be understood. Such a phenomenal seamlessness, in 
general, is exactly the scientific cutoff which Modern Science – inasmuch Newtonian 
(and Cartesian) mode of knowledge production – has always disowned and never 
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grasped
66. In turn, the artlessness of Wallerstein’s narrative has dimmed his trailblazing 
way of seeing reality and unfolding analytic enterprises, banishing or ostracizing it as 
simplistic or even unrigorous. But it is far from being the truth. As we have seen, and as 
far as we are concerned here, Wallerstein puts forth a complete hegemonic scheme that 
deserves to be further elaborated. Wallerstein envisaged something that lasted mostly 
unexplored in any analysis on hegemony. A moiety of the hegemonic scheme has been 
widely studied – hegemony as a projection of power. What the remainder of the chapter 
will show is a perspective that endeavors to flesh out what Wallerstein sketched out in 
1980.  
 
 
2.2 The Hegemon’s Perspective  
 
2.2.1 The Trialectic of State, Capital and Society  
 
Hannah Arendt in The Origin of Totalitarianism reasons on the theme of power, 
state and capital. Her arguments represent the early inspiration for the present 
perspective
67
. In Chapter 5, devoted to bourgeoisie’s ascent and Nation-states’ 
expansion, she makes engrossing assertions concerning the relationship between 
economy and politics within the framework of imperialist-capitalist expansion and 
power.  
Let me start out by noting that Arendt sees the contradictory link between the 
topmost and best form of political spatial differentiation and social oppositional 
segmentation in history, that is, the nation-state –  as jurisdictional space of legitimate 
conflict and spatial unit defined by strong and legally-established geographical and 
 108 
 
operative boundaries – and the unique sake for the expansion which is inherent in the 
operations of nation-states as a crucial operative unit of the capitalist world system’s 
dynamics. 
 
That a movement of expansion for expansion's sake grew up in nation-states which more than any 
other political bodies were defined by boundaries and the limitations of possible conquest, is one example 
of the seemingly absurd disparities between cause and effect which have become the hallmark of modern 
history. The wild confusion of modern historical terminology is only a by-product of these disparities. By 
comparisons with ancient Empires, by mistaking expansion for conquest, […],by neglecting, in other 
words, the difference between export of […] people and export of […] money, historians tried to dismiss 
the disturbing fact that so many of the important events in modern history look as though molehills had 
labored and had brought forth mountains 
68
. 
 
Meaning that the world expansion of nation-states can only be seized as world 
expansion of capital; and the world expansion of capital can only be understood as 
world expansion of nation-states, since the survival of both modern state and capital, 
due to being inextricably dovetailed, is inherently unconceivable with no world 
interlocked unfolding of their own. Such world-historical contradiction – firmly- and 
legally-established spatial boundaries vs. ceaseless spatial expansion – has defined the 
political, economic, socio-cultural and ecological complexion of western Modernity’s 
global expansion within the world system. This linkage brings us to another 
The global expansion of western Modernity made the link between capital and 
state not only necessary hence, but inevitable, for to bolster the ceaseless pursuit of 
power and capital inherent in an expanding world system of relations committed to the 
valorization and accumulation of capital, the power of state and the power of capital 
themselves were to be interlocked and sealed in a single though multifaceted process of 
capitalist power accumulation: 
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Money could finally beget money because power, with complete disregard for all laws – economic 
as well as ethical – could appropriate wealth. Only when exported money succeeded in stimulating the 
export of power could it accomplish its owners' designs. Only the unlimited accumulation of power could 
bring about the unlimited accumulation of capital […].The [capitalist] concept of expansion, according to 
which expansion is an end in itself and not a temporary means, made its appearance in political thought 
when it had become obvious that one of the most important permanent functions of the nation-state would 
be expansion of power
 69
. 
 
Within a system of independent states whose power of both state and system is 
premised on capitalist accumulation of capital, the ongoing pursuit of power is the 
continual and enlarged reproduction of capital and vice versa. The reproduction of 
capital and the production of power are a single capitalist bundle of relations whereof 
the state embodies its operational agency and a mode of spatial organization within the 
modern world system
70
. The permanent function of the nation-state is thus the capitalist 
expansion of power which is the capitalist expansion of capital.  
 
Then the test of achievement can indeed become meaningless and power can be thought of as the 
never-ending, self-feeding motor of all political action that corresponds to the legendary unending 
accumulation of money that begets money. The concept of unlimited expansion that alone can fulfill the 
hope for unlimited accumulation of capital, and brings about the aimless accumulation of power, makes 
the foundation of new political bodies […] well-nigh impossible71. 
 
This leads us to a further observation that tops off herein the outline (of part) of 
the modernity’s master process of capitalist power accumulation and world expansion. 
With Hobbes, Arendt argues that the national pattern of capitalist accumulation and 
modern body of power relations was put into operation since the seventeenth century 
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«under the guise of necessity [and] chance […]» – in a context in which the elevation 
of the pursuit of capitalist power to state-national level was compulsively thrusted out 
unto world space. Necessity and chance in turn gave rise to a struggle for stability in 
Europe that raged on the plane of universality. This universal conflict may be construed 
as the classical infighting between two historical systems, feudalism and capitalism, but 
it should be better interpreted as the outgrowth of their continental conflation
72
. 
Regardless, what the struggle brought was the stabilization of the capitalist world-
economy and the general formulation – but the limited implementation within state 
structures – of the modern rules of power73. With none of both – the European-based 
capitalist system and the nation-state – western society would have been «built on the 
sand» – as it arguably was since the nineteenth century, when the referred-to 
implementation started to be effectively put into operation at continental level to 
penetrate in depth the structure of the European nation-states; as a consequence indeed, 
the rootedness of capitalist territoriality allowed for intensive and extensive expansion 
of the capitalist system onto the terrestrial limit of the planet. Only at that time, indeed, 
the «Great Divergence» became crystal-clear. 
Only few were capable to avert the quicksand of such a conflict and contradiction 
during the seventeenth century. 
 
Since power is essentially only a means to an end a community based solely on power must decay 
in the calm of order and stability; its complete security reveals that it is built on sand. Only by acquiring 
more power can it guarantee the status quo; only by constantly extending its authority and only through 
the process of power accumulation can it remain stable
74
. 
 
But state power accumulation is only part of a master process of modernity 
formation that saw, in Europe, the accumulation of capital and the accumulation of 
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power as dialectically constituted. While, during the long XVI century, great part of 
Europe was not poised for such a unity of state and capital, because of still in essence 
permeated by processes of «political accumulation»
75
 – the would-be absolutist state, 
that is, the unlimited accumulation of power with no unlimited accumulation of capital –
, the forming Dutch Republic was since the origin structured on, and assembled in order 
to buttress, capitalist processes of power accumulation and expansion – the unlimited 
accumulation of power with the unlimited accumulation of capital
76
. Drawing on 
Hobbes thus, Arendt maintains that   
 
power as the motor of all things human and divine […] sprang from the theoretically indisputable 
proposition that a never-ending accumulation of property must be based on a never-ending accumulation 
of power. […].The limitless process of capital accumulation needs the political structure of so "unlimited 
a Power" that it can protect growing property by constantly growing more powerful. […].This process of 
never-ending accumulation of power necessary for the protection of a never-ending accumulation of 
capital determined the "progressive" ideology of the late nineteenth century and foreshadowed the rise of 
imperialism
77
. 
 
It is to be argued that the Seventeenth century Dutch Republic embodied firstly, 
but not lastly, the dialectical constitution of state and capital that Arendt asserts to be 
the harbinger of western modernity, and its global expansion; the investigation of the 
Dutch hegemon, explored according to the perspective to be argued, is to provide the 
historical portrayal of Arendt’s general assertions78.  
Along with Arendt’s theoretical underpinning, the second eminent source the 
present perspective draws on is Karl Polanyi, who will avail us to start out accounting 
also for some of the Dutch historical prerogatives
79. Arendt’s coextensive constitution 
of state and capital as a single process of power formation and accumulation intertwines 
Polanyi’s pivotal concept of «double movement», which in this respect can be rephrased 
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as follow. For Polanyi, in sum, the unabated expansion of capital and market calls for a 
countermovement of society protection «checking the expansion in definite directions». 
State and capital coextensiveness allows for capitalist processes of power accumulation 
but the direction the expansion is bound to take is intrinsically embedded in their 
specific historical intertwining with society. It is to be argued that this interlocked 
embeddedness was thus not distinctive of the nineteenth-century British «market 
fundamentalism», but of any hegemonic regime of accumulation leading the systemic 
cycles of power accumulation, expansion and change of the modern world-system, with 
its own peculiar features and historical dynamics. But let me start out from the 
inception. 
Firstly, it behooves to note that Polanyi readily acknowledges what represents the 
central tenet for the historical development of capitalism – and not simply of the market 
–, the core tenet according to which the capitalist world system operates: the 
«commodity fiction». 
 
The crucial point is this: labor, land, and money are essential elements of industry; they also must 
be organized in markets; in fact, these markets form an absolutely vital part of the economic system. But 
labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; […] In other words, according to the empirical 
definition of a commodity they are not commodities. […] The commodity description of labor, land and 
money is entirely fictitious. Nevertheless, it is with the help of this fiction that the actual markets for 
labor, land, and money are organized
80
. 
 
Such a fiction has operated unevenly in time and space according to the specific 
historical development of capitalism. As we shall see, the capitalist logic unfolded on 
the Dutch ground along four centuries and this unfolding brought about consequences 
such as the central role of the cash nexus and the market dynamics since the late middle 
ages. What is to be noted is that as a result, labor, land and money began to be 
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commodified – appropriated and/or capitalized. The historical analysis to be argued, in 
essence, makes Polanyi’s account more than a specific depiction of nineteenth-century 
liberalism. When the cash nexus, which is part of the capitalist logic of power, overrules 
other socio-ecological nexuses and logics, the commodity concept becomes the 
mechanism according to which the market is geared to social life in any time. 
 
The commodity fiction, therefore, supplies a vital organizing principle in regard to the whole of 
society affecting almost all its institutions in the most varied way, namely, the principle according to 
which no arrangement or behavior should be allowed to exist that might prevent the actual functioning of 
the market mechanism on the lines of the commodity fiction
81
. 
 
However, a corrective is always needed to regulate the functioning of this 
mechanism, for «to allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human 
beings and their natural environment indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing 
power, would result in the demolition of society». In this respect, as we shall detail in 
chapter 3, since the late middle ages the institutional framework of the Dutch had the 
central role of regulator of social life in accordance with the cash nexus and the market 
dynamics that was developing in the region. Since labor, land, and money are essential 
to any market economy, and to social life as well, Dutch commercial society was not 
only “protected” by its own institutional landscape, but the power of this developing 
market economy was funneled by way of it into bundles of relations patterned after the 
logic of capitalist accumulation and re/production. With no protection, no society, 
Polanyi says, «could stand the effects of such a system of crude fictions even for the 
shortest stretch of time unless its human and natural substance as well as its business 
organization» is protected as it was in a primordial but however effective way in 
Holland. «The extreme artificiality of market economy is rooted in the fact that the 
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process of production itself is here organized in the form of buying and selling. No 
other way of organizing production for the market is possible in a commercial society» 
as in Holland, it is argued, since the early formation of its capitalist ground. When 
money, land and labor began to be commodified, «the fiction of their being so produced 
became the organizing principle of society»
82
. But what does it mean?  
Here we step into Polanyi’s most contentious concept: embeddedness. That is, in 
sum, the idea that relates economy and society – plus state admittedly – as a single 
bundle of relations. Three leading interpretations are called forth herein. The first one – 
we can call it “the classic interpretation” – argues that Polanyi would have seen the 
historical normality of the embeddedness shattered by the resounding advancement of 
the self-regulating market, factual aim of nineteenth-century liberalism and theoretical 
pivot of the classical economists. Polanyi thus would have viewed the Great 
Transformation of the XIX century in the ungluing and unhorsing of economy from 
society, the former now having a motor force of its own. The self-regulating market 
became autonomous but at the same time it produced permanent and crushing social 
changes. In sum, this interpretation contends that, according to Polanyi, the rise of 
capitalism in the nineteenth century disembedded market economy from society and the 
former came to dominate the latter by virtue of its own separated capitalist motion. The 
XIX century represents the very breaking point of the dynamics that kept market 
economy going throughout history. To the writer, this is a radical misinterpretation 
which misconstrues and mistakes Polanyi’s thought from the roots. 
The second interpretation is the one put forward by Fernand Braudel. In Volume 
II of his magnus opus, Civilization and Capitalism, the French historian seems first to 
interpret Polanyi in a classic fashion: «the economy is only a 'sub-division of social life, 
one which is enveloped in the networks and constraints of social reality and has only 
disentangled itself recently (sometimes not even then) from these multiple threads» by 
 115 
 
virtue of the emergence of its capitalist complexion. That is, the process of 
disembedding is launched in the nineteenth century as upshots of the industrial 
expansion. But Braudel goes on: «If we are to believe Polanyi, it was not really until 
capitalism burst fully onto the world in the nineteenth century that the 'great 
transformation' took place, that the 'self-regulating' market achieved its true dimensions 
and subjugated the social factors hitherto dominant. Before this change, only controlled 
or false markets, or non-markets, could be said to exist». In view of this, Braudel’s 
interpretation seems to own nuances of ambiguity: Does the market free itself from the 
social fetters, detaching itself – becoming «disentangled» – in the XIX century, or, by 
achieving its «true dimensions», it subjugates – incorporates and determines – «the 
social factors hitherto dominant»?
83
. 
The third and most interesting interpretation is the one of Fred Block and 
Margaret Somers. According to the two students, what Polanyi in actuality posits in The 
Great Transformation is the harsh critique to the classic economists’ utopia according 
to which the self-regulating market is the most efficient mechanism of social regulation 
and equilibrium. By rejecting the theoretical strategy of the “invisible hand”, he avers 
the necessity to delve into the actual factuality of history instead. Against the classical 
economists, Polanyi would hence argue that the history of market economy is the story 
of the perennial and conflicting balance between the self-regulating thrust of the market 
and the countermovement for the protection of society against the «satanic» effects of 
the market itself. It is in this sense that the history of market economy is shaped by a 
«double movement», Block-Somers contend: «Polanyi demonstrates persuasively that, 
throughout the whole history of market society, the strength of protection effectively 
embeds the economy. He suggests that functioning market societies must maintain some 
threshold level of embeddedness or else risk social and economic disaster». In all this, 
the nineteenth century represented another moment of historical double movement. 
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Only once liberalism triumphed within the western governments’ circles, and thus it 
acquired a proper systemic momentum to carry out its operations throughout western 
society, the concrete attempt to make the market completely self-regulating crumbled 
away world society, and along with it, the systemic breakdown, epitomized by the 
thirty-years period of world wars and fascism, occurred
84
. 
Despite their eminency, none of them is to be espoused here. By contrast, the 
writer shall put forth in short a further interpretation that views capitalism as the most 
successful attempt of embeddedness in history
85
. Such an insight, it is contended, is the 
one which Polanyi himself ultimately asserts. In so doing, we can appreciate the 
historical-social complexity of capitalist development across history, and in keeping 
with it, the capitalist development of Dutch region as it is to be posited historically in 
the next chapter, providing furthermore underpinnings to understand the hegemon’s 
perspective. 
In fact, the crucial question regarding the embeddedness pivots on the concept of 
capitalism, which, as far as it is concerned here, outdistances Braudel from Block-
Sommers and thus from Polanyi. According to Braudel, differently from Polanyi, 
capitalism is not the market economy, but, by contrast, the «counter-market», the 
accumulation zone par excellence, the heights of command of the world economy. In 
view of this, Braudel thus would detect a conceptual distortion in Polanyi’s arguments 
that would view capitalism, by contrast, as something which is historically, temporally, 
separated and subsequent to the market economy in any of its historical forms: «Before 
this change, only controlled or false markets, or non-markets, could be said to exist». 
For Braudel, it is space, not time, as Polanyi instead, that defines the different planes of 
maneuver of capitalism and market economy, that is, the historical fields within which 
the two terms unfold their operations, not separated but in unison. Capitalism and 
market are two distinct structural levels of one single story, of world History; they stand 
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distinct but bound together. Fernand Braudel saw world trade as device capable of 
joining world space by way of world networks of capital accumulation before the XIX 
century. The Fernhandel was in fact the first and foremost device of accumulation, a 
cliquish way to power, «the superlative commercial activity [and] a zone of free 
operation, par excellence» capable of organizing functionally the world. According to 
the French historian, this was in essence not a device to give power to masses, but to 
accumulate, concentrate and centralize power of command at the heights of (western) 
society
86
.  
Braudel’s initial account becomes, by contrast, the historical groundwork to 
Polanyi’s account as to be construed here below. 
Indeed, once in the XIX century the industrial production – mode and relations – 
became the topmost structural device for capitalist world accumulation within the world 
system in place of the Fernhandel, the descent within society and hence the progressive 
socialization of the logic of the commanding heights of the world economy – the logic 
of ceaseless capital accumulation – was the inevitable consequence, since processes of 
production, which now mainly led systemic processes of capital accumulation, became 
of course societal processes of production and reproduction as a whole. This meant that 
the capitalist logic set about ordering extensively and reproducing intensively the 
dynamics of society; it thereby realized itself in the radical expansion of market 
dynamics and the commodity fiction within society; as a result, the same logic and 
fiction set about bridling mechanisms and processes of society, enveloping its structure 
as a whole.  
The capitalist descent within society – whose logic had typified the zone par 
excellence and height of command, but now became the motor force of society as a 
whole – moved the capitalist system from its elite form of power accumulation to a 
system of power accumulation whose roots became intrinsically clung to the lower rank 
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of society itself. Society came to be slowly but progressively reconfigured from the 
grassroots and molded. In other words: capitalism (logic and rationality in very short) 
started out to play an active societal role, activating the process of embedding of 
societal relations through a motion of vertical penetration. The vertical percolation of 
the capitalist logic can be regarded indeed as the intensive dimension of historical 
capitalism. And this is what Polanyi ultimately may argue in the Great Transformation: 
up to the nineteenth century,  
 
The economic system was submerged in general social relations; markets were merely an 
accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated more than ever by social authority. 
[…] As a rule, the economic system was absorbed in the social system, and whatever principle of 
behavior predominated in the economy, the presence of the market pattern was found to be compatible 
with it. [With capitalism by contrast] the control of the economic system by the market is of 
overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of 
society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social 
relations are embedded in the economic system.
87
  
 
This was the great transformation in essence. The market became a place (not the 
sole one!) where the zone par excellence of the economy encountered the whole 
society; a linkage (not the sole one!) between the heights of command and society as a 
whole. The whole economy was to become the order of society itself – whose polarity 
became thereby subverted – in which general social relations, as well as political 
relations, became immersed, and hence embedded, subordinated and eventually 
generated by the capitalist order of the “new” economy. 
What could be somewhat surprising is that this interpretation of Polanyi’s thought, 
in the end, would come to match with Braudel’s final articulation and conclusive 
statement on the true nature of capitalism and of its historical operation, below called 
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forth. The dialect Polanyi-Braudel makes us prone to appreciate a possible difference in 
the conceptualization of capitalism, and of historical expansion and development 
thereof, local and systemic alike. Indeed, by the same token, it is to provide the most 
eminent conceptual-theoretical underpinnings, firstly, to the foregoing analysis of the 
Dutch regional cycle of power formation and accumulation and, secondly, to the 
hegemon’s perspective in the ensuing section. This in general represents a challenge to 
the Marxist, Anglo-centered interpretation of capitalism, both historical and theoretical.  
Now, the dialectic Polanyi-Braudel will be pushed to the present point. Indeed, in 
keeping with the articulation of evidence and concept put forth in the next chapter, 
could we argue that the process of embeddedness is not solely a historical process 
originated in, and unfolded pursuant to, the nineteenth century great transformation of 
the Industrial Revolution, but a very process inherent in the unfolding of the capitalist 
logic of power and operation in itself when historical contingencies – necessities and 
conditions, both local and systemic – operates suitably? Braudel, who sees capitalism 
on the very longue durèe,  avers in the end that, regardless of time and space: 
 
 capitalism is unthinkable without society's active complicity. It is of necessity a reality of the 
social order, a reality of the political order, and even a reality of civilization. For in a certain manner, 
society as a whole must more or less consciously accept capitalism's values. But this does not always 
happen. […] There is action and interaction. That rather special and partial form of the economy that is 
capitalism can only be fully explained in the light of these contiguous "ensembles" and their 
encroachments; only then will it reveal its true face. […] the real fate of capitalism [is] determined by its 
encounter with social hierarchies
 88 
 
The next account of the dynamics of Dutch power formation and capitalist 
unfolding purports to bear out Braudel’s appreciation on capitalism.  
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In view of all of this, it is to be contended that the greatest capitalist power – such 
as the British in the XIX century, or the Dutch in the XVII or even the US in the XX – 
can develop only in the long run when and where such a historical embeddedness of 
society and economy occurred in an apposite and specific form accordingly to historical 
contingencies – that is, according to the systemic, contextual and local historical 
features of a given era
89
; by the same token, «capitalism triumphs» only when and 
where this articulation is then arranged and unfolded within, and by means of, a 
structure of power capable of buttressing capitalist processes of power accumulation, in 
so doing «checking the expansion in definite directions»
90
. Or, in other words also, 
capitalism wins the day when and where comes to form the trialectic unity of state, 
capital and society such as to signal the occurred process of interlocked embeddedness. 
Braudel sums up:  
 
the modem state, which did not create capitalism but only inherited it, sometimes acts in its favor 
and at other times acts against it; it sometimes allows capitalism to expand and at other times destroys its 
mainspring. Capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the state. 
[But], capitalism is unthinkable without society's active complicity. It is of necessity a reality of the social 
order, a reality of the political order, and even a reality of civilization. For in a certain manner, society as 
a whole must more or less consciously accept capitalism's values
91
.  
 
What it shall be argued is that the Dutch state, to say with Braudel, acted in favor 
of capitalism, and this occurred because it inherited capitalism from the historical-social 
ground upon which it was structured. The foundation of the power of the Dutch 
Republic has to be tracked down in the long path of embeddedness of capitalism with 
society – the Dutch regional cycle of accumulation to be posited, whereof the next 
chapter represents a portrayal. In a nutshell: the late medieval ground of Holland 
developed and sorted out the societal arrangements according to which, in view of the 
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new historical contingencies – both local and systemic – that came up in the second half 
of the sixteenth century, the Dutch were in condition and in the position to (have to) 
construct a state premised on and committed to the capitalist strategy of power 
accumulation 
In sum: the long lasting process of capitalist embeddedness on the Dutch ground 
interlocked and buttressed the formation of a state that, being faced with the historical 
context of the XVI-XVII century, was to propel the unlimited accumulation of power 
with the unlimited accumulation of capital (and vice versa) – «The limitless process of 
capital accumulation needs the political structure of so "unlimited a Power" that it can 
protect growing property by constantly growing more powerful. [Thus] this process of 
never-ending accumulation of power [is] necessary for the protection of a never-ending 
accumulation of capital […]» - this is a hegemonic regime of accumulation92. 
 The point is: how to explain it? And then: how to show it?
 
The first question is to 
be addressed below; the second query to be the kernel of the following chapters.  
 
2.2.2 The Trialectic unity of state, capital and society   
 
As has been aptly said, «the accumulation of capital through capitalist production 
cannot take place either in a vacuum or in chaos»
93
. This is to say that capitalism cannot 
develop disembedded from society and the environment wherein it is to unfold. And 
such an argument holds true at any rate whether we see capitalism from both a world(-
)system perspective and a state perspective – perhaps even from the view point of 
individual enterprises and single capitalist entrepreneurs. It should not be considered 
merely as an economic system of production and exchange but as a patterned whole of 
power relations which are indeed capitalist, and whose reach tends to envelope human 
reality by virtue of the innate complexion, inherent in the capitalist logic of power, to 
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extend ceaselessly the scale and scope of the operations of its own over and within 
space –  that is, to operate intensively and extensively in human space and nature. 
It has been argued that triumphant capitalism does not resolves in hegemony or in 
the construction of a hegemon. The previous section have never put the two terms close. 
It has been discussed instead, from the state perspective, the two general features 
according to which a hegemon can develop within the capitalist world system. Indeed, 
this section purports to argue that the triumph of a capitalist economy (i.e. Wallerstein) 
is a mere internal pre-condition to hegemony (possibility-probability)
94
, and that the 
hegemon, borrowing from Cox, develops an internal coherence, which, on the one hand, 
has of course arisen as factual developmental condition of the system historical 
dynamics, but that has primarily unfolded itself by means of an intersubjectively 
constituted capitalist reality. From the this perspective hence, the hegemon embodied 
the highest internal coherence of an intersubjectively constituted reality premised on 
capitalist relations of power, accumulation and wealth. It is in this first respect that the 
power of the hegemon embodies a social formula of infrastructural power. Capitalism is 
to be understood thus as the logical pattern according to which, and by which, human 
space – state, economy, ecology, institutions, society – moves through time and space95. 
There is not “structure” nor “superstructure”, but capitalism, as is to be argued in the 
next chapters, becomes the historical embeddedness of human(-and-extra-human) space 
to a patterned logic of power and operation which is centered on the reproduction of 
value through commodity production and exchange
96
.  
The hegemon in the modern world-system is thus a specific regime of capitalist 
power accumulation which displays an organic movement of state, capital and society 
(in nature). It shall be called “trialectic unity”. Trialectic unity is a necessary 
requirement to the hegemon because the hegemon’s premise itself, the greatest capitalist 
development, is always riddle with harsh conflict and contradictions of its own. In this 
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regard therefore, the objective and role of the state-capital path, which is inherent in a 
regime of accumulation, is to regulate and normalize – regulatory and normalizing 
capacity – human conflict and contradictions to give rise to the most adequate societal 
environment – sufficient stability and predictability for example, in accordance with 
historical human means and resources – to allow for capitalist accumulation of power. 
A regime of accumulation embodies, in essence, the modality the flow of power is 
commanded over human space, and thus the way the organic triple movement between 
economy, state and society is organized
97
. 
In other words: as Polanyi notices, if capitalism stands unchecked, the effects of 
its free unfolding will be crushing at all level. In this respect, a hegemon hence demands 
a «mode of regulation» of capitalist processes of power accumulation. And since 
capitalism is not simply productive-financial capital within the cash nexus, but, in 
Moore’s vein, an organization of human and extra-human capital exploited and/or 
appropriated to be capitalistically accumulated and expanded, in essence a regime of 
accumulation is to be understood as the way to hold in check Polanyi’s double 
movement – that is, in Polanyi’s idea, the balance between the capitalist thrust for 
power and the countermovement for the protection of society, and environment, against 
the «satanic» effects of capitalism itself. In other terms, it is the «scheme of 
reproduction» of capitalist processes of power production that provides a kind of 
capitalist command of societal dynamics, conflict and competition – as well as on the 
environment – such as to channel contradictions and struggles inherent to the capitalist 
development in directions that are not unduly disruptive of accumulation but greatly 
propulsive of its own unabated expansion – that is, affords in essence, the highest 
coherence of the process itself and guarantees that the agents conform to its institutional 
– logical – rules98.  
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In organizational terms of power, structure and process: the state can be defined as  
the organizational complex of governmental, business agencies, networks of 
accumulation and operative institutions which commands the panoply of human and 
extra-human resources within space for the defense and the expansion of power. 
Accordingly, state power (efficiency and effectiveness for example) is the degree by 
which the organization attains and fulfills such functions and it is directly correlated 
with the operative coherence of its agencies, networks and institutions. State power is 
thus the capacity to implement such functions within, and deploy the same without. In a 
hegemon, the topmost coherence must permeate the dynamics of the organization of 
state, capital and society as a whole, whose arrangement pivots on, and comes phased 
by, the interdependencies and the interactions among the institutions, agencies and 
networks through which power (economic, political, military, fiscal-financial, socio-
cultural, ecological) within space operates and is deployed. The interdependencies and 
the interactions among the agencies, networks and institutions, represent the nodules of 
power, or among powers, which interlock, relate and substantiate an organization of 
human space – state society and capital (and nature as well)99. In other words, the 
hegemon must develop a compound structure of power with a unified internal structure 
of its own, which is therefore a composite whole whose intrinsic power amounts to 
more than the sum of its operative cogs and single powers, as well as the single logistics 
of them. The multiplier complexion of such an articulated organization of state, society 
and capital spells that power becomes overdetermined by the multiple and overlapping 
interactions and interdependencies, a resonance, among institutions, agencies and 
networks that relates the whole organization itself, and that enable to deploy factual 
power within a territory. No power, or logistics thereof, in human reality/nature is 
compartmentalized. Each, by contrast, is molded by, and captures, elements of the other. 
What thereby comes about in essence within a hegemonic regime is a lifelike process of 
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mutual internalization and inter-twine among forces, powers, and the related logistics, 
which is to define ultimately the power dynamics of the hegemon – such is the central 
argument of this study on the hegemon and it is to be explored historically in the next 
chapters through the history of Dutch space and the construction of the Republic
100
. 
What the present writer is calling forth here is Althusser’s concept of overdetermination 
as explicated by Resnick and Wolff:   
 
Althusser’s concept of contradiction emphasizes the necessary complexity of all contradiction, as 
against notions of contradiction that are simply dualistic opposites. Each distinct social process is the site 
constituted by the interaction of all the other social processes, each contains "within itself" the very 
different and conflicting qualities, influences, moments, and directions of all those other social processes 
that constitute it. In this sense, argues Althusser, each social process is the site of, or "contains," the 
complex contradictoriness inseparable from overdetermination. Each social process exists, for Althusser's 
Marxism, only as a particular, unique concentration of contradictions in its environment. […] any object 
of analysis […] is approached in terms of specifying its existence as the site of overdetermined 
contradictions and thereby explaining both its dynamic and its relation of complex mutual effectivity 
[…]101. 
 
Such an insight can be readily transferred to the perspective here argued. The 
point is: power production as interaction of powers. What the production of hegemonic 
power signals is a continual (but limited of course) process of power formation, 
reproduction, and expansion which ensues from the most coherent articulation, 
interaction and interdependency among key factors, contradictions, conflicts and limits 
of agencies, institutions and networks; from the whole organization with key factors, 
contradictions, conflicts and limits of its own; to be sure, from historical contingencies, 
internal and systemic; and, finally, from the articulation, interaction and 
interdependencies among all of three. What is crucial to explicit is that the present 
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concept of “coherence” does not spell absence of conflict and contradictions. On the 
contrary, the hegemon is also the outgrowth of the same conflict, limits and 
contradictions that characterize the existence and propel the development of human 
space, of a society and of a sociospatial organization. Harmony does not foster 
hegemony. Therefore, Althusser’s concept of overdetermination stands out as 
important, if crucial, determinant for the factual development of a hegemon. In this 
respect, the history of Dutch seventeenth century is the archetype.  
The hegemon’s construction is hence a process of coherent integration-cum-
circular causation which has not an artificially pinpointed (and pinpointing) trigger. 
This is to say that the hegemon cannot be conceptualized and historicized as produced 
by one single factor or another – or in one domain of human power or in another – but it 
encrusts, to use Wallerstein’s words, the most coherent panoply of factors and vectors 
which, as a whole, constitute, reproduce and constrain the operations of the trialectic 
unity, and thus the production of hegemonic power itself. The trialectic of human space 
as a whole is hence accountable for the production of hegemonic power. The hegemon 
becomes manifest by way of a state which becomes coextensive with capital and with 
society – as well as with the nature within which capitalism unfolds –, and vice versa. 
As explored in the next chapters, the concept of coextensiveness conveys also the apt 
signifier to the historical process of interlocking embeddedness that capitalism propels 
under apposite historical conditions, opportunities and constraints. This process makes 
human space a capitalist «seamless skein»: 
 
The [four] presumed arenas of collective human action – the economic, and the social or socio-
cultural [and ecological] – are not autonomous arenas of social action. They do not have separate 
“logics”. More importantly, the intermeshing of constraints, options, decisions, norms, and “rationalities” 
is such that no useful research model can isolate “factors” according to the categories of economic, 
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political and social, and treat only one kind of variable, implicitly holding the others constant. […] there 
is a single “set of rules” or a single “set of constraints” within which these various structures operate102. 
 
What capitalism affords is a commodity-centered pattern of human behavior – a «single 
“set of rules” or a single “set of constraints”» inherent in human reality – according to 
which, as far as it is concerned here, the highest coherence operates – that is, a logic 
premised on and embodying the commodity-centered re/production of value according 
to which the governmental dynamics of society, economy and state unfolds (regime of 
accumulation)
103
. Once capitalism – i.e. the capitalist logic of power – envelops society, 
economy and state as a whole – as well as the environment – the composite whole sets 
about operating as intersubjectively constituted capitalist reality. The complex of 
governmental and business agencies, networks of power and operative institutions 
which owns the highest coherence and integration with capital and society, patterned 
after the capitalist logic of operation, gets hegemonic in the modern world-system
104
.  
However, as Braudel notices, such a complexity is an opportunity and condition 
of development which is not – and cannot be merely –  a creation of modern state or of 
modern society, but which is bequeathed by the long-run development of a past 
organization of human space – such as instance in Holland in view of the next chapter. 
Therefore, the rise of a hegemonic power – Dutch, GB or US alike – rests heavily upon 
the historical trajectory of development, but also on the concrete historical conditions, 
opportunities and necessities that history (the system) displays and processes at the 
moment of the ignition. Recasting SSA approach hence, we can say that the hegemonic 
bout of capitalist power can be regarded as outgrowth of «a durable investment that, 
once installed, pays off over a long period of time. It is durable because much 
investment has gone into its institutionalization; and it is successful because it results 
from the distillation of a long period of experimentation». The Dutch hegemon, as well 
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as the British and the US one, stems from exactly such a historical durable investment 
and bout of experimentation
105
.  The Dutch regional cycle to be posited embodies this 
long period of experimentation of Dutch history. 
As far as our case is concerned, as we shall see, the capitalist logic unfolded in 
Holland region, and, as a consequence, the institutionalized development of scattered 
capitalist power on the ground – a regional space and structure of accumulation – took 
hold, thereby affording societal conditions conducive to the ensuing construction of the 
structured complex of concentrated capitalist power, the Dutch state. Its development 
was at the same time an imperative that history thrusted on the Dutch at the end of the 
sixteenth century. Indeed, the new structure and organization of power that the Republic 
embodied for the Dutch was, in contrast with the European trend of state formation, 
deeply compatible with their historical long-run path of development, and hence with 
the composite complexion of medieval society from which it ensued. This character 
gave rise to the most efficient regime of accumulation of early-modern era thereon.  
Dutch modernity was indeed and counterintuitively the continuity of the historical path 
in a form which made possible reaping all the fruits whose seeds were previously 
sowed. It was by way of this continuum of power formation, accumulation and change 
that “Dutch capitalism” gathered momentum, gained strength, acceptance and far-flung 
currency over and within Dutch space, and by way of it, the ongoing accumulated 
potential energy came unleashed in and through the conflictual arrangement of the 
structures, agencies, institutions and networks composing the Republic, within society. 
It was this continuity that gave texture and propellant to Dutch expansion and eased the 
integration of the very complex and composite structure and organization of Dutch 
society in a new and unprecedented regime of power. The Dutch State indeed was the 
first «territorial state» at all, as Marjolein ‘t Hart terms it, to institutionalize the 
imperative usage of capitalist accumulation of power as main strategy of human space 
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management and power
106
; on the other hand, and in view of this, the Dutch state was 
the first to manage to produce and reproduce the world conditions of capitalist 
accumulation by making human space directly useful to Dutch capital
107
.  
Modernity was not hence the emblem of coercive-intensive regime as 
organizations of power premised on domination through militarized coercion
108
 – 
inefficient and ineffective because of inapposite state-institutional structures and 
operational infrastructures and agencies that in their coercive operation of appropriation 
and coagulation of power disrupted complex social balances with no effective 
renegotiation of jurisdictional prerogatives
109
. By contrast, the historical technics of 
power construction demanded historical compliance with the tiered and composite 
complexion of historical society – a dialectical (i.e. trialectical) process of 
development
110
. In fact, this was the secret of the «confederative federation» of the 
United Provinces in the end, and of the regime of accumulation that ensued
111
. Thanks 
to the particular mode of regulation of space the Dutch organized, the Dutch Republic 
was the first organic center of modern capitalist accumulation and expansion emanated 
from the European restructuring occurred during the long 16
th
 century, and hence the 
first capital-intensive regime in modern era as an organization of power premised on, 
and committed to, domination trough capitalized-value exploitation, which abided by 
both the world system of modern rules (logic) that was developing since the fifteenth 
century and, largely, the stratified nature and organization of Dutch medieval society
112
. 
As we shall see, the Dutch state owed a multifocal but logically combined structure that 
furthered, as never happened in history since then, economic(-environmental) 
rationalization, institutional-political innovation, fiscal-military capitalization, socio-
cultural differentiation/stratification, and, power combustion thereon
113
. As a 
consequence, power combustion allowed for the intensification and articulation of the 
spatial concentration and centralization of the political-economic command in the 
 130 
 
sphere of the European economy and the sway on politics of Europe – as well as a 
waxing commodifying power in nature at home and abroad
114
 – in a self-sustaining (but 
limited
115
) structural mechanism of power
116
. In short: also in this sense, the Dutch 
developed infrastructural power.  
But we are not engage in exploring the projection of power, the hegemony. This 
study purports to understand the hegemon. To follow this through, an important step is 
to understand the state organization that the Dutch put into place. The issue of the Dutch 
state will be explored in chapter 4. Its constitution was crucial to understand the 
development of the Dutch regime of accumulation as here understood. In the next 
chapter instead, we explore the long and crucial bout of “experimentation” that allowed 
for the construction of a capital-intensive regime. 
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Chapter 3  
The historical formation of the Dutch space of 
accumulation 
 
 
 
This chapter draws on an engaging suggestion made by David Landes in his well-
known 1969’s The Unbound Prometheus: «In any event, it was surely one of Europe's 
great advantages that its first capitalist entrepreneurs worked and flourished in 
autonomous city-states, hence political units where the influence of landed wealth was 
necessarily limited». This chapter explores and expands such a suggestion
1
. 
Charles Tilly reminds us that: «standard debates about the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism and the rise of national states have concentrated too heavily on 
the experiences of France, England, and a few other massive states, while neglecting a 
major determinant of the actual character of states»
2
. Let us see what Braudel, for his 
part, thinks of the transition debate. His eminency deserves to be fully quoted: 
 
So the rather bitter debate between those who accept only an internal explanation for capitalism 
and for the Industrial Revolution, seeing them as the result of an on-the-spot transformation of 
 132 
 
socioeconomic structures, and those who consider only an external explanation (in other words, the 
imperialist exploitation of the world) – this debate seems pointless to me. No one can exploit the world 
simply because he wants to do so. He first must develop his power and consolidate it slowly. But it is 
certain that, although this power is developed through a slow, internal process, it is strengthened by the 
exploitation of other parts of the world, and that, in the course of this double process, the chasm 
separating the exploiter from the exploited constantly deepens. The two explanations – internal and 
external – are inextricably interwoven3. 
 
These are the very general starting points, both conceptually and historically. This 
chapter is devoted to the understanding of the slow, internal process of formation and 
consolidation of the Dutch space of accumulation – the «determinant of the actual 
character of» the Dutch state –, by way of the exploitation of other parts of the world 
could be put into operation by the Republic in the 17
th
 century. The time frame within 
which the process that restructured and reorganized Dutch space occurred stretches 
from the late middle ages to the early modern times – XIII-XVI centuries ca.. 
Borrowing the idea from Giovanni Arrighi, we may term this bout of historical 
formation as Dutch regional cycle of formation and early accumulation
4
. 
Marx writes:  
 
 The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and 
habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws. The 
organization of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance. 
The constant generation of a relative surplus population keeps the law of the supply and demand of 
labour, and therefore wages, within narrow limits which correspond to capital's valorization requirements. 
The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the 
worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases. In the ordinary 
run of things, the worker can be left to the “natural laws of production”, i.e. it is possible to rely on his 
dependence on capital, which springs from the conditions of production themselves, and is guaranteed in 
 133 
 
perpetuity by them. It is otherwise during the historical genesis of capitalist production. The rising 
bourgeoisie needs the power of the state, and uses it to “regulate” wages, i.e. to force them into the limits. 
suitable for making a profit, to lengthen the working day, and to keep the worker himself at his normal 
level of dependence. This is an essential aspect of so-called primitive accumulation. 
 
The Dutch regional cycle of formation here posited conveys in a good fashion 
Marx’s dialectic between the silent compulsion inherent in the law of supply and 
demand, regulated through the state structures, and the early accumulation as an 
ongoing integrated force to the capitalist accumulation of wealth and power – 
admittedly, it becomes a trialectic indeed (at least!), I argue
5
. But the historical portrayal 
here put forward elucidates also that if «labour is the father of material wealth, the earth 
is its mother»
6
. Indeed, Marx continues, «Labor-power itself is, above all else, the 
material of nature transposed into a human organism»
7
. 
The method whereby the investigation is to be carried out probes the socio-
ecological networks of wealth, production, exchange and institutions on the societal 
ground which set about unfolding since the late middle ages – mostly focusing the 
analysis on Holland. Such a matrix of value relations hauls in a perspective which in 
itself gainsays the theoretical formula of historical change called “transition”. The 
capitalist formation and expansion was not a question of “crossing an edge”. The 
historical edges are figment of scholars’ imagination. Capitalism has been, by contrast, 
the historical outgrowth of geohistorical necessities and conditions deployed and 
harnessed in given moments of time. 
The query of the chapter is thus: how were the foundations of Dutch power in the 
XVII century laid? Capitalism requires «permissiveness by the state. In the West, this 
permissiveness appeared in varying degrees; it was chiefly owing to socio[-ecological] 
reasons, reasons deeply rooted in the past»
8
 that Dutch permissiveness could develop, 
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endowing the region with structural conditions for the power combustion of the XVII 
century. Here there is an attempt to investigate these reasons by taking a look at those 
factors and vectors that were conducive to Dutch world expansion in the XVII century. 
Compounding together these factors and vectors we will understand the lineages of the 
Dutch hegemon, that is, its historical space and structure of accumulation
9
. This 
perspective spells strong path-dependency.  
As we have seen in chapter 1, Holland region was typified by: manorial 
marginality (free peasants colonization) and historical agro-ecological disorder. Both, as 
argued here, eased the shift from control of land as a direct relation of surplus 
appropriation to control of land as a condition for rising labor productivity within 
commodity production
10
; the correlative trend of peasants dispossession and market-
oriented agency; the late but staggering patterned growth of self-governing cities and 
the trend unto demographic concentration
11
. Such a historical background drummed up 
and stirred up the historical proclivity to capital across the entire region that came to be 
magnified through the resulting formation of a patterned matrix of sociospatial 
correlations over and within the regional space – a regional circuit of compound 
growth
12
.  
In Holland region, compound growth was organic movement of capital and labor 
in nature deployed in space by virtue of the negotiated understanding and concerted 
bargaining of local – and then supra-local – capital-oriented agencies – rural and urban 
governments and private businesses alike – penetrated and interrelated through largely 
institutionalized markets, rules and practices. Coordinated organization resulted in the 
formulation of spatial, organizational and operational strategies which delivered Dutch 
space to the logic of capital accumulation – that is, enabled and propelled the historical 
embeddedness thereof within societal arrangements. Compound growth was thus the 
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organic conflation of human dynamism and historical opportunity, man’s ingenuity and 
the energies and constraints of nature and history. 
Here it is argued that capitalism unfolded on the ground as historically co-
produced through a unique panoply of historical-regional factors and vectors which 
allowed for a unique persistence of growth across four centuries. «The growth process 
did not so much 'sow the seeds of its own destruction» but the germs of its own 
reproduction
13
. Moreover, it will be argued that precisely such a co-production of 
capitalist power on the ground in the late middle ages made for the Dutch state and 
regime in the 17
th
 century. In such a story thence, in short, what the Hollanders did at 
the origin was to free up, socially and ecologically, what Michael Mann aptly called 
«congealed labor (i.e., capital)» and to unleash the latent value-relations of capitalist 
sort incorporated in it
14
. 
 
 
3.1 Urban-rural complex as early unit of capitalist development: a study 
 
Since the onset of the time period here questioned, the historical co-presence of 
medieval Malthusian friction, sharp inter-city competition, agro-ecological disorder and 
commodified market-dependent rurality, thrusted on urban centers to put into operation 
sociospatial networks of wealth, production and exchange premised on commodity-
centered value-relations operationalized through market with the respective surrounding 
rural areas. This developmental contingency, in junction with the related and already 
consolidated sway of the territorial lord
15
, restrained the customary urban thrusts toward 
the institutionalization of relations of value extraction and predation from rurality 
premised on politico-military coercion
16
. In view of such an appreciation hence, the 
chapter understands the urban-rural networks of power that resulted in fact as a 
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capitalist alteration of the socio-ecological pattern of value production and exchange 
which started out to relate and envelope Dutch space as a whole
17
.  
The local framework of potency, the public sphere of government and the 
institutions that penetrated the urban-rural web of relations, were to substantiate a 
coherent space of activity and agency, with common rules of sociality which embedded 
the socio-ecological alteration of capitalist sort, and whereby it gained far-flung societal 
currency
18
. For the institutions did not pop up in history out of the blue, they are the 
very projection of human beings’ leanings, of the prowess to regulate power infightings 
and coordinate disparate interests and, ultimately, of the drive of the most prominent 
among them, both public and private alike
19
. The capital-oriented articulation of such 
institutional constituents ensued from the geohistorical conditions and constraints of the 
region: in general, the status of frontier space of the European manorial system – i.e. 
freedom – along with the specific pattern of urbanization and the unruly ecology, were 
essential to shape people’s behavior, and sequentially, the institutional quality and 
public activity
20
.  
The eminent Dutch Historian Bas Van Bavel, for example, offers us an enticing 
explanation according to which workings and orientation of institutions were arguably 
the upshot of a balance of power between different social interests and the political 
organisms in the process of decision-making. Such a balance compelled to arrange 
compromises and to expand cooperation based on voluntarism and horizontal 
associations of equals. Such a cooperative involvement set in both in rural and urban 
spaces as a consequence of freedom, early peasant self-appropriation and the self-
governing power of the cities
21
.  
The institutional landscape in Holland was crucial to translate the market-oriented 
behaviors or leanings into effective and binding social norms premised on transactional 
impersonality, relational and contractual formalizations. Capital intensity and the 
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flowing circulation of capital, as well as the easy access to markets, was boosted and 
buttressed hence through an interlocking set of institutional devices prone to reducing 
risks via property rights security, market exchanges safeguard, transactional 
transparency and formal protection, and designed to control and defuse rent-seeking 
behaviors
22
 – the upshots were in short: the lowering or the regulation of transaction 
costs, market openness and accessibility, and the growth of trade attractiveness and 
competitiveness
23
. The public agencies thrusted out thence a societal arrangement of 
institutions that aided to disseminate the new and inchoate form and condition of power 
within market: this institutional proclivity thereby bestowed formal body and lively 
color on the socio-ecological shift from the manorial strategy of “safety-first” to the 
market-based strategy and agency premised on the commodity-centered logic of value 
re/production – the capitalist logic of power24.  
The adaptive institutional framework was the hallmark of Holland in contrast with 
the «rigidity» of the European landscape
25
. By way of this institutional flexibility, a 
capitalist network of accumulation, wealth and power could innervated and lubricated 
the societal arrangements since the onset; in so doing, the web of relations propagated in 
the space within and between towns and countryside, propelled by both at once through 
the sociospatial correlation, integration and dynamics of market
26
 – the market, Mann 
says, «is itself a form of social organization, a mobilization of collective and distributive 
power» of Parsonian remembrance, and in Holland, this was a function it assumed 
swiftly
27
.  
To account for capitalist expansion moreover, a compound dynamic of 
development regional-wide can be identified. In keeping with evidences and concepts to 
be put forth, two interrelated movements of development can be inferred: within an 
urban-rural complex, sociospatial relations were to operate through a structural 
inconsistency of competitive pressures leading to the joined expansion of market and 
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profit drive in virtue of the coherent landscape of institutions and public potency that 
protected capital and capital accumulation. The result was the combined and contextual 
growth and interrelation of urban and rural commercial networks of production and 
exchange
28
; on regional scale by contrast, sociospatial relations among urban-rural 
complexes were to operate through the structural intensity of competitive pressures, 
premised on and led by inter-city competition, opening up the way for an efficient and 
cost-effective regional structure of market – labor, capital, goods and land – that 
contributed to wiping out any spatial and logical feudal barrier
29
. This dual condition of 
a single development was to replenish, to expand and to entrench the drive for profit, 
toward profit reinvestment and the accumulation of power through capital expansion 
within the whole regional space – both public and private30.  
Profit primacy and drive innervated therefore the rise of a capital-intensive 
structure and network of production and exchange that enabled the region to focus, 
since the late middle ages, on intensive capital accumulation rather than mere intense 
labor exploitation
31
. Due to being shielded by a capital-oriented institutional framework 
arranged by local public bodies, market competition stimulated the formation of early 
flows of cheap capital that favored the density of capital-intensive accumulation 
strategies; capital intensification allowed for intra-regional specialization and 
production diversification that boosted the intra-regional trade in goods, semi-fabricated 
and raw materials-energies – which in turn tended to encourage further the institutional 
checks – as well as the well-nigh free viability of labor32. 
The interlocked growth of institutions, markets and productions, both in urban and 
rural areas, took place between the XIII-XV – Institutions by the mid of the XIV 
century took a better shape; land-lease and capital markets developed in the course of 
the XIV century; (proto-)industrial activities swelled after the second half of the XIV 
century (goods and labor). After the second half of the fourteenth century, the Dutch 
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economy as a whole was re/structured – and thus society as well. These centuries were 
the «period of very rapid structural change […] dominated by structural 
transformation»
33
. Dutch societal expansion was contextual also to a primordial wave of 
nature’s appropriation – which is to be accounted in section 4 – upon which the 
development of economy and society was premised and could unfold.  
The constitution of the commodity-centered complex of rural-urban value-
relations propelled the early moment of Dutch accumulation. Thereby, it delivered 
Dutch space to the logic of capital accumulation for it institutionalized the sociospatial 
networks of capitalist wealth, production and exchange as the way of organizing society 
and nature. In other words, the capitalist logic of power became the Dutch strategy to 
manage human space. Such a historical movement signaled therefore that an incipient 
and underlying process of embeddedness of the commodity-centered logic of power 
re/production within the political, economic and social structures, networks and 
institutions of the region occurred. The capitalist-regional praxis was, hence, the 
complex entanglement of local geohistorical conditions and constraints, both human and 
natural, and as such it to be explored in the rest of the chapter
34
.  
If cities are concentration of wealth and power, the organic movement of cities 
and rurality is their (potential) magnification
35
. 
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3.2  Accumulation by checked dispossession  
 
Dense capital intensity sharpened, and in turn was fed into by, the dialectic 
moment between the movement unto peasants’ dispossession and the strategic check 
thereof.  
As Jan van Zanden suggests, the Dutch proto-industrial landscape was really 
variegated
36
: metallurgy, dyeing, bleaching, lime burning, brick production, brewing, 
cloth, line, peat-digging, shipping, water transport and fishing – the most important 
sectors in Holland – as well as dairy production and oil pressing, were carried out 
mainly in rural areas. But the regional headway of the economy as a whole brought 
most sectors, such as shipbuilding and transportation, peat-digging, brick-production 
and lime-burning, and the cloth industry to be logically subjected to processes of scale 
enlargement and capital intensification. In view of the proto-industrial complexion of 
production, the hold of urban capital became incrementally pervasive at any level of the 
economy, as well as the presence of waged labor
37
. Its steady command upon flows of 
capital and the capital-intensive framework of the economy increasingly demanded 
costly investments in fixed capital that provided in turn ample possibilities for profiting 
from the surplus-value of rural and urban (proto-)waged labor
38
. Furthermore, capital 
intensification spelt diversification and specialization that allowed for both urban and 
rural concentration of industries and the management of large-scale-cum-labor-
extensive productions. These processes were underpinned by both the ease of retrieving 
fuel, natural energies and raw materials and by means of technological advancement – 
industrial watermills, better kilns, windmills, and greater loom – and the improved 
water management and functional landscape transformation. Investments in capital-
intensive technology, both in urban and rural productions, was a witting strategy of 
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capital expansion by labor-saving techniques, labor-cost reduction and ecological 
manipulation
39
.  
The expansion of capital accumulation processes allowed urban capital to buy 
heavily into the surrounding land, coming to wear out further the rural eco-agricultural 
landscape of Holland
40
. A pivotal driver for a capitalist investment into, and rational 
exploitation of, land was the formalization of the related market and of the relations of 
market. Market transparence and security, but also openness and flexibility, was the 
correlative of it, and whereof the lease system was part and parcel
41
. The lease system 
became, especially since the sixteenth century, «the dominant mode of exploiting 
landownership» – especially short-term lease (ten-years term was predominant42) – by 
way of the formalization of contractual protection and transparence
43
. The early 
safeguard of property rights and of land transactions through public courts of justice 
shielded against any arbitrary claim or confiscation: contracts had to be written and 
registered, and «books or protocols had legal validity and evidentiary value». This 
practice became the normal procedure in towns where it firstly set in, and then in the 
countryside since the XIV
44
. From the late XIV century it was extended to villages also. 
Since 1529, Holland made compulsory the judicial conveyance and registration of 
transactions in public registers on penalty of transaction nullification. An appropriate 
fiscality – related to the check of tax declarations or a more accurate taxation of land as 
well as of sales or leases – was at the base of the institutional policy of enforcing the 
registrations publically
45
. However, the expansion of lease was by the same token 
propelled by the expansion of the burghers’ acquisition of land: the utilization of lease 
was the device to make land profitable. Such a thrust was furthered by the more precise 
definition of landownership, property rights and the increased adherence to the terms of 
leasing arrangements, and facilitated by the absence of taxation on sales
46
. All of «This 
contrasts sharply with the situation in other parts of 16th-century Northwestern Europe 
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[…]. The main underlying cause was the high degree of personal, legal freedom in the 
Netherlands, which was in place already in the high Middle Ages»
47
. The Dutch 
leanings towards formalization signals thus, on the one hand, the factual need of rules 
protecting and spurring capital accumulation; on the other, it emphasizes how concrete 
the behavioral shift was and how it affected human behavior and social relations. 
Thus, small farming was replaced by larger-scale urban landownership that 
bulked the production by way of capital intensification and specialization, whereof the 
greater efficiency and the higher returns on investment afforded relevant capital 
accumulation
48
. The displacement of the small farming, «much more than the 
subsidence of the soil in the 14th century, really swept away the link between non-
agricultural activities in the countryside on the one hand and small farms and some 
subsistence farming on the other». Fringes of peasants came to be dispossessed through 
this process of replacement and, as a result, waged labor expanded along with the 
extension and the contractual formalization of the labor market
49
. Up to 45 percent of 
rural workforce was engaged in proto-industrial activities and 29 percent ended up 
being bridled within full wage-labor schemes during the sixteenth century – a 
percentage alien to other countries – within a regional pattern of semiproletarianizing 
processes
50
. The labor market was almost freed by institutional medieval-like 
constraints and, indeed, the insistence of wage labor was the strongest it had been in 
Europe since the late middle ages
51
. The growth of the institutionalized networks of 
production and exchanges enabled towns to incorporate, within an extended wage-based 
framework of urban labor cycles, large quantities of rural workforce. The formalization 
of labor in the fifteenth and in sixteenth centuries, both in towns and in the hinterland, 
developed through market-driven arrangements «based on a cash wage, paid daily, 
weekly, or monthly. Labor contracts in these areas were mostly formal and short-
term»
52
.  
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The importance and the presence of formalized waged relations was prominent in 
the most typical proto-industries inherent in the economic and ecological landscape of 
Holland such as bleaching and peat-cutting, brick production and lime-burning
53
. Urban 
capital bought heavily into these sectors that demanded costly fixed capital goods and 
technologies and extended its own command by way of the strategic organization of 
managerial layers to check wage laborers
54
. Managerialism and notably wage labor in 
water management as instance was widely adopted, and due to the increasing necessity 
to create new arenas for profitable activities, the proletarization process advanced and 
coupled with the higher degree of monetization of the work relationships. Jobs 
pertaining to ecological manipulation such as in water management – digging and 
diking – were for two-thirds waged in Holland55. Fishing labor under wage-based 
relations grew for urban capital invested also there, from the lease of fishing rights – 
«increasingly monopolized by wealthy burghers» – to fishing equipment such as nets or 
ships. The increment of the operation scale – herring was a case – demanded capital 
which only urban investors could provide.  
The capitalist strategy of power and relation was working and it set about 
regulating the workings of society as a whole
56
. The expanded urban-rural capitalist 
accumulation provided an entire set of opportunities to the advancement of the early 
processes of value exploitation through proletarianization by setting up conditions, in 
time, to increase concentration, centralization and polarization of the rural labor forces’ 
surfeit within higher capital-intensive unities of production, both in urban-rural 
industries and in larger market-oriented farms. The lower social substrata came to be 
fleshed out by dispossessed men and crosscut by market-driven hiring processes, in 
towns and country alike. Capital expansion resolved into the acquisition of the means of 
production and the enlargement of the wage-based scheme of reproduction for the 
workers that moved «30–40% of the labor force from low productive agriculture to high 
 145 
 
productivity activities in the secondary and tertiary sectors», thereby allowing for an 
increase of 15-20% of GDP per capita. «Total growth was much more, however, almost 
60% in per capita terms» in the sixteenth century
57
. The command of urban capital 
however enfolded but not coerced Dutch space in virtue of the coherent orientation and 
activities of institutions and public authorities that fostered the societal diffusion of the 
capitalist logic of operation. The result: the capital-intensive structure of relations, 
production and exchange of the region expanded and came to be entrenched in the span 
of time that run from the XIV century on the eve of the Golden Age. In other words: 
 
While capitalism transformed independent household labor processes into a unified “social process”, it 
also created a spatial separation of the workplace from the household. At the same time, capitalism joined 
together independent workplaces into an ever expanding set of market relationships. In the words of 
Nassau Senior, “Nature seems to have intended that mutual dependence should unite all the inhabitants of 
the earth into one great commercial family”
 58
. 
  
But proletarianization was only part of the wider capitalist movement on the 
societal ground which could unfold in the long run instead only through the shifting 
combinations of labor systems in space that the proto-industrial pattern of expansion 
enabled, and that cushioned the costly impact of mounting fully-waged labor
59
 on the 
reproduction processes of capital – the semiproletarian was the best investment60. 
Inherent in the proto-industrial process of labor reproduction, the deployment of an 
uneven labor composition and of uneven accumulation strategies in the region as 
articulation of the capitalist pattern of re/production and accumulation, enabled the 
Dutch a rising rate of exploitation and the check on proletarianized reproduction
61
. This 
was, on the other hand, part and parcel of an interpenetrating movement of 
capitalization-cum-appropriation of socio-ecological energies which seizes in fact the 
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history of world capitalism and which also typified since the onset Dutch space, and 
pursuant to which the Hollanders managed to enlarge their organized basin of 
accumulated capital
62
. It was indeed by virtue of this mixture of labor strategies, 
cautious investments and environmental manipulation as we shall see – «tricks and 
plans» in Braudel’s terms – that the Dutch arena as a whole managed to turn in time 
into a heavily industrialized and commercialized space
63
.  
In short: here, what appropriation of regional semiproletarianized labor-value 
spelt and permitted – that is, the great part of labor-time unpaid by capital, a variant that 
hence impinged on the circuit of capital reproduction by boosting the rate of 
accumulation in virtue of the curtailment of part of the labor reproduction cost – was to 
downsize or to check the tendency of the value composition of capital to rise in the 
mirror-context of rising technical composition of capital. In other words, all-out 
dispossession and proletarianization 
 
 would not be in the best interests of capital. Instead, capital would manipulate the extent to which 
workers relied on self-provisioning in order to maximize its advantage. [To capitalism hence,] wage labor 
and nonwage labor are, indeed, inextricably linked […]. The greater the reliance on pre-capitalist 
economic relations, then, the more successful capitalism is in raising the rate of surplus value
64
. 
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Table 3.1. Labor-input in non-agricultural activities in the countryside of the Holland region (in man-years), 
1350-1550
65
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 c. 1350 c. 1450 c. 1550 
Cloth industry 
Linen industry 
Bleaching  
Brick-ovens  
Lime-kilns 
Brewery 
Cheese 
Hemp-processing 
Peat-digging  
Peat-transport 
Other transport 
Herring-fishing 
Coastal fishery  
Other fishery 
Shipbuilding 
2,000 
2,000 
50 
200 
200 
[800] 
[500] 
[500] 
5,000 
3,000 
[1,000] 
1,000 
[800] 
[2,000] 
500 
6,000 
1,000 
100 
500 
350 
[600] 
[1,500] 
[1,000] 
3,000 
2,000 
[1,500] 
2,000 
[1,000] 
[2,000] 
1,000 
 
3,000 
1,500 
150 
1,000 
500 
[800] 
[3,000] 
[1,500] 
6,000 
4,000 
[2,000] 
4,000 
[1,200] 
[2,000] 
750 
Total all-year labor 
Total seasonal labor 
12,500 
7,050 
16,950 
6,600 
 
19,050 
12,350 
 
Total Man-Years 16,025 20,250 25,225 
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Table 3.2. Estimates of labour inputs (in man-years) and shares of wage labour 
in the main branches of proto-industry in Holland
a66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Square brackets signify less certain estimates. 
b Seasonal labour (=6 months of the year). 
c Total of all-year labour input+half of the seasonal labour input (=6 months). 
 
 
 
 
Labor Input Share of  
wage Labor (%) 
Man-years  
in wage labor 
Brick-making 
b
  
Lime kilns   
Bleaching 
b
  
Herring-fishing 
b
  
Peat-digging 
b
  
Coastal fishery 
b
  
Other fishery  
Woollen industry  
Linen industry  
Peat transport  
Other transport  
Shipbuilding  
Brewery  
Cheese-making  
Hemp-processing  
 
Total, all-year labor input  
Total, seasonal labor input  
 
Total man-years  
 
1,000 
500 
150 
4,000 
6,000 
[1,200] 
[2,000] 
3,000 
1,500 
4,000 
[2,000] 
750 
[800] 
[3,000] 
[1,500] 
 
19,050 
12,350 
 
25,225
c 
100 
100 
95 
80 
75 
75 
75 
75 
60 
60 
60 
50 
40 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
500 
500 
71 
1,800 
2,400 
450 
1,500 
2,250 
1,125 
2,400 
1,200 
450 
400 
1,200 
225 
 
 
 
 
16,471 
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Table 3.3. Estimates of per capita wealth c. 1500 (in guilders Holland pounds of 40 groten) 
a - seven different estimates ranging from 444 to 553
67
 
 
Reverting to the section point. A last contingent factor deserves to be mentioned: 
mass production proclivity. Mass production proclivity was stimulated by a cumulative 
structural effect: the combination of structural intensity of competitive pressures among 
rural-urban complexes and structural inconsistency of competitive pressure within a 
rural-urban complex. The reticulations of urban-rural centers tended to lowering prices 
and to expanding the corpus of inputs and outputs as a whole, cheaply and readily 
forthcoming for production, and to reducing transaction and transport costs as well as 
times and timing of exchanges – in this respect, the coherent complexion of the 
institutional setting protective of capital accumulation and investment was fundamental; 
meanwhile, the development of a low-cost, semiproletarianized economy as a whole 
enabled extended production to be absorbed in consumption by the improved 
purchasing power of the middle layers of society (artisans, retailers, civil servants) in 
 year  
 
total capital  
(1000 guilders) 
capital per 
capita(guild. ) 
Amsterdam 
Delft 
Haarlem 
Leiden 
Leiden 
Gouda 
Enkhuizen 
Hoorn 
Edam 
1505/7 
1508 
1495-1500a 
1498 
1502 
1492 
1514 
1514 
1514 
1018 
536 
444-553 
919 
805 
216 
200 
332 
147 
73 
36 
32-40 
55 
49 
23 
51 
54 
54 
Total   3810 46 
Haarlem 
Alkmaar 
Edam 
1483 
1532 
1462 
973 
547 
317 
 70 
78-99 
60-80 
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the cities, but also of the larger farmers in the countryside as well as of the workers as a 
consequence of the displacement of the living strategy from the “safety first” toward the 
capitalist one
68
. Wealthy burghers and tenant farmers as well as the (proto-)industrial 
substrata could engender thus a further source of regional accumulation, and 
sequentially a further rootedness of the logical thrust to profit
69
.  
To round off: paraphrasing Harvey, the general process of accumulation by 
dispossession was the early socio-ecological mainstay whereon local and regional 
economy and the institutional framework as a whole – and their articulations over and 
within Dutch space – could expand. The contingency of dispossession underpinned, 
fostered and propelled the reinforcement of the constraint to accumulate power and 
wealth through market networks and the rational economic imperative, calculus and 
flexibility of both rural and urban actors. But the dispossession (i.e. proletarianization) 
strategic check, at the same time, turned out to be the best terrain upon which the same 
capitalist accumulation could unfold and expand (semiproletarianization praxis). 
Moreover, the strategy of checked dispossession spurred on the urban-rural spaces to 
compound and knit stocks and flows of (human and extra-human) resources together, 
turned as a whole under the command, the strategies and the energies of urban capital 
and the rising capitalist agriculturists. Town-country credit facility and market networks 
along with mass production proclivity within a formalized set of juridicial relations 
made the «urban-agrarian symbiosis» a structural vector on the societal ground 
conducive to the Dutch combustion in the seventeenth century
70
. Adapting Moore’s 
illuminating concept of commodity frontier hence, we can say that the production and 
the extension of an incipiently commodified human space, bred and interrelated «the 
production in one place and the expansion of capitalist space» on regional scale
71
.  
The urban-rural agglomerates represent institutional nodules of formalized 
relations of wealth, production and exchange whereon and whereby the capitalist 
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network of power accumulation became structured and gained momentum across the 
centuries, as well as the logic hereof
72
. 
 
3.3 The early European networks of Dutch accumulation 
 
The eminent Dutch historian Jansen introduces: «in the period 1350-1400 Holland 
was completely transformed from a largely agrarian and rural society to an urban, 
commercial, and industrial one, and that only during these years did Holland acquire a 
dominant position in the foreign trade and commerce of the Netherlands». The process 
of accumulation by dispossession and commodified space extension, embedded within 
the Holland system of government-based control of export industries and importation, 
afforded also the internal base for the articulation and the expansion of primordial 
networks and processes of accumulation across Europe – the enlargement of the 
commodities and market frontiers in the bout under exam as base for the coagulation of 
an expanded capital within the Dutch State and regime, and the world expansion of the 
Dutch networks in the 17
th
 century. According to Jansen indeed, (proto-)industrial and 
market development seem having had their correlative in the expansion of networks of 
market and production unto the continent – through exploitation and/or appropriation of 
the European natures, soil/grain/forests
73
.  
Urban capital maintained the main stages of rough production of the main line of 
products, that were expanding on the European markets, in the countryside. This was 
the crucial strategy which enabled the Dutch to be competitive at European level since 
the late middle ages: in a nutshell, commodities to be sold off abroad were mostly 
produced through semi-proletarian cycles of labor which allowed entrepreneurs and 
merchants to have a better hold on the rate of reproduction of circulating capital – 
reproduction costs of labor and costs of production. This enabled hence to check and 
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downsize the impact of circulating capital on the rate of capital reproduction boosting 
capital accumulation
74
. In time, since 1350, accumulation of capital along with the 
expanding European circuits of imported raw materials and semi-fabricated spurred on a 
major urban and then rural focus on specialization and capital-intensive production 
stages, the sequential retrenchment of the inefficient labor-intensive processes of 
production, and the consequential valorization of the higher value-added of capital
75
. 
Such a further strategic concentration led the organization of the higher capital-intensive 
production towards capitalistic-industrial forms by way of technological improvements, 
the larger scale of outputs and the formation of rough scale economies
76
. A profitable 
circuit of importation-production-exportation premised on capital valorization was put 
into operation in the higher capital-intensive specialized industries. As a result, exports 
became competitive
77
. Moreover, the trend of increasing conflation of urban capital 
with land and commercial agriculture impinged on the agrarian landscape of Holland for 
it compelled urban investors, as we have seen, to bolster the shift of the agrarian social-
property relations in order to expand profit and the return on investments: the process of 
spatial extension of urban landowning in time made household proto-industrial 
productions drop and small tenant farmers gradually disappear, meanwhile it gave rise 
to larger export-oriented capital-intensive tenant farms being rented out
78
.  
The rural labor-intensive sectors of industrial production were affected by urban 
capital expansion: in dairy production for instance, a curtailment of labor input by 
means of capital injections was put into operation by urban entrepreneurs as a strategy 
to profit. By way of such a process of rationalization, dairy commercial farming 
expanded until the XVI century and conquered international markets: «the cheese sector 
was generating a chief export product of the Holland countryside»
79
. Another example 
of internationally successful proto-industry was the brick industry. Brick industry 
underwent the enlargement of the scale of production thanks to higher thermal energy 
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employment, eased by the expansion of fuel markets and the quickness of commodity 
circulation due to market regional integration, and it was export-oriented: the IJssel 
bricks and paving-tiles found markets in England with cargoes ranging from 10,000 to 
35,000 bricks each brought by Gouda and Rotterdam ships to Newcastle, Great 
Yarmouth and Chichester. Also large quantities were shipped to Denmark and the Baltic 
region during the XV century and swelled strongly in the XVI. Van Bavel tells us that 
«in the period 1540-1565 yearly some 1.5 million tons of turf were abroad exported 
from Holland»
80
. Brewing developed more rapidly from the XIV century in the Dutch 
market as well as abroad thereafter. Urban capital bought into technology, 
specialization, concentration and sizeable scale enlargement in more urban-centered 
unities of production thereby marketizing at the expanse of rural producers
81
. «By far 
the most of the Holland beer exported to non-regional markets, perhaps some 90 %, was 
produced by larger urban brewers»
82
. Line production was spatially-synergetic. The 
linen industry for the most employed raw material such as flax or hackled flax imported 
from abroad and worked, at different stages of production, by both country- and town- 
workers and whereof a good portion came to be destined to the exportation to Italy, 
England and Spain
83
. But it was fishing the leading example of Dutch market-organized 
expansion
84
: 
 
Fishing was often linked with transportation, since fishing-ships were also used for carrying cargo, 
at least until the end of the 16th century, when specialized types of ships gained more and more ground 
[…].The strong development of shipping and fishing in Holland in the 15th and 16th centuries not only 
resulted in a growing demand for rope, nets and canvas […] but also in an increasing demand for ships. 
Part of the shipbuilding was done in the countryside, along the rivers. Ship carpentry was a highly 
developed skill and increasingly so through the 15th and 16th centuries, as ships became bigger and more 
complex. Simultaneously, and connected with this development, a process of capital intensification, 
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scale-enlargement and concentration took place. This process went together with a shift of the sector to 
the cities, which also exercised some political pressure to this end. 
 
Dutch herring became in that span of time a pivotal exportation and during 1300s 
it had already tapped into the English market and then into Flanders and Brabant
85
, the 
Danish market, in Germany – Rhine, Cologne, Basel – Spain, France – Saint-Malo, 
Dieppe and Rouen to Paris and then Franche-Comte, Toulouse, the Dauphine and 
Avignon –, and finally reached the Mediterranean shores. «Herring was one of the 
typical products of the North which formed the basis for the commercial connection 
with southern Europe. Herring was therefore naturally in the cargoes of the northern 
European ships which invaded the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century»
86
. Indeed, 
the actual burst was between 1450 and 1590 and it occurred as a compound growth. Its 
initial nature of seasonal proto-industrial activity enabled: to hire out low-waged 
workers; cheap, peasant-produced equipment; shared ships-owning; efficient protection 
of herring fleets; well-organized markets; reduced costs of information; urban-rural 
authorities’ regulation and backing; quality; good packing. Only in the XVI century, 
when herring fishing cut its proto-industrial base off by cycles of capital injection, 
productive growth, specialization and a major employment of wage labor-force, this 
industry managed to bulk further the scale of operation and the opportunity for profit 
although, at the same time, the same very processes of expansion started out to 
gradually fret its rate of accumulation by increasing production costs
87
. 
But what needs to be emphasized is that any of such developmental correlatives 
for Holland’s economic advance could only be developed by virtue of the feasible and 
factual estrangement from subsistence that the European circuit of food grains 
importation and circulation – viz., the European circuit of capitalization-appropriation 
of natures –  allowed and endorsed. Ludovico Gucciardini in 1567 beheld that: 
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Di si fatta maniera che, da quel’ tempo in qua, pare che il terreno restando coli basso. Se 
sopraffatto dall’acque, che il più del tempo vi regnano, habbia molto mutato di natura & conditione: onde 
per tanta bassezza & aquosità quello paese fa pochissimo grano,& manco segale, nondimeno n’ha tanta 
abbondanza , che ne provede piu Provincie, ma vi fono portati da più bande, & specialmente di 
Danimarca, & d’Ostarlante88.  
 
Ecology molded the formative path of the Dutch structure of accumulation and its 
constituents in space. The need for grain to feed the Low Countries after the Black 
Death was «staggering» owing to the next demographic upswing, populace 
concentration in expanding towns and the intrinsic constraints of agriculture and soil
89
. 
In other words: soil scarcity beset Dutch history
90
. It was in the XV century that 
Holland, as one would have expected, commenced relying heavily on imported grain, 
notably long-distance grain trade, whose volume was «impressive»: the quantity of rye 
alone was about 5,500 metric tons in the 1460's and up to well over 20,000 tons each 
year by the end of the century. By the first half of the 17th century the average for all 
grains was more than 150,700 metric tons per year. The maximum reached in 1618 was 
around 220,000 tons
91
. Grain production was declining since the XIV century and, by 
the sixteenth century, wheat and rye cultivation «became almost impossible»
92
. Only 
soft grain was cultivated and in the XV-XVI century bread grain almost disappeared 
from the crops. «If grain imported were halted, Holland and particularly Amsterdam 
would have serious difficulties as the domestic (Holland) grain accounted for less than a 
tenth of the total required. According to this, the Dutch population depended on foreign 
imports for more than 90 percent of its needs». The most important source of grain from 
the Baltic was with no doubt Gdansk: 79 percent of importations emanated from there
93
. 
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Table 3.4. Grain export from Danzig according to the harbor records of Danzig (1490-1557)  
and the Sound Toll tables (1562-1569)
94
  
 
Baltic grain circuit undoubtedly had a decisive role in helping to substitute the 
subsistence strategy inherent in the feudal rules of reproduction with an economic 
rationality that was to base the source of socio-ecological power on the imperative of 
capitalist accumulation. The precocity of the shift of Holland’s agrarian, industrial and 
commercial landscape as a whole was an outcome thereof: capital-driven (proto-
)industrial activities as well as commodification of land and nature – we saw above and 
we see below –, capital-intensive farming and proletarization, took roots and expanded. 
Holland, the Baltic, and Poland as instance, came to be strongly correlated with patterns 
of intense trade exchanges since the late middle ages, owing to their own capitalized 
ecologies
95
. The span of time from XIV century to XVI century indeed is proven to be 
Year Last Hectoliters 
1490 
1491 
1492 
1530 
1557 
1562-1569 
(average) 
10,00
0 
5,900 
10,50
0 
18,00
0 
29,80
0 
45,30
0 
301,000 
177,600 
316,000 
541,800 
897,000 
1,363,500 
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crucial to the jump-start of Holland
96
. Concurrently, the shipments of grain from the 
Baltic to the Low Countries began by the 14th century and, over time, became the most 
important pattern of exchanges «in terms of volume and value, at least in northern 
Europe, down to the Industrial Revolution. The records of the tolls charged in the Sund 
demonstrate that». In actuality, «specialization in grain production in Poland» coupled 
with «rising exports of grain to Low Countries» propelled by «the higher level of 
market integration», notably in the XVI century. There are evidences also endorsing the 
conclusion that «Poland suffered not only from short term drains of foodstuffs but also 
from limitations in the total supply of grain» from export correlation and soil 
exhaustion. «The volume of grain shipped was impressive [and the] sheer size of the 
trade meant that the economies and the grain markets of the two regions were 
interdependent»
97
.  
Van Thielof tells us that about 600,000 people could live with grain imported 
through the Baltic sea from the east in the decade of 1560. These figures, the historian 
says, are truly «impressive», even more if we consider that Holland population was far 
less than that and the greater part of the grain imported came to be re-exported for profit 
in England, Scotland, Spain, Portugal, and in the countries on the Rhine and Meuse
98
. 
As far as it is concerned here, this profit was not simply profit hoarded, but capital 
reinvested into i.e. proto-industrial and industrial production, that is, in technology, 
innovation, specialization – capitalist intensification of production, concentration and 
centralization, scale enlargement, labor-savings techniques, etc. – and the further 
expansion of the commercial networks. In short: expanded accumulation of capitalist 
sort. In this respect, the Dutch deployed a circuit of compound growth: grain trade was 
integral to the qualitative and quantitative expansion of proto-industries in the 
countryside and in towns, and both to the further growth of commercial activities – such 
as fishing (herring) for example. All these factors, as we shall see below, molded and 
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were in turn molded by Dutch ecology which enabled the easy retrieve of fuel and 
energy, and the functional environmental manipulation. Increasingly from 1540 on, 
Holland was to be «the grain entrepot of Western and Southern Europe» and the highest 
capital-intensive productive centre; furthermore, «the importance of Baltic grain trade 
became disproportionally large [for] the great influx of eastern rye during the sixteenth 
century put the masses of not-rich inhabitants of the Netherlands in the position of 
supplying their needs for basic food item and a relatively cheap manner […] even in 
hard times»99. The shift in the living strategy for the Dutch was integral and crucial part 
of this circuit. 
The imperial emissary to Hamburg Maximilian Transilvan in 1534 beheld that: 
 
The whole profit and increase of the kingdom of Poland and the said town of Danzig lies in this, that 
the Hollanders come every year once or twice to Danzig with two or three hundred ships, to buy and take 
off in fourteen days all the grain that they find in the said town of Danzig. For in the past twenty-five 
years all the great lords of Poland and Prussia have discovered therein the means of sending by certain 
rivers all their grain to Danzig and there to have it sold to those of the said town. And for this reason the 
kingdom of Poland and the great lords have become mightily rich. For before this time, they knew not 
what to do with their grain and left their lands uncultivated, and the town of Danzig, which was nothing 
but a village, is at this time the most powerful and richest city in all the Eastland sea
100
. 
 
Not only eastern grain was imported. Any run of western grain in the XVI century 
flowed into Holland from England – soft grain, barley and malt –, France, notably 
norther France nearby the Seine, Somme, Artois – that during the start of the Revolt 
strongly integrated the Baltic flows that were hit hard – and South Flanders, but also 
from Germany via the Rhine and Meuse. The Province of Holland particularly came to 
be even fed by Netherlands’s sources emanating from Zeeland, south Holland, Delft and 
Dordrecht, up to Leiden, Utrecht – whose wheat transportation to Amsterdam spawned 
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a market devoted –, and from Guilders via the Rhine and Meuse to Dordrecht101. Cities 
were crucial to supply Holland from the outside indeed: ecological disorder foisted the 
need to capture foreign flows of grain foods on the Dutch and only the market networks 
of the cities managed to provide such a service, and whose appendages were to 
provision increasingly the rural areas also
102
. It is tenable to say that the whole Dutch 
space – albeit unevenly – came to be dependent on foreign grain from the eve of the 
sixteenth century
103
.  
This perspective tends to back also the historical importance and the nature of the 
town-countryside involvement as a rather coherent complex of relations, as well as the 
spatial interpolation of such a historical bloc in the region: trade, production and labor, 
the networks of trade and the chains of productions and labor, were all intermeshed 
within, among and by such composite units of institutionalized capitalist space. It was 
not a pattern of urban exploitation to be sure; nor was it an exchange whereby power 
simply accrued to cities. It can be better described as a historical unit of capitalist-
patterned relations premised on multilateral interdependency and exchanges of value-
forms and wealth, whose inherent quality and quantity of interactions and operations 
built the conditions to greater achievements. As de Vries claimed: «one can view the 
European economy of the late sixteenth century as consisting of hundreds of towns with 
hinterlands of 50 to 100 square miles [as] unities». In Holland, since the late middle 
ages, they worked hand in glove. The national economy and political economy of the 
Republic of the seventeenth century came to be mapped out and organized in time, then 
fashioned apace in the last three decades of the sixteenth century, through the increased 
and expanding thickness and density of the medieval network of power relations on the 
ground which both urbanity and rurality at once weaved
104
.  
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Pivoting on such a matrix finally, pace Brenner, it was the expansion of an 
economy geared to a supra-regional export-import pattern of accumulation what exactly 
permitted the expansion of the capitalist praxis, and thus capital enlargement – not its 
formation. This pattern provided to Dutch capital outlets to boost accumulation and to 
check the impact of proletarianization rate on the rate of capital reproduction, without 
however overly limiting the development of domestic markets. That is, the expansion of 
capitalist accumulation occurred through: enhanced exploitation/appropriation, in virtue 
of the semiproletarianizing scheme of labor reproduction (waged laborers + unpaid 
labor); through the underpinning of uneven levels of consumption in domestic market; 
and through the European circuit of import-export production, exchange and 
appropriation that boosted capital accumulation and reproduction, and that overcame, or 
however curbed, the constraints to the semi/proletarian-based consumption in and for 
the domestic market. In short: historical capitalism (as system) in full swing
105
.   
 
3.4   The capitalist logic and the Dutch ecology  
 
The process of capitalist expansion and workforce (semi-)proletarization 
demanded and allowed at once a movement towards the appropriation of Dutch nature 
and thus an ecological and environmental manipulation at unprecedented scale: early 
processes of capitalist environment-making were put into operation. Money was a 
powerful lever for organizing the nature of the world, Moore avers. Indeed, profitability 
rose, but appropriation outpaced exploitation and commodification. In Holland «we see 
capitalism’s marriage of accumulation by capitalization [i.e. proletarization-
commodification proclivity] and accumulation by appropriation (lots of ‘free gifts’): the 
savage coupling of productivity and plunder that conditions every great wave of 
accumulation». In this respect we can say that Dutch history epitomized, above all else, 
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«social processes with environmental significance, in [a matrix] in which, through 
complex relations, the physical, social, economic, and political factors intertwine». 
Dutch history is the history of Dutch environment shaped by a historical-social 
metabolic exchange
106
. 
«If God made the world, the Dutch made Holland» René Descartes said (1596–
1650)
107
. Simon Schama tells us that «the period between 1550 and 1650, when the 
political identity of an independent Netherlands nation was being established, was also a 
time of dramatic physical alteration of its landscape»
108
. Not for nothing this 
seventeenth century peak in environment-making processes paralleled the world 
unfolding of Dutch power. It was the climax of a long-lasting process of landscape 
manipulation funneled through the institutional framework to facilitate the expansion of 
the economy since the middle ages
109
. The capitalist thrust was at the roots of both of 
them. The making and remaking in time of Dutch ecological space was thus a master 
process of the same expansion of capital on a par with the economic-social and 
institutional processes of Holland formation since the late middle ages. Therefore, in 
this respect, the environment definitely was not a mere recipient to capital development 
but integral constituent of Dutch processes of capitalist accumulation and expansion 
since the beginning.  
 
[W]hy around 1600 [did]  the Republic [assume] the mantle of leadership on the path of mankind's 
economic and social development[?]. The answer is: because it was able to extensively apply inland 
navigation and, by that, to fall back on its peat deposits when everywhere (also in the Netherlands itself) 
deforestation had progressed to such an extent, that wood had become an expensive fuel
110
.  
  
Usually, during the Middle Ages strict socio-ecological constraints to 
development had to be respected for, being all men dependent directly from soil 
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productivity, «different sorts of energy [were] mutually exclusive»
111
. The early Dutch 
capitalist thrust was to push the limit of development against the limit of the natural 
developmental conditions – which had been inherent in the medieval logic of 
production and power
112
. The expansion of the capitalist logic of operation – cash nexus 
or appropriation alike – embedded on such a vast scope, changed the rhythmic of 
society instead, and of society in nature with an «irreparable rift»
113
. «Urban living 
created a new human environment in medieval northern Europe [and] extended human 
environmental impact beyond their own immediate surroundings. Centers of market 
exchange transmitted demand pressure to natural local ecosystems at some remove from 
the urban consumers, so initiating on a modest scale effects now attributed to 
globalization»
114
. In this process, the Dutch stepped into the limelight for this creative 
manipulation was under way to deliver profits on an ever-larger scale of reproduction to 
men. The prospect of «capitalism as environmental history» for Holland fits quite 
well
115
. Commodified energy was required by an expanding capital indeed, and work, in 
this respect, can be seen as an action toward the transformation of nature to cater to 
human needs.  
As the capitalist logic came to root and spread out, the pace of the erection of 
dams, dikes, sluices, and polders, the construction of drainage canals, water mills and 
transport systems stepped up as well as the rhythm of deforestation and soil-dependent 
energies extractions. Along with this, the effect of an industrial production on a larger 
scale that such man-made environment eased and propelled further began to be felt
116
. 
However, what we need to emphasize is that any such processes of environment-making 
were far from being permanent and irreversible
117
. Early-modern capitalism did not 
intrinsically altered nature. But nature was harnessed and subordinated to the logic of 
capital accumulation. «One could argue that society did not have its back to the 
ecological wall but was facing it, for the old ecological order could hardly provide 
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higher living standards for the masses»
118
. What this shifted mode of landscape 
production in Holland signaled was “nothing more” than the underlying shift in the 
living strategy, moving from the old ecological order to the capitalist one – for a wealth, 
power, and nature, produced by the search for money and premised on the relation of 
power and production embedded in the commodity-centered reproduction of value
119
. 
What the expansion and the entrenchment of the capitalist logic of operation within 
Dutch space factually made was to entrain – unsurprisingly of course – a swift shift in 
the management of the environment – quality – and in the pace of the ecological 
manipulation – quantity.  
The pace and the quality of soil exploitation and degradation stepped up forcefully 
as a result of the increasing operations of industry that foisted the more intense 
appropriation of natural resources on capital
120
. The Dutch started out putting into 
operation activities of deforestation and excavation on a massive scale to recoup fuel 
and energy for replenishing the capital-intensive structure of production, and to keep up 
with the demographic upswing and urban concentration. Forests were razed to the 
ground to produce wood for heating, to supply industries, and for building purposes, 
leading to heavy deforestation
121
. The increasing scale of fishing operation for example 
was enabled by technological investments in shipbuilding and the expansion of 
production, spelling the accretion of the rate of deforestation, even beyond Holland 
region, in the territory close to her122. «Around 1640 the Dutch stock of harvestable 
wood lots had been reduced practically to zero»
123
. Not only deforestation but rivers 
depletion: investments in fishing technology delivered to the Dutch «enormous drift and 
drag nets used by fleets of 30 to 50 ships, which emptied the sea». The usage of trawl 
nets and net poles and the practice of smothering or catching young fish, nearly emptied 
some rivers, such as the Meuse near Rotterdam. «Around the middle of the 16th 
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century, fishing grounds in the Zuiderzee seem to have been depleted by 
overfishing»
124
. 
The Dutch were the greediest extractors of peat in Europe, proceeding to operate 
on the soil on ever-increasing scale and more intensive manner starting from the late 
middle ages, succeeding «in breaking through the development limit»
125
. The 
subsidence of drained peat bogs had been a longstanding issue
126
. The rate of peat 
extraction in Holland, in the course of the late-medieval capital expansion, compounded 
severely such a historical-natural condition: the mounting drive for profit delivered 
increasingly the soil to market expanding usages
127
. The waxing pace of extraction and 
the extension of the activity of dredging of peat paralleled indeed the «jump-start of 
Holland» – fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries128. In this respect, the upshot was forced 
and systematic landscape manipulation – and sometimes degradation – on ever-larger 
scale
129
. This was only possible thanks to the capital accumulated, reinvested and 
reproduced capitalistically. In sum: the expansible industrial structure of Holland 
necessitated increased quantities of fuels
130; the soil’s natural bounty131 along with the 
prompt availability of capital and the cheap and plentiful rural labor-force made it prone 
to invest in larger-scale capital-intensive operations
132
 and new methods
133
 – although 
peat digging remained largely high labor-intensive
134
. The increasing throughput of an 
expanding economy meant higher returns on investment. The outcome: the further 
accumulation of capital. By way of this early and inchoate circuit of «capitalism-in-
nature», buttressed by the profit-oriented institutional framework
135
, the industrial thirst 
of commodified energy could be quenched
136
, endowing the economy as a whole with 
productive capacity, flexibility and competiveness alien to other region in this respect, 
thereby enabling to expand and extend range, quantity and quality of productions, 
exchanges and operations in domestic and international markets alike at unprecedented 
scale.  
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The expanding rate of dikes building, sluices construction and wind/watermills 
technology swept across Dutch space, and along with private and public investments for 
creating new polders, they were part and parcel of the movement that was making ever-
more profitable land in the course of the early process of commodification of nature. 
Add to this the extensive transport and port system – «the finest transportation networks 
in all of medieval Europe»
137– and the facilities by water which the furtherance of the 
hydraulic technology – i.e. sluice mechanization and raw material improvements for 
dikes – enabled as a response to the widespread ecological crisis – partially bred but 
with no doubt sharpened by the spreading logic of commodifying nature – and we set 
about gleaning why accumulation of capital and capitalist forces could congeal in the 
region consistently
138
. «Indeed, it is impossible to envision the economic success of the 
Dutch Republic during the early modern era without taking the inland waterways into 
consideration» with energy-fuel production as a function of water managements: 
«investment in water managements provided the means for intensive economic growth 
[and in so doing] water adaptation strategies were connected not only to environmental 
processes, but also to the changing framework of political, economic, and social 
institutions»
139
.  
Adapting Moore, the «Fours Cheaps» – reserve of labor, food (largely imported), 
raw materials (domestic and imported) and energy (domestic – peat – imported – wood) 
– were all at work in full swing here largely accruing to the operations of capital. The 
capitalist circuit of compound growth afforded the Hollanders «twice doubled 
opportunities for development» pursuant to the fact that it embedded within itself the 
nature and the profit-oriented management thereof
140
. 
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3.5 By way of introduction 
 
Over time, in Holland, the capitalist expansion spelt the same old problem of the 
capitalist strategy of power and relation across history. Wealth polarization, social 
inequality and environmental exhaustion through market transformation of human 
values was not an unnatural distortion but the factual agency of a society of capitalist 
sort, and it signaled the degree to which the capitalist logic of operation enveloped 
Dutch space. The first and second points – inequality and polarization – have been 
omitted thus far and now treated in passing. 
Social mobility brought about an ample inequality between various social groups. 
It grew, and wealth distribution became more uneven with the increment of the scale of 
the market operations. The phases of economic expansion partially concealed the 
process of uneven distribution of social wealth by expanding purchasing power; but it 
brought out also that the growth of GDP per capita paralleled the increment in 
polarization and a sharpened process of wealth concentration: the gap between rich and 
poor was waxing. The masses were not worse off in absolute terms but in relative ones. 
Abstract indicator such as GPD per capita diverts the quality of Holland development 
for the expansion was accompanied by improved and yet languishing living standards. 
And the quality of such a contradiction has been tracked down in the growing 
importance of the cash nexus and the market-based social relations of exchange and 
production, the scale enlargement of the operations of accumulation, production and 
exchange and a division of labor towards a sharpened proletarization. «This process was 
able to increase or sustain GDP per capita and feed more people, but at the same time 
created inequality, pollution, and environmental degradation». The capitalist thrust has 
always been structured on, and has always operated by way of, an oligarchic accretion 
of wealth which pollutes and degenerates any social achievement
141
. 
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Nonetheless, the material and cultural development of society proceeded in waves 
of accelerations and braking, but, since the later middle ages, Holland region slowly but 
steadily accumulated and bulked forces and powers, means and ideas, knowledge and 
know-how, function of the capitalist origin of its own framework of expansion
142
. The 
exceptional level of urbanization was a long-run vector of “modernization” conducive 
to a «bourgeois society» in which particular institutional and occupational flexibility, 
market-oriented agency and religious-intellectual broad-mindedness, further swayed 
medieval traditions and collectivity and enveloped the countryside outright. This 
“modern” environment and spatial arrangement in turn furthered the common individual 
and individualistic propensity to act by creating «situations in which personal initiative, 
innovation, and responsibility [could] develop, and where political, economic, and 
personal freedom [was] valued more highly». Medieval remnants were thus 
progressively eroded away, displaced by a logic of socio-ecological agency rooted in an 
institutional framework premised on tenets of «modern economy». Such a bias was not 
confined to cities, but it had its profound sway on peasantry as well, and thus all over 
the region – the «institutions by their nature were probably closer to the most basic 
values of life and therefore more firmly embedded in the fabric of society»
143
. The 
interplay of historical factors and vectors represents the early matrix of power relations 
and pattern of wealth, production and exchanges; the original intertwining and 
intersecting «sociospatial networks of power» over and within Dutch space; the very 
ground upon which the next structured complex and higher assemblages of power 
relations embodied by the Dutch Republic could be framed and put into operation
144
. 
 
«Capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is 
the state» avers Braudel. But capitalism, Braudel continues, «reveals its true face» only 
when it becomes identified with society, when it is society. Hence, if a capitalist-
 168 
 
hegemonic triumph is to occur, within a territory, state and capital, plus society, are to 
be coextensive, that is, to constitute a trialectic unity premised on a capitalist process of 
interlocking embeddedness
145
. Power is to be the result, and the world expansion of 
power to be the result of the most logically-coherent rootedness and development of the 
same process of constitution. The incunabula of this movement factually occurred on 
the Dutch ground since the late middle ages in a characteristic fashion and it represented 
an interstitial emergence of a new configuration of power within the general feudality of 
Europe
146
. As capitalism took hold and expanded by way of the interlocking articulation 
of institutionalized capital-oriented business and governmental agencies and structures 
of power on the ground up to the sixteenth century
147
, its triumph was to be 
substantiated by means of (the structuring of) a capital-based «territorial state» in the 
seventeenth century – a organizational capitalist complex of agencies, networks and 
institutions
148
. Such a process of development and structuring did not signal the crossing 
of an edge, but the historical development of «infrastructural power» – a regime of 
accumulation
149
. The Dutch Republic was thus the historical outgrowth of both 
Schumpeterian adaptive and creative response society- and state-wide that signaled not 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism, but the passage from medieval networks of 
scattered capitalist power on the ground to a structured complex of concentrated 
capitalist power that the Dutch state embodied in the seventeenth century
150
. 
The historical lack of a congealing organic state structure – an organic and strong 
upper ordo of power – in the process of power formation during the late middle ages 
was an important factor conducive to the expansion of Dutch society as a whole and the 
extension of the benefits and the logic of such an expansion toward the very ground of 
the Dutch social edifice. For its own historical premises, Holland region lacked strong 
higher configurations and coordination of powers premised on the strategy of «political 
accumulation» that were to exert a rent-seeking hold in the process of early formation, 
 169 
 
displacing and distorting powers, forces and wealth from the ground
151
. In view of this 
hence, by laying out conditions and seizing opportunities on the historical ground, 
urban(-rural) capital, in the long run, managed to garner and strengthen the hold of 
political power at supra-local level pursuant to the vertical and horizontal extension of 
networks of accumulation and power – from the second half of the 14th century, towns 
in Holland began to «move to the centre of the political stage» up to becoming «the 
dominant center of political power» in the Republic
152
.  As we shall see, this capitalist 
hold in politics on the ground, enabled to seize and thus to run from below the process 
of jurisdictional coagulation that historical contingencies and necessities thrusted upon 
the Dutch during the second half of the sixteenth century
153
. The construction of the 
Dutch Republic was the witting completion and historical acme of the developmental 
path of a society compelled, since the origin, «to sell to survive»
154
. 
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Chapter 4 
The Dutch Regime of Accumulation.  
From Scattering to Concentration to Redeployment, 
XVI-XVII centuries.  
 
 
This chapter draws on and essays in expanding a riveting suggestion made by  
Brian Downing in his 1992’s The Military Revolution and Political Change, that is, that 
the impetus for the historical change during the middle ages and early modern times 
came from «the institutional momentum of the medieval estates, local governments, 
personal freedom and independent judiciaries» themselves, not from the emerging 
structure of nation-states. But also it endeavors to elaborate on the insight made by 
David Landes recalled in the previous chapter which the scholar rounds off as follow: 
  
In any event, it was surely one of Europe's great advantages that its first capitalist entrepreneurs 
worked and flourished in autonomous city-states, hence political units where the influence of landed 
wealth was necessarily limited; and that even in the larger embryonic nation states, the special juridical 
status of the urban commune made it possible for its inhabitants to develop and sustain their own distinct 
political interest […]. In this way the cities were not only foci of economic activity but schools of 
political and social association incubators of the bourgeoisie as a self-conscious, assertive interest group. 
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They were also crucibles for the refinement of values that, although profoundly rooted in European 
culture, were still deviant and limited to a minority-values ultimately subversive of the feudal order
1
.  
 
This chapter also takes inspiration from the work of the distinguished historian 
Frederic Lane who drew attention to the effect that the transfer of resources by means of 
taxation engenders on processes of capital accumulation, notably with a focus on «the 
extent to which governments determined directly the uses made of surplus through their 
taxes and disbursements»: 
 
Economic growth depended not only on the incentives to invest but also on the capacity to invest. 
In recent times it is estimated that nearly all individuals' savings, and thus capacity to invest, is in the 
hands of ten percent of the population. The poor may have the incentives, but they lack the capacity. 
There is reason to believe that such was also the case in early modern times. Economic growth then 
depended very largely on whether or not the system of property rights, and the use by governments of the 
tribute they collected, put surplus under the control of men who invested it and thus increased total 
production
2
. 
 
This chapter follows the path already undertaken to understand the formation of 
the historical basin of Dutch power. In this regard we can summarize that the horizontal 
unfolding of the logic of capital accumulation on the Dutch ground during the XIV-XVI 
centuries enabled the vertical thrust of power which structured the Dutch state in the 
second half of the XVI century. Paraphrasing David Held, this interdependent capitalist 
transformation of both state and society came to be topped off by the coming into 
operation of the Dutch regime of accumulation during the last decade of the XVI 
century right up to the XVII century. The issue looks at how the capitalist logic of 
operation permeates the pattern of behavior of state, capital and society up to create an 
historical intersubjectively-constituted capitalist reality which was characterized by a 
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great logical coherence. The completion and acme of the historical process of 
interlocking embeddedness begun in the late middle ages was the Golden Age, that is, 
the Dutch hegemon of the seventeenth century in the context of consolidation of the 
capitalist world system. But, in this long-run process of formation and combustion, 
nothing was preordained or certain and definite. 
William Aglionby wrote in 1669:  
 
scarce any Subject occurres more frequent in the discourses of ingenious men, than that of the 
marvellous progress of this little State which in the space of  about one hundred years (for ‘tis not more 
since their first attempt to shake off the Spanish yoke) hath grown to a height, not only in transcending all 
the ancient Republicks of Greece, but not much inferior in some respect to the greatest monarchies of 
these latter ages. Nor is the wonder inconsiderably augmented, in that the lesser moiety hath farre 
exceeded even the whole itself, and seven provinces are become greater than seventeen; with manifest 
verification of that enigmatical aphorism dimidium plus toto. To which it may likewise added that for 
above sixty years of that abovementioned hundred they were continually engag'd in a Warre against the 
greatest king of this Western World. […] and nevertheless the difficult exercise of their nonage not only 
promoted their growth, by necessarily exciting the industry natural to that nation, but likewise 
contributed to render the constitution of the state it self more robust and athletick.
3
 
 
This chapter therefore will attempt to show how the construction of the Dutch 
State – conflictual and flawed as any process of state-making in any time – was tapped 
and became so productive to the Dutch to transform a tiny piece of land under siege by 
the Spanish imperial forces in the first hegemonic regime in the history of the capitalist 
world system. Of course, the constitution of the Dutch edifice was first and foremost 
highly remunerative for the oligarchies at the helm, but the populace under them 
enjoined prosperity at unprecedented levels. This is not to say, for instance, that workers 
fared extraordinary well during the agricultural doldrums of the mid-seventeenth 
century – firstly affecting the inland areas and northern Brabant in the 1650s and then 
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became progressively general in the late 1660s – despite the efficient network of 
welfare that the local authorities, subsidized and backed by the State, arranged
4
. 
However, the Dutch organization of social provision was, above all else, a «symbolic 
means for representing cultural norms to a broader public» which conveyed the image 
and the actual manifestation of a bonum publicum to which the Dutch oligarchy could 
not renounce and the Dutch state had to provide to the Dutch. In this regard see an 
example of how state, capital and society worked hand in glove in a social equation 
pivoting on capital in 1658: 
 
Although it must be admitted that in these banks everything is not so equitable as in the Mountains 
of Charity, and although the profits are not used in helping the poor with alms, nevertheless the interest 
charges have been reduced one-half, and they are intended to help pay the cost of government. 
Furthermore, since it is the duty of every man to continue to labor with his hands in order to improve his 
financial condition and so build up a surplus for the maintenance of the needy, I conclude that the 
magistrates by increasing the public funds are taking care that in times of depression the poor may be 
aided either through loans or alms
5
. 
 
An internal projection and organization of power of this sort instantiates the 
concept of regime of accumulation as here understood. Such a projection contributed to 
defuse potentially perilous popular uproars during the entire history of the Republic and 
to keep economy and state going as well. In this sense therefore, a Dutch historian 
termed the Dutch state «a function of society», a device of management to-ing and fro-
ing the societal ground. The Dutch trialectic unity that ensued from this interlocked 
involvement of the new state with the “old” capital and society was not mere 
concentrated power; it was concentrated power constructed through collective efforts. 
And this, the same historian says, is a conception of state, and thus of society and of 
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perspective of power, «which differed widely from that which prevailed in the Europe 
of royal absolutism»
6
.  
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The Republic of the Seven United Provinces 
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4.1) The birth of the Dutch state and the dawn of the Dutch regime of accumulation 
 
4.1.1) 1482-1560. The first surge of territorial state-building: absolutism in 
reverse 
 
Concentrated power through collective efforts spelt that Dutch governmental 
dynamic – structure(s) and processes – in the history of the Republic credited its 
subjects with powers pursuant to the institutionalized bargaining entrenched during the 
preceding centuries of societal development theretofore. That is to say that power lay 
within the Dutch historical edifice, not at its tip, sweeping from within to the tip(s) back 
and forth – as Herbert Rowen said, power in the Dutch Republic «was distributed all up 
and down the scale across the country»
7
. This suggests also, as we shall see, that the 
governmental helm was held by those who already had the means to wield rights and 
rules, but that were too scattered on the ground to assume complete control, and that 
exerted – and were only able to exert – a typology of power which called for collective 
efforts and collective enterprises. In keeping with its historical development thus, the 
Dutch regime in the XVII century was characterized by rulers which possessed actual 
power and subjects who were organized and able to organize themselves on the same 
scale as the rulers. This levelled confrontation was conducted in an highly productive 
way for populace and rulers alike, and this, in the seventeenth century context, was an 
exception rather than a rule – purportedly, it was a governmental dynamic which 
represents a historical rarity as well. Furthermore, it enables to understand the Dutch 
trialectic unity. The construction of the Dutch state brought the third element missing to 
constitute the Dutch regime of accumulation. 
Since power stemmed primarily from the ground of the Dutch edifice – society –, 
the passage from scattered to concentrated power can be viewed firstly as an 
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organizational revolution related to the way state power was organized and structured in 
actuality in relation with capital and society.  
Before the Revolt, especially during the sixteenth century, the urban-rural 
complexes were subjected to a superimposed authority external to the locus of power 
itself which obstructed and diverted functions and values to ends which did not conform 
with the logic according to which the same value was produced. Indeed, the Spanish 
rulers, for their own prerogatives, lacked a specialized network of bureaucrats and 
diplomats who could undertake technical negotiations in the sphere of international 
economy. They were inadequately equipped to play an effective role on the technical 
level of accumulation, production and exchange
8
. The early expansion of the Dutch 
space of accumulation provided an opportunity to those rulers to harness the Dutch 
frontier in the form of social disciplining, political interloping and thus fiscal extraction 
– viz., value predation. However, the external thrust for appropriation ended up 
heightening the historical tension inherent to the capitalist logic of power geared to 
define a clear constitutional self-identity which found political expression in the forcible 
and ongoing assertion of the Privileges and Liberties in the form of an irresistible thrust 
towards self-organization and self-representation in political, social and economic 
matters. This contributed in creating a situation in which, in practice, Spanish rulers 
scarcely played any role at all – against the collectivity of urban-rural complexes, 
mainly of Holland, and also in Zeeland 
Up to the fifteenth century, the Netherlands had been politically dormant. During 
the sixteenth century by contrast, especially after 1520, the socio-political 
reorganization of the Netherlands by the Spaniards bridled the northern space in an 
integrated Hapsburg jurisdiction under the rule of the agents of the Crown’s 
bureaucracy. The intensified processes of unification, centralization, and 
bureaucratization caged the true spirit of Dutch sociality, liberties and power with a 
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superimposed bundle of bureaucratic-fiscal relations – new provincial high courts and 
the transformation of the Hof of Holland and Zeeland as instrument of Hapsburg 
meddling, the curbs on provincial self-government turned instead into a centrally-
managed web of patronage, etc. Up to 1540, political constraints were reckoned with 
and brooked by both sides. But once the process of social disciplining and political 
restructuring was coupled with an ever-mounting fiscal pressure during the ‘40s, 
situation changed. The struggle for hegemony in Europe between Spain and France was 
escalating and all provinces were subjected to new heavy burdens in terms of taxation, 
recruiting, billeting, provisioning, and dislocation of troops – in the Netherlands, the 
annual cost of waging war in the 1550s was double compared that of the 1540s, and 
seven/eight times higher than that of the 1520s. The only way to cater to the military 
needs of the Spaniards – that is, the administrative enhancement of the web of finance 
and taxation, and the related increase in efficiency of both of them – was a wave of state 
expansion within Dutch space.  
The submission of provincial administrations was of course the main objective of 
central government. In the newly won provinces indeed, fiscal and political extortion – 
and the resultant frustration of processes of capital accumulation – exacerbated deep-
seated socio-political malaise, and bred strong contention concerning the form and 
organization of the Hapsburg crown’s relations of power with its subjects as well as the 
right to wield power in that form over them. Notably Holland – but in general the entire 
Dutch space – owed a deep-rooted «habit of cooperating on behalf of perceived 
common interests», and when these – the interests of the expanding capital in its 
operations of accumulation – began to be obstructed or seriously damaged, the harshest 
frictions set about surfacing
9
.  
The new burden – political fetters, fiscal exaction, and economic interloping 
thereon – was to divert forces and values from the activities of production and trade, 
 179 
 
thereby impinging on the rhythm of regional accumulation – within and among the 
urban-rural complexes – and, as a consequence, on the European networks of Dutch 
accumulation, notably those ones extending on the Baltic and in north-western Europe. 
Political, fiscal and economic pressures, exerted for different purposes not related to the 
urban-rural political economy, enfeebled the rate of accumulation, weighed down the 
rate of capital reproduction, increased costs – especially related to the circulating 
capital
10
.  
Take an example: concerning Baltic grain, political-economic competitive 
pressures were intense at home as well as in the Baltic. The most intense competition 
might have been contained, or averted in great part, thanks to an opportune trading 
policy and/or fiscal relaxation from the center. By contrast, fiscal exactions might create 
a situation for the Dutch in which a) grain prices might have increased, leading foreign 
traders to avoid Holland, b) offering to the closer competitors from the southern 
Netherlands the opportunity to redirect trade directly to Antwerp, or by way of them to 
other shores, thereby eluding Holland; worse still, c) Holland involvement in the 
Spanish dynastic and imperial politics – a fiscal and military involvement – pertaining 
to the northern states might have closed off Dutch trade in the Baltic – Holland had 
proceeded during the XV century, and in the first decades of the XVI, to secure its 
international relationships in the Baltic, notably with Denmark that was crucial to Dutch 
trade. A Baltic war, commercial or political alike, might have brought on increasing 
fiscal pressure, seafaring unemployment, contraction of the grain market and of the 
correlatives at home, and increased costs in general – transaction, protection and 
production costs. Uproars might have sparked off. But the Dutch government – namely, 
Holland towns’ regents – did not permit any effective meddling in the economic, fiscal, 
and also political affairs of the Province when this one impinged on the vital nerves of 
Dutch economy, and especially on the international economic policy – notably on grain 
 180 
 
and herrings – of the most important regional centers of accumulation, such as 
Amsterdam – the “Danish question” is an example of Amsterdam’s obstreperousness11.  
The Dutch made their own policy in the face of the Spanish central governors 
since the beginning of their rule, deftly handling several central government 
encroachments
12
. Two instances: since 1495, Amsterdam owed a privilege, granted by 
Maximilian I, for the free re-export of grain, but during Margaret of Austria’s 
stewardship in the second decade of the sixteenth century, the Spaniards tried 
(1527/1535 officially) to withdraw it – it was believed an affront “to the sovereignty of 
the Emperor in his native provinces” – but to no avail. Indeed Holland – the Council of 
Holland – succeeded in averting the promulgation of the edicts of 1527-1535, and the 
imposition of the congie on the re-export of Baltic grain, through artful political-
economic contentions concerning its domestic legitimacy, and by way of the leverage of 
international commerce. The Hollanders retained room of maneuver and never gave 
away in practice their free agency
13
.  
Another instance was the attempt to introduce a hundredth penny on the value of 
all goods exported from the Netherlands and a tenth penny on commercial profits. Mary 
of Hungary attempted to impose the hundredth penny but the States of Holland refused 
it. Even when Mary imposed it ''ex potestate absoluta Imperatoris", the edict – thanks 
to the Council’s obstruction – was not published in Holland for months, and when it 
was, Amsterdam ignored it. Furthermore Holland insisted on modifying the tenth penny 
on commercial profits, to change it in a tenth penny on the assumed profit of mercantile 
inventory. Holland won but, even then, no collection was put into operation for months 
and when it was, only about 1,200 pounds were collected. The same fate had a four-year 
tax on imported wine consumed in the Low Countries. “The great and excessive 
monopolies that merchants practice”, as a treasury official said, impeded taxation in 
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fact: in the period between 1543 and 1554, only 1.8 percent of the taxes collected in 
Holland stemmed from the direct taxes on mercantile activity.
14
.  
Differently in Brabant or in Flanders, this Spanish inability to extract values from 
Dutch merchants was, above all else, the result of the ability and the stubbornness of 
Holland’s deputies to uphold, on the one hand, the bonum publicum – regional profit 
and capital –, on the other, their own interests – they bought into industrial-commercial 
activities. The two overlapped. In sum: «the attempts of the central government to 
control the regional and local receivers were largely unsuccessful. Repeated proposals 
to introduce general systems of taxation, especially proportional taxes on trade and on 
capital, were aborted as a result of the opposition of representative institutions 
dominated by the large cities»
15
.  
One great leverage to lobby and endure central government pretensions was fiscal 
blackmail in wartime, whose effective strength was premised on the great capitalist 
accumulation of the urban-rural complexes
16
. The expected submission was in fact 
constrained not enhanced by warfare needs that in the Northern Netherlands 
precipitated, by contrast, the role of the Provincial States in the management of finance 
and taxation, and thus the weight and the sway of the urban oligarchies on the supra-
urban processes of decision-making: warfare led to a forcible Spanish dependency on 
the States, notably of Holland, and an unwilling devolution of functions, in a context of 
absolutist processes of centralization and concentration
17
. The absolutist reverse brought 
about a historical-structural contradiction in the Dutch-Habsburg relations of power, and 
in the related hierarchy, which contributed to redistribute power within Dutch space, 
and from the Spanish crown to the Dutch
18
. This was an important step in the 
construction of the ensuing Dutch state: expanded financial empowerment, historical 
articulation of fiscal-financial practices, agencies and institutions unto and on the 
ground, and the creditworthiness which in those years came to be borne out. The 
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creation of an incipient infrastructure of provincial public finance embodied the 
headway of Dutch state formation underneath the Hapsburgs’ nose, and the percolation 
of such an advancement within the Spanish organization itself
19
.  
The province of Holland (1256) – a «proto-territorial state»20 – was the propellant 
core and trailblazer of such a power movement and expansion, in terms of technics, 
administration, disbursements, investments and financial accumulation of capital, by 
virtue of the historical urban-rural power and bargaining on the ground
21
. To account for 
what happened in the sixteenth century we need therefore to broach the matter of how 
capital encountered the state during the cycle of power formation and accumulation up 
to the 16th century. What follows also explains why the next Union was to be founded 
on the natural – but not taken for granted – lead of Holland22. 
 In the course of the middle ages, the urban-rural spheres of governmental activity 
designed an institutional architecture geared to stave off the feudal usage of coercion – 
property rights were secured and rent-seeking behaviors were checked
23
. It thereby 
strengthened the capitalist logic inherent in Dutch space – the start of capital 
accumulation of capitalist sort traced back at that time we noted. Agents, elected 
representatives and officeholders of local administrations stole the limelight because 
directed, regulated and monitored economic exchange – the local public sphere was 
«the backbone of the market structures» because set out a market-oriented legal 
framework, based on a mix of Roman and German law, which propelled interaction. In 
this regard, the activity of the official receivers was momentous for it normalized and 
intermeshed economy and (within) society: it was prone to check and rationalize 
taxation, to put in order the public spaces of exchange, production and information, and 
to promote the socio-economic policy of the urban-rural complexes – «these three 
incentives were at the heart of the local political economy and the main motives for 
institutional change». Along with what we saw in the previous chapter, we can say 
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hence that the urban-rural complexes displayed an efficient regulatory and normalizing 
capacity of (and within) their space and that this came about because state-capital 
relations were bundled into a permanent and inextricably institutionalized whole which 
enveloped Dutch space. The local public sphere – i.e. the local courts – became indeed 
the «pivotal points in economic exchange» between early state and capital – land, 
industry, commerce and finance – and for the expansion of both since the late middle 
ages. This bundle of relations can be rendered by the dynamic concept of 
“governmental-business agency”24. But if the state-capital encounter of capitalist sort 
was processed as a bottom-up movement, the top-down thrust (the States + the counts) 
was itself incipiently on the move
25
. 
 We have already noted the patterned matrix of value relations extensively 
developed. What importantly contributed to the sociospatial fluidity of capitalist 
accumulation was the formation and development of an efficient capital market. It 
started out to operate on the ground indeed during the late middle ages and it was 
crucial to expand the financial body of the urban-rural complexes, the supra-urban 
framework of politico-financial relations, and the layered connection between public 
(local and supra-local) and private sphere of accumulation and investment. It bettered – 
homogenized and strengthened – societal environment for capitalist accumulation and 
topped off the Dutch institutional landscape and its primordial web of sociospatial 
relations rooted into the urban-rural framework
26
. It provided the crucial 
institutionalized space wherein medieval state and capital could develop a fluid 
encounter – transaction costs reduction, savings redistribution and increased velocity of 
money circulation – and enlarge the quality and quantity of their exchange of power27. 
Institutions geared to control market risks, asymmetry and fraud swiftly emerged, 
premised on the general security of property we saw: arbitrations, judicial courts and 
information asymmetry check (Zeventuig), contracts formalized and incorporated in an 
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extensive legal framework, registers and registrations to combat frauds, to check profits, 
tax and wealth for example.
28
.  
Capital market enabled people to contract obligations and to own securities which 
permitted the transference of value from savers to investors in an enlarging circuit of 
financial accumulation – part and parcel of the regional process of capital intensification 
and accretion, and of expansion of the capitalist logic of power within both private and 
public sphere. It therefore allowed for the “widest” participation of actors to the process, 
and by the same token, a primordial Dutch fusion of state and capital – the States, cities, 
and villages in medieval Holland were both intermediaries and investors on capital 
market along, and in combination, with private capital. The capital market was hence 
important to transmit economic, social and political changes: on the ground, for it 
contributed to disseminate the capitalist logic of power by early “democratizing” 
capital
29
; upward, for it resolved into the crucial conduit for transferring and channeling 
from the ground capital and the logic of capital accumulation – with a fusion of private 
and public investments by way of tax, debt and financial transactions
30
. It was this 
medieval wave of state-capital formation, conflation and enlargement into an ensemble 
of interlocked governmental and business agencies which was to provide the basis to the 
sixteenth-century provincial empowerment we will account for below: the «tangle of 
debt and credit link[ing] the Republic’s households» formed across the centuries XIV-
XVI represented the stepping stone for the financial and fiscal headway of the mid-
sixteenth century
31
. Along with it, the «market for renten […] remained the main 
institution enabling the accumulation of capital for the public and private sector under 
the Republic»
32
.  
To keep up the pace with, and at any rate foster, the capitalist expansion of the 
urban-rural political economy, Dutch governmental agencies were forced to enhance, 
and promote, relations of power based on informality, impartiality and transparency 
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through which local finance and private-public exchanges came to be organized. Late 
medieval Holland indeed showed a remarkable local public sphere which managed to 
create founded debt through taxation – as well as by way of important institutions such 
as the general mortgage
33
. Pursuant to its institutional homogeneity, the urban-rural 
complex secured the capital market – for renten as instance – through the assumption of 
debt management – «they had to find buyers, draw up contracts, pay out renten, and 
monitor retainers» – and the direct liability of the remittances. Such empowerment 
resolved at the same time into a round of bureaucracy formation since more tax and 
more debt entailed more agents, offices, accounts and checks. This contributed to 
further improve the institutional framework and to expand not only the complexity and 
specialization of administrations and administrators, but also the value of the debt itself 
– since the agents themselves bought into it –, the quality of the economic-financial 
networks the administrations guarded, and, every bit as important as that, the linkages 
between subjects and governments
34
. All this allowed for the expansion of capital 
market scope and operation and the number of actors participating with safety in it – 
public and private ones alike since the capital market shaped an early common space of 
accumulation in which rulers, local public sphere and privates could dialogue. Tax and 
debt were their point of juncture
35
. In turn, such institutional constraints drove out 
competitors of feudal sort
36
. 
The early spreading of renten trade was thus itself the signal. The market for 
renten expanded during the second half of the sixteenth century, but its origin is to be 
traced to the late middle ages, during the early wave of state-capital formation in which 
collective responsibility for debt was hooked in eventual tax incomes. By assuming the 
liability of public debt (as early as 1291 for Holland and Zeeland), the urban-rural 
complex allowed for the expansion of domestic financial investments – «the vast 
majority of the lijfrenten the counts sold between 1389 and 1433 were secured by 
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towns» for example
37
 – and attracted foreign investments that contributed to the creation 
of a primordial foreign debt. Furthermore, the development and diffusion of a rural 
public debt by way of sales of lijfrenten and losrenten signaled the great scope of 
irradiation of the capital market and its openness – as well as the quality and solidity of 
the market relations between urbanity and rurality as an organic complex. In 1514, 59.9 
percent of the villages had created funded debt: 85 villages had sold lijfrenten, 161 had 
sold losrenten, and 148 had sold both. According to the Informacie, funded debt in the 
countryside was «ubiquitous»
38
. Public value formation and institutional security 
enabled the downsizing of floating debt and forced loans, spurring on further financial 
capital – of private and public investors – and expanding with a vengeance the renten 
sold by the governmental agencies themselves (States included) to an increasing number 
of rentiers throughout Holland and even in the rest of the Low Countries – The 1514 
Informacie shows that all cities and the majority of villages serviced funded debt; the 
main ones obtained 50 percent of their ordinary revenues from debt
39
.  
 
Table 4.1 Collective public debt (1292–1482)40 
Year                     Town Securities 
1292  
 
 
1294 
 
1295  
 
1345  
 
 
 
1351  
 
 
 
 
1405  
 
Dordrecht, Middelburg, Zierikzee, Delft , 
Leiden, Haarlem 
 
Dordrecht, Middelburg, Zierikzee 
 
Dordrecht, Middelburg, Zierikzee 
 
Dordrecht, Zierikzee, Middelburg, 
Delft , Leiden, and Haarlem, assisted 
by 24 nobles 
 
Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft , Leiden, 
Amsterdam, Alkmaar, Medemblik, 
Geertruidenberg, Schiedam, 
Rotterdam, and Oudewater 
 
Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft , Leiden, 
Amsterdam, Middelburg, and 
– 
 
 
– 
 
– 
 
Among others, a Delft bede tax and all 
taxes paid in Rijnland 
 
 
Tax revenues from northern Holland, and 
confi scated goods 
 
 
 
Tax revenues from Kennemerland and 
West Friesland 
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1407  
 
 
 
1416  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1417–1418 
 
 
 
 
1418  
 
 
 
1430  
 
 
1482  
 
Zierikzee 
 
Haarlem, Delft , Leiden, Amsterdam, 
Gouda, Rotterdam, Middelburg, and 
Zierikzee 
 
Haarlem, Delft , Leiden, Amsterdam, 
and Gouda, assisted by Alkmaar, 
Hoorn, Rotterdam, Schoonhoven, 
Geertruidenberg, Heusden, 
Oudewater, Middelburg, Zierikzee, 
Remmelzwaal, and Goes 
 
Haarlem, Delft , and Leiden, assisted 
by Amsterdam, Gouda, Alkmaar, 
Rotterdam, Schiedam, Hoorn, and 
Oudewater 
 
Haarlem, Delft , Leiden, Amsterdam, 
and Gouda, assisted by noblemen 
from Holland, and Zeeland 
 
Haarlem, Delft , Leiden, Amsterdam, 
Gouda 
 
Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft , Leiden 
and Gouda 
 
 
 
Tax revenues from Kennemerland and 
West Friesland 
 
 
Tax revenues from Egmond 
and IJsselstein 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenues from northern  
Holland, including part of the bede tax 
 
 
 
Revenues from northern  Holland, 
including part of the bede tax 
 
 
Bede tax in Waterland and Kennemerland 
 
 
– 
 
 
Table 4.2 Collective public debt (1404–1425)41 
Year Public  Principal 
sum (lb)  
Destination Public bodies Securities 
1405  
 
 
 
 
1407  
 
 
 
 
1416   
 
 
 
1417–1418   
 
 
1418   
 
4440 
 
 
 
 
3885 
 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
 
2899–3103 
 
 
8968 
Arkel war  
 
 
 
 
Purchase 
Gorinchem 
 
 
 
Compensation 
lords of Egmond 
and IJsselstein 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft , 
Leiden, 
Amsterdam, Middelburg, and 
Zierikzee 
 
Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, 
Amsterdam, Gouda, Rotterdam, 
Middelburg, and 
Zierikzee 
 
Haarlem, 
Delft , Leiden, 
Amsterdam, Gouda 
 
Haarlem, Delft, 
and Leiden 
 
Haarlem, Delft , Leiden, 
Amsterdam, Gouda 
Dordrecht toll, 
Kennemerland, 
West Friesland, and 
Zeeland revenues 
 
Kennemerland and West 
Friesland revenues 
 
 
 
Egmond and IJsselstein 
revenues  
 
 
Central Holland 
revenues 
 
Comitial tolls and domain 
revenues 
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Taxation and public debt – borrowing – were means in the hands of the Dutch 
governmental-business agencies – operated by the public sector which mediated and 
extended the relationship between rulers (counts and States of Holland) and subjects – 
to manage, re/produce, accumulate and redistribute value, and to maneuver in the 
political-economic-social arena at once. Such a financial empowerment forced 
competitive cooperation thereon: negotiations with the counts demanded, and allowed 
for, the development of solidarity and consistency. The expansion of economy, and the 
drive of capitalist accumulation that had to be catered, compelled governmental and 
business agencies to develop horizontal and vertical networks of financial relations and 
information enfolding creditors, foreign cities, governments, in order to negotiate 
«about terms of payment, safeguards, and moratoriums […] about the securities backing 
rente payments, such as future tax revenues, and about compensation for money they 
had advanced to renteniers and other expenses». In sum: 
  
From the end of the 13th century, collective public debt provided a strong impulse to develop a 
supra-local organization representing the interests of public bodies. This organization was gradually 
institutionalized and became known as the States of Holland. Once established it became a platform for 
cooperation on a large number of issues, including collective public debt.
42
 
 
Under the Spanish rule indeed, the urban-rural complexes continued to be the 
crucial cogs of juncture between regional politics and markets, and to the sociospatial 
processes of intermediation, cooperation and competition among the Dutch. Only 
during the second decade of the sixteenth century, the States started to coordinate with 
higher intensity the Dutch political space as a whole, especially in economic-financial 
matters
43
. But once, in the 40’s, the Spanish central government essayed the most 
powerful attempt of financial-organizational restructuring of Dutch space
44
, the States 
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countered this move by managing to stretch, and to strengthen to the full, their web of 
power relations toward society. By tapping the Spanish attempt of absolutist 
reorganization itself, the States of Holland (and Zeeland) succeeded in gaining a wider 
hold over the management and the coordination of provincial space, notably taxation 
and finance
45
.  
The Spanish reform of 1542-1544 was aimed at financing the struggle for power 
of Spain against France. It put into place a circuit of urban-rural taxes-credit-provincial 
bonds geared to bankroll the growth of public revenues. The reform comprised the 
nieuwe middelen consisting of province-wide excises (beer and wine) and land taxes (a 
10th penny on the income from renten and real property); these were destined to fund a 
new set of renten – the expected principal source of revenues for the central 
government
46
. It comprised also new taxes on mercantile wealth (100th penny on 
exports and the 10th penny on commercial profits). In sum: the 1542/1544 reform was 
to widen the tax base in order to extend credit in order to expand the financial market 
with a vengeance
47
. To propel the restructuring, a consequent expansion of bureaucratic 
functions was called for. But the wave of Spanish state expansion resolved instead into 
the first important Dutch surge of “modern” state formation: the «novel expedients» had 
the effect of propelling the higher conflation of state and capital – in the form of 
provincial administration and borrowing, and urban capital – through a) the 
reorganization of the financial networks on provincial bases directly useful to Dutch 
urban-rural capital in the form of proceeds from provincial loans, b) and the spreading – 
not the takeoff – after 1553 of securities purchased on voluntary base – an incipient free 
market, thereby relaxing the custom of forcing buying. Provincial borrowing was sealed 
in so doing with urban-rural processes of capital accumulation and expansion via 
fiscality through the financial circuit of the forming Dutch state
48
.  
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A provincial reorganization on the base of the urban-rural complexes, which 
entailed the voluntary investment of values in modern state-building processes, was 
however possible, indeed because state networks of power and capitalist networks of 
accumulation overlapped and integrated each other – the Province increasingly raised 
taxes but in so doing it had to cooperate with its societal ground, and especially with the 
urban-rural governmental-business agencies that in fact handled such taxes with great 
care. Such an intertwining had started during the preceding centuries through the 
capital-based encounter of public and private sphere but now it expanded because itself 
integral to, and motor force of, the process of Dutch state formation, that is, the 
formation of an actual state structure governed by the Dutch themselves. The urban-
rural complexes – capital, private and public wealth, institutions, framework of relations 
– and the forming Dutch state – structure and networks – was now welding together on 
the base of a common matrix of financial relations – which emerged out of the medieval 
embeddedness of state and capital – whose pattern of accumulation and wealth was 
indeed capitalist. It was thus this move and this higher conflation which «opened the tap 
and allowed urban[-rural] capital to flow freely into the refinancing of state debt» of the 
modern kind, and thus into processes and cogs of modern state formation, thereby 
syphoning off and letting flow within the forming venae and arteries of the state the 
logic of capital accumulation. Put it very simply: the difference between a rentier, a man 
engaged in commerce or industry, a magistrate and a provincial deputy was now 
blurred, if nonexistent
49
. See, as instance, table 4.3 for the multilayered political ties 
developed by the public agents of Holland and Zeeland: 
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Table 4.3 Political ties of members of the Admiralty Boards
50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What happened in actuality? While previously the function of the States of 
Holland, firstly during the Utrecht War and during the Guelders Wars, connoted in 
essence mere loan organization but neither the management and the allocation of the 
related funds, nor their granting – this was a primordial provincial debt organization –, 
during the ensuing struggle for power between Spain and France in the mid-sixteenth 
century, the States managed to assume the direct responsibility of finance indeed by 
way of the same «novel expedients» the Spanish government had promoted. These 
allowed the Dutch to fund borrowing by imposts and land taxes that the States 
themselves set about managing and granting. Technically, in time, the Dutch aspired to 
convert short-term obligations premised on forced buying at high interest rates into 
long-term debt at low rates on a voluntary basis of investment – mainly, lijfrenten and 
losrenten, already developed in the centuries of power formation
51
. Such a voluntary 
engagement and participation came about simply because it was fruitful in terms of 
profit enlargement. Capital wanted to buy into modern state formation because state 
formation resulted in profits and political power
52
.  
While the first and second round of renten issued during the Utrecht War (1482) 
and the Guelders Wars (1514-1517) was paid off respectively in 1529 and, partially, in 
1566, the first round of renten funded by the «novel expedients» and managed by the 
Years  Number of 
councilors 
Average years 
in function 
Function in 
local 
government 
Function in 
provincial 
government 
Function in 
national 
government 
Representatives from Holland on the Amsterdam Admiralty Board 
1586–1699   170 5.1 151 (89%) 66 (40%) 29 (17%) 
1700–95 116 5.8 107(92%) 43 (37%) 26 (22%) 
Representatives from Zeeland on the Zeeland Admiralty Board 
1584–1699    56 15.0 45 (80%) 55 (98%) 13 (23%) 
1700–95  37 15.1   36 (97%)  37 (100%)  4(11%) 
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States allowed to partially pay off the huge debt accumulated between 1552 and 1559 
already in 1566 – a strategy for continuing to curb the debt, lowering the interests and 
hence foster trust was found in a circuit of renten conversion-cum-taxation of income 
from renten (10th penny). The vast amount of money raised by the Province never 
reached the coffers of the Spaniards. Such a huge retention of value in time, by contrast, 
 
 effected a dramatic shift in the relative position of the central government and its provinces. [In so 
doing,] the province not only maintained a superior credit rating, at a time when the government could not 
even pay the salaries of its officials, but showed a positive cash flow, which could be used either for 
additional debt retirement or for gratuities to helpful officials […]. Moreover, during this period 
Amsterdam was forced to end its proud isolation, so that the debt was truly the responsibility of “the 
common body of the land”53. 
 
An amalgam of freedom, security and good rates – initially high admittedly – led 
to a fundamental expansion of Dutch-governed provincial financial networks within the 
urban-rural complexes in Holland, and then also in Zeeland, thereby making urban-rural 
rentiers – officeholders and public representatives firstly – the main protagonists of 
such a financial accretion of the Province. The sharp decline of the annual renten 
interest charged on the excises and land tax from 134,000 in 1555/1556 to 59,685 in 
1566/1567 within the same level of impost and land tax rates was the strong signal that 
Dutch management was working despite the Spaniards. Dutch Provincial government 
tapped into urban-rural wealth in depth as well as urban-rural capital tapped into Dutch 
politics with a vengeance of accumulation and investments
54
.  
In this subverted whole of power relations, the value extraction operated by the 
Spanish central government was thereby checked and frustrated powerfully. The low 
credit rating was a critical weakness for the Spanish crown in a time in which financiers 
in Antwerp were still crucial to uphold the Spanish side. But the bankers, in fact, 
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preferred dealing with the States directly. This happened because the Spanish crown and 
financiers were bound together, as far as it is here concerned, by way of supposed 
“reliable and ready” fiscal and financial flows from the Dutch that instead were slowly 
channeled unto the center (taxes), or drawn to themselves (financial capital)
55
. The 
Spanish renegotiation and repudiation of debt was an usual procedure that actually 
enshrouded a process of state-unmaking in terms of power formation and accumulation, 
state structures, networks and institutional practices compared with the Dutch in the 
context of an expanding capitalist world-system.
56
. 
 In this sociospatial exchange of value and power, Amsterdam was the core-center 
of accumulation in which the widest fractions of population got into capital market, 
debt, renten, borrowing. The following table shows the investments by Amsterdam’s 
upper/middle classes and elites – the most sizeable part of course on the totality of the 
investments in the capital market – but the lower classes and subalterns, proportionally 
to their wealth, invested remarkable sums – having in return a solid, further source of 
income to sustain household economy and the urban-rural complex’s political 
economy
57
.  
This voluntary popular involvement in provincial borrowing is of great 
importance for it signaled the trust the Dutch populace put in their provincial 
governmental agencies. The high quality of Dutch institutional framework and network 
had built degrees of cooperation and trust on which the voluntary popular participation 
in the state activities rested. Put it simply: provincial taxes were high – and they were to 
become progressively higher in time. Therefore, if the state was to avert malaise or ward 
off the peril of uproars, the populace had to have material returns. These returns were: 
financial takings, fluid accumulation of wealth, state services – protection (military, 
social, economic), social provision, reliable markets for exchange and production, 
efficient public sector. Contrary to the rest of Europe therefore, modern state formation 
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turned out to be profitable for all: the administrators had a their disposal a wide stream 
of resources to back state operations – and their own interests – through a great power 
of extraction that was offset in turn by great social investments – we shall see next. In 
this sense, this was a financial revolution: provincial finance helped capital, markets and 
state to be intermeshed and “democratized”. This exchange of values contributed to 
forge in time solid, upright relations of power based on accumulation of capital 
provincial-wide – whose underlying logic was of capitalist sort – through the active co-
partnership of governmental and business agencies up to the provincial level (States, the 
local public sphere and its subjects) – «a continuous bargaining process between local 
and central levels, between taxpayers, investors, and political representatives, and 
between urban and provincial officials, over fiscal policy». In other words, the 
bargaining process enabled the governmental dynamics of the state agencies and agents 
to be legitimized by the other spaces of government and accumulation, and this 
permitted a far greater rate of value extraction, a fiscal expansion. Thereby «the political 
ceiling of taxation» rose, that is the point beyond which social malaise and the ensuing 
unrest could explode
58
. In sum: cooperation and trust were built on profit; profit was 
propelled to the full through cooperation and trust, in economic-financial, political and 
social matters. 
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Table 4.4 Characteristics of investors in the Amsterdam annuities, 1542-1565, in percentages and in guilders
59
 
 
 Proportion of investors Mean 
Local political officeholders 37% 1573 
Idem, with no other business than local political office 13% 1618 
Professions 11% 847 
Brewers  7% 1257 
Drapers  7% 1826 
Baltic Exporter (herring-packers, wine merchants  soap-boilers  10% 1604 
Grain dealers  22% 1178 
Other merchants  20% 833 
Shippers/shipyard entrepreneurs  10% 755 
All merchants, brewers, drapers, shippers, entrepreneurs 76% 1154 
Idem, but not combining with local political office 52% 972 
All identified investors 100% 1181 
All incl. unidentified investors  714 
 
To this purpose, an engaging theory that links state-capital formation, 
accumulation of power and people stands out. It posits that the Dutch sixteenth and 
seventeenth century represented «an important link between» two ‘democratic’ 
movements –  the Medieval and the ‘Atlantic’. This link is understood as the economic 
character of citizenship – the Dutch concept of citizenship. Within a capitalist space, the 
economic dimension of citizenship proves paramount to be sure. We can describe this 
dimension as the plane of capital-state cooperation that stemmed from a social moment 
of value formation that links state, capital and society through the interchange of 
material and juridical participation (tax and formal recognition), state services and 
public goods. Citizenship therefore would help create a link between state, capital and 
society, and a suitable situation conducive to a «cooperative relationship» geared to 
lower state-society transaction costs in a more efficient supply of services with a higher 
tax morale in turn, and thus a more coherent movement of economy, politics and society 
as a whole – more efficient accumulation of power. Indeed it seems implausible 
upholding that the Dutch, and then the Dutch state, would survive the early modern 
warfare if popular participation to state-building processes would not have encountered 
the elites’ participation to society-building processes – that is, without the formation of 
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an efficient regime of accumulation. Accumulation of capital and power would be 
damaged otherwise. In this sense, according to Jan Luiten van Zanden and Maarten 
Prak, the point of juncture might be citizenship: the Dutch succeeded in mobilizing 
comparatively large amounts of resources on a per capita basis pursuant to a contract 
that jointed rulers and people – capital, state and society. This structural pact developed 
not at the end of the sixteenth century, but – for Holland notably – in the long-run 
development on the societal ground, and then topped off by the construction of the 
Dutch state
60
. 
To round off: in the course of the first half of the sixteenth century, the assembly 
of the cities in junction with rural enclaves strengthened the political struggle to assert 
explicitly their long-standing right in the sphere of fiscality, and the primacy of 
economy both on a juridical level and internationally, against the Spaniards – self-
government
61
. This organization of power was the means in the hand of an uneven bloc 
or syndicate of wealthy men, consisting of entrepreneurs, merchants, magistrates, 
agents, officeholders and deputies, to achieve their goals and realize their wishes, 
thereby at the same time overlapping and intersecting – embedding – the political and 
social functions to the internal and external rhythm of economy. Such patterned motion 
peculiar to Dutch urban-rural milieu gave to this type of upward-thrusting 
representation the capacity to exert a strong pressure, primarily economic, then fiscal-
financial and, as a consequence, political, on the Spanish central government and on 
other actors to, or levels of, negotiations. Local and provincial governments 
strengthened and conjoined their operations through a web of financial-bureaucratic 
relations that set about enveloping Dutch space – the official receivers were members of 
the central administration but part of the local elite at once. The relational interlacing in 
a common space of government, a common matrix of power, expanded the urban-rural 
capital clutches from the ground upward and the networks of capital accumulation 
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within the networks and infrastructures of the forming state and, on the other hand, 
allowed for the contra-trend inherent to the percolation of the provincial state operations 
on the ground through the same networks. In short: the incunabula of the Dutch regime. 
In sum: power was not to be concentrated in a single place, but concentrated 
throughout Dutch space – Dutch localities and provincial government(s), and then 
States General. The single but spatially differentiated bundle of bureaucratic-financial 
exchanges was indeed caged in a «mediated structure» of overlapping interests, 
institutional coherence and shared forces to better serve and guard the actual liberty of 
the Dutch against the increasingly pervasive control of the Spanish government. In fact, 
«the States were becoming a self-conscious and self-regulating “body”, like a 
municipality on a grander scale», that, in junction with the strong identity of the 
municipalities themselves in practical terms, succeeded in untying the Spanish reins and 
constraints: progressively, the urban-rural ground and the sphere of the higher politics 
were knitted together
62
. The fusion of urban-rural governmental-business agencies and 
provincial state intensified and, because of premised on a sociospatial continuum of 
power relations that in fact turned out to be overlapping, it was to become more and 
more organic with Dutch society on the ground – whence capital and power expanded. 
It was this socio spatial organicity that contributed to distinguish the (formation of the) 
Dutch regime of accumulation from the rest of the other European regimes
63
. 
 
4.1.2) 1560-1600. The second surge of territorial state-building: republican materialism 
 
Dutch state formation set in within the absolutist framework of Spain and 
propelled its crisis: the 1542 reform’s washout and the related fiscal fiasco during the 
’50; the huge debt accumulated and the bankruptcy; related army malaise (unpaid 
salaries) resulting in insubordination, sometimes mutinies; societal turmoil, from the 
 198 
 
ground to nobility; rising imperial costs, and economic inefficiency in terms of 
processes and management;  and the advance of Protestantism – reformed Protestantism 
in the Netherlands took firm hold in 1555. This sketches out the general situation of the 
sixteenth century would-be hegemon in Europe – and around the world. Indeed, Philip 
got back to Spain after making peace with France at Cateau-Cambrésis (1559). This 
signals here two main things: first, a world empire demanded a stationary commander in 
an established center of command and the uppermost managerial heed; second, the Low 
Countries made him fear. And fear was vindicated: «Nobody doubts», will sum up 
bishop Juan de Palafox in 1650, «that the wars in Flanders have been the ruin of this 
monarchy»
64
. Margaret of Parma was chosen to govern, but, from the outset, decision-
making and administrative and ecclesiastical control lay with Granvelle (bishop of 
Arras and a member of the Council of State), and Viglius. The new Spanish governors 
proved incapable and the distance with the Dutch forces (led by Orange above anyone 
else and Egmond) increased, increasing in turn the wider rift in the Netherlands society 
between Spanish rule and Dutch identity. Soon, Alva’s descent would have exacerbated 
the situation to the full. The Dutch space of politics, society and economy was riven
65
.  
Among the Dutch – firstly the Hollanders – the general conviction of the necessity 
of getting rid of the Spaniards spread. But the thrust for independence was only 
strengthened by the ensemble of socio-political processes scattered on the societal 
ground, which we will explore afterwards. The furtherance of state formation 
intersected and intensified them – the socio spatial continuum of relations and interests 
just discussed enables to glimpse the intersection between socio-cultural tension and 
state formation. Such a twofold whole of processes flowed into a historical-relational 
contradiction I argue. Thus, to appreciate to the full the reasons for the all-out rejection 
of the entire historical-constitutional order of the Netherlands we need to understand the 
historical relation of command between sovereign and subjects. The crucial moment in 
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such a story was of course the Arrival of Alva which embodied the historical 
obliteration of the framework of Dutch dominium politicum et regale. Why? In sum: 
Alva attempted to directly extract resources by restructuring and centralizing from 
within the historical organization of capital, wealth and institutions of the Dutch – the 
core of which was the Spanish attempt to reorganize and appropriate Dutch wealth by 
taxing it according to value (the Spanish tenth penny)
66
.  Hence, we will understand the 
structural friction ensuing from the attempt of power restructuring in the ’70s and 
appreciate the relationship between power as Authority-freedom as Liberty (singular) 
and the role of the Spanish crown
67
. This whole of relations defined the second surge of 
Dutch state formation, which structured the republican character of the state, and put 
into operation the Dutch regime. As summed up by Brian Downing: «The Dutch revolt 
was a successful rebuff of a monarch’s attempt to dissolve constitutional government 
and build military bureaucratic absolutism»
68
. 
The provincial financial accretion built upon the sociospatial extension upward of 
the urban-rural capital frontier in the first half of the sixteenth century slackened off at 
the end of the ’60s because of Alva’s descent. Already in 1568, the Revolt showed 
paucity of funds
69
: the urban-rural complexes indeed endeavored first to spur on 
financial investments towards the province on the base of their long-standing 
creditworthiness, that is, acting more than ever «as guarantors for debts charged to the 
States» or, for instance, by pushing forward a strategy of tax-debt exchange – taxes 
urban capital owed for debts owed by the province – or by selling off ecclesiastical and 
annotated property; then, practices of forced loans resorted and expanded – especially 
short-terms loans until 1580 – but to no avail70. The financial voltage was not enough. 
The fluidity of the financial circuit came to be obstructed.  
The basic problem was that revenues – both urban and provincial ones – had to be 
now earmarked directly to the pressing needs of the war for independence that the 
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Province as a whole was now waging
 71
. The staggering amounts of capital needed to 
endure the pressure called for a viable and readily available alternative structured more 
on the great material wealth produced, or to be produced, than on creation of financial 
value. The Spanish-derived strategy of provincial financial accumulation was thereby 
complemented with the first provincial policy of fiscal expansion, only possible by 
virtue of the fantastic expansion of institutionalized networks and processes of urban-
rural capital accumulation of the preceding centuries
72
 – the institutionalized primacy of 
economy in urban-rural politics on the ground had allowed for the secular composition 
of an ample basin of historical value to tap
73
.  
But capitalist accumulation on the ground was now put in grave danger, and it 
was so not merely because the economy was in peril and slowed down
 74
, but because 
the syndicates that managed processes, networks and capital risked to lose control of 
their own political-economic and social operations. The Spaniards attempted indeed, for 
the very first time, to really expunge the three fundamental prerogatives of the Dutch – 
and whence, by the same token, the Dutch drew their (capitalist) strength – thereby 
trying to cut their resistance for good: self-identity, self-organization and self-
representation – in one word, self-determination. With the greatest danger at all at the 
gates, by virtue of their far-flung networks of trust and capital, and because of entirely 
destined to finance their own independence, the Dutch were prone to bankroll war with 
a steady stream of ever-increasing human, material and financial resources.  
On the technical bases of the 1542-44 reform, the States of Holland devised 
(1572-1574) the first independent fiscal policy topped off with a new round of state 
accretion – premised on the urban-rural network of accumulation, wealth and 
institutions. «In virtually every sphere of activity the States now assumed 
responsibilities that had formerly been reserved to the central government [at the same 
time being] more broadly representative of urban interests across Holland»
75
. In 1572, a 
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new policy of direct locally-administered taxation (verponding) was put into operation: 
a twelfth penny, that is, 8.3 percent on land rents was increased to the sixth penny, 16.7 
percent, in 1574. To better account wealth, in 1575 a register of houses was arranged 
and spread in addition to already existing land registers we accounted previously. Since 
1576, 2% per year was levied on the value of lands and houses whose total estimates 
was about 105,000 guilders per year. In 1580 the rate was doubled. In 1584 a 
verponding-register (lands and houses) was put into operation for an expected yield 
about 220,000 guilders per year for each verponding, that since 1586 was more than 1 
million guilders per year, and then 1.3 million guilders per year in 1599. As such it 
remained unchanged until 1621
76
.  
The second part of the fiscal reform was known as gemene middelen (common 
means), taxation of direct provincial administration. a) The gemene middelen hit a much 
larger number of commodities – for example, beer and wine of course, but also soap, 
meat, fish, bread grains, woolen cloth, horned cattle, peat – and a larger and enlarging 
population – from about 350,000 in 1544 to about 760,000 in 164877. According to 
Tracy
78
, in 1575 the gemene middelen brought in 24,000 pounds per month, and 
increased steadily the following years: 1578 - 68,199, 1579 - 63,490, 1580 - 68,135, 
1581 - 69,520, 1582 - 72,308; b) taxation was proportionated to weights and not to 
prices, thereby limiting the effect of the inflation – tax burden for an urban day-laborer 
went from less than 5 per cent at the start of the revolt to a peak of nearly 16 per cent in 
1630; c) contrary to the novel expedients that were geared to back and fuel the financial 
accretion of the province – by funding renten, lijfrenten, losrenten – common means 
were earmarked primarily and directly to war expenditures and, only as collateral, to 
financial remittances
79
; d) significantly, countryside and towns came to be taxed on the 
same bases, the provincial excises – in origin the countryside was subjected to 
provincial taxation but on different bases, a tax on land (morgengeld). In so doing the 
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States evened out the provincial fiscal relations and barriers between towns and 
countryside; e) finally, the gemene middelen were handled by the very first run of 
provincial agents, appointed and organized not by urban governments, but by the States 
of Holland directly
80
 – albeit the fiscal jurisdiction remained a prerogative of the urban-
rural complexes. Local spaces remained the lynchpin
81
. In sum: the Province approved a 
package comprised of provincial taxes on domestic commercial products, activities and 
assets in the cities as well as in the countryside – provincial excises plus two thirds of 
town excises – taxed according to quantities, that became the major source of direct war 
financing during the first part of the Revolt
82
.  
Structural accretion, institutional enhancement and the extension of the fiscal 
network of provincial state in scale and scope, homogenized the urban-rural fiscal – and 
financial – space on provincial base (to military purpose) and expanded the provincial 
capacity of fiscal extraction to the full. Fiscal equalization, administrative empowerment 
and socio spatial extension resolved into a great fiscal expansion – «a dramatic rise in 
public revenues», contrary to the novel expedients of 1542 that witnessed the dawn of 
financial capital (borrowing)
83
. These moves represented the actual headway of the 
process of Dutch state formation in the form of expansion of the provincial fiscal-
bureaucratic frontier up to envelope the whole Dutch (Holland) space. All this signaled 
thus the consolidation and extension of the provincial relations and networks organized 
and put into operation in 1542, the shift in the relative position of the province and the 
urban-rural complexes – «As the income of the provincial receivers grew, the 
dependence of the province on the credit of the individual cities decreased»
84
 – and the 
fusion of the fiscal processes of the Province with – and their grafting within – urban-
rural processes of capital accumulation – the forming of a provincial-level basin of 
value accumulated and managed directly by the Dutch. A somewhat similar process of 
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tax expansion, economic accumulation and provincial empowerment was put into 
operation by Zeeland since 1574 (until the eve of the 17th century)
85
. 
The Spanish coercive rupture of the late medieval framework of dominium 
politicum et regale was however the stepping stone for another Dutch move during the 
70’s, that ruptured with the past outright, this time in the constitutional sphere: it 
translated into the strengthening of inter-provincial relations and the expansion of the 
authority of the States General. In those years, with a series of resolutions and political 
ploys, the Dutch managed to strengthen the spatio-constitutional relations of power 
within Holland – and within Zeeland as well – thereby welding the urban-rural spaces 
and the provincial state into a «parliamentary» complex of power relations in which 
formal «sovereignty and considerable control over the executive had shifted to the 
estates». This move represented the constitutional-structural obverse of the fiscal-
financial structural shift in the relative position of the province and the urban-rural 
complex previously said
86
. The covenant of Holland and Zeeland signed in June 1575 
sealed the (Protestant-led) political, military, financial inter-provincial state network of 
power, and overlapped the sociospatial relations of inter-provincial power to constitute a 
territorial embryo, or northern mini-state, the core of the Dutch state. To this add the 
new critical position the States General went to acquire after 1576, and along with it the 
Council of State, and the «revolutionary stance» of the Dutch becomes truly apparent. 
Thanks to a strategic tug-of-war of demands and contentions with the Spanish rulers, 
the Dutch managed to shift the States General in an independent and empowered 
organism in which the assembly «had the right to deal with all the matter whatsoever»: 
the States assumed sovereignty; at the same time, the Council of State was to become an 
operative propagation of these independent States. In other words: the Spanish had 
made once again a move – Alva’s – that in the end the Hollanders (and the Zealanders 
also) turned in their favor also in these respects, and that completed after Don Juan’s 
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arrival in 1577 with the unprecedented stance the States General took. The Spanish 
thrust spurred on the reshaping of relations between the Generality and the Estates of 
the other provinces towards a structured complex of power relations: 
 
The States General at Antwerp eventually merged with the assembly of the estates forming the Union of 
Utrecht [1579]. The political structure that eventually emerged in the north, the seven United Provinces of 
the Netherlands, could function with the revolutionary system of parliamentary government because this 
system had achieved a high degree of stability. This stability was to a large extent the result of the 
economic and financial preponderance of the province of Holland
87
.  
 
Premised on Holland’s power – and supported by Zeeland – during the decade 
1580-1590 the Dutch thus knitted together, and extended as a whole, the structural and 
the constitutional: all the seven provinces, Utrecht, Friesland, Overijssel, Drenthe, 
Gelderland, Groningen, Zeeland and Holland came to be dovetailed in a state-wide 
sociospatial web of power relations of financial, fiscal and governmental sort that the 
States General set about coordinating, and that Holland was to run by means of its 
powerful capitalist thrust. It was this organization, as the Dutch Historian Boogman 
says, that «provided cities and provinces ample opportunities for seriously promoting 
the essential interests of their own citizens and subjects»
88
. The growing degree of unity 
and cooperation that the Revolt was to engender in political and financial-fiscal terms 
was coupled also with the increased power and sway of the urban-rural oligarchies in 
any provincial states. Such a relative social equalization of power within the provinces 
allowed for a wider degree of sociopolitical isomorphism in the Generality as well
89
. 
This socio-relational organicity of command, along with a constant movement of 
adaptation to society and change in relation to capital, allowed the republican machinery 
both to operate in accordance with the composite nature of Dutch society itself, whereof 
the state was a mirror, and to drive forward the regulatory and normalizing capacity of 
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the Dutch regime
90
. The Union covenant was indeed intended as a flexible-because-
pragmatic framework of power, in legal-judicial and material terms, interpreted «in 
accordance with “de experientie en de opgevolghde practicquen” (experience and 
practices followed)». It was the pragmatic myth upon which Dutch nationalism was to 
be built and fed into: 
  
This myth most certainly fulfilled a real need: it functioned as a very necessary counterbalance to the 
local and provincial feelings of solidarity which remained so uncommonly forceful and vital, in fact even 
continued to prevail, until the very end of the old Republic. Besides, let us not forget that the advocates of 
local autonomy and provincial sovereignty could equally well appeal to the Union of Utrecht. For in 
terms of clause 1 it had as a principal aim: maintenance of the privileges
91
.  
 
Upon these foundations, the 1580s state circuit of politics, capital, finance and fiscality 
in the making, based on the historical thrust of accumulation of Holland and Zeeland, 
began to breed infrastructural operativeness and a state-wide integration of power.  
With no doubt, it was «not in spite of, but precisely because of Holland 
particularism» and preponderance that the Dutch Republic became the first hegemon of 
the capitalist world-system in the XVII century. In fact, Holland particularism, the 
policy of Holland, in normal circumstances was the Generality policy, a federal 
policy
92
. Thus, sociospatial relations of co-operation could rise by virtue of the 
preponderance of the urban-rural syndicates within both the provincial estates and hence 
within the States – even the power of the Grand Pensionaries of Holland rested on the 
urban-rural bloc too
93
 – and thanks to the late medieval urban-rural formation and 
accumulation of Holland whereon the entire sixteenth century financial-fiscal 
expansion, state formation and societal coagulation could be activated – in this regard, 
Thomas Wilkes, an Elisabeth’s agent in The Hague, was flabbergasted by the fact the 
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Hollanders evened out so rapidly the divergences in the States of Holland: «the mislike 
of the States, bred in the people heretofore by faction is now removed and the 
government so quieted and settled (as the States themselves avow) that since the 
beginning of their troubles the like was never seen»
94
. Holland hegemony (in 
Gramscian terms) begot capital accumulation and the expansion of power of the entire 
Republic. 
In these years indeed, under the leadership of Oldenbarnevelt and the Hollanders, 
the Dutch managed to get rid of overlords and suzerains of any kind and managed to 
gain full control over their space of government through the cognizance that substantive 
sovereignty, in fact, resided not in the States assemblies, but in the urban-rural capitalist 
syndicates, pursuant to the historical network of power they run from the societal 
ground. Thomas Wilkes reported in 1587 that «the sovereignty resided not in the States 
assemblies, but in the people themselves»; on the other Francois Vranck (1587) asserted 
also that was in the vroedschap within the urban-rural complexes, the actual “national” 
council of rulers, that sovereignty lay, and that determined the States assemblies and the 
Generality:  
 
these boards – Vranck says – must be as old as the towns, as no one remember their origin […] They 
alone had the power to resolve upon all matters affecting the state respectively of the province and the 
town, and the citizens accept these decision as binding, for they have never infringed or opposed these 
decision […]. From this it is clear that these boards of town magistrates and councilors, together with the 
corporation of nobles, undoubtedly represent the whole state and the whole body of the inhabitants
95
. 
 
In other terms: the long-standing bargaining power of the urban-rural complexes could 
not be eluded, restrained or avoided, but it had to be acknowledged and stretched with a 
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vengeance unto the center – and through the center. The weight of the other provinces’ 
urban-rural spaces was stretched as a result.  
The urban-rural complexes of Holland, and the urban-rural spaces in the other 
provinces, became the substantive-structural lynchpin on the ground upon which the 
only model of state possible on these premises could be put into operation. It was the 
republican model, that is, freedom and growth
96
. The States of Holland rose to power 
within the emerging Republic during the ‘80s, and along with them, the relations of 
politics and power enfolding the urban-rural complexes of Holland were projected unto 
the center
97
; at the same time, the States General consolidated their role and function as 
«the centre of […] improving cooperation» in the matter of world and national 
economy, politics, finance and war, deploying a network of agents, agencies and 
institutions which enveloped Dutch space and that intertwined the provincial and local 
ones – we account for them next.98. Holland leadership promoted a form of government 
pivoting on persuasion, accommodation and the search for intra- and inter-provincial 
consensus, thereby determining the structure of decision-making in the States General: 
all important decisions became a product of the constant interaction between provincial 
and “central” decision-makers, on behalf of the urban-rural syndicates, in Holland 
notably, whose political economy rose as the main politics of society in the Dutch 
Republic
99
. Within the common sociospatial matrix of power that now comprised not 
only financial-economic and fiscal relations, but also the constitutional and 
governmental ones, the social strategy of «maintenance and increased prosperity» 
became dominant but also, more than ever, achievable on an expanding scale – the 
world scale
100
. The scattered capitalist power on the ground formed during the centuries 
could be funneled and deployed through the cooperative form of scalar representation of 
the Dutch state, now topped off by the States General, and that went consolidating in 
that decade, along with the normalizing and regulatory capacity of the new regime. 
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The sovereign state expansion of capital, starting from the late 1580s indeed, 
occurred during the very stabilization of the marriage between republican framework 
and urban-rural (and Provincial) capital in a historically-new machinery of power called 
Dutch Republic
101
, was, at one time, the foremost outgrowth and primary source 
thereof. It enabled to consolidate the state networks of politics, finance and fiscality, and 
the domestic economy as a state network of interrelated, urban-rural based, industrial, 
agricultural, financial and commercial processes of accumulation; and to wage war by 
buying into army, science, technology and warfare practices. In sum, to expand power. 
Spain was in reverse also because of France, and the Dutch state could have respite, 
thereby managing to congeal and thus to redeploy its potential across world space.  
Above all else, state formation was coupled with, dovetailed to, and propelled 
through, world capital accumulation for the very first time. The 1590s Dutch capital 
expansion was the first world capitalist expansion of a state – and of its domestic 
processes of capital accumulation – in the modern world-system that replenished and 
expanded power through progressively wider sociospatial spate of value re/production, 
exchange and appropriation on world scale – Northern Europe, Russia, South Europe, 
West Africa, Middle East, the Caribbean and East Asia: Dutch capitalist frontiers were 
extended to the full upon, through or by virtue of, the different societies and social 
logics of power encountered and harnessed. Dutch state formation therefore 
intermeshed with Dutch capital world expansion: expanding networks, agencies and 
institutions of capital world re/production eventually and definitively welded to and 
with the state networks, agencies and institutions of finance, fiscality and warfare. But 
was capital that swiftly and readily embedded the state – not vice versa! – and this came 
about pursuant to the longstanding historical process of interlocking embeddedness and 
capitalist-spatial expansion on the societal ground that had organized the Dutch region 
since the later middle ages. By means of the capitalist institutions and practices of state, 
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the governmental-business agencies of the Republic – based in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
Leiden, Middelburg, also Harlem, the more prominent among capitalist consortia – 
went to consolidate the European network of exchange and appropriation in the Baltic; 
extended and consolidated relations of accumulation and exchange in Russia; expanded 
relationships of accumulation onto the Mediterranean; stepped into and grasped the 
commercial space of Guinea, the Caribbean trade and East Asia.  
What is crucial to stress is that all these sociospatial networks of accumulation 
and wealth were possible thanks to the interlocked operation of state and capital within 
Dutch society at home towards world space – the marriage of state society and capital 
we are exploring, in fact, became a single bundle of relations; but more importantly, 
they grew mutually interlocked in world space as well: any of these spatial circuits of 
capital re/production became dovetailed in a world-wide grid of accumulation operating 
according to the commodity-centered logic of value re/production, through which value 
flowed unto Dutch space – and by way of it throughout the system. The functional 
intertwining of spatially-different places of value re/production in a single but multi-
articulated space of world accumulation allowed for the consolidation of the Dutch 
capitalist marriage of power and wealth both, at home and throughout the world – this 
whole of sociospatial relations world-wide was to constitute the single world-historical 
process of capitalist expansion that Giovanni Arrighi called Dutch systemic cycle of 
accumulation and the related systemic regime of accumulation. It was such a world web 
of local nodules of value re/production that enabled in sum to expand Dutch power and 
to command world space – and as far as Arrighi is concerned, to expand further the 
capitalist world-system as a whole as well. This world maelstrom of value and relations, 
in the making during the final decade of the sixteenth century, enabled thus the 
consolidation of the Dutch state, and therefore, the coming into operation of the Dutch 
regime of accumulation: the state circuit of capital, taxation, finance, and warfare, 
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premised on urban-rural processes of accumulation, which became thereby state-
organized processes of world accumulation, came to be replenished by ever-increasing 
injections of value, produced, exchanged or appropriated across the world. In sum: the 
Dutch had now resources enough to refine state formation, to bankroll war, to finance 
army and to fight for independence, and at the same time to allow for the further 
expansion, regulation and normalization of society and capital. In a nutshell: to become 
a sovereign great power, internationally acknowledged
102
. 
In all this, what is arresting, and pivotal, is that the post-1574 Dutch mode of 
value extraction from society was incomparably heavier than that of the Spanish in 
terms of material efforts and exploitation, but its organization and redeployment was far 
more rational: the increment of state pressure upon Dutch resources was more than 
sixfold
103
. The expansion of the operations of value extraction put into place by the 
Dutch was outstanding. Of course, the world expansion of Dutch political economy was 
essential to make this rate of extraction accepted by the population. What was to be a 
Dutch warfare-welfare regime of accumulation indeed came into operation because the 
process of value extraction from Dutch society definitively was organized through and 
accompanied with Dutch capital world expansion and thus with societal growth in terms 
of wealth and power.  
Firstly, as far as here is concerned, the greatest part of resources garnered by the 
state stemmed from indirect taxes – common means indeed – that were directly and 
strictly connected to the world expansion of Dutch trade and the socio-economic growth 
that ensued – that has been estimated around 0,86% per year between 1565 and 1620 – 
and directly earmarked to war. Holland increased its monthly quota from about 74,000 
in 1583 to about 92,000 guilders on average per month in 1585. Estimates show an 
impressive increase in the total revenue of the ‘common means’ between 1586 and 1600 
from about 1.5 million to about 2.7 million guilders, which amounts to a growth of on 
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average 4.6 percent per year
104
. Value extraction was brutal but however socially 
accepted
105
. But this is only part of the explanation.  
The degree to which this pressure was accepted was narrowly linked also to the 
past of the region itself. The historical trajectory of formation and growth of the 
seventeenth century Dutch regime emanated from a single and unified long-run 
historical regional process of capitalist expansion that enabled the Dutch to build 
historical customs and infrastructures devoted to accumulation of power and capital as 
dialectically constituted within state and society. As van Bavel, Zuijderduijn and 
Dijkman showed in their extensive and thorough researches, taxes, tax networks and tax 
institutions developed highly within society. But this occurred by virtue of an expansion 
that viewed capital and state on the societal ground interlocked through a logic of 
capitalist sort. Institutions, public sphere and markets were center of, and means to, 
fiscal accumulation tapped by the urban-rural complexes to expand their operations in 
time and space – civil servants, burghers, peasants, local and foreign traders, all 
contributing to social accumulation of value and power, and to the institutionalization of 
the Dutch treadmill of fiscal cooperation
106
. While the Dutch cycle of formation was 
characterized «by very rapid structural transformation» of Dutch space – a capitalist 
restructuring of human space –, the outstanding power expansion of the last decade of 
the sixteenth century occurred for the capitalist thrust came to be braced by state 
formation, technology development, demographic growth and social adaptation – 
immigration was important, especially after 1590
107
. This whole enabled the 
unprecedented rate of value extraction. 
However, there is another aspect that crosscuts Dutch structural history: the 
“national” character of the war, a war of the Dutch for the Dutch, that permitted the 
highest degree of acceptance among the populace. This meant in sum that value and 
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efforts began to be spent for the Dutch themselves, to protect the territory, their wealth 
and their long-time grounded way of organizing life
108
.  
Alva attempted to reorganize and centralize the mode and operations of values 
extraction and redeployment from Dutch space towards the Spanish center as never 
happened before, and this contributed strongly to shatter the historical order and its own 
premises – all the provinces’ public finance, and as a consequence, the entire political 
organization of commercial-industrial space, was to be at the direct helm of the 
Spaniards
109
. Indeed, if the incunabula of the Revolt can be spotted in 1566, the take-off 
occurred during the quadrennial 1568-1572. In other words: of course religious 
oppression and historical political violation were welded into a process of powerful 
symbiosis that sparked off the revolt
110
, but the actual thrust emerged only once both 
became coupled with the most forcible attempt to predate from within Dutch space – 
self-determination (the way of organizing life) thereby was truly jeopardized as well as 
the liberties of making a living (self-government)
111
. We should wonder: why therefore 
under the new heavier independent organization arranged by the Dutch themselves, did 
the urban-rural complexes bear the brunt and never revolt? It is suggested here that a 
“materialist nationalism”, premised on freedom and growth, and entrenched within 
society, fired up the Dutch. 
The Revolt was not merely about the question of asserting a claim on religion and 
customary arrangements. Along with it (or underlying it) lay the recasting of the 
historical relationship of command and obedience in the context of advancing processes 
of modern state formation. In this regard, the Dutch War of Independence was not 
simply a revolt eighty years long, but, as Charles Tilly and Alberto Tenenti both say, the 
revolt: it was the model of the European bourgeois revolution
112
. Why? In that it spelt 
the first conflict in early modern times around two ways of organizing life – the 
structure of every-day life – that implied the restructuring of the internal and external 
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relations of power among those who were ruled and those who ruled. When a transfer 
and a reorganization of state power comes about Tilly says, the form thereof is strictly 
related to the nature of society and to the previous organization of the state, and also 
related to interstate relations. When a forced reorganization of power is the case – a 
revolution in Tilly’s scheme – the process sharpens and gets more complex. According 
to Tilly, the Dutch revolt was in essence revolutionary because it implied a forced shift 
in state power during which two contending blocs had incompatible and irreconcilable 
claims and contentions that resolved into an all-out conflict
113
. But frictions get even 
more violent, I argue, when two incompatible ways of organizing life are pitted against 
each other. 
The long-standing cooperation among the Hollanders climaxed – it was in that 
moment that «the political elite in Holland revealed themselves, [especially] in the crisis 
years of 1572 and 1573, as masters in the art of compromise and accommodation»
114
 – 
and among the separate provinces emerged strongly, owing to a historical-relational 
contradiction which escalated during the XVI century concerning the historical role and 
stance of the Dutch overlord in relation to the Dutch – and by means of which the 
historical-structural contradictions advanced in the two surges of state structural 
formation
115
. In fact, in the Netherlands, central rulers had always been in essence 
suzerains, a role and a stance which spelt in actuality a power relation comprised of 
protection with freedom-and-growth against loyalty-prestige with (reasonable) taxes
116
. 
Role and stance overlapped in this multi-pronged exchange of power and values. But 
when, because of interstate competition and the general warfare, the historical role of 
overlord came to be split from the stance of the same one, the relational contradiction 
inherent in the differences between the historical way of organizing life of the Spaniards 
and the Dutch surfaced and then climaxed. This became the lynchpin around which the 
conflict raged. It surfaced when, within his own formal role of suzerain, the Spanish 
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ruler attempted to break off the historical relation of power ruler-subjects by changing 
the form of his hold in the Netherlands – sparking off the Dutch processes of state 
coagulation during the ‘40s. It climaxed because, as the process of state coagulation 
advanced, the Spanish ruler completely cut off any formal linkage between historical 
stance and historical role in the Netherlands
117
. Dutch state formation intensified indeed 
after the stance-role split became outrageously evident – Alva’s descent, the true start of 
the Revolt. The advancement of Dutch state formation process was itself a signal and an 
opportunity for the Dutch of freeing themselves from the Spanish historical (relational-
structural) fetters for good.  
To make the purport of such historical rift somewhat clearer we can draw on some 
observation made by contemporaries. What follows is to be stressed that predation of 
value and self-determination were at the center of Dutch concerns and unrests, and that 
such problems were conveyed indeed through the popular exposure of the ongoing 
Spanish assaults and violations to the entrenched dominium politicum et regale of the 
Low Countries. What stands out is that religion seems to be ancillary to the Revolt since 
it appears to be vindicated through political-economic-fiscal reasons – in a nutshell: 
religion pertained to the level of the événementielle; but value and power pertained to 
the level of the structural
118
. The problem of Dutch contractualism summarized such 
reasons. 
An Anonymous in 1581 says: 
 
I clearly identify what are abuses and what are Privileges. I term privilege a custom duty 
exemption, an exemption from duties, from […] taxes and others levies. […] A privilege is when – as for 
the urban centers – a burgher’s house is to such an extent free from constraints that no official receiver is 
allowed to step into to arrest an individual, unless the latter has unsolved debt; it is a privilege which 
ensure the payment of a certain type of debts before others; and I can find many other exemptions like 
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this. Moreover, I term privilege the norm according to which the Duke of Brabant cannot impose new 
taxes without the consent of the Provincial States, and the states can chose a different overlord if the duke 
does not comply with the norms in the Joyeuse Entrée.
119
 
 
This is the nub of what for the Dutch in 1581 a privilege was – and reason to 
revolt. The Joyeuse Entrée (1356), called forth by the writer, was the true Magna Charta 
of the Low Countries. On the one hand, it had a potentially revolutionary content for it 
prescribed clauses that envisaged and justified the possibility of legitimate rebellion. On 
the other hand, it lay legal foundations – structuring also the societal ground – for the 
ensuing and crucial general “common law”, a true constitution, promulgated in 1477 
after the death of Charles the Bold: the Groot Privilege. The Groot Privilege comprised 
many arresting articles about: provincial integrity and state property guarantees; 
administrative and judicial procedures and offices; anti-corruption practices; the ius de 
non evocando; norms on judicial and financial decentralization and management; tax 
and financial imposition; and many others, all geared to create a balance among potency 
on the ground and between the overlord and the Dutch – by way of such legal-historical 
framework of power balance the rebels pushed forward their legitimate claims against 
the Spaniards in the XVI century. The document in sum was crucial to the history of, 
notably, Holland (and Zeeland) for it clarified and deepened the checks and balances 
thrusted on the overlord by the Joyeuse Entrée, and interlocked such binding rules with 
the effective historical structure – social, institutional and hence, economic – of the 
provinces of Holland and Zeeland
120
.  
The constitutional web of rules, constraints and guarantees, which enveloped and 
shielded Dutch space since the XIV century – paralleling the start of the expansion of 
the capitalist logic of power, and this is not a coincidence (ch. 3) –, may be intended as 
the political obverse, complement and brace for the capitalist web of wealth, production 
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and exchange developed within Dutch space. We may also push such a line up to 
suggest that, in fact, both complemented and interpenetrated each other in time, as today 
capitalism and democracy do – both in essence emanated from a shared historical 
background
121
. Owing to such an interlocking of rules and capital – in Clerici’s words, 
because of «la natura del paese e dei suoi abitanti»
122
 – any attempt of damaging or 
weeding out the former resolved into an intolerable danger for the latter – and vice 
versa
123
. Unrests crept up or uproars burst – as after Charles the Bold’s death (1477) and 
after Alva’s arrival (1568, especially after 1571-1572124), not to mention Gand in 1539-
1540
125
. In 1540s indeed, more than ever, «[fu] attorno al problema dell’imposizione e 
raccolta dei tribute che cominciò a manifestarsi chiaramente il paradosso dello scontro 
fra un monarca sempre più bisognoso di risorse economiche per governare da solo il 
nuovo “stato moderno” [e il] ceto dei mercanti e imprenditori che detenevano proprio 
quelle risorse tanto ricercate dal sovrano, ma disposte a cederle in cambio di una 
compartecipazione alla gestione del potere pubblico»
126
. This (unintended) 
«compartecipazione» (1542-44) was the first movement towards the birth of the 
Provinces united as a state. 
Alva’s absolutist attempt of coercive dispossession embodied the collapse of an 
entire constitutional-historical order in Holland, and in the Northern Low Countries as 
well: unconstitutional centralization of illegitimate extraction was to spell a profound 
shift in the power relations among the Spaniards and the Dutch, in favor of the 
former
127
. But the Hollanders, differently from other populaces under the imperial joke, 
had their lively past and present of freedom and growth: 
 
Non era mai stata solita la Fiandra per l’adietro a sentir gravezze di gabelle, e di datii nella forma 
che si costuma in Inspagna, in Italia, & in altri paesi. L’uso inveterato era di chiedersi dal Principe ne’suoi 
bisogni a’popoli quelle sovventioni, che paressero consapevoli, e l’essere bene spesso negate, mostrava la 
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libertà dell’essere concedute. Presa la risolution del concederle, imponeva per ciascuna Provincia a se 
stessa quel peso, ch’era necessario per tal effetto. Domandavansi però sempre queste contributioni a 
tempo dal Principe, e venivano a tempo consentite ancora da’popoli; e quante volte il bisogn o stringeva 
quello a far nuove instanze, era di mestieri, ch’altretante da questi se n’havesse nuovamente il consenso. 
Onde il modo insolito, che proponeva hora il Duca d’aggravare così all’ingrosso il paese per tempo 
indeterminato, & in forma prescritta, non dalle Provincie, ma da lui stesso, alterò sommamente gli animi; 
e tanto  più allora, ch’erano di già commossi gli humori per ogni parte128. 
 
William Temple, in a retrospect, observed: 
 
‘Till the duke impatient of further delay, causes the Edict, without consent of the States, to be 
Published at Brussels. The people refuse to pay, the soldiers begin to levy by force; the townsmen all shut 
up their shops; the people in the Countrey forbear the Market, so as not as much as bread or meat is to be 
bought in town. The Duke in enraged, and calls the soldiers to arms, and commands several of the 
Inhabitants, who refused the payments, to be hanged that very night upon the sign-posts; which nothing 
moves the Obstinacy of the people: and now the officers of the Guards are ready to begin the executions, 
when news comes to town of the king of Briel by the Gueses, and of the expectation that had given of a 
sudden Revolt in the Province of Holland
129
. 
 
In this respect, already in 1568 an observer wrote: 
 
Les practiques & menées du Cardinal de Granvelle, & autres avaricieux & sanguinaires, lesquels 
sous le pretexte & manteau de la Religion pretendue Catholique, ne cherchans autre chose, que diminuer 
l’honneur de Dieu, l’autorité du Roy, & le bien du commun peuple130. 
 
And such an accusation was followed by a spate of pamphlets and treaties that 
«reiterated the view that Granvelle and Alva were trampling on the privileges and 
thereby violating the “old traditional freedom”. Under the pretence of religion and the 
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service to the king both tried to destroy the prosperity of the Netherlands and to bring 
“the inhabitants who before had had good freedom, in pitiable slavery with oppression 
and extermination of all the privileges and franchises of the country”»131.  
Another anonymous Fidelle exhortation aux Inhabitans due Pays Bas (1569) 
pushed on Dutch historical contractualism which had afforded not only «Liberté» but 
also so great «prosperité», and on the fact that the final point for the oppressors and 
occupiers was the appropriation of the wealth and power of the Dutch: 
 
Quelle iouissance  de vos droicts, libertez & coustumes esperez vous, soubs la indeve domination 
des iniques invaseurs & violens oppresseurs d’icex, les trescruelles & tresiniustes actions desquelles ont 
par tant d’exemples manifesté leur intention n’estre aultre que de grasser tyrannicquement  & 
Impunement sur les personnes & biens detous les inhabitans, de quelle religion, qualité, eage, ou sexe 
qu’il soit, selen leur desreiglée passions […] ?132 
 
What is important to stress, with Alberto Clerici, is the almost absence, in all this 
strand of pamphlets published in the first years of the war, of religious underpinnings to 
vindicate the Revolt – the Libellus Supplex is another example. Indeed, the Fidelle 
exhortation put forth also what we may term as the issue of “materialism”: the 
inquisition must be abolished not because it slays heretics or because it is bringer of a 
bogus religion, but because it appropriates Dutch customary wealth and power
133
. Put 
very simply: the Dutch wanted to free themselves because of religious oppression and 
the violations of the Privileges; but the Dutch had to free themselves for they did not 
brook to be pillaged in terms of wealth and liberty – freedom and growth. Plunder 
would have meant actual passive submission and definitive reorganization of their lives 
according to the Spanish feudal-coercive logic of absolutist power.  
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In these regards, indeed between 1568-1569, Jacob van Wesembeeke, secretary of 
William Orange, published several important and influential works which emphasized 
the crucial steering the Revolt was to take
134
. A shift came about in the realm of thought 
that was to reveal itself as a turn in the realm of practice as well. “Liberty” in the 
singular – in the modern political fashion – was posed at the center of the reflection. 
What is to be stressed is that this modern concept of liberty was regarded as the long-
lasting and silent heritage of the old concept of medieval liberties that now it was to be 
abandoned in the realm of praxis to propel the revolt as an all-out national war. This 
was the step that would have led to the development of the conceit of Dutch absolute 
sovereignty and sovereign government. Liberty (singular) was understood as the 
manifest foundation for wealth and wealth as the foundation for liberty. Such a 
singularization caught a historical situation in which the operations of the Revolt started 
to be regarded by the Dutch more and more as a single national thrust for liberation.  
The «old liberty» the pensionary says, is «natural, inborn» and «will not allow to be 
taken away». Van Gelderen, commenting on Wesembeeke, stressed that the author 
  
argued that the prosperity of the Low Countries was closely linked to the eager protection of Dutch 
liberty. The distracted policy of the government was not only an outright attack on the freedom of the 
Netherlands, making the Dutch “the most oppressed slaves in the world”. In addition it would lead “to the 
complete ruination of the whole country, which was standing solely on its liberty and freedom (and the 
trade, merchandise and the multitude of goods and persons, which had followed from this)” 
 
The «intrinsic connection» between freedom and growth is the leitmotif of Dutch 
historical life, understood by both populace and pamphleteers, and used in actuality in 
the realm of historical politics since the late middle ages by the urban-rural syndicates 
against «encroaching central institutions». In this respect, to counter the sixteenth 
century encroachment of the Spaniards, Wesembeeke suggests that at the center of the 
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thrust for the protection of Dutch space, the States General was «a sound resort and 
secure remedy in all anxieties». Along with the recognition of the Generality’s role of 
guardians of the Liberty, Wesembeeke proceeds to argue «that the prosperity of the 
country and the personal freedom of the inhabitants rested upon the country's old 
liberty. The loss of liberty would be catastrophic: the country would be ruined and the 
people turned into […] “the most oppressed slaves in the world”». Therefore, the 
sovereign activity of the States General had to become an «imperative» around which 
the defense of wealth and liberty must be carried out
135
. The accords of Gand in 1576 – 
south and north united, that is, different historical-structural societal arrangements but 
overlapping politico-constitutional infrastructures
136
 – had confirmed the States 
General’s role of barrier against central encroachments and the Dutch volition of self-
government and self-financing – the provinces «had to be governed by the Dutch 
themselves» and they had to be «willing to pay all the necessary and reasonable 
contributions and taxes» (article II)
137
.  
The Hollander showed and pushed this volition above anyone else through the 
Union of Utrecht afterwards. In 1579 indeed, for the first time in another pamphlet, the 
Brief discours sur la negotiation de lapaix, Wesembeeke’s discourse was echoed and 
deepened. We read that directly to the States is to be «reserved the power to decide on 
all matters concerning the sovereignty». This was truly revolutionary. The Dutch started 
to see the Generality as a true sovereign organism by itself, thereby transforming it in 
the most incisive device for the protection of customs and privileges, which were, in 
turn, the main form of protection for «la libertà personale e del patrimonio». 
Sovereignty was to reside in the States because of representatives of the estates and 
guardians of the liberty and wealth of the Dutch, on behalf of cities and countryside
138
. 
In the early ‘80s indeed, as acknowledgement of such a new stance and position of 
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sovereignty, Holland and the other Provinces remitted their finance and government to 
the supervision of the States General to seal the revolutionary vision
139
. 
In the Generality’s arena, the Hollanders naturally took the lead and this allowed 
their voices to be strongly heard, and the resources well spent for the protection, firstly 
and importantly, of their space, and as a consequence, of Dutch space as a whole
140
. In 
these years indeed, Holland increased staggeringly its monthly quota to Dutch space 
protection, from 80.000 guilders in 1578 to 128.500 in 1586, by way of taxes to be sure, 
but also through an urban-rural, and then provincial, creditworthiness on the way of 
restoring
141
. In this regard, Fritschy stressed, the financial strategy of uncoupling the 
gemene middelen from the remittance of the interests, hooking payments in the locally-
administered verponding – gemene middelen were earmarked directly to war financing 
not to the payment of the interests, and this obstructed the financial market in the first 
decades of the revolt – was crucial for it allowed the re-opening of the free financial 
market of the Province as a whole, and thus the thrust for the refinancing of the funded 
debt of the state – obligations, short terms loans, were to become a common mean for 
borrowing; interests started to get lower (we shall see below). The provincial fiscal 
network (with provincial receivers) and the urban-rural financial network (with public 
bodies) could, and in actuality started to, operate like “clockwork” at the end of the 
sixteenth century contributing to Holland’s new financial accretion and the Dutch 
Republic’s coagulation142.  
The consolidation of the republican moment in 1590 was concurrent to the re-
opening of the financial tap of Holland, the general and mindful assumption of the 
sovereignty of Dutch space as a whole – self-determination, especially in its «economic 
dimension» – and the start of Dutch capitalist world accumulation. This happened 
simply because these four things are to be considered as one – along with the bundle of 
consequences that stemmed from it. Structurally and constitutionally legitimated, the 
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State General set about coordinating the multi-layered Dutch space of rules and capital 
that became thereby interconnected through a web of power relations that set about 
articulating, regulating and normalizing the different levels of societal government and 
accumulation – a unified logically-combined structure of power. The Dutch state sought 
to defend Dutch territory and to expand societal power as unified process like never 
before
143
. For the very first time, modern state formation, territorial sovereignty and 
capitalist accumulation on world scale became mutually and inextricably interlocked, 
and interlocked with, and articulate through, its societal ground – this was the dawn of 
the first regime of capitalist accumulation in the history of the modern world-system. 
The Dutch world power of the seventeenth century was the outgrowth of this complex 
whole of relations. 
Hans Blom aptly rounds off: 
 
If the Dutch Republic ultimately found its rationale in the defeat of tyranny, in the process it had 
developed a sense of community that consisting in a joint effort to bring together the funds necessary to 
successfully wage the war, can very well be described as one republican virtue. By gradually making 
(transit) trade the stronghold of this financial policy, by establishing “publicly-owned” trading companies, 
by taxing consumption instead of import and export, by making available to the population lifebonds to 
strengthen the treasury, the energy of the country was geared to one single purpose. The political 
structures reflected this public spirit
144
. 
 
8.2 The Dutch regime of accumulation under completion 
 
The Dutch regime of accumulation was the most efficient and coherent mode of 
regulation of human space and scheme for the re/production of power in the seventeenth 
century, and the only national regime patterned after the capitalist logic of operation in 
the seventeenth century world-system. This enabled the Dutch to be hegemonic in the 
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European context. Herein, we keep exploring the mode of organizing Dutch space, that 
is, the most important constituent for a hegemon and of a systemic hegemony. In 
keeping with the forgoing, it will be shown how the Dutch brought to completion their 
historical edifice and major historical accomplishment. It is to be argued that Dutch 
rulers and subjects succeed in organizing and interlocking the military logistics and the 
cultural-welfare organization to the financial-fiscal networks, and the urban-rural 
structure of accumulation whence power primarily comes. In other words, they 
managed to deploy the different agents and agencies in an entwined commodity-
centered web of value relations that enveloped the whole ensemble of powers – from the 
military to the socio-cultural to the market to politics – and the related organizations. 
Since we are to argue a historical unity, it is not useful to discern or split in successive 
and separate paragraphs the operations or the realm of capital, society and state, thus we 
will continue to proceed jointly. 
To sum up the argument and rationale: the unique accumulation of capital and 
wealth of the preceding centuries translated into a warfare-welfare organization of 
Dutch space permeated by the capitalist logic of operation and structured on networks 
of regional markets for the re/production of power and wealth the Dutch state organized. 
The medieval capitalist expansion of trade and production had allowed for an urban-
rural accumulation of fiscal-financial capital, especially from Holland and Zeeland, that 
enabled the structuring and consolidation of the Dutch state during the XVI century. 
The remarkable expansion of trade and production in the course of the century bulked at 
unprecedented level customs duties, excises, surcharges on exports, land taxation, tax 
on capital, that constituted the hefty basin of public resources for the emerging state. 
The XVI century capital and fiscal accretion enabled to consolidate the debt-based 
management of Dutch space and a great financial expansion injected further and 
unprecedented supplies of money into the general circuit of capital accumulation that 
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during the seventeenth century wholly embedded organization and processes of military 
power re/production – in view of the ongoing state of warfare in which the Dutch lived 
– and the most advanced network of welfare and social value re/production of the early 
modern times created to bear the brunt of war and social conflict. By way of an ample 
array of procedures of value redeployment, the Dutch state, in close association with the 
urban-rural spaces, managed to order society and economy at large toward a coherent 
and efficient capital-based movement of power re/production for the protection and the 
expansion of Dutch space. 
In very short: all the logistics of power that the Dutch organized crisscrossed in 
domestic markets and re/produce power and wealth according to the logic of capital 
accumulation. The coherent deployment and the efficient redeployment of the 
expanding value so produced by the governmental business agencies stands out as the 
distinguishing character of the Dutch regime during the Seventeenth century. 
 
4.2.1. The capitalist organization of Dutch military space 
 
The Dutch military power, and the deployment of it, had its premises on the 
historical efficiency of production and the rapid circulation of commodities and capital, 
along with the capacity of labor redeployment that the historical urban-rural structure of 
public power, network and system of accumulation, distribution and transport permitted 
(chap. 3). This organization allowed for, and in turn was further potentiated thanks to, 
the seventeenth-century technological advancement and rising productivity as a whole, 
which led to an unprecedented industrial expansion and spurred on a remarkable state 
financial-fiscal accumulation. Thus, the rising productivity and technological leadership 
in the Golden Age was not merely the result of industrial investments limited to specific 
sectors, but indeed it was an outcome of the whole urban-rural structure of power, and 
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involved the economy as a whole. The capitalist organization of Dutch space pushed for 
a general technological and productive advancement through the market nexus that 
interlinked loci of technological experimentation to centers of production and 
consumption. This resolved into a rise of both the «physical productivity of labour – i.e. 
an increase in the number of items produced per manhour input» – and, at the same 
time, of the «qualitative surplus value per item produced» – often this occurred as an 
interconnected phenomenon. Against all the circulationist eddies of thinking, it was 
industry indeed – production – that after the Revolt saw the highest rates of growth – 
even compared to merchant shipping
145
.  
As a consequence, seventeenth-century domestic commerce boomed as a whole, 
especially in terms of value
146
. Value explosion downsized negative consequences such 
as networks’ congestion and the perilous increase of general transaction costs, and 
greatly strengthened the domestic position in the international structure of comparative 
cost advantages, which was bolstered by the ample margin of productivity. This injected 
an impressive volume of commercial value in domestic markets by which the urban-
rural complexes profited as never before in terms of both industrial-commercial and 
fiscal-financial accumulation. The latter was then redeployed through the financial-
fiscal networks of the state to further boost material accumulation. As a result, «per 
capita wealth tripled. The most important factor in this was no doubt domestic savings» 
which contributed in turn to expand, diversified and specialized further the structure of 
urban-rural investment, production and accumulation
147
. As van Zanden bears out: «The 
period 1580 to 1650 was one of industrial diversification, with the rise of new (often 
harbour-related) industries (sugar refining, diamond cutting, paper making, printing, the 
silk industry, delftware)» with an ever-increasing liquidity and supply of money; 
notwithstanding the absorbing capacity of a booming economy, de Vries says, the 
«demand for labour rose more rapidly in the period 1570-1620 than did its supply [,] 
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despite the massive immigration from the Southern Netherlands, despite the rapid 
natural increase and urbanization of the domestic population, and despite the radical 
rationalization of the work year introduced after 1574»
148
.  
In a nutshell, the magnitude of Dutch accumulation and expansion in the 
seventeenth century was unprecedented
149
. Capital investment and diversification with 
labor surfeit were preconditions for expanding capital accumulation in the seventeenth-
century Dutch wars, that is, a bourgeoning war economy required several different and 
new state-capital-labor combinations to survive the necessity of war and to profit from 
it.  
 
Table 4.5 . Estimates of the growth of production in the most important sectors of the economy 
and in the economy of Holland as a whole. 1500-1650 (annual average growth rates)
150
 
 1500-1580  1580-1650 1500-1650 
Agriculture  
Herring fisheries  
International services  
Textiles (woollen)  
Brewing  
Shipbuilding  
Gross output 
weights 1500  
weights 1650  
Population  
a - minimum estimate 
0.3 
1.0 
1.8 
-2.0 
-0.6 
1.8 
 
0.7 
0.3 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4  
1.3 
3.3 
0.6 
1.3 
 
1.2 a 
1.2 a 
0.9 
 
0.4 
0.7 
l.5 
0.5 
-0.1 
1.5 
 
0.95 
0.7 
0.7 
 
 
 
Table 4.6. The taxable value of capital assets according to taxes levied in 1599, 1650,1672 and 
1788 (in millions of guilders
151
). 
1599 
1650 
1672 
1788 
160 
400 
626 
1400 
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Since the uninterrupted bout of warfare the Dutch Republic passed through, the 
organization of military power and of military labor-power was crucial to societal 
dynamics, for the expansion of the societal control of the state and the societal control 
over warfare processes as well as over the consequences of war
152
. The urban-rural 
expanded accumulation enabled a cumulative dynamics according to which public 
revenues and financial capital, through state and provincial governmental-business 
agencies which were wholly embedded into the urban-rural structure of production, 
trade and labor, replenished the organization of military labor and power; the military 
logistics at the same time fed the urban-rural space of accumulation and allowed for a 
noteworthy boost in financial-fiscal accumulation: the transference of wealth from the 
ground towards the upper level of government, and vice versa, came about thus by 
virtue of the related increase of public revenues and investments in the financial market 
that the general expansion of the processes of capital accumulation enabled. This value 
was redeployed thereon. A hybrid network of capital deployment and redeployment – 
hybrid because part government part private, that is, governmental-business – spawned 
a movement of interaction and integration between entrepreneurs-merchants, business 
companies, state agencies and agents involving state, province, urban-rural complexes, 
that highly speeded up and guaranteed military funding and provisioning through the 
historical urban-rural structure of wealth, production and exchange. 
The organization of redeployment operated through a circuit of financial 
transference, urban-rural military-centered accretion of trade, production and 
consumption and thus fiscal growth, up to replenish public revenues, and also the 
financial market in the Republic. The military presence in towns and countryside 
became part of the processes of capitalist accumulation of the Dutch regime. A 1664 
pamphlet witnessed: «the more mony they pay, the more they receive again, in that 
insensible but profitable way». The development of regular mechanics of the operations 
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of payment, supply, commodity distribution and redistribution that was based on the 
historical urban-rural structure of accumulation, «underpinned cohesion» and increased 
the Dutch military efficiency but also the efficiency of the Dutch regime in general 
through the marketization of the military life, that is the entering of the army in the 
commodity-centered web of relations characterizing the Dutch regime
153
. In sum, The 
financing of the military organization – as instance, the regularization of troop’s 
payment, arguably the most relevant element in public expenditure
154
 – was to connect 
the regularization and rationalization of public finance and the financial market we have 
already explored to warfare and the local space of wealth, production and exchange in a 
layered but coherent web of value relations
155
.  
The military organization and power were connected with financial capital. The 
seventeenth century capital and per-capita wealth explosion witnessed the related 
explosion of voluntary investments in the financial market that created an environment 
in which large fringes of population – regularly-paid soldiers included – participated 
through the markets to the financing of war, and to profit from it. The proceeds of this 
market expansion returned to the urban-rural complexes in the form of public loans 
through transferences of sums from the state, linked to the increase of public revenues 
that ensued from the expanding economy, or in the form of profit from interests on 
capital invested in the market. By the same token, the money invested stemmed directly 
from the growth of production and trade that war stimulated, and from the fact that the 
increasing presence of proletarianized labor, both in towns and countryside 
characterized by wages that were among the highest in Europe, boosted consumption, 
and, along with it, expanded the financial investment opportunities of the population in 
general
156
. The proceeds that the expansion of the “free” financial market procured to 
the urban-rural complexes – population, elites and soldiers – fed into capital 
accumulation through the consequent further urban-rural investment in production and 
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trade, and the further rise in wages that such an injection of productive and commercial 
activities and money enabled – the high purchasing power was «a product of the era of 
economic growth, achieved by productivity-raising investments in agriculture, industry, 
and commerce. In this expansion era costs [of any kind] rose, to be sure, but wages rose 
more rapidly than prices, and real annual household earnings probably rose even more 
than did real wages»
157
. The Seventeenth-century expansion of financial capital was 
structured on the funding of a (long-term) state debt premised on the urban-rural 
financial expansion that the local capitalist growth in general enabled.  
The more traditional lijfrenten and losrenten were replaced by bonds and the 
official receiver morphed into broker and banker that fed and guarded the market 
dynamics in the whole space of Dutch accumulation from the state perspective. As ‘t 
Hart reminds, «Obligaties became the preferred kind of investment, since they were 
easier to transfer than lijfrenten and losrenten. They were used typically by receivers 
less bound by traditional regulations, such as the Receiver General of the Union, the 
provincial receivers of the western maritime regions, the receivers of the five 
Admiralties, and the receivers of the largest cities»
158
. As a result, such a loan policy 
dragged the Dutch burghers deeper into the state
159
. 
 
Table 4.7 Annual budget of the Dutch Republic c.1641, and the Dutch state, 1801: percentage distribution of 
expenditure (excluding local and provincial expenses)
160
 
 c. 1641 (%) 1801 (%) 
Army and fortifications   61 30 
Navy  26 15 
Military expenditure subtotal  87 45 
Debt servicing costs  4 41 
Administration and miscellaneous  9 14 
TOTAL  100 100 
total (millions of guilders)  24 71 
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Between 1621 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Holland’s debt rose more 
than fivefold, to 125.5 million guilders
161
. A financial expansion of this sort implied, on 
the one hand, the staggering organized accumulation of capital that in fact was – «the 
level of capital accumulation was enormous» van Zanden estimates
162
; on the other, it 
spelt the widest trust in the fiscal-financial creditworthiness of the state, premised on the 
one of the urban-rural complexes. The financial management of the state was «grafted» 
upon the urban-rural structure of accumulation and permeated by its institutional 
framework apt to capture revenues «in a timely and properly manner». Indeed, the 
Dutch had begun to tap the fiscal wealth of the urban-rural spaces in place of coercive 
loans to foster further trust in the voluntary investment of capital that in turn translated 
into the expansion of the bond market– the growth of bills’ issuing from the late 1620s: 
«By 1648 bills amounted to 73 million guilders, or 60 percent of Holland’s debt». The 
shift from coercion to investment, Gelderblom-Jonker say, meant the building up of a 
long-term debt by way of short-terms instrument, with rates among the lowest of 
Europe:  
 
By 1630 Holland combined a strong credit record with a booming economy and savings outpaced 
the rise in public debt […]. Consequently, we must see Holland’s anomaly as an equilibrium of interests 
achieved on one side by rapid economic growth and wealth accumulation and on the other by the soaring 
expenditures needed to defend that prosperity. The equilibrium depended on the receivers’ dual-action 
safety valve, which gave investors an exit option while buffering roll-over crises
163
.  
 
Short-term loans in the XVII century, and especially after the end of the truce 
(1622), became the most reliable source of money because the state began the 
widespread use of solliciteurs militair apt to mobilize, advance and guard the 
transference and employment of funds all over Dutch space
164
. The Dutch put into 
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operation brokerages through this new breed of financial agents of war
165
. Related to 
them, a contemporary wrote in 1669: 
 
It is very observable in these Provinces, that though there be no Money in the Treasury, yet the 
Souldiers receive their pay every week or moneth; for every Regiment chooses an Agitatour, who resides 
near the States to sollicite the payment of those he represents; and when there is no Money in the publick 
Treasury, he may confidently, and does borrow and take up Money for the present necessity; and it is 
repaid him again with interest by the States order. The hops of the great profit there is to be made, 
engages these solicitors to d thus; for they advance their money it is at rate of 10 per cent. gains which 
they take upon the arrears which the state owes to the officers
166
. 
 
Appointed by the Province, a military solicitor had to collect funds and redeploy 
money from Provincial treasury (comptoir) to the army or, at any rate, in case of need, 
to guarantee troop funding by investing his own capital or raking money from other 
private investors
167
. Great accumulation of capital was the objective and, purportedly, 
the outcomes for these agents, ensuing primarily from interest – noteworthy in time of 
war –  but also from provincial funds’ surplus. The great mobilization of money and the 
networks these brokers developed enabled the more efficient redistribution of the 
resources
168
. The operations of these solicitors boosted velocity and quantity of 
commercial transactions, and thanks to the improved army funding that ensued from 
their operations of value redeployment, the sectors of value production that were 
directly connected to the army on the field came to be boosted as well
169
.  
Not only willingness to participate – with ever-increasing profit in return in mind 
– to the financing of state and war, but also willingness to bear increasingly heavier 
taxation. In the 1590, Fyes Moryson observed: 
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The Tributes, Taxes, and Customes, of all kinds imposed by mutuall consent, – so great is the love 
of liberty or freedome – are very burthensome, and they willingly beare them, though for much lesse 
exactions imposed by the King of Spaine – as they hold – contrary to right, and without consent of his 
Subjects, they had the boldnesse to make warre against a Prince of such great power
170
. 
 
The explosion of capital, trade and purchases in the seventeenth century brought 
about an accumulation of fiscal value that was tapped to bankroll the protection of 
Dutch space and the protection of capital. Since 1600, Provincial taxation – common 
means – came to be viewed as a good source to fund interest payments on a 
consolidated debt, and thus remarkably expanding the possibilities for war financing 
with an expansion of the financial market. Taxation and finance were tied up 
together
171
. However two other points can be taken into account. 
Fiscal cooperation in the seventeenth century was pushed forward by the 
consolidation and further adjustment of the federal organization of state related to the 
urban-rural complexes. The Dutch Republic was organized through the compliance to 
the historical nature of Dutch society: the efficiency of the Dutch regime was achieved 
in this respect because the Dutch rulers understood and abided by the differences in the 
historical socio-economic structure of production and wealth between the provinces, 
thereby operating in accordance with them. Holland, and Zeeland, performed the 
starring role in the Republic, but the state power rested also on the other provinces’ 
value-added in productive, commercial, military and fiscal-financial terms. The greatest 
achievement of the Dutch rulers in the seventeenth century was thus the management 
and the organization of Dutch space as a whole in compliance with the historical socio 
spatial differences of its own: they channeled and harnessed the added-value the 
provinces brought with them by creating a socio-economically differentiated 
organization of financial-fiscal accumulation – what Fritschy calls the «Social-
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Economic Structure of the Public Revenue of the Provinces». The Dutch rulers captured 
the productive and commercial differences and constructed a state-wide policy of fiscal-
financial differentiation that slipped over the historical provincial peculiarities to obtain 
what the rulers longed for, «the required public revenue-increases». In so doing «the 
‘fabric’ of the total of public revenue was ‘stretched’ from on average nearly 17 million 
guilders between 1621 and 1700, to on average about 24 million guilders between 1700 
and 1794»
172
.  
The fiscal network of differentiated accumulation of the Republic was organized 
upon a very efficient provincial system of direct urban-rural extraction-redeployment – 
that is, «the increases in public expenditure […], did not lead to an increasing financial 
role of the centralized institutions in the course of the existence of the Dutch 
Republic»
173
. Within a framework of provincial fiscality, taxes were spent for example 
to finance troops that stationed in the same towns-countryside in which taxes were 
levied and the money so redeployed spent further in the local economy. The local public 
sphere, geared to market and capital accumulation thanks to the solid framework of 
capital-oriented institutions, in close association with the merchants put into place a 
dynamic network of relations between artisans, industries, proto-industries and army for 
the general supply of populace, field army and navy alike
174
. A direct circuit of state 
loans-urban-rural fiscal deduction from provincial taxation thus was installed: its 
linkages became the markets and the soldiers’ purchases. The tax revolution the 
Provincial States put forward in the 1570s enabled the Provinces to advance loans to 
pay soldiers whose amount would have been deducted later from the towns’ tax 
contribution to the province; at the same time the market involvement of soldiers who 
purchased food (bread for example
175
), beer, housing stimulated the circulation of 
commodities and money, increased the volume of commercial and financial transactions 
(interest-bearing obligations), breeding an expansion in the urban-rural fiscal, and 
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provincial financial, accumulation
176
. The soldiers stepped thus into market relations 
with hosting structures, households, merchants stimulating an added state circuit of 
capital expansion. The market system was crucial to lower the friction between the 
garrison and population in the urban-rural space. The reform in the 1570s thus changed 
the organization of military payment by establishing a direct link «between the army’s 
local expenses and the sums raised in the immediate locality by the improved provincial 
taxes. From June 1577 onwards the serviesgeld, the financial compensation for the 
services, was paid out of local tax funds (and then deducted in turn from the sums the 
town had to advance to the province)» 
177
. 
An example is offered by the financial/fiscal organization for sea protection and 
warfare put into operation through the five leading naval governmental-business 
agencies, the admiralties
178
, whose main objective was capital accumulation by warfare 
and trade protection, and whose decentralization in structure and operations was indeed 
«part of the mechanism by which the Dutch society mobilised resources and monitored 
how the state used them». As Glete summarized: «The most successful maritime 
economy of our period, the Dutch Republic, created a state navy around the traditional 
private competence of convoy escorting but retained a highly viable sector for private 
violence at sea. Offensive warfare was to a large extent left to chartered private 
monopoly companies, the East and West India Companies»
179
.  Although state 
organisms, the admiralties were in essence independent agencies of accumulation, 
wholly rooted into the urban-rural network of power, that controlled the collection of 
custom duties in the urban-rural spaces wherein revenues were collected and then 
redeployed through the financial networks and agents – military solicitors –  for the 
fitting out of ships and the protection of trade and of the Dutch seas space
180
. In so 
doing these leading agencies shored up Dutch shipping and productivity by hiring out 
cannons, arms, ammunition, sails, anchors, maps and so on from their arsenals that were 
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provisioned through the historical networks of production and exchange – 
shipbuilding
181
 as instance took off –, feeding the state-wide processes of capital 
accumulation – from protection also the Dutch extracted great wealth, the so-called 
rents
182
. In sum the Admiralties provided regular financial and military support to the 
major trading companies by way of loans and the subsidies the Provincial States of 
Holland and the States-General granted in order to expand wealth, power and protection 
that, through the expanded fiscal accumulation which ensued, came to be further 
replenished
183
. How said in 1644: 
 
[B]ecause of the commerce and navigation exercised in this country over the last sixty years, the 
inhabitants have so much increased their means or capital, that one can truly say that they own the 
greatest wealth in the world. For if one would seriously investigate this point, one would find that they do 
so because they command over thousand ships, capable of usage for warfare
184
.  
 
The Dutch navy was one of the most efficient in Europe also because it was 
entirely geared to hire labor through market: it absorbed and employed outstanding 
portions of energies and thanks to the stratification and differentiation that the 
seventeenth century market of labor ensured, enabled the strategic redeployment of both 
skilled and unskilled labor
185
. Its efficiency in terms of power was thus also an outcome 
of the efficiency of its military labor that emanated from the urban-rural structure of 
market and production. The Dutch navy was the only navy in the seventeenth century 
which completely relied on, and rested upon, the market for mass recruitment of sailors 
– «the largest concentrated labour market for seamen in the world and the Dutch 
mercantile marine». As Glete says indeed, «The key to their availability was, of course, 
high wages [but also] the republic’s good reputation as a reliable paymaster»186.  
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The market network thus could penetrate the military logistics because of military 
investments being earmarked with the state financial-fiscal policy of accumulation – 
savings included
187
 – through the urban-rural structure of capital accumulation and the 
historical web of regional markets throughout Dutch space. Such a spatial and layered 
interlocking of economic, financial, fiscal and political sort reveals thus that the Dutch 
regime owed a compound structure of power with a unified internal structure of capital 
accumulation, characterized by continual processes of negotiation and adaptation 
between spaces and layers of power and accumulation
188
. But finance, taxes and capital 
were not the only reasons that explain the capitalization of the warfare processes. Quite 
the contrary. Discipline became the hallmark of Dutch military labor and this had 
remarkable consequence for the capitalist power accumulation of the Dutch regime.  
The reinforced military discipline regulated troops’ behavior and marshaled the 
resources that war mobilized to the market, allowing for the improvement and the 
strengthening of the market discipline of war in turn: soldiers set about utilizing market 
networks in place of plunder and theft, completely substituting in time coercion with 
money the state paid to them for market services – the market network penetrated even 
within the camp wherein was put into place «a market square […] where the sutlers 
could proffer their wares to the soldiers»
189
; this circuit of resources’ redeployment 
centered on the troop’s presence in the urban-rural spaces aided to reproduce capital, not 
to impair the accumulation – as occurred in other regimes190. The disciplinary 
movement started in the first years of the Revolt with a rising professional army. Since 
the 1570s, William Orange’s reform and the following reorganization by Maurice and 
Frederik Hendrik, transformed both the management and logistics of Dutch military 
organization.  
In his political testament, Richelieu wrote: «history knows many more armies 
ruined by want and disorder than by the efforts of their enemies; and I have witnessed 
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how all the enterprises which were embarked on in my day were lacking for that reason 
alone»
191
. The Dutch were the exception proving Richelieu’s rule. Before the state 
regulation, the urban-rural complexes were reluctant to host soldiers within their space. 
Law infringements and havoc – thefts, rapes and citizens’ revolts as a consequence in 
essence – were usually the result of soldiers’ permanence in town192. The situation 
changed by arranging and imposing a new organized discipline and institutionally-
controlled behavior to both army and urban-rural spaces that quartered troops, thereby 
linking over time military discipline to the order of capital accumulation. With the 
introduction and the perfection of Roman strategies and tactics, the Dutch transformed 
the army in a «coherent community» as McNeill says, based on a rational deployment 
of military labor, the most efficient in the early seventeenth century. In sum, they 
increased the quality and the efficiency of military labor power through the 
enhancement of the military regulation, drill and engineering. In keeping with Dutch 
history, Dutch armies «were, readily, renewable and preserved old-fashioned”, i.e., rural 
values and attitudes within an ever more drastically urbanized, monetized, 
commercialized and bureaucratically rationalized world»
193
.  
New institutions were created whereas the old ones were recasted as were the 
related agencies. Here some instances: it was reduced the hold of landsknechts, 
extended the numbers of officers compared to soldiers and introduced standardized 
military trials presided by officials that began to punish whatsoever law infringements – 
the jurisdictional control of the landsknechts was abolished and the captains could wield 
full judicial powers. Then, the so-called Articles of War were also changed by adding 
new disciplinary regulations, making the relations between the several actors more 
rational and impersonal at all levels, pushing the relations between the army chain of 
command and state towards higher standards of integration and depersonalization – a 
standing army was on the way of formation in so doing
194
. Societal control became 
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central since military courts were filled with citizens that acted as public secretaries, 
advisors or prosecutors. Civilians played a remarkable role in the administration of the 
military trials thereby making the entire urban-rural citizenry the guardian of military 
comportment and administration. What developed was a sort of “democratic” check, or 
more precisely, surveillance on the organization and execution of military power. For 
instance, ‘t Hart reports, «when three farmer’s children lost their lives as a result of 
some stupid act by soldiers from the Zutphen garrison, a public outcry arose in which 
the Zutphen government sued the garrison governor, Van Dorth. By comparison, in 
almost all other early modern armies prosecutors came from the military ranks»
195
.  
The role of the Council of State was limited to administrative functions by the 
extension of the power of the States General in the process of military appointment that 
was driven by both the stadholder and the provincial governments, and that was highly 
influenced by local authorities. Especially after 1618, processes of recruiting of high 
officials – no private selling of such positions was allowed – and of mustering of troops 
were organized by the provincial government with specific institutional rules of hiring 
concerning skills and experience, precise rules of discharging – pension for injuries for 
example
196
. This organization was complemented by civilians’ supervision, notably 
those of noble birth with military experience, accompanied by new strict regulations 
issued by the local governments. Formal regulations and skill- and experience-centered 
assignments of functions, hierarchical chain of command and increased society-state 
judicial authority managed by both government – especially the Provincial government 
of Holland – and local bodies, made the States’ troops the model army of the time; but 
more importantly, these new rules made the state organization of Dutch space as a 
whole an intersubjectively constituted reality in which cooperative behavior was the 
norm –  «[T]he effectiveness of military-fiscal systems [was] forged in the negotiation 
of complex contractual relationships between rulers, subjects, bureaucrats, and armed 
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forces, negotiation of the sort possible in the Dutch Republic after the Revolt». About it, 
‘t Hart says: «Since the 1590s war had increasingly become ‘not an act of uncontrolled 
violence, but rather the orderly application of force, directed by a competent and 
legitimate authority, in the interest of the state’»197. 
The improvement of drill organization and regularization was crucial to avert the 
unpleasant consequences of unruly armies in cities, towns and countryside, and their 
impact on processes of production and exchange. The standardization of drill was only 
possible as a consequence of the standardization of weaponry after Maurice’s reform – 
and more fully later with Frederik Hendrik – that signaled a general movement toward 
the rationalization of the practices of human management, beyond army and war, with 
the use of science as strategy of control and order
198
. Improved drill indeed allowed for 
more strict adherence to the orders, and thus a more disciplined use of coercion. Regular 
and standardized drills were new inasmuch as they became part of daily life for the 
militaries. In sum, the increase of professionalism and rationalization «reduced 
significantly the negative burden on society represented by mutinies or uncontrolled 
provisioning by bands of soldiers»
199
.  
Another instance is troops’ lodging. William Aglionby wrote: «Besides their pay, 
the soldiers have likewise their lodging free, and the states do pay to inhabitants of all 
towns upon that score, six pence a week for each soldiers they lodge, and this is call’d 
Service Money»
200
. For the time, large amounts of «Service money» were syphoned off 
from central government to those who actually provided lodgings for troops, in sharp 
contrast with the practice adopted elsewhere in Europe, especially in the absolutist 
jurisdictions. From June 1577 onwards the serviesgeld was paid out of local tax funds 
deducted, as in the previous case, from the amounts the urban-rural complexes had to 
advance to the provincial government. In so doing, troops’ lodgings came to be 
bankrolled directly by local authorities and state, and thereby the hosting structures 
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obtained regular funds that substantially downsized the attrition between troops and 
civilians, that is, lowered in a substantial way transaction costs for society as a whole, 
and between state and society as well. State rules of billeting established that the Dutch 
soldiers were not to be forcibly billeted upon households, which were legally protected 
from obligations of any sort. Even local elites provided such a service in the same 
manner, underlying relaxed practices at any level of society
201
. Since no obligations 
were established, a free bargaining between troops and hosts developed, and this 
freedom highly fostered the market organization of relationships between army and 
local spaces. Financial agents such as serviesmeesters, appointed by local governments, 
managed the money to financially organize war space – as instance, funding households 
that hosted soldiers. In general, the introduction of the so-called serviesgelden «created 
above all a regular source of potential income for numerous townspeople, above all 
middling and lower income households», and in so doing it enhanced societal 
cooperative behaviors for the provision of such a service for the troops. Despite military 
labor demand grew vastly during the seventeenth century – as a consequence the 
presence of would-be soldiers in the cities posed actual threats to social order
202
 – the 
army’s permanence «strengthened the Dutch urban communities» instead of weakened 
them
203
. 
In sum: the Dutch regulated and normalized conflict within society spurring on 
the market discipline and the intertwining of capital accumulation, military logistics and 
social organization of market through their deep-rooted institutional framework of 
medieval constitution and their newborn state networks of power. The state intervened 
with a disciplinary movement to order Dutch military labor and power that became part 
of everyday social life, and as a consequence, geared to market. While in other 
jurisdictions during the seventeenth-century global state of warfare, accumulation of 
capital and power were highly impaired and the «confusion reigne[d] supreme», the 
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Dutch regime by far outdid the others by means of the conflation of military logistics 
with market, capital accumulation and state – that is, it disciplined soldiers to the market 
rules of capitalist sort the state sorted out
204
. In so doing, the Dutch Republic put into 
operation and supplied one of Europe’s first and largest standing armies throughout the 
XVII century in proportion to Dutch population and domestic space.  
The Seventeenth-century Dutch army consisted of 50.000 to 120.000 men. At the 
same time, it had between 80 and 120 ships of the line. If we compare these figures in 
absolute terms, they were not extraordinary since England's navy had over 120 ship of 
the line, for example, and its army included  up to 87.000 men. France also had well 
over 100 ships, at least during the early 1700s, and in theory its army comprised over 
400.000 men; Sweden c. 100.000 at the end of the century. However in relative terms, 
situation changes: compared to population, the composition of the Dutch army was 
astonishing, for the Dutch population was about 2 million while England counted 
around 5.5 million inhabitants, and France over 20 million. This means that the Dutch 
outfitted about one soldier for every seventeen civilians, and 1 ship for every 25.000. By 
contrast, England had 1 soldier per 61 civilians and 1 ship per 45,000, while France had 
(at best) 1 soldier for every 50 civilians and only 1 ship for every
205
. These astonishing 
figures buttresses the actual capacity of regularization and normalization of Dutch space 
activated by the Dutch regime.  
 
4.2.2. Religion, welfare and the logic of capital accumulation 
 
Religion was a great vector for capitalist accumulation. But herein it is to be 
understood differently from the usual purport historians and sociologists mostly 
assigned to it. State organization, capital accumulation and the salvation of the soul 
passed through the organization of welfare and social provision arranged and bankrolled 
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by the urban-rural bloc and hence the state. By way of such a socio-cultural 
organization of state, the Dutch managed to placate the violence of the social conflict 
during the XVII century and made Dutch society an environment which, by contrast, 
improved and enhanced the capitalist expansion of power. Thereby, salvation and 
charity became firstly a question of pragmatism. It was in this sense that welfare and 
religions aided to get richer, and getting richer was a crucial condition to fuel state, 
economy and the struggle for independence and power. This hence concerns how 
religion disciplined man in depth to peaceful coexistence according to the logic of 
capital accumulation that the welfare organization enabled to propel further. 
Needless to say that capitalism did not originate from some religious penchant or 
its entrenchment within society and the soul of man. In this respect thus, the protestant 
thrust was at most a propellant, a facilitator of historical dispositions already deep-
seated into the Dutch and their logic of action. As Clé Lesger suggests, «socioeconomic 
change seems to have promoted the reception of Protestantism in the Netherlands rather 
than the other way round». From a European perspective, Protestantism sparked off a 
continental reconfiguration and massive redistribution of labor, capital – both financial 
and human – and land through migration movements that «transformed the geographical 
distribution of labor and capital, diluting it in some areas (e.g., the Southern Netherlands 
and Northern France) while concentrating it in others (e.g., the cities of Holland and 
Zeeland)»
 206
. The disciplinary thrust the Dutch put into operation to regulate the inflow 
that followed this movement, proved fundamental to the Dutch regime.  
This section purports to expand such suggestions. Actually, part of the 
background has been already set and explored in chapter 3 in which it has been argued 
that the logic of capital accumulation fully developed in Holland many centuries before 
the coming of Protestantism – during the late middle-ages-early-modern times (XIV-
XVI c.). It is not a coincidence thus that an extensive network of welfare, social care, 
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education, justice, along with its institutional framework, set about developing in Dutch 
towns from the XIII century onwards
207
. Early administration and the related 
institutions have been broached above in this chapter as well, and as such they showed 
how early state, and its networks, came to be bridled and embedded into the capitalist 
patter of power re/production to replenish the entire urban-rural structure and Dutch 
network of capital accumulation.  
The historical process of formation of Dutch space brought the Dutch unto world 
power. It was brought into completion by way of the construction of the Dutch State 
and the deployment of its organization over the territory of the Republic. The 
management of socio-religious strife in the Dutch Republic – that emanated from the 
universal conflict within Church, and spread out because crucial component of the 
struggle for stability in Europe between the emerging nation states – was actually a 
crucial constituent for the movement of societal regulation and the rise of the Dutch 
hegemon. But before exploring how the Dutch managed this inner conflict – inner in a 
twofold sense: inner to the soul of man, and internal to Dutch society –, we need to 
sketch out in very brief the historical religious landscape of the Dutch. 
The Revolt rifted the Low Countries through the combination of materialist thrust 
funneled through political discontent – as we have seen – and religious contradictions. 
The latter were rooted in turn in a European maelstrom of theological differentiations, 
ecclesiastical repressions and continental migrations whereof the Low Countries, for its 
particular configuration in terms of institutions, economy and geography, were swept 
over. Already between 1520-1530, from the German Empire, Lutherans and Anabaptists 
were attracted and mixed with local traditions of critique and opposition – both of 
religious life and ecclesiastical organization. The great industrial landscape enhanced 
the central position of the Low Countries in such a movement: for example the 
development of printing industry made biblical texts and evangelical literature available 
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for anyone, and the growing number of those who were “protesting” against the 
authoritative monopoly of church encouraged and increased demand. Literature was 
formerly reserved to clerics but now, thanks to the industrial democratization of 
religious readings, anyone in towns and cities bought both Bibles and devotional works. 
Religion became a popular affair in the Low Countries. To counter what was being 
viewed a perilous movement of political destabilization, the catholic Emperor arranged 
a legal framework of inquisition and control through agents and agencies – 
commissioners, provincial Courts and urban justices, the regular episcopal courts, and 
the reviewed of the heresy laws that forbade reading, possessing, printing and sale of 
heretical books – to protect and preserve the catholic unity of the realm. 
In the 1540s, from France, Calvinists stepped into South. French Calvinism was 
not only a religion, but also a political movement – not entirely different from 
Anabaptism which was viewed as a political danger owing to its proclivity to not 
acknowledge political authority. All over the Netherlands Calvinism grew rapidly 
especially in the 1560s, and after 1566 new Calvinist groups emerged and changed its 
character by organizing politico-religious operations of recruiting and opposition to 
royal policy. As a dated but interesting analysis aptly summarizes: 
  
This historic movement reveals Calvinism as much more than a creed. It was, as Kuyper called it, 
a " life-system," but something more, for it possessed within itself the dynamic of life, vitalizing creed, 
worship, moral and intellectual discipline, church organization and civil government, economics and 
social ethics, developing and utilizing to the utmost God-given talents for the up-building of church, free 
public schools, military defence, and the wealth necessary for so comprehensive and costly a 
commonwealth […].  Calvin not only said, "We must walk each according to his station”, but also, “We 
must walk forward, and grow, so that our hearts may be capable of things we cannot now understand. If 
our last day finds us going forward, we shall learn beyond this world what we could not learn here”. This 
not merely forward-looking but forward-moving spirit made Calvinism a growing, questioning force
208
. 
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Along with these major strands – and the Jewish –, many other variations and 
nuances of religious practices and credo – the Mennonites were a relevant community 
for example – spawned a highly-diversified socio-cultural landscape that forced the 
Spanish rulers to change their tactical strategy. As Jean-Baptiste Stouppe wrote in 1673: 
«Is this really a Protestant country that we have occupied?»: 
 
The States give unlimited freedom to all sorts of religions, which are completely at liberty to 
celebrate theirmysteries and to serve God as they wish. You will therefore know that besides the 
Protestants there are Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Brounisteds [Congregationalist followers of Robert 
Browne], Independents, Arminians [Remonstrants], Anabaptists [Mennonites], Socinians, Arians, 
Enthusiasts, Quakers or Shakers, Borelists [partisans of the collegiant Adam Boreel, who tended towards 
prophetism], Armenians, Moscovites, Libertines, and others whom we can call Seekers because they are 
seeking a Religion and they do not profess any of those established. I do not say more about Jews, Turks, 
and Persans
209
 
 
Although the unlimited freedom whose Jean-Baptiste Stouppe talks about was 
surely an overstatement, the question for the Spanish rulers was not whether the church 
had to remain a single catholic corpus anymore, but «rather what attitude the authorities 
should adopt in the face of the phenomenon of religious diversity»
210
. The Spanish 
failure in understanding and implementing such a conceit, substantiated by Alva’s 
descent, created the conditions for the solid incorporation of protestant factions into the 
leading circles which would have run the Dutch state– and the church as its appendages 
– that is, at the same time within the urban-rural elites and their men in the upper levels 
of government. By contrast, the successful organization the Dutch put into operation to 
face the crucial knot of diversity aided their power, and its re/production and expansion.  
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The reformed community was a religious minority. Nonetheless, it was officially 
recognized with the birth of the United Provinces. What follows was not a national 
Protestant church, but, in general, a «church of the state» – especially after 1618, the 
synod of Dordrecht
211
. As for state-building processes, the last decade of the sixteenth 
century was an important bout of church-building: politics and war pushed for a 
restructuring that could be useful to uphold the Dutch war efforts
212
.  
But the organization of the new church of the state proved difficult
213
. Protestant 
ministers were scarcer and the high standard of moral conduct, pastoral prowess and 
education made the recruitment difficult. «They had to teach their flocks a godly 
discipline that was stricter than traditional, medieval Catholicism had been». The state 
now earmarked a great part of church revenues to brace the war efforts and repay the 
damages war brought with it – it was the catholic church that firstly paid off for war. In 
essence, the Dutch state and Church appropriated the wealth of the Catholics. The other 
part of funds was destined for the building up of the protestant network of university 
and discipline that had to shape the next governing elites of the Republic. A new breed 
of religious ministers was trained in the new universities. These were the new governing 
agents of the church of the state who possessed administrative competence and 
disciplinary functions. The remainders were earmarked to bankroll the local church 
organization – activities, but also pensions and salaries. Ecclesiastic agents were in sum 
laborers waged «from the State, upon whom they wholly depend» William Temple 
claims
214
.  
Such a web of rules and money was rather strictly and restrictively organized, 
firstly because funds were few and thoroughly regulated, secondly because to step into 
it, the requirements of learning, public profession of faith and lifestyle were remarkably 
high for the ministers, and a full membership under a permanent scrutiny of the 
consistory was called for the believers. As a consequence, in the Dutch Republic,  
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the Reformed Church was, for a public Church, rather exclusive, and it is estimated that by the end of the 
sixteenth century only ten to twenty percent of the population could be counted as members. This is 
remarkable. It is an indication that all the humanism, evangelicalism and anti-clericalism of the preceding 
decades had not made many people into informed and convinced Protestants. It would take a process of 
confessionalization, of systematic inculcation of religious values, lasting deep into the seventeenth 
century, to do that
215
 
 
As far as it is concerned here, Jo Spaans reports a crucial fact related to the 
religious landscape of the Dutch Republic that upholds a central hypothesis of the 
present study: the origin of Dutch capitalism had nothing to do with Protestantism 
precisely because confessionalization and systematic inculcation of religious values was 
a process accomplished throughout the seventeenth century (at least!) – this is a tenable 
historical scenario even regardless of our framework of Dutch historical capitalist 
expansion put forth in chapter 3. An explosion in magnitude akin to that of the Dutch in 
the XVII century should have implied the completion of the confessionalization process 
and the thorough rootedness of Protestantism to uphold the link between origin of 
capitalism and Protestantism. Or in other words, religious conversion should have 
involved far wider strata of population than in fact were at the end of the sixteenth 
century to uphold the Weberian hypothesis. By contrast, when Protestantism involved 
more people, Dutch power was already fading away.  
Instead, Dutch world capitalist expansion and power in the seventeenth century 
involved Dutch Protestantism inasmuch as «in worship, church and civil government, 
education, social and economic program, even more than in theology, [it] was marked 
by an adaptability which enabled it to become an international movement» and to 
discipline the diverse socio-political landscapes it encountered in its European 
expansion
216
. We can say that Protestantism, and Calvinism in particular, proved crucial 
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in two respects: it engendered, or contributed to engender, a double movement, at the 
same time, of disciplinary regulation and flexible adaptation. The crucial character of 
capitalism in its longe durèe is precisely adaptability – as Braudel has showed. 
Calvinism in this respect provided a powerful inner lever to brace capitalist 
accumulation. The discipline it thrusted on man was crucial in helping regulate Dutch 
society, making it an environment apt to capitalist accumulation. Both conditions were 
crucial to the construction of the Dutch hegemon. 
«Church is not only part of politics […] but the Church is also political society» 
claimed an Arminian practitioner
217
. Hence, as Troeltsch avers in his study on 
Protestantism, Calvinism fell into place within the Dutch state that was fighting for 
sovereignty since it favored its power and evolution vigorously. This translated into a 
unique ideological overlapping between state-builders and church-builders which, on 
the one hand, fed into the anti-despotic compulsions, and on the other, consolidated 
within the state organization forms of government hinging on participation, thereby 
grafting the idea of social contract and of election of sovereign powers
218
. Indeed, it was 
in Holland that «durante il XVI e XVII secolo venne elaborata la teoria della titolarità 
della sovranità alle assemblee rappresentative […]», Clerici bears out219. And those who 
held this power were the urban-rural syndicates. As such, it was another important 
factor which helped solidify the urban-rural organization of Dutch constitutional 
framework – state-builders and church-builders became, in their intertwining and 
interplay, social engineer, society-builders
220
. But, as De Vries and van der Woude 
recall, «the common individual and individualistic propensity to act», typical of 
capitalism, that created «situations in which personal initiative, innovation, and 
responsibility [and] where political, economic, and personal freedom [was] valued more 
highly» were already developed, according to the two historians, since the XVI century, 
before the diffusion – not to mention the rootedness – of Protestantism in Holland and 
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in the other Provinces – according to our framework, these situations and propensity set 
about developing since the XIV century
221
. Therefore the role of Protestantism should 
be sought in something different than the origin of capitalism. In this respect however, 
the original Calvinist thrust in the Netherlands proved at times detrimental to the Dutch 
space of accumulation, as for instance in Friesland: 
 
During the following fifty years, Friesland's share in the Baltic trade rose to the highest percentage 
ever recorded, that is, 799 ships out of a total of 3,9283 which passed through the Sound in 1564, against 
2,425 for Holland. At this time Calvinism was just entering Friesland from the south; and, if this religion 
actually helped the growth of commerce and industry, it should have benefited Friesland more than any 
other Dutch province, for Friesland became predominantly Calvinistic after 1564. But the figures show a 
contrary trend. In 1574, Friesland had only 46 out of 4,567; in 1575, 36 out of 3,786; in 1576, 592 out of 
3,885; in 1577, 252 out of 4,784; in 1578, 354 out of 5,010; in 1579, 380 out of 3,772; in 1580, 401 out of 
3,832; in 1581, 421 out of 4,262; in 15892, 442 out of 4,946; in 1583, 529 out of 5,371; in 1584, 449 out 
of 4,898; in 1585, 360 out of 4,103; and in 1587, 502 out of 6,465. The figures for the period from 1587 
to 1660 remain approximately the same as those from 1580 to 1587, while those for Holland also show 
about the same percentage after 1587 as they do before 1587: in 1587, 92,254 out of 6,465; in 1594, 2,974 
out of 6,208; in 1600, 1,778 out of 4,288; and in 1608, 3,387 out of 6,582
222
.  
 
The general synod at Emden in 1571, that gathered representatives of the 
Reformed churches throughout the Netherlands and of the refugee churches in 
Germany, stated that although it was permitted to be a merchant, it was «improper for 
the confessors of the pure religion, unjust and hostile to love, to accumulate money in 
order that it may be debased, or otherwise to coin money which may result in damage to 
the general welfare, even though it be done with the connivance of the magistrates of 
the city». In the provincial synod of Dordrecht in 1574 it was stated even that a banker 
could not partake to the Holy Supper: «No, for he has been allowed by the magistrates 
to operate his bank only because of the hardness and evil of men's hearts, and not 
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because of God's will. Hundreds of persons would be scandalized by the admittance of 
such a person to the communion service». The national synod convoked at Middelburg 
in Zeeland in 1581 stated, related to the banker’s wife and servants, that «the wife was 
not responsible for her husband's actions and was therefore permitted to come, though 
on condition that she declare her objections to those actions, while the servants could 
not attend because they had been free to leave the banker's business if they had objected 
to his way of doing business»
223
. This is not to say that Calvinism was against 
capitalism, but that its orientation about capital accumulation should be regarded rather 
as neutral.  
However, once capital and state conflated, Calvinist elites postured somewhat 
differently. The treatise called Res Judicanda, published at Leyden in 1658, contained 
the official opinions of leading Calvinists in the Netherlands during the fourth and fifth 
decades of the seventeenth century, that showed plainly, as a historian says, «that in the 
provincial towns, removed from the bustle of the great commercial and industrial 
enterprises, the attitude of the clergy and of the scholars was very slow to change, and 
that Calvinism cannot possibly be held responsible for the rapid growth of capitalism in 
the Netherlands»:  
 
A distinction must always be made between the rich and the poor, for from the poor one may not 
require interest, since to them one must loan money without charge ..... Let no one think that he will stand 
free before the hosts of God, who in the countries where commerce is carried on, with the connivance of 
the magistrates, institutes a bank and devours the people, especially the poor ..... Such are they who in the 
Netherlands and else- where are called Lombards, who publicly carry on a business as the Jews do in 
other places, wherefore they have become infamous
224
.   
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When, in the provinces of Holland and Utrecht magistrates and municipal 
governments started out regulating or checking strictly banking operations, channeling 
activities and profit also toward the well-being of the community, the posture softens:  
 
Although it must be admitted that in these banks everything is not so equitable as in the Mountains 
of Charity, and although the profits are not used in helping the poor with alms, nevertheless the interest 
charges have been reduced one-half, and they are intended to help pay the cost of government. 
Furthermore, since it is the duty of every man to continue to labor with his hands in order to improve his 
financial condition and so build up a surplus for the maintenance of the needy, I conclude that the 
magistrates by increasing the public funds are taking care that in times of depression the poor may be 
aided either through loans or alms 
 
Not only the posture here comes to be softened, but also reveals the kind of 
dynamics the Dutch (Calvinist elites) permitted and promoted. The synod of North 
Holland convened at Alknmaar in 1656, accorded permission to a clerk in loan bank at 
Hoorn «to attend the communion service [a public service] in the Reformed church in 
his city». The Res Judicanda in 1658 indeed averred that there was «a decided 
difference between a bank properly licensed by the municipal government» and the 
unregulated private one. State regulation secured property rights, guaranteed the 
security of capital holders but also the security of the community – as an expert bears 
out: during the seventeenth century, figures related to property crimes as instance 
mostly «remains rather low: 22.3 to 38»
225
. The Estates of Holland declared in 1658 that 
«henceforth no church had the right to deprive any banker of participation in the 
communion service because he was a banker. In due course the other provinces followed 
suit. The new regime was first officially introduced in North Holland, where 
Amsterdam was located»
226
. So the estates of Holland and West Friesland on March 30, 
1658, stated that:  
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 After ripe deliberation it has been decided that the question of moneys loaned by banks does not 
fall within the jurisdiction of church boards, classes, or synods, but comes under the supervision of the 
civil government, and that therefore the civil officials in the forthcoming synod will declare in behalf of 
the estates that the churches are not to take upon themselves the decision regarding the amount of profit 
the banks are permitted to earn, but they must leave that to the discretion of the government, resting 
assured that the latter will take care to protect the public and especially the poor against usury and to 
take the proper steps to insure profit for the majority of the population, whether the magistrates shall 
continue to operate the banks themselves or shall lease them to private concerns. Consequently, when 
those persons active in such banks comport themselves to the satisfaction of the magistrates, they shall 
not be suspected or accused of being guilty of usury
227
. 
 
The present standpoint on the way the Dutch regime operated cannot be expressed 
better. Only when profit, in sum, came to be geared to community, Calvinist elites 
admitted operations when marshaled by the public sphere in turn – whereof Calvinists 
formed a part as well. Profit was just to the Dutch when individual accrual comes 
closely associated with the well-being of society as a whole – «Only after the bankers 
met the terms proposed [above], by greatly lowering the rates of interest and by helping 
the communities to give sufficient financial support to the poor, were they permitted to 
partake in the sacrament of communion in Utrecht and Friesland»
228
. By contrast, the 
search for the salvation of the soul became weak when, and where, the greatest profits 
were craved and expected: 
 
With deepest shame did Voetius recognize the fact that the Dutch East India Company, unlike the 
Portuguese and the Spanish commercial companies, paid very little attention to missionary work among 
the heathen. Consequently, the Japanese gladly welcomed the Dutch merchants during the second half of 
the seventeenth century, because the Dutch, who were less religious than the Portuguese, came only to 
make money, not to make Christians
229
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On the other end, in Holland, Arminias «together with the more worldly and more 
liberal among the orthodox Calvinists, became the leaders of business». In the city of 
Amsterdam 
 
the greatest diversity of faith and of original habitat existed, both among the proletariat and among 
the leading members of the bourgeoisie, the owners of the industrial and commercial establishments, who 
exploited labor. Nevertheless, the greater capitalists belonged for the most part to those families which in 
the days before the religious dissensions had carried on commerce on a large scale. But since many 
foreigners had recently arrived from the south- ern Netherlands, together with Protestants and Catholics 
from the outlying Dutch provinces, the bourgeoisie was readily inclined to sympathize with the various 
religious beliefs current in the city
230
 
 
These long but noteworthy quotations underscore two essential things: the first 
one is that Calvinism does not show a necessary causal link with capitalism, neither its 
origin nor its expansion; the second one is exactly its political-social flexibility or 
adaptability.  
As the last sentence of the previous quotation recalls, the Dutch protestant elites 
adapted to historical contingencies. For instance they adapted quite well to the swelling 
influx of exiles, migrants and the socio-religious fragmentation that followed the Revolt 
and the wars of religion that wiped out the European continent
231
. They implemented a 
political strategy of religious regulation and negotiation. It was substantiated by the fact 
that the rulers «made use of religious rituals to strengthen the feelings of unity in society 
at large», which was the main objective of the urban-rural governments to survive and 
then thrive from the seventeenth-century contingencies. Partly, tolerance
232
 was an 
outcome of how reformation was introduce in the Low Countries and this led to the fact 
that no act of uniformity was issued, so the Dutch were never forced to become 
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members of one church and the protestant church never became a national church. 
Rather, it was the «church of the state» as Huizinga once termed it, but even more, a 
church in the urban-rural space. As such, the church polity mirrored somewhat the 
decentralized polity of the Republic, making a «comprehensive Protestant Church 
illusory»
233
. This meant that, although it was officially constituted as a supralocal entity 
since the origin, the synod of Emden in 1571, its polity and authority was layered «and 
ascended from the local level upward»
234
.  
Indeed, religious organization and politics was the upshot of the pragmatic stance 
the urban-rural elites, both political and religious, were forced to put into play to 
regulate the social conflict that might have been ensued from diversity and 
fragmentation, and that might have impaired the Dutch machine of accumulation, 
whereof they were the crucial cogs
235
. The social policy of the church was indeed 
premised on four features, as Willem Frijhoff summarizes, that by the same token came 
to mirror the social policy of the Republic: individual freedom of conscience, religious 
sociability from the bottom up, a culture made up of debate and civic participation, and 
a social ideal of real co-existence. Any of these were rooted in the urban-rural ground: 
these features, which made for degrees of religious freedom, «would have had but little 
effect had it not been associated in everyday life with a great permissiveness on the part 
of the local authorities»
236
. 
Protestant elites were thus integrated into the urban-rural elites that commanded 
the organization of state and capital. The new Church in Amsterdam even functioned as 
first city’s Bourse where entrepreneur and merchants used to gather. As Fynes Morrison 
observed in 1592: «The Marchants in summer meet upon the bridge, and in winter they 
meet in the N e w Church, in very great number, where they walke in two rankes by 
couple, one ranke going up, and another going downe, and there is no way to get out of 
the Church, except they slip out of the doores, when in one of theose rankes they pass 
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by them»
237
. For their own interests, and as a result, for the interests of society, they had 
to maintain social peace and harmony at all cost. Tolerance was thus a pragmatic 
strategy, not at any rate a question of principle
238
: the materialism of accumulation 
swayed the policy of this new church that a long-time secularized society welcomed
239
. 
The leading example is offered by the fact that members of tolerated churches were 
allowed to access public office and civil service: in the seventeenth century, Catholics, 
Mennonites and Lutherans were part of the urban-rural governments and public bodies, 
as sheriffs and bailiffs, as secretaries serving urban magistrates, as managers 
(binnenvaders) in public orphanages, schoolteachers
240
 – although during the 
seventeenth century, especially in the second half of this century, this policy became 
more restrictive because the acquisition of citizenship in some towns became more 
restricted as well (Arnhem, Deventer, Nijmegen, Utrecht, and Zwolle for example). In 
this regard, an arresting link has been spotted between economic downswing, occurred 
in the second half of the century, and dwindling of tolerance: the more wealth dwindled, 
the less forthcoming it was, the more restrictive the enjoyment of religious and civic 
rights became
241
.  
Such a socio-cultural blend on the one hand reflected the composite composition 
of Dutch society, but on the other, made the governing bodies socio-cultural organic 
compared with the stratification of society itself – this character mirrored in turn the 
already-recalled sociospatial organicity of the Estates and States.  
 
Government office or civil service were valued highly because they gave access to influence 
where it counted: in the field of economic regulation. Local governments set tariffs and regulated their 
own markets, and threw in their weight in favour of their own cities in the provincial Estates, where 
supra-local commercial activities were controlled. The decisions taken at this higher level were often 
decisive for the health or even viability of local industry
242
. 
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As a consequence, despite that the protestant church was officially intolerant
243
, 
this organicity made church and governments prone to practical accommodations for 
social peace. For example, pragmatism led governments to shield the Jewish community 
which «flourished because of the protection of the regents, who ignored most of the 
complaints of the Reformed clergy»
244
. The Regents were the conductors of the Dutch 
movement of accumulation, but the Jewish were important actors as well. They were 
capital holders and possessed networks and contacts, especially in the trade with 
Portugal and the Portuguese empire over which they detained a sort of monopoly, and in 
the domestic sector of production processing colonial commodities – sugar, diamonds, 
tobacco, silks
245
. It was not by chance that Amsterdam’s politics of toleration 
concerning the Jewish became the politics of Jewish toleration in the Dutch Republic – 
the Jewish community obtained leeway compared with other communities. The room of 
maneuver the Jewish had stemmed from their important involvement in the processes of 
capital accumulation of the Dutch Republic. The state policy of religious pragmatism 
was in essence an urban-rural strategy of “parting by sharing”, that is, to differentiate 
socio-religious communities once a certain degree of acceptance was attained between 
them, thereby allowing a porous thriving
246
.  
The relations between urban-rural governments and the numerous catholic 
communities living in the Republic was always premised on bargaining processes which 
entailed flexibility by both sides: accommodation on the one side, trust in law on the 
other. For them, «tolerance was always in flux» but, on the other side, they enjoyed full 
civic rights. «Practical considerations prevailed [especially] in crowded towns with 
large Catholic minorities, [where] systematic or consistent religious persecution would 
have threatened public order». Since the importance in terms of figures and overall 
wealth, prosecution against Catholics was unworkable.  As Henk van Nierop stressed: 
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«the burgomasters probably considered effective anti-Catholic action suicidal from an 
economic point of view»
247. So William Temple described the Republic’s socio-
religious landscape:  
 
the great Care of this State has ever been, To favour no particular or curious Inquisition into the 
Faith or Religious Principles of any peaceable man, who came to live under the protection of their Laws 
[…]A free Form of Government either making way for more freedom in Religion, Or else having newly 
contended so far themselves for Liberty in this point, they thought it the more unreasonable for them to 
oppress others. Perhaps while they were so threatened and endanger'd by Forreign Armies, they thought it 
the more necessary to provide against Discontents within, which can never be dangerous where they are 
not grounded or fathered upon Oppression in point either of Religion or Liberty, But in those two Cases 
the Flame often proves most violent in a State, the more 'tis shut up, or the longer concealed.
248
 
 
For the Roman legal principles were by now rooted and substantiated the 
framework of institutions of the urban-rural structure of accumulation, they were 
integral to implement the policy of pragmatism as well. Roman codes provided a legal 
framework upon which building up the strategy of parting by sharing, enabling the 
differentiation of socio-cultural treatments. In this respect, the web of rule and capital 
comprised hence the religious-legal principles that overlapped with the tenets of 
government and administration. The urban-rural governments were firstly and directly 
involved in the ecclesiastical organization of social space – clergy monitoring and 
arbitrations for example – of the diverse religious communities. The strong political 
involvement implied thus that, despite their formal role, the tolerated Churches were an 
integral part of the urban-rural structure of power and legitimate actors participating the 
urban-rural policy of socio-religious regulation. As a consequence of this political 
mixture, freedom, within given limits, was accorded. «These limits varied, sometimes 
considerably, from place to place, but these differences were differences of degree». 
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Penal laws became superfluous, since the social elites of tolerated groups were found willing to discipline 
their coreligionists, and this usually included their clergy. It can be taken for granted that these policies, 
taken together, were consciously aimed at stabilising the religious order and the relations between 
different confessions. […] A important characteristic of this social order was that, by this time, religious 
differentiation had also come to mirror social stratification. […] The key to the development of this 
stratification is, in my opinion, the reform of poor relief.  
 
A general civil religion was the consequence of this religious integration, that is 
connivance and concord as Frijhoff says, within elites and population that allowed the 
«multi-confessional pattern to be imprinted further». The result was not the rootedness 
of a dominant religion but the «entrenchment of diverse religious communities» which 
as such became the socio-cultural organizational tenet of the Dutch Republic. The 
Reformed Church turned into a «multiform organization» based on a practical and 
pragmatic tolerance
249
 that became at the same time a state «weapon […] to further 
political ends»
250
. In so doing, the Dutch religions became an essential element that 
contributed in defining the Dutch common wealth
 251
.  
Tolerance, freedom of religion, and diversity – and this was the combination that 
gave distinct colors to the Dutch socio-religious landscape
252
 – were the outcomes of the 
societal regulation and normalization operated by the religious-secular elites. The state 
politics of the religions was based on the urban-rural policy of “parting by sharing” 
which had the effect to regulate and normalize the relationships between different, and 
potentially conflictual, communities in order to continue the foremost activity for Dutch 
society, that is, capital accumulation. «For a stranger to be abroad in the Streets in the 
Night-time. On the contrary one may travel Day or Night in Holland, without fear of 
being robb'd or otherwise molested» Wrote Aglionby.
253
 Such a quite social 
environment was the creation of the religious governance of the urban-rural syndicates 
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whose topmost expression proved to be the urban-rural organization of state welfare – 
the incunabula thereof were established well before the political involvement of 
Protestantism. This urban-rural organization had its origin in the middle ages, exactly 
during the period of capitalist expansion we have explored, when the urban-rural 
combines (lay people) took the lead and attempted to make money from it. This made 
for «a mixed economy of welfare» whose origin hence is to be traced back in the middle 
ages, more than at the end of the sixteenth century
254
. The political-religious 
entanglement, although sometimes conflictual in its unfolding, in both state and urban-
rural composition, was really central: without urban-rural government support and lead, 
the disciplinary regulation of the Church in the seventeenth century would have been 
ineffective simply because, as we already said, the greater part of the Netherlanders 
were not Calvinist. 
 
Of course, the small towns and villages of the Dutch countryside made due with less elaborate and 
less costly systems. But even they had their deacons and almsmen, who regularly visited those receiving 
aid and diligently recorded their revenues and expenditures. In retrospect, one cannot help but be struck 
by the scope and complexity of the Republic's "welfare state." In this area, the Dutch state was truly a 
Leviathan. It embraced a sizeable percentage of the population, including a great many who might 
otherwise have drifted into "riotous" and "disorderly lives
255
. 
 
The crime rates in the Netherlands were lower than anywhere else in Europe
256
. 
Since the implementation of the Dutch regime (1590 c.), According to Herman 
Diederiks, in the leading industrial textile city of the Republic, Leiden – which 
employed in the textile industry almost half of its inhabitants that in during the 
seventeenth century went from 45.000 to 72.000 c. – very few people were convicted of 
homicide: almost a hundred were convicted between 1600-1630; during the second 
quarter, the number declined to two thirds; from 1650 to 1675 homicide dropped to less 
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than one quarter
257
. Amsterdam shows a quite similar trend according to Pieter 
Spierenburg
258
. Differently but consistently, The Dutch Republic was also a «moral 
nation» in which the rate of illegitimate births, stemming from sexual-extramarital 
activities, was extremely low compared with the rest of Europe
259
. 
The relaxation of the social landscape had its principal mainstay and 
manifestation in the organization of social provision. Compared to others – and that was 
the key determinant of its efficiency in terms of power and projection of power – «the 
Dutch system had a peculiar intertwining of church and government», or as Israel puts 
it: «the key feature was the overall control from the town hall and highly regulated 
character of civic welfare»
260
. These organizations consisted of an extensive urban-rural 
network of secular-religious agencies whose relationships were organized according to a 
certain division of labor. Philip Gorski posits a lifelike framework: «three basic 
arrangements were possible: «(1) dualistic: the Reformed diaconates could serve 
Reformed Protestants and the secular agencies could serve everyone else; (2) church-
governed: the secular agencies could be subsumed in or subordinated to the religious 
agencies or (3) state-governed: the reverse of (2)»
261
. Regardless, these agencies were 
controlled by town governments – although control was sometimes shared with other 
religious institutions
262
.   
The confessional agencies were the diaconates which the Calvinists first 
organized on local level, soon followed by Baptists and Lutherans and eventually by 
Catholics and Jews. In association with the towns’ government, they put into operation 
a set of outdoor and indoor relief agencies, such as orphanages, almshouses, hostels, 
hospitals, workhouses, and houses of correction – some of them shall be shortly taken 
into account – with a shifting institutional settings from town to town263. This system 
was well-funded: private funding, state funds, urban-rural taxes levied on saloons, 
theaters, and other forms of public entertainment. Very interestingly however, the main 
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source of funding for the diaconates was voluntary contributions – we shall return to 
this in brief later. Peter Lindert’s estimates seem to support the fact that per capita 
expenditure in the Dutch Republic was among the highest in Europe, comparable only 
to those of England – we shall return on financing later also264. 
The dividing and rational logic leading the operations of these agencies was to 
offer relief only to deserving poor. Whoever could work and earn his/her own living 
was regarded as undeserving. Thus, widows, orphans and the sick, both physically and 
mentally, were generally regarded as deserving. This is not only a rational strategy that 
allowed to slim down and streamline their activities but also to earmark funds more 
rationally and efficiently towards those who truly deserved. But also it may have the 
effect of stimulating people to work and to enter the market of labor, trade and 
productions. This, according to the evidences put forth by Jan De Vries concerning the 
astonishing expansion of labor market in the seventeenth century, seems quite 
reasonable. Furthermore, this market expansion seems compatible with the fact that the 
Dutch earmarked great funds to the system of social provision: wage labor is more 
vulnerable to market fluctuations, and thus labor needs social care
265
.  The secular-
religious agencies developed different approaches and strategies: outlawing or 
restricting mendicancy and begging – «Even the begging of Franciscans friars was 
subject to the authority of town government in Leiden. In 1445 the government of 
Leiden agreed to the foundation of a Franciscan Friary just outside the town, on the 
condition that there would be no more than 20 friars and that they would only beg in the 
town once a week»
266
; introducing and enforcing strict qualifications for outdoor relief; 
providing moral and practical education for the young; and attempting to re-socialize 
the rebellious and the indolent. «By means of these various measures, the Dutch elites 
sought to encourage economic self-sufficiency, combat moral degeneracy, and maintain 
social stability, goals that they tended to see as interconnected».
267
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The Reform did not drastically change the institutional landscape of the Republic 
concerning social care. However, at the end of the sixteenth century, two interesting 
institutions developed: tuchthuis (1595-1596) and the civic hospital for the disabled and 
the sick poor. The first one was an house of discipline in which isolation and forced 
labor along with moral education and religious guidance taught to idles the value of 
discipline, good sociality and work, that is, they were transformed into productive men. 
The first hospital of this genre the Dutch activated was in Amsterdam: it was called the 
Rasphuis because one of the main activities installed there was the rasping of Brazil 
wood to produce a red dye for the textile industry. Some of the hospices
268
, or a 
gasthuis, were turned into free hospitals for disabled and sick poor at the end of the 
sixteenth century, thanks to the welfare policy of towns governments which earmarked 
abundant funds, and under the spiritual lead of the Church. We find similar agencies in 
Gouda, at the beginning of the century, and in Harlem already in 1592
269
. By the same 
token hospital-hostels, that developed during the middle ages, grew steadily in 
importance at the end of the sixteenth century since the astonishing flux of migrations in 
which the Republic was involved. These agencies welcomed and housed travelers and 
the poor, often with no charge, often in separate spaces from the sick. Other secular-
religious agencies such as the Masters of the Resident Poor (huiszittenmeesters) and the 
Masters of the Holy Ghost (Heilige Geestmeesteren) had functions of providing food, 
clothing and some money to the poor. The hospitals were run mostly by laymen, who 
were part of the local elite, appointed by, and answerable to, the magistracy – as such 
these developed since the fourteenth century through a combination of civil, religious 
and secular authorities, but at the end of the sixteenth century they became public 
agencies. An example of these dynamics is the parish of St, Pancras in Leiden
270
. 
Education was a business in which towns were willing to buy into. Developed in the 
period 1350-1550, parish school administration changed over time towards the 
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organization of public schools administrated by the public bodies: «town governments 
were assuming the role of protectors and propagators of education» – this may have 
been crucial: since the whole institutional framework of the urban-rural complex was 
market- and capital-oriented, the assumption of the school administration and the 
acknowledgment of the ‘public’ character of the education may well have spurred on 
further the spreading of the capitalist logic and proclivity over the societal ground.  In 
1519 in Leiden, the magistracy stated that the school should be maintained well 
considering «... the great profit, virtue, honor and welfare that the town and community 
might receive through it». In the town of Haarlem in 1565 however «The utmost in 
terms of well-being lies in a good school» according to the magistracy
271
. 
The financing of this prosperous network of welfare agencies and institution 
above sketched out pivoted on public funds and, importantly, on voluntary contributions 
which were integral to Dutch welfare finance
272
. This indeed was a «mixture of 
voluntary, semi-voluntary and forced (through indirect taxes) contributions by vast 
layers of urban society»
273
.  In these respects, great donations were given by the elites of 
capital and state. Why? To put it very simply: because capitalists, and protestant 
capitalist in particular, searched for salvation from their greed and atoned for their 
“capitalist sins” with generosity; but also because they needed a tranquil society274.  
Planning and careful civic and government administration, along with pressures 
by religious agencies and agents (deacons for example)
275
, made this organization 
profitable by interlacing the urban-rural financial and fiscal structure to welfare in order 
to expand and maximize Dutch accumulation but also the well-known Dutch open-
handedness. The public financial involvement of the religious agencies of welfare was 
extensively organized. As instance, in Leiden, Zwolle and Delft, money gathered by 
religious institutions was then managed by secular agencies which had a better grasp on 
financial efficiency. At the same time, the urban governments in the same Delft, Zwolle, 
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Utrecht but also in’s-Hertogenbosch syphoned off to the most important charities of the 
cities, and to the ‘s Hertogenbosch’s diaconate, municipal subsides stemming from the 
fiscal-financial accumulation of the urban-rural complex – firstly excises, then other 
taxes and fines –, which then came to be redeployed directly to the poor by the religious 
agencies
276
. Where centralized public institutions were created instead, the poor, and 
especially the non-Calvinist poor such as Catholic, Mennonite, Lutheran and Walloon 
turned directly to the urban administrators for assistance instead of the religious 
actors
277
. This organization was also funded through a specific involvement in the 
urban-rural complexes’ financial market, whence these agencies profited: for example, 
for orphanages, interests on financial assets, such as income from capital and real 
estates, were often the main sources of money whereas other charities bought into bonds 
and renten. The Amsterdam Catholic Charity invested in shares and bonds 10 per cent 
of its income, thereby making revenues increasing over time from 20.000 guilders a 
year at the end of the seventeenth century to 100,000 guilders a century later with an 
increase of interests of five times in absolute terms «which probably implies a five-fold 
growth of the capital stock as well»
278. «Amsterdam’s civic welfare institutions 
possessing substantial investment portfolios, with an estimated total of 4.3 million 
guilders at the end of the 18th century. The Burgerweeshuis, with 2.5 million, was the 
single biggest institutional investor, followed by the two public poor houses with 1.5 
million together, and the hospital and mad house closed the ranks with a total of about 
430,000 guilders»
279
. Thanks to the urban-rural networks of financing, comprising of 
both markets and public finance, funding was stable and never broke down, even during 
the descending phase of Dutch world expansion since the last decades of the 
Seventeenth century
280
. Of course phases of crisis occurred as in Utrecht after 1650. 
There, crisis hauled in government plans of structural reforms – the Almoners’ chamber 
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of Utrecht was one of the agency worst managed at all – but religious pressure thwarted 
any attempt
281
. 
In many cities, especially during the Golden Age heights, charitable donations 
were the lion’s share for the financing of poor relief organization. «The Delft authorities 
even admonished all city-dwellers to fulfil their obligation towards the poor»; by the 
same token in Zwolle, when government and religious bodies called for generosity of 
the burghers to build a new orphanage, great sums of money were collected since a 
large majority of citizenry effectively contributed generously. In this regard the 
economic dimension of citizenship abovementioned as posited by van Zanden and Prak 
seems to fit quite well. Collection boxes that gathered money were dislocated in streets 
and churches alike. Placed both in public edifices and private houses, about 60 poor 
boxes have been numbered in ’s-Hertogenbosch throughout the city, while in 
Amsterdam there were about 450 boxes. «Making small charitable donations was 
practically a daily habit in the Dutch Republic». This circuit of donation and giving 
formed up to two thirds of the financing of the City Poor Chamber in Zwolle while for 
Delft and Utrecht it represented over 40 per cent
282
. It has been calculated that during 
the Golden Age, the Reformed Charity came to manage up to 300,000 guilders a year 
by the mid-seventeenth century
283
. The voluntary arrangements of course was the most 
cost-effective method of collecting money for the urban-rural complex which did not 
imply government involvement and expense and from which the diaconates could profit 
as well. For this kind of activity, town planning was not required because money 
collection took place on regular bases as in Utrecht and Delft whose religious agencies 
organized weekly door-to-door collections
284
. The Reformed churches, along with 
Lutherans, Catholics and Mennonites garnered most donations during their services; 
also, the reformed community collected door-to-door up to five times a week, while the 
other communities however preferred the classic offertory boxes to gather money
285
. 
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Often the elites were sent door-to-door to collect money and this actually fostered 
further generosity «When magistrates or ministers came to ask for a charitable 
contribution, it was difficult to be stingy […].The tactics employed by the almoners and 
deacons were so successful that collections were often a stable source of income for 
charities. For example in Delft, from 1641 to 1794, about 20,000 guilders were 
collected in the churches and streets in almost every year»
286
 
 
Table 4.8. Percentage of income of selected charitable institutions raised through collections and alms boxes
287
 
 17
th
 century  18
th
 century  
Delft 
Chamber of Charity  
Zwolle 
City Poor Chamber  
Utrecht 
Almoners’ Chamber  
Reformed diaconate  
’s-Hertogenbosch 
House of Giving  
Blocks  
Reformed diaconate  
 
45 
 
66 
 
42 
No data 
 
0 
17 
No data 
 
37 
 
42 
 
13 
60 
 
0 
21 
26 
  
Every once in a while, Danielle Teeuwen reports, larger sums were donated or 
bequeathed to the charities. But, as Marco van Leeuwen points out, «Philanthropy is 
easier to describe than to explain»
288
. The elites were important facilitators for the social 
care agencies; but they were even more important as “investors”. The government elite 
was the capitalist elite, merchants, financers and entrepreneurs. Clé Lesger reports that 
between 1578 and 1630, the position of Amsterdam burgomasters was performed for 81 
per cent by great merchants and capitalists involved in wholesale trade: of the forty-two 
men, thirty-four were indeed leading capital holders. Only of eight burgomasters, 
Lesger say, commercial activities are unknown, but surely «even they came largely 
from backgrounds in wholesale commerce». For many of these men, the “American 
dream” was the “Dutch dream” indeed. An extraordinary case was Jan Poppen. He 
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arrived in Amsterdam from Holstein in the 1560s with a humble background and in a 
space of three decades became one of the leading capital holders in Amsterdam and 
director of the VOC in which he invested over thirty thousand guilders. His wealth was 
utilized later by the son Jacob Poppen, who became for many years a member of the 
governing elites. «At his early death in 1624, he left a fortune of one million guilders, 
which made him the wealthiest Amsterdammer of the age». As Lesger reports, wealth 
was not enough to win the day, but wealth must couple with wisdom, sensitivity and 
competence. Cornelis Pietersz Hooft wrote in his biography, «the wealthiest were wise» 
but they need to be «sensible, and also the most competent». But also prodigal
289
.  
Men like Poppen and Hooft were exactly the urban-rural elites who ruled Dutch 
space since the late middle ages and which we are referring to, and who effectively 
donated great sums of money. They ruled economy, politics but also society since they 
had garnered dominant position in courthouses, a profound sway as legislators and as 
administrators of justice, but also in the entire welfare organization, even in church 
councils. What for? What the Dutch historian Lesger tells us is that great wealth feared 
the hell, that is, a great capitalist «feared eternal damnation», thus he had to confess his 
sins, and hoping «that God will forgive him». Or, to atone for them by philanthropy. 
This was not simply useful to their souls, but as a consequence, according to the present 
perspective, also to the social and potentially highly conflictual and unstable social 
landscape of the Dutch Republic, that is, useful to their pocket. Capitalist herd required 
green but also tranquil pastures to grow in health. The Embarrassment of Riches was 
checked through social care, but social care fed into the embarrassment in turn. 
Capitalists were the first supporters of the poor and when they bequeathed money often 
donated these sums to charitable institutions. Lesger says: «Should this be interpreted as 
an indication of anxiety and fear of eternal damnation?». Reputation and prestige were 
important. To donate enough money to fund and built new institutions or structures for 
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social care – the numerous “hofjes” (almshouses located around a common courtyard)  –  
was a common practice. To have entitled entrances and buildings was of great use for 
the governing elites. It gave social power and popular consensus
290
.  Social prestige was 
a great determinant and impulse for the Dutch capitalist class of rulers. 
The Amsterdam merchant Octavio Francisco Tensini bequeathed in 1675 no less 
than sixty thousand guilders to the poor, «on the explicit condition that to save his soul a 
mass was to be read for him every day for all eternity, a provision that neatly tied in 
with Roman Catholic doctrine and practice, of course». Also the great Louis de Geer 
was very prodigal:  
 
the very wealthy Calvinist industrialist and merchant Louis de Geer seems to have had a current 
account with God. In a letter to his children written in 1646, he mentions that he had promised God to 
give to the poor 200 guilders a year for each of his children as long as they would be alive. Since God had 
kept his part of the deal and saved De Geer’s children, the merchant had yearly paid his debt to God. He 
then urges his children always to give to the poor and not to think that these gifts would decrease their 
wealth, since actually they would make their wealth grow “like seeds in fertile ground.” And elsewhere in 
the letter De Geer wrote, “Support the poor and dejected and you and your posterity will receive God’s 
blessing”291. 
  
Marco van Leeuwen finds that no reference to the Virgin Mary or the Holy Spirit 
or any other saints was reported in Amsterdam by the eighteenth-century Catholic wills. 
«However, recommending one’s soul to God’s mercy was a standard formula»292. This 
is to say that fear of damnation was present but not really crucial for these men
293
. And 
despite fear, they kept the machine of accumulation going. Why? Lesger, who delved 
into the self-perception of Dutch merchants, tells us that, although careful of their souls, 
especially for the protestants, a new moral discipline and philosophy developed to join 
religion and profit, an inner compromise which stopped regrets and protected and 
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supported the interests of elites and burghers, and at the same time allowed to save their 
soul. It can be argued hence that Protestantism in this respect propelled further the 
development of such a moral ethics supporting the expansion of wealth and the 
expansion of the generosity for salvation at once. «High profits and great wealth were 
now acceptable as long as the rich cared for the poor and generously supported the 
urban charitable institutions». Lesger rounds off: 
 
Amsterdam merchants were concerned about the salvation of their souls, but they most probably 
did not experience the agonizing uncertainty that Protestant doctrine and the work of Max Weber might 
induce us to expect. Judging from the contents of literary texts, hard work and thrift also seem to be 
rooted in the moral philosophy that came to dominate urban society in the Low Countries well before the 
Reformation. 
 
This capitalist ethics was fed into by the Dutch system of social care whereof the 
Protestant framework of moral rules and ascetic ethics was an  important cog. It was a 
flexible and as such a disciplinary device that made more organic, compact and coherent 
the Dutch indented socio-cultural landscape
294
. 
In a nutshell, «discipline increases state power insofar as it increases overall levels 
of administrative efficiency and social order because a more orderly society is cheaper 
to govern and a more efficient administration is cheaper to run». The movement of 
social regulation spelt indeed a «bottom-up perspective, in which local reformers play 
the central role»
295
. Thereby, discipline became the invisible but actual force that 
permeated and completed the Dutch regime of accumulation and that crucially 
lubricated the complex and seamlessly intertwining of Dutch economy, state and 
society. Discipline kept the inner workings of the Dutch regime going towards the most 
efficient and effective capitalist organization of space within the seventeenth-century 
 270 
 
capitalist world-system. As the military disciplining, social disciplining was integral to 
the capitalist accumulation of power. The latter helped the former to be imprinted 
further.  
Hence, the Dutch regime was the outcome of its historical structure of 
accumulation, and the interlocking thereof with the formation of a rational state 
machinery – rational because, above all else, it was embedded into the fabric of Dutch 
society, conforming to its nature and historical composition –, with the strength of its 
socio-political infrastructure rooted within society and «the rationality of its 
sociopolitical ethics», as Gorski has claimed
296
. 
 
Like the industrial revolution, the disciplinary revolution transformed the material and 
technological bases of production; it created new mechanisms for the production of social and political 
order. And, like the industrial revolution, the disciplinary revolution was driven by a key technology: the 
technology of observation-self-observation, mutual observation, hierarchical observation. For it was 
observation- surveillance-that made it possible to unleash the energies of the human soul-another well-
known but little-used resource-and harness them for the purposes of political power and domination. […] 
by creating more obedient and industrious subjects with less coercion and violence, discipline 
dramatically increased, not only the regulatory power of the state, but its extractive and coercive 
capacities as well
297
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Chapter 5 
Historical-theoretical reprise 
The Dutch Hegemon 
 
 
 
The previous chapters showed the process of power concentration from its 
scattering condition. In short: the Dutch turned the endeavor of the Spanish rulers of 
complete incorporation within the absolutist framework into a process of state 
structuring that allowed for the extension of networks, agencies and institutions from 
the societal ground upward, in direction of a higher level of government, and a contra-
process of formation and expansion of networks, agencies and institutions of the upper 
space of government toward the societal ground. This combination was the dawn of the 
Dutch regime of accumulation. What ensued from this multi-pronged process was a 
scalar mode of cross-representation and governance of Dutch space hinging on what has 
been called urban-rural complexes on the ground, pivoting on the States of Holland in 
the middle, and coordinated state-wide by the Generality at the top. The multi-sided 
interlacing came about between the 1540s and 1590s. This bout of state structuring was 
crucial for it interlocked the urban-rural capitalist structure with an organizational 
complex of politics, economy and society. This was the product of the opportunities that 
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history afforded, of man ingenuity and also of strategic ploys; it was the specific 
product of a historical-human path of development. 
The Dutch Republic, or Dutch regime of accumulation (1579-1795), was a 
historical organization of Dutch space. The matrix of wealth, accumulation and power 
that constituted the Dutch regime have been scrutinized as a developing regional web of 
rules and capital: it consisted of regional-wide urban-rural networks of relations of 
accumulation and wealth premised on the commodity-centered logic of value 
re/production  (ch. 3), that interlocked and embedded the public sphere of power, rules 
and institutions – public bodies and operations, officeholders, official receivers, public 
policies. As we have seen, since the main social actors overlapped, and also overlapped 
and shared objectives and strategies, a bloc of business and governmental agencies 
commanded processes of power accumulation developed across Dutch society. Such a 
fusion of state, society and capital, an interlocking embeddedness, was articulated in 
terms of capitalist accumulation. This allowed for the historical entrenchment, and the 
ensuing spatial expansion, of the capitalist logic of power – understood as an early 
capitalist alteration of the socio-ecological pattern of value re/production and exchange 
(ch. 3).  
The formation of the Dutch Republic entailed the supra-local expansion and the 
structured re-projection onto and within society of networks of accumulation, 
governmental-business agencies and operative institutions. Since the historical 
pathways within which capital and power flowed developed in the course of the Dutch 
regional cycle of formation (XIV-XVI), the Republic had available a ready-made 
nervous system that facilitated the deployment of an organic command over and within 
society and economy as a whole. The structural and constitutional interlocking of the 
urban-rural and provincial networks, agencies and institutions in the course of the 
sixteenth century sealed the new historical course of state, capital and society; the 
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coordination of the Generality, led by Holland, propelled further the capitalist 
organization of Dutch space as first structured center of national capitalist accumulation 
and world capitalist expansion at the end of the sixteenth century. The Dutch Republic 
was, and at the same time allowed for, the intertwined accretion and expansion of both 
national and world accumulation by making the organization of state and society 
directly useful to Dutch (and non-Dutch) capital, and vice versa – in braudellian terms, 
the identification of state, capital and society: networks of accumulation and 
governmental-business agencies were re-arranged to attain these goals, namely, 
accumulation of power. Such a movement and process of power accretion was, for the 
historical premises already explored, of capitalist sort..  
The Dutch Republic was structured on and innervated by the capitalist logic of 
power from the ground. Such an in-built complexion propelled as never happened 
theretofore the growth and the expansion of a European-level inter-state system of 
relations that, for the specific features of Europe itself, developed upon processes of 
world capitalist accumulation, systemic capitalist rationalization and societal capitalist 
embeddedness. The primacy of the logic of capital within Europe and the related 
capitalist strategy of power was slowly grasped and accorded by state rulers; as a 
consequence of the slow pan-European process of societal embeddedness, a profound 
reorganization of power relations within European society was put into operation in a 
long bout of three centuries that followed the rise of the modern world-system (1450 
ca.). This double process of recasting of human thought and of re-elaboration of state-
society-capital relations, both according to the capitalist logic, took the entire modern 
history to be carried out European-wide. Only in the nineteenth century it was topped 
off and the Great Divergence materialized as a consequence
1
.  
This new era of European states domination was heralded by the Dutch Republic 
at the end of the sixteenth century, a historical position of trailblazer that brought about 
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two general consequences: the first, here not strictly pertinent, was that the European 
interstate system found, after a century and a half of disorganized and disarticulated 
world capitalist expansion (1450-1600), the first organizational space of world 
accumulation that was strong enough and structured enough in its capitalist complexion 
to buttress and propel system dynamics; the second was that, pursuant to the general 
landscape of Europe compared with the Dutch historical landscape, no jurisdiction or 
“nation” could not nearly vie with the Dutch Republic in terms of capitalist 
accumulation of power. Such a condition of supremacy was maintained, in general, until 
the eighteenth century
2
.  
The greatest part of the literature would say that such an edge of power, moreover 
because of world scale and scope, was surprisingly maintained in the course of the 
seventeenth century despite material, territorial resources and human energies that in 
quantitative terms were by a great deal less than the those of the absolutist competitors. 
By contrast, it has been argued that was not despite these historical constraints, but by 
virtue of them that the Dutch hegemon emerged – although limits of course surfaced 
and then were encrusted in the eighteenth. In other words, relatively “small” in the 
context of seventeenth century ability, technology and understanding was a great 
advantage. Bigger territories, bigger populations and bigger basins of resources to 
control and organize were insurmountable problems for the other jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, for such jurisdictions were disorganized and disarticulated active centers 
of feudal power in the context of an expanding capitalist organization of world space
3
. 
Was it indeed a mere coincidence that the next hegemon of the capitalist world-system, 
the Great Britain, became in terms of size a medium state and an intermediate form of 
governance, between absolutism and Dutch republicanism, in terms of structure? And 
was it a mere coincidence that the British hegemon displayed a parallel path of 
historical embeddedness as here understood, but recasted in its own historical terms of 
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reference, according to its own long-run history, and climaxed in the late eighteen 
century according to the new systemic conditions and contingencies
4
? No, it was not. 
After 1590, the urban-rural networks of wealth, production and exchange caught 
alight through a new injection of historical vectors and factors. The hold of the urban-
rural bloc in society was topped off by the structuring of a state machinery that allowed 
for the horizontal and vertical articulation of the urban-rural structure of accumulation. 
It was then dovetailed to external space through the expansion of networks, operations 
and sociospatial relations of power that were entirely geared to, and interlocked with, 
the accumulation of power of the Dutch jurisdiction as a whole. Exactly the historical 
form of this spatial articulation transformed the Dutch historical-capitalist space in a 
structured complex of concentrated capitalist power of world scale and scope; at the 
same time, it displayed the highest degree of internal – and external – logical and 
operative coherence compared with other jurisdictions. Dutch power has been 
understood thus as the outgrowth of such a coherent unity of state, society and capital, 
premised on and organized through the historical logic of capitalist accumulation. The 
Dutch became thereby the seventeenth-century hegemon, the first hegemon of the 
modern world-system, because Dutch society, Dutch capital and Dutch state worked 
hand in glove as an intersubjectively constituted capitalist reality – overlapped 
movements and integrated functions of each other, as no jurisdiction managed to do at 
that time; it was phased through the logic of capital accumulation which was indeed the 
logic of the modern historical-social system that was developing and expanding. In a 
nutshell: state, capital and society chimed with one another in the unfolding of their 
operations because their own operations were all patterned after historical capitalism 
which allowed to win the day in an emerging capitalist world system. 
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What has been maintained is that such a presumed three-cornered exchange of 
power turned into an organic and coherent bundle of historical relations of power 
precisely because the Dutch arenas of collective actions were not 
 
autonomous arenas of social action. They [did] not have separate “logics”. More importantly, the 
intermeshing of constraints, options, decisions, norms, and “rationalities” [became patterned after] a 
single “set of rules” or a single “set of constraints” within which these various structures operate5. 
 
At the heart of the Dutch regime was indeed the need to protect society, capital 
and the field of accumulation of societal power; in return, protection and accretion of 
societal accumulation would have provided resources and energies to protect Dutch 
rulers, state and jurisdiction, and to propel further the capitalist expansion of power, at 
world level as well as at local level. But it would be wrong considering this mode of 
regulating space as smooth or perfectly operating. And it would be of course wrong 
considering such a way of organizing space as an ethical or moral thrust of Dutch rulers 
towards people. The Dutch historical edifice was ridden with natural conflicts of 
interests and ongoing political, economic, social, and even ecological contradictions
6
. 
All these are intrinsically inherent in any polity of space and in any human policy 
carried on throughout the history of mankind. Only when the needs of those who rules 
overlap the needs of those who are ruled, that is, only when rulers’ needs are people’s 
needs – the identification of both interests –, a state and a society find a way out of the 
stalemate of self-interest and of the permanent struggle for power among irreconcilable 
interest groups.  
This is what happened in essence to the Dutch in virtue of their long history of 
freedom and growth and the historical coherence of their societal ground in terms of 
logic of operation and interests: the power strategy the rulers carried on to cater to their 
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own interests, and the state interests as a consequence, adhered to the historical interests 
of their subjects acting within society. This happened because, contrary to other states, 
it was from the very ground of towns and countryside that rulers’ power and interests – 
if the rulers themselves – came and to that ground that power and interests had to revert. 
The historical power of the urban-rural syndicates involved, as we have seen in the 
previous chapters, society, capital and early state at once. It was a historical power that 
did not discern the three arenas of collective action for it encompassed and enveloped 
them as one single field of operation and power abiding by a single set of rules and 
constraints: herein, the rules and the constraints of capitalism. This historical feature 
enabled the Dutch to organize their space in function of the societal needs themselves 
and to make their new armature – the new and modern state – at the service of society 
itself, «a function of society» – to develop the most powerful regime of accumulation in 
the XVII century. But, since it was from society that the capitalist thrust emanated, 
capital, state and society became one, a single bundle of patterned relations in that 
structured complex of concentrated capitalist power that was the Republic of the Seven 
United Provinces, the first hegemon of the capitalist world system. 
An hegemon is an organization of human space which developed the highest level 
of coherence compared with other spaces and regimes of accumulation in definite 
jurisdictions. Compared with other regimes, the Dutch regime was an organization 
historically premised on the capitalist logic, in which the great industrial-commercial 
development interlocked the expansion of finance and was penetrated by networks of 
fiscality – direct and indirect taxation, differentiated in space –  which allowed for the 
reproduction and redeployment of value throughout Dutch space. The state organized 
indeed historical commodity and financial markets that bolstered fiscal accumulation 
which in turn was redeployed by agencies and agents of state across the whole territory 
to boost the same material accumulation. At the same time the state financial policy 
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morphed into a movement of popular participation to the dynamic of general 
accumulation – that by contrast, was in general a classic moment of early-modern state 
coercion and cliquish accumulation of power. Popular willingness, and capability, to 
invest in markets and state was part of Dutch uniqueness. In doing so, the Dutch 
constructed a regime in which industry, trade, finance, fiscality buttressed each other 
from below through the state organization of agency and agents which stepped into 
economy not by seeking unproductive rents but producing value of their own through 
public activities. And this came about only owing to the historical entrenchment of a 
logic throughout the sociospatial landscape of the region, thereby permeating Dutch 
space as a whole. Such an entrenchment made coherent – which does not mean smooth 
uniformity of society, or perfect adherence to a historical rationality – the behavior of 
the Dutch, both rulers and subjects. And this was the actual uniqueness of Dutch power 
in the seventeenth century: the Dutch rowed (in general) in the same direction, despite 
harsh conflicts concerning the way by which such a “rowing” was to be put into 
operation – as instance republicanism-monarchism. On the contrary, they tapped into 
conflict and turned it into a positive movement of expansion
7
.  
Therefore, state organization mirrored historical society and then helped further 
regulating and normalizing it when history posed constraints and materialized harsh 
conflicts. The state organization of material, financial and fiscal accumulation 
penetrated the historical structure of society through the reorganization of networks of 
agents and agencies of social care, which were driven in junction with new religious 
powers. Dutch Religions, Protestantism in particular, were in fact conducive to a 
pragmatic flexible intimacy that morphed into a social behavior geared to bolster the 
historical open-handedness of the Dutch. The protestant lead allowed a major hold of 
the historical logic of capitalism not because it owed a spirit favorable to it, but because 
it was so flexible in disciplining the inner and social landscape of the Dutch that adapted 
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pragmatically to their historical organization. It contributed to develop a kind of cultural 
control which did not stand in the way of Dutch historical dynamic, as occurred in other 
jurisdictions instead, but eased it. The cultural control of the variegated Dutch religious 
landscape was the pragmatic force which tamed an oligarchic logic of power, such as 
capitalism, and oriented it towards a self-interested generosity. The rich gave because 
they wanted to save their soul from damnation, but in so doing, they helped themselves 
to get even richer. In other words, they aided to regulate and normalize the social 
conflict that an excessive polarization of wealth and power might have engendered on 
its own. Polarization was high because intrinsic to capitalist development but during the 
Dutch seventeenth century it was not so high or unbridled to made for a destructive 
dynamic. The welfare of the state was, purportedly, the greatest achievement of the 
Dutch which truly distinguished the Dutch hegemon – and perhaps in general, a 
historical hegemon – from the most powerful competitors.  
The Dutch state became thereby a hegemonic state, capable of projecting the 
greatest power outward – hegemony – because embedded into the very fabric of society 
through its capitalist complexion which made capital the lynchpin of Dutch power 
dynamics. In sum: state, capital and society chimed with each other, and this turned a 
regime of accumulation into an hegemonic regime of accumulation, the first hegemon 
of the history of the capitalist world-system. Retrieving Mann’s scheme, the Dutch 
Republic was thus the product of an ensemble of sociospatial networks of power which 
interpenetrated each other to constitute the political, ideological, economic and military 
framework of the Dutch regime.  
 
The Dutch revolt was prompted by religious contradictions in  1566, but took off 
after 1568 when the structure of accumulation was impaired by Spanish absolutism –
Alva’s descent. The Revolt in 1565/6 started off with the “Compromise of the 
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Nobility”, signed by four hundred lesser nobles of the outlying provinces8. The 
Compromise attempted to thwart the installation of the Inquisition into the Netherlands 
and its substantial failure unleashed the Dutch iconoclastic fury against Catholics. Fury 
emanated mainly from the south and from Antwerp whence it was diffused later across 
the Netherlands. The crucial point is that the early geography of revolt bears no relation 
to the main rebel thrust that later was to emanate from the North. That is, although 
religion was important for the Dutch in general, the struggle for the independence raged 
mainly for different reasons. Indeed, nonetheless William Orange, pater patriae, 
became leader of the rebellion, all the attacks during the first period, especially in 1568, 
failed and religious violence petered out. In keeping with this, I have argued that these 
reasons were related to the fact that the Spanish rulers attempt to cage and thus to impair 
the historical machine of Dutch accumulation – indeed, Amsterdam had been a 
stronghold of Catholics until the end of the century Israel says
9
. That is, Dutch-Spanish 
structural-historical contradictions mainly involved Dutch materialism not the 
événementielle of religion. In these respects hence, religion (ideological power) was 
important to spark off but not to propel the revolt across eighty years of war. It did not 
define the Republic in depth as well as its territorial organization and societal dynamics. 
It provided conditions out of which the state and the regime could be put into operation. 
Calvinist power in the north occurred later indeed; it was not the fuse but the result of 
the rebellion. As Mann says, ideological power, that is, Calvinist power, was the 
«immanent morale» which contributed to make the social edifice of the Dutch more 
stable, that is, to spawn a Dutch community
10
. 
It was not by chance that the state had its expansion in the second phase of the 
Revolt, 1569-1576
11
. Revolt called for military power which Mann defines as «the 
necessity of organized physical defense»
12
. The Dutch built their military power not on 
coercion but on capital accumulation, and the rationalization which emanated from it. 
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Their very first spearhead of military power was not a regular army or navy, but people 
engaged in attacking Spanish wealth and accumulating and investing the proceeds. 
During the 1570s, the Sea Beggars gave rise to what Giovanni Arrighi called «inverted 
fiscal squeeze» through piracy and privateering
13
. In 1572, with an invasion from the 
west, the sea beggars provided the conditions for the rebellion in Zealand and south 
Holland – both were not involved for the most in the early iconoclast fury. Polarization 
of forces and energies in the north concentrated resistance – Calvinist included – and 
this concentration of wealth and power allowed for military expansion
14
. Spatial 
concentration of military power resulted in turn in further social and wealth 
concentration. What followed this sociospatial process was indeed the new state 
heralded by a mini-state made up of Holland and Zeeland which represented the 
historical core of the Republic after 1581. Maurice of Nassau propelled the military 
revolution further by way of the means the new state provided: statewide fiscal-financial 
networks, agencies and agents; a state structure of capital accumulation interlocked with 
the fiscal-financial web; ideological pragmatism. By means of this, the Stadholder 
turned Dutch space into what Braudel called «a fortified island»
15
. The capitalist island 
of the maritime provinces allowed value to be invested into war and the general 
protection of Dutch space; the inland provinces provided spatial protection – a spatial 
buffer – to the destruction that war brought with it16. The “invisible” support of the 
in/land provinces was integral to the Dutch mechanism of military expansion by 
capitalist protection and as such integral to the success of the United Provinces. In doing 
so, Dutch space – especially Holland – was relatively unimpaired from the ravages of 
war, compared with the scale and the scope of the war itself. Military power begot a 
peaceful space that contributed to maintain freedom and growth. In this respect the 
Dutch Revolt permitted the world expansion of Dutch accumulation
17
. 
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On the one hand, we had a situation in which «old structures are adapted to new 
needs and a new situation», as Rowen says
18
 – the historical structure of urban-rural 
accumulation. On the other hand, we had a «creative response» to these new conditions 
– state fiscality, social provision, etc.19. The result was a structured complex of 
concentrated capitalist power which organized old features to create a new historical 
synthesis. It was not a medieval state or a variant thereof
20
. It was not molded on, or 
patterned after, a nonexistence model of western development, but a state with its own 
historical features premised on a capitalist-brokerage complexion that chimed perfectly 
with its historical ground made of continual social bargaining
21
. Paraphrasing Brandon, 
The «complex system of cross-representation»
22
 interlocked the upper levels of 
governance «to local political elites while at the same time ensuring the involvement of 
the leading merchant families» – town governments (urban-rural syndicates) appointed 
delegates and sent them to the provincial States, which in turn sent delegations to the 
States-General. Fifty-eight cities
23
, with their related countryside as integral part of 
them –  the urban-rural complex – thereby had an institutionalized upper hand on the 
government and governance of Dutch space as a whole – state, society and economy. 
Thereby, the political organization of accumulation of the Republic became «so 
intertwined» in its spatio-political, -economic and -social characters, as Rowen 
suggests
24
, that Dutch patterns of power projection in world space was the result and 
mirror of it – hegemony25. In Mann’s fashion, the sociospatial networks of power, 
which emanated from Dutch historical society, thereby integrated and supported each 
other in a unique fusion (through the structuring) of the Dutch state. In a nutshell: what 
the state afforded was the opportunity to extend, expand and strengthen to the full the 
urban-rural capitalist praxis – that is, organized capitalist accumulation – , or what 
Mann calls «circuit of praxis», which enabled a «stable, sociospatial blend of extensive 
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and intensive power, and of diffused and authoritative power». In other words, capital-
based regulation and normalization of the Dutch space of accumulation
26
.  
This was the Dutch regime of accumulation. And by means of this extended 
circuit of praxis from the societal ground that world accumulation could unfold: it 
expanded state power and allowed for the intensification and articulation of the spatial 
concentration and centralization of the political-economic command in the sphere of the 
European economy and the sway on politics of Europe, in a self-sustaining (but limited) 
structural mechanism of power. It, in sum, was organized so that the accumulation of 
capital via historical-structural innovation the state represented was enforced by the 
very structure of urban-rural relations of power that could turn an accrual of potentially 
productive resources from outside to the service of domestic and world capitalist 
development at once
27
.  
The United Provinces, and historically, Holland, were in between the Baltic, the 
Atlantic, and the Rhine trade routes. Especially the Baltic and Rhine networks of Dutch 
accumulation were developed during the regional cycle of formation in the XIV-XVI 
centuries as we have seen. After the fall and the sack of Antwerp in 1585, and the 
related political and military maneuvers of the Dutch
28
, the center of the European 
economy was easily captured by them by virtue of their unique historical structure of 
accumulation, wealth and markets which could brace, boost and expand actively 
systemic processes of capital accumulation. The Dutch enacted the recentering of the 
European economy towards (and from) Dutch space. Amsterdam was its natural core 
since the historical role of node of north-European commerce and finance
29
. The 
swelling immigration from the south eased the recentering and concentrated further 
historical value, both material and human, into Dutch space. Many were the points of 
attraction for the stateless mass of migrants. The Mediterranean Cologne, north-western 
Germany, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Rouen, and London were also major important shores. 
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But stateless people needed state protection and hospitality that, among the other 
jurisdictions, only the United Provinces were willing to offer and capable of providing – 
that is, stateless masses longed for «protection and active support of a powerful state»
30
. 
The tranquil space of the Republic became fruitful for both the Dutch, but al so for the 
foreigners who gathered in Amsterdam but also in Leiden, the most important industrial 
center of the Republic throughout the seventeenth century. This transference of 
European energies and value into Dutch space was then thrusted out into a set of 
agencies which historically embodied Dutch world capitalist expansion and systemic 
cycle of accumulation: the VOC (1602), Vereenigde Geoctroyeerde Oostindische 
Compagnie and the WIC (1621). VOC, in particular, was the archetypical operative 
synthesis of the Dutch regime in which accumulation of capital was conflated and 
intermeshed with the pursuit of power throughout Asia. It was the archetypical 
operative synthesis because here capital identified with its own political-military 
obverse, that is, borrowing from Braudel, VOC triumphed for one century and a half 
because capital became identified with the state, it was the state – but also with Dutch 
society! By contrast, as Christopher Hill said, it was a «department of state», not simply 
an arm of it as Israel tells us; it was an agency in which «politics and economics merged 
at every point»
31
. A similar state department was the Wisselbank, the Bank of 
Amsterdam.  
Dutch military power could be then deployed – premised on this new injection of 
value and forces – thanks to its capitalist logistics within Dutch space, which abroad 
operated through merchants, thanks to merchants and in favor of these merchants
32
. An 
English petition to Cromwell's government complained: «It is no wonder that these 
Dutchmen should thrive before us. Their statesmen are all merchants. They have 
travelled in foreign countries, they understand the course of trade, and they do 
everything to further its interests» on world scale
33
. The Dutch regime of accumulation 
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as here understood was in fact able to expand on a world scale. By virtue of its domestic 
organization, the Dutch were able to put into operation strategies and structures through 
which their leading agencies promoted, organized, and regulated the expansion or the 
restructuring of the capitalist world-economy. That is, their domestic organization of 
capital, state and society enabled the installation of the first capitalist «regime of 
accumulation on world scale» of the modern world-system
34
.   
But was the Dutch regime hegemony
35
? It was with some caveats. It was 
hegemony because, as far as the present perspective is concerned, the Dutch was with 
no doubt the most efficient and coherent organization of state, capital and society during 
the seventeenth century – or at least until the last decades of the century. On this basis 
the Dutch regime was able to project power outward and influence the main European 
competitors that, vying with the Dutch, endeavored to mimic it, but to no avail. This 
was a non performing politics of emulation. Its failure holds a very simple answer: 
wars, economic crises, great achievements in culture and science, systemic crashes, 
international competition, ecological changes, and so forth, made the capitalist world-
economy advance, and along with it, the conditions, factors and vectors accountable for 
hegemony. France, England, Spain, Germany ended up to be of course in a radically 
different system in the eighteenth century compared with the situation of the sixteenth 
and early-seventeenth century. Different systemic conditions coupled with very 
different national-local historical prerogatives and as such both could not be encoded 
with the hoary Dutch pattern of power
36
. Contenders had to develop new organizations 
of economy, state and society according to the coeval conditions of the world and their 
coeval national-local state of affairs
37
.   
What is at the stake here is the degree of influence, not the fact that the Dutch 
were in fact influent as no jurisdictions in the seventeenth century. Its hegemony was 
with little doubt of European scope. Many studies, old and new, bear out such a 
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condition
38
. However, with no doubt, it was not hegemony on world scale. For the most, 
ecologies and economies throughout the world were harnessed, exploited, capitalized or 
appropriated. The greatest part of the social and political world was touched lightly by 
the Dutch. For example, scraps of Asian space were truly reorganized or restructured in 
their socio-political-ecological complexion. China, Japan, and India, among many 
others, were brushed. The world influence of the Dutch was feeble – not their ability 
and prowess to accumulate capital by itself. And this feebleness, as far I am concerned, 
accounts for the reason why the Dutch regime embodied the lineages of the hegemons, 
and hence, hegemonies. British and US hegemonies were respectively on world scale 
and of global level – as Lucien Febvre understands “scale” and “level”39. But it is 
tenable to envisage and say that their power stemmed from an internal organization of 
incomparable power and complexity that was to be activated, in essence and in general, 
in similar fashion and degree of coherence. This allowed to project a major power 
outward. So in this sense, the Dutch regime heralded the future: it was the first organic 
and structured organization of state, society and economy that was wholly embedded 
and patterned after the capitalist logic of power to dominate the modern world-
economy, and to hegemonize European space thereon. It embodies the lineages of the 
British and US hegemon which spread such a “pattern” of socio-ecological 
commodification and appropriation  – capitalism – throughout the social, ecological and 
political world by way of their power and hegemony. 
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Chapter 1 
 
118
 Many others delved into the issue. The most eminent are Rodney Hilton, Takahashi, Perry Anderson 
and Eric Hobsbawm. For I cannot treat them all extensively, and since Anderson and Hobsbawm’s theory 
and history are both widely known (Eric J. Hobsbawm, 1954, “The General Crisis of the European 
Economy in the 17th”, Past & Present, N. 5: pp. 33-53, and Eric J. Hobsbawm, 1960, “The Seventeenth 
Century in the Development of Capitalism”,  Science & Society, Vol. 24, N. 2: pp. 97-112; Perry 
Anderson, 1974, Lineages of the Absolutist State, NLB, London; Perry Anderson, 1974b, Passages from 
Antiquity to Feudalism, NLB, London), I would like to sum up the kernel of the less quoted but equally 
eminent analysis afforded by Hilton, in R. H. Hilton and Christopher Hill, 1953, “The Transition from 
Feudalism to Capitalism”, Science & Society, Vol. 17, N. 4: pp. 345-349. Such quotation reveals in 
advance some of the most debatable elements that are to fill the following pages: «[…] struggle for rent 
was the "prime mover" in feudal society […].The economic progress which was inseparable from the 
early rent struggle and the political stabilization of feudalism was characterised by an increase in the total 
social surplus of production over subsistence needs. This, not the so-called revival of the international 
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trade in silks and spices, was the basis for the development of commodity production». What then 
produced decisive changes were factors «all internal to» feudalism for Hilton.  
        Important contribution to the debate was given by Takahashi and Mins also whose viewpoint sounds 
like a classic Marxist interpretation: «The question of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is not 
merely one of a transformation in forms of economic and social institutions. The basic problem must be 
the change in the social existence-form of labor power», H. K. Takahashi and Henry F. Mins, 1952, “The 
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism: A Contribution to the Sweezy-Dobb Controversy”, in Science 
and Society, vol. 16, N.4: 315. 
119
 For a wide exploration and interactive explanation of the “feudal fetters” see Dimitris Milonakis, 
1993/1994, “Prelude to the Genesis of Capitalism: The Dynamics of the Feudal Mode of Production”, 
Science & Society, Vol. 57, N. 4: pp. 390-419; see in brief David Laibman, 1984, “Modes of Production 
and Theories of Transition”, Science & Society, Vol. 48, N. 3: pp. 273-276. Cf. Herbert Gintis and 
Samuel Bowles, 1984, State and class in Feudalism, in Charles Bright and Susan Harding (ed.), 
Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory, Publisher, University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor: p. 46, who assert interestingly that there was no transition. 
120
 Trade had theretofore been accounted the main historical vector of transition. Pirenne was the most 
eminent proponent of such an account. To understand Pirenne’s stance, see Henri Pirenne, 1914, “The 
Stages in the Social History of Capitalism”, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 19, N. 3: p. 504. 
According to the Belgian historian, merchants, since the eleventh century, were really capitalists for they 
had «instinct». Pirenne conceived historical capitalists as pure circulationists, and their instinct as pure 
accumulation through «wandering commerce»: «It is impossible to maintain that these men conducted 
business only to supply their daily wants, impossible not to see that their purpose is the constant 
accumulation of goods, impossible to deny that, barbarous as we may suppose them, they nonetheless 
possessed the comprehension, or, if one prefers, had their instinct for commerce on the large scale». The 
same instinct brought them to «increasing specialization» and «monopoly»  unto «the progress of 
economic evolution», ivi, p. 510. Cf. Henri Pirenne, 2014, Medieval Cities, Their Origins and the Revival 
of Trade, Princeton University Press, Princeton: esp. ch. 4.  
121
 Dobb has a clear definition of «feudalism» in mind, based on the concept of serfdom: «It is "an 
obligation laid on the producer by force and independently of his own volition to fulfill certain economic 
demands of an overlord, whether these demands take the form of services to be performed or of dues to 
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be paid in money or in kind. .[…] This coercive force may be that of military strength, possessed by the 
feudal superior, or of custom backed by some kind of judicial procedure, or the force of law», Maurice 
Dobb, 1946, Studies in the development of capitalism, Routledge, London-NY: p. 35-36 
122
 Maurice Dobb, Studies, p. 42, 46: «it was the inefficiency of Feudalism as a system of production 
coupled with the growing needs of the ruling class for revenue, that was primarily responsible for its 
decline; since this need for additional revenues promoted an increase in the pressure on the producer to a 
point where this pressure became literally unendurable. […] The result of this increased pressure was […] 
to provoke [...] a movement of illegal emigration from the manors […] destined to drain the system of its 
essential life-blood and to provoke a series of crises in [the] feudal economy» 
123
 For example, Dobb himself  says that we should seek out, «a close correlation between the 
development of trade and the decline of serfdom in different area of Europe» if we are to believe the 
circulationist eddy. Such a correlation did actually occur, he himself acknowledges, in parts of European 
space, Dobb, Studies, p. 39 
124
 Dobb, 1946, Studies, pp. 37-50, 70-79. See Ellen M. Wood, 1999, The Origin of Capitalism. A Longer 
View, Monthly Review Press, London-NY: p. 42: «One point stands out in the arguments of Dobb and 
Hilton: the transition to capitalism is a matter of liberating or 'shaking loose' an economic logic already 
present in simple commodity production. We are left with the overwhelming impression that, given the 
chance, the commodity-producing peasant (and artisan) will grow into a capitalist. The centre of gravity 
in this argument has shifted away from the city to the countryside, and class struggle has been given a 
new role, but how different are the assumptions underlying this argument from some of the main premises 
of the commercialization model? How far are we from the premise that the capitalist market is an 
opportunity rather than an imperative, and that what requires explanation in accounting for the rise of 
capitalism is the removal of obstacles, the breaking of fetters, and not the creation of a wholly new 
economic logic. […].The explanations offered by Marxists like Hilton and Dobb, while in many ways 
devastating to the commercialization model and to its assumptions about the antithesis of feudalism and 
commerce, have not entirely escaped this trap, because they still in some important respects assume the 
very thing that needs to be explained» 
125
 Although he inconsistently falters before the «indispensable contribution of the world market», Robert 
Brenner, 1978, “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo- Smithian”, New Left Review, 
vol. 104: p. 76 
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126
 Robert Brenner, 1976, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 
in T.H. Aston, H. E. Philip (ed.), The Brenner Debate Agrarian Class Structure and Economic 
Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: p. 20: «In sum, fully to 
comprehend long-term economic developments, growth and/or retrogression in the late medieval and 
early modern period, it is critical to analyse the relatively autonomous processes by which particular class 
structures, especially property or surplus-extraction relations, are established, and in particular the class 
conflicts to which they do (or do not) give rise». 
127
 Notably the models put forward by Postan and Ladurie. See Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, 1966-1969, 
Les paysans de Languedoc, 2 vols. S.E.V.P.E.N., Paris ; M. M. Postan, 1972, The Medieval Economy and 
Society: An Economic History of Britain in the Middle Ages, University California Press, Berkeley. 
Brenner’s early article comprises – pp. 25-30 – a brief critique of the so-called «commercialization 
model», only taken into account to fulfil his own argument upon the fallacy of the demographic theory. 
What will be termed «neo-Smithian critique» is extensively explored in Robert Brenner, The Origins of 
Capitalist Development. 
            In the demographic models, especially in the Ladurie’s, long cycles of upswings and downturns 
based on secular trends systematically ended up to cause an overall stall since peasant production could 
not expand up to cater to the needs of the growing population, making the ensuing collapse of 
demographic and economic patterns the upshot of the cyclical standstill of Feudalism – food price hike 
and the consequential hardship and starvation in the rurality brought to depopulation which sparked off 
crisis that in turn gave rise to another cycle. Inasmuch as such a movement is accounted as general, it 
does not grasp nor it can explain, Brenner says, the wide differences in terms of development between 
East and West Europe, and between England and France for example. «In particular, their methods 
prevent them from posing what in my view are perhaps the two fundamental problems for the analysis of 
long-term economic development in late medieval and early modern Europe, or more generally, the 
"transition from feudalism to capitalism": (1) the decline versus the persistence of serfdom and its effects; 
(2) the emergence and predominance of secure small peasant property versus the rise of landlord / large 
tenant farmer relations on the land. In historical terms this means, at the very least: (1) a comparative 
analysis of the intensification of serfdom in eastern Europe in relation to its process of decline in the west; 
(2) a comparative analysis of the rise of agrarian capitalism and the growth of agricultural productivity in 
England in relation to their failure in France», Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure, pp. 10-29, and 
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recap in p. 30. See Postan and Ladurie’s rejoinder in: M. M. Postan and John Hatcher, 1976, Population 
and Class Relations in Feudal Society, in T.H. Aston, H. E. Philip (ed.), The Brenner Debate Agrarian 
Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: pp. 64-78; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, 1976, A Reply to Robert Brenner, in T.H. Aston, H. E. 
Philip (ed.), The Brenner Debate Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial 
Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: pp. 101-106 
128
 Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure, p. 30 
129
 Ivi, pp. 31-46; p. 36 
130
 Ibid.: «their relative levels of internal solidarity, their self-consciousness and organization, and their 
general political resources - especially their relationships to the non-agricultural classes (in particular, 
potential urban class allies) and to the state (in particular, whether or not the state developed as a class-
like competitor of the lords for the peasants' surplus)» 
131
 Ivi, p. 58. Indeed, as it has been just surveyed, the revolts that swept across France were against royal 
taxation, not against lords. 
132
 Ivi, p. 61. Cf. Guy Bois, 1978, Against the Neo-Malthusian Orthodoxy, in T.H. Aston, H. E. Philip 
(ed.), The Brenner Debate Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial 
Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: esp. p. 111-112 
133
 Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure, pp. 35, 48-49. See, pp. 51-54: «agricultural improvement 
was already having a significant effect on English economic development by the end of the seventeenth 
century can be seen in a number of ways: most immediately in the striking pattern of relatively stable 
prices and (at least) maintenance of population of the latter part of the century; in the long run in the 
interrelated phenomena of continuing industrial development and growth in the home market. […] there 
were not the same sort of violent fluctuations in prices nor the crises of subsistence [neither] was there the 
marked demographic decline which came to dominate most of Europe at this time, the famous Malthusian 
"phase B". In short, England remained largely exempt from the "general economic crisis of the 
seventeenth century». 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 Ivi, pp. 54-62. Historical counterevidences to Brenner’s analysis of the English path to capitalism – 
and thus of its uniqueness – in Mark Overton, 2006, Agricultural Revolution in England: The 
Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: pp. 203-
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207: «There is mounting evidence to show that there was not a coordinated relationship between landlord 
power, tenure, ownership, farm size and capitalistic farming. Landlords were frequently unable to 
exercise the power that Brenner attributes to them […]. In general, economic differentiation was a process 
which took place among the tenantry. Moreover landlords, especially in the sixteenth century, showed 
little interest in developing their estates for capitalist tenant farming, and as a rule they were not very 
adventurous in promoting innovation in agriculture. The pioneers […] were not the great landowners but 
smaller farmers […]. […] large farms were not necessarily a prerequisite for higher land productivity. 
[Contrarily to Brenner’s theory,] the most dramatic advances in output and land productivity came in 
those areas (such as Norfolk) where lordship was relatively weak. [By contrast], the key to the 
relationship between institutional change and farming practice lay more with commercialisation and the 
market than with the social relations of production. The integration of local markets and a new 
willingness of farmers to exploit commercial opportunities provided the impetus for innovation and 
enterprise which led to the agricultural revolution». Very relevant, R. W. Hoyle, 1990, “Tenure and the 
Land Market in Early Modern England: Or a Late Contribution to the Brenner Debate”, The Economic 
History Review, Vol. 43, N. 1: esp. p. 17. Cf. John E. Martin, 1986, Feudalism to Capitalism. Peasant 
and Landlord in English Agrarian Development, McMillan Press, Houndmills: ch. 4, 7-8 
136
 It is well-known that Marx himself was concerned with the role of trade, market and money 
percolation, but his statements and arguments are non-linear, if contradictory. For example, Karl Marx, 
1991, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3, Penguin Books in association with New Left 
Review, London-NY:  ch. 20; see p. 450-451: «There can be no doubt  […] that the great revolutions that 
took place in trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, along with the geographical discoveries of 
that epoch, and which rapidly advanced the development of commercial capital, were a major moment in 
promoting the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production. The sudden expansion of 
the world market, the multiplication of commodities in circulation, the competition among the European 
nations for the seizure of Asiatic products and American treasures, the colonial system, all made a 
fundamental contribution towards shattering the feudal barriers to production. And yet the modern mode 
of production in its first period, that of manufacture, developed only where the conditions for it had been 
created in the Middle Ages. Compare Holland with Portugal, for example. And whereas in the sixteenth 
century, and partly still in the seventeenth, the sudden expansion of trade and the creation of a new world 
market had an overwhelming influence on the defeat of the old mode of production and the rise of the 
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capitalist mode, this happened in reverse on the basis of the capitalist mode of production, once it had 
been created. The world market itself forms the basis for this mode of production». Cf. Karl Marx, 1971, 
The Grundrisse, Harper & Row, New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London: ch. 14.  
           As Gottlieb aptly puts it: class struggle-based interpretation as vector of transition, like the 
Brenner’s one, conceals «any real argument as to why the "commercial changes," which necessarily 
include the rise of demand, should be seen as subsidiary to the "structure of class relations." If the former 
are "necessary" to "induce a transformation" of the latter [Brenner’s words in The Origin, p. 76], then 
while the latter might shape the effects of the former, they are also shaped by them. Alternatively, of 
course, we might consider the growth of a world market as an inseparable aspect of the "structure of class 
relations". The identity of trader, producer for trade, etc., would then be essential to the class relations of 
late feudal/early capitalist society. […]. It is, in fact, precisely because the growth of international and 
local trade constituted a decisive change in the class structure by introducing both new social actors and 
transforming old ones that a rigid distinction between the effects of "trade" and those of "class struggle" 
cannot be made. The resources for and the motivation which directed the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism came not solely from the social differentiation described by Dobb and Hilton, but also from the 
benefits of a local and international exchange and division of labor. As Wallerstein argues, the surplus 
which will fuel capitalist development comes partly from surplus on trade generated by successive 
dominant positions within a developing world-economy. As developing state structures help insure 
favorable conditions of trade, the capacity to benefit from unequal exchange both provides an investable 
surplus and constitutes a motivation for increased production» in Roger S. Gottlieb, 1984, “Historical 
Materialism, Historical Laws and Social Primacy: Further Discussion of the Transition Debate”, Science 
& Society, Vol. 51, N. 2:  p. 13-14 
137
 Paul M. Sweezy and Maurice Dobb, 1950, “The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism”, Science & 
Society, Vol. 14, N. 2: p. 135, 159: «western European feudalism […] was a system with a very strong 
bias in favor of maintaining given methods and relations of production […]. It is inherently «conservative 
and change resisting». 
138
 Contrarily to Dobb, Sweezy does not offer a systematic definition of feudalism, but serfdom stands out 
as absent in his analytic framework . Paul M. Sweezy and Maurice Dobb, The Transition, in p. 136: In 
feudalism, «markets are for the most part local and […] long-distance trade, while not necessarily absent, 
plays no determining role in the purposes or methods of production. The crucial feature of feudalism in 
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this sense is that it is a system of production for use». Feudalism thus «is a system of production for use. 
The needs of the community are known and production is planned and organized with a view to satisfying 
the needs. […] There is […] none of the pressure which exists under capitalism for continual 
improvements in methods of production. There is a very strong tendency for the whole life of society to 
be oriented toward custom and tradition», Paul M. Sweezy, 1976, A Critique and A Rejoinder, in R. H. 
Hilton et al. (ed.), The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, Verso, London: p. 35. 
139
 Paul M. Sweezy and Maurice Dobb, The Transition, pp. 142-146.  
140
 Paul M. Sweezy, 1986, “Feudalism-to-Capitalism Revisited” , Science and Society, vol. 50, N. 1: p. 
82: «Dobb argued that the weakening and disintegration of feudalism resulted from causes internal to the 
system (mainly the need of the lords for more revenue, leading to overexploitation of the serfs), while my 
contention was that the dominant causal factor was external to the feudal system (the revival of long-
distance trade in the later Middle Ages followed by the accelerated growth of towns and the proliferation 
of market relations between town and countryside). I did not deny the need of the lords for more revenue, 
but argued that this need stemmed not from economic laws peculiar to the feudal system but rather from 
the availability of new and more sophisticated luxury goods (including arms), arising in the first instance 
from the revival of long-distance trade, and further stimulated by the spread of commodity production, 
division of labor, money-lending, etc.» 
141
 Paul M. Sweezy and Maurice Dobb, The Transition, p. 150-152. As Sweezy sums up later: «trade (and 
of course its concomitant commodity production) did indeed play a major role in undermining Western 
European feudalism and at the same time established the necessary preconditions for the rise of 
capitalism. The actual emergence of capitalism in its ultimately predominant form however, did not occur 
until some two centuries after the disintegration of feudalism. There was thus no significant connection 
between the two phases of the transition process - decline of feudalism on the one hand, and rise of 
capitalism on the other», Paul M. Sweezy, Feudalism-to-Capitalism Revisited, p. 81-82.  
          A similar claim has been made by Dobb himself: «the disintegration of the feudal mode of 
production had already reached an advanced stage before the capitalist mode of production developed, 
and that this disintegration did not proceed in any close association with the growth of the new mode of 
production within the womb of the old». Therefore such span of time «seems to have been neither feudal 
nor yet capitalist so far as its mode of production was concerned», Maurice Dobb, Studies, pp. 19-20. Or, 
Dobb says, such bout  was «transitional, in the sense that the old was in process of rapid disintegration 
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and new economic forms were simultaneously appearing», Paul M. Sweezy and Maurice Dobb, The 
Transition, p. 162 
142
 Ivi, p. 155. 
143
 Ivi, pp. 147. Such «inability» was consistent with, and sharpened by, market forces and the «extension 
of market relations between towns and countryside». Dobb’s internal cause of the feudal terminal crisis is 
strongly challenged in Sweezy's view for it is associated directly to the lairds’ need for cash, bred by the 
«external» thrust for luxuries. The flight of the peasants fed the expansion of the cities and their market 
economy. Cf. previous chapter1, pp. and note 74 
144
 The second and crucial one is the refusal of the nineteenth-century scientific heritage in the social 
inquiry, namely, the segmentation and compartmentalization of the historical-social reality. The 
American scholar rejects the so called «holy trinity» – state, economy and society as separated historical 
arenas with specific and distinct sets of rules, investigated as disjointed and parted domains – as a 
scientific object and objective of any historical social inquiry. Immanuel Wallerstein, 2011 [1974], The 
Modern World-system, vol. I. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in 
the Sixteenth Century, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles: pp. 2-13; Immanuel 
Wallerstein, 1991, Unthinking Social Sciences, The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms,  Polity 
Press, Cambridge: ch. 6.  
145
 Immanuel Wallerstein, 1976, “From Feudalism to capitalism: Transition or Transitions?”, Social 
Forces, Vol. 55, N.2: p. 273. I cannot here explain extensively the terms employed by the scholar and 
their analytical implications. See in short Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, pp. 2-13; 
Immanuel Wallerstein, 2006, World-System Analysis. An Introduction, Duke University Press, USA: pp. 
91-100 
146
 Immanuel Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 1989, 2011, The Modern World-System, 4voll. See Wallerstein’s  
recap in Immanuel Wallerstein, 1983, Historical capitalism, Verso, London: pp. 7-74 
147
 See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, ch. 7 and Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System 
Analysis. An Introduction, pp. 7-74 
148
 See ivi, ch. 7; Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System Analysis. An Introduction, ch. 2 
149
 See Immanuel Wallerstein,  The Modern World-System, ch. 1 
150
 Immanuel Wallerstein,  The Modern World-System, ch. 1 p. 18: western feudalism «is a series of tiny 
economic nodules whose population and productivity were slowly increasing, and in which the legal 
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mechanisms ensured that the bulk of the surplus went to the landlords who had noble status and control of 
the juridicial machinery» 
151
 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, p. 44. See p. 42: «In the long run, staples account 
for more of men's economic thrusts than luxuries. What western Europe needed in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries was food (more calories and a better distribution of food values) and fuel. Expansion 
into Mediterranean and Atlantic islands, then to North and West Africa and across the Atlantic, as well as 
expansion into eastern Europe, the Russian steppes and eventually Central Asia provided food and fuel. It 
expanded the territorial base of European consumption by constructing a political economy in which this 
resource base was unequally consumed, disproportionately by western Europe […].Wheat was a central 
focus of new production and new commerce in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries». Cf. suggestions by 
Georges Lefebvre, 1956, “A Historian's Remarks on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism”, 
Science & Society, Vol. 20, No. 3: pp.241-246 
152
 Cf. Georges Lefebvre, A Historian's Remarks. The eminent French historian puts forth a brief but 
captivating and complex account by compounding together several factors: production, trade, state and 
society.  
153
 Likewise to Brenner, and in a lesser extent to Dobb, also Hilton seems to falter on the role of trade: 
trade is a variable that «must be examined in the closest association with the investigation of changes in 
the mode of production», R. H. Hilton, 1952,  “Capitalism-What's in a Name?”, Past & Present, N. 1: p. 
39.  
154
 Paul M. Sweezy and Maurice Dobb, The Transition, p. 143-144 
155
 See for example Karl Polanyi, 2001 [1944], The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of our Time, Beacon Press, Boston. In fact, even Sweezy supports such a line of reasoning in the 
end: «We are, I think, justified in concluding that while pre-capitalist commodity production was neither 
feudal nor capitalist, it was just as little a viable system in its own right. It was strong enough to 
undermine and disintegrate feudalism, but it was too weak to develop an independent structure of its own: 
all it could accomplish in a positive sense was to prepare the ground for the victorious advance of 
capitalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries», Paul M. Sweezy and Maurice Dobb, The 
Transition, p.153 
156
 Sweezy’s stance indeed focuses on the so called «system of production for the market», that is, a 
system premised on exchange relationships rather than productive relationships.  
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157
 See the previous bibliographical references 
158
 Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, 1986, “Commodity Chains in the World-Economy 
Prior to 1800”, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 10, N.1: pp. 156-170 
159
 An in-depth critical examination of the “commercialization model” came from a later Brenner’s 
article, Robert Brenner, The Origins of Capitalist Development 
160
 Such question involves also dimensions that the original debate did not deal with explicitly. The 
debate was widened in a further strand of discussions launched by Science and Society in the 1980’s: 
Roger S. Gottlieb, Historical Materialism; David Laibman, Modes of Production; Samir Amin, 1985, 
“Modes of Production, History and Unequal Development”, Science & Society, Vol. 49, N. 2: pp. 194-
207; Henry Heller, 1985, “The Transition Debate in Historical Perspective”, Science & Society, Vol. 49, 
N. 2: pp. 208-213 
161
 Karl Marx, 1976, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, Penguin Books in association with 
New Left Review, Harmondsworth-NY: p. 875 and ch. 26 in general; see also Karl Marx, Capital vol. 3, 
ch. 47 
162
 Karl Marx, Capital vol. 3, ch. 20. It is well known that Marx talks of Holland as «the model capitalist 
nation of the seventeenth century» (Karl Marx, Capital. Vol. 1,  p. 916). This claim was based also on the 
historical acknowledgement of the productive foundations of Holland that ensued from the industrial 
development of the middle ages in junction with trade. But, in the end, for Marx, the predominance of 
merchant capital, that is, the subordination of the industrial complex to the trading interests determined 
the failed “leap forward” to capitalist processes of production and a fully-fledged capitalist system of 
production and class relations in Holland (Karl Marx, Capital vol. 3, p. 446-451).  
163
 An effective recap of Marx’s theory of transition in Claudio J. Katz, 1993, “Karl Marx on the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism”, Theory and Society, vol. 22: pp. 363-389 
164
 Eric J. Hobsbawm, The General Crisis, p. 54.  
165
 Cf. Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Seventeenth Century in the Development, p. 108: «the development of 
modern capitalism cannot be understood in terms of a single national economy or of the national 
economic histories taken separately, but only in terms of an international economy. […] Broadly 
speaking, the capture of this entire world market- or most of it-by a single national economy or industry 
could produce the prospects of rapid and virtually unlimited expansion which the modest and confined 
capitalist manufacture of the period could not yet achieve itself, and thus make it possible for this modest 
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capitalist sector to break through its pre-capitalist limits. In other words, there was probably at this period 
not room in the European economy (including its colonies) for the initial industrialization of more than 
one country. Or, to put it another way round: a widespread simultaneous economic expansion everywhere 
in the advanced areas of Europe would probably have slowed down the preparation of industrial 
revolution» 
166
 Immanuel Wallerstein, 1997, “Merchant, Dutch, or Historical Capitalism?”, Review (Fernand Braudel 
Center), Vol. 20, N. 2: p. 254: «the only ideal proletariat is the semiproletarian», and this is the «dirty 
secret of capitalist exploitation» and survival. See extensively Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical 
Capitalism, pp. 13-46.  
167
 Maurice Dobb, 1946, Studies, p. 195 
168
 Sweezy mentions Holland only in his The Theory of Capitalist Development with no references to the 
question of “transition”. Paul M. Sweezy, 1962, The Theory of Capitalist Development. Principle of 
Marxian Political Economy, Dobson Books LTD, London: p. 296, 298. 
169
 Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure, p. 53 
170
 Robert Brenner, 1976, The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism, in T.H. Aston, H. E. Philip (ed.), 
The Brenner Debate Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: pp. 319-320, 325-326. «By contrast, the English economy of the 
early modern period witnessed the gradual construction of mutually interdependent, mutually self-
developing agricultural and industrial sectors at home», enabling to diverge the effect of Phase B in the 
second half of the seventeenth century to small or to the traditional sectors of the economy, like the cloth 
one. Indeed, «The appearance of an actual glut in grain production in these years, with accompanying 
lower prices, seems to have eased the effects of the cloth crisis and provided the basis for continuing 
growth» pp. 326-327.  
171
 P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), 2001, The transformation of rural economy and 
society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages - 19th century) in light of the Brenner debate, Brepsol. Earlier, 
van Zanden released an important theoretical-historical inquiry concerning a possible Dutch «third road to 
capitalism», J. Luiten van Zanden, 1993, The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy. Merchant 
Capitalism and The Labour Market, Manchester University Press, Manchester-NY . See, inter alia, 
further perspectives in: Bas Van Bavel, 2007, “The Transition in the Low Countries: Wage Labour as an 
Indicator of the Rise of Capitalism in the Countryside, 1300–1700”, Past and Present, vol. 195: pp. 286-
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303, and Bas van Bavel, 2010, “The Medieval origins of Capitalism in The Netherlands”, Bijdragen en 
Mededelingen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, vol. 125: pp. 45-80; Pepijn Brandon, 2011, 
“Marxism and the ‘Dutch Miracle’: The Dutch Republic and the Transition-Debate”, Historical 
Materialism¸ vol. 19, N. 3: pp. 106-146; Catharina Lis and Hugo Soly, 1997, “Different Paths of 
Development: Capitalism in the Northern and Southern Netherlands during the Late Middle Ages and the 
Early Modern Period”, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 20, N. 2: pp. 211-242. For an overall 
historical overview on early modern capitalism see Maarten Prak (eds.), 2001, Early Modern Capitalism 
Economic and social change in Europe, 1400–1800, Routledge, London-NY; See also valuable critiques 
in William H. Hagen, 1988, “Capitalism and the Countryside in Early Modern Europe: Interpretations, 
Models, Debates”,  Agricultural History, Vol. 62, N.1: pp. 13-47; Charles Tilly, 1983, “Flows of Capital 
and Forms of Industry in Europe, 1500-1900”, Theory and Society, Vol. 12, N.2: pp. 123-142 
172
 Summed up in Jan De Vries, 2001, The Transition to Capitalism in a Land Without Feudalism, in P. 
Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), 2001, The Transformation of Rural Economy and Society 
in the Low Countries (Middle Ages - 19th century) in light of the Brenner Debate, Brepsol: pp. 67-84 
173
 Jan De Vries, 1973, “On the Modernity Of The Dutch Republic”, The Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 33, N. 1: p. 198. See Jan De Vries and Ad van der Woude, 1997, The First Modern 
Economy. Success, failure, and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: pp. 27-32 
174
 De Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, p. 161 ; see, also, ivi, pp.159-195 
175
 Jan De Vries, 1974, The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700, Yale University Press, 
New Haven: pp. 119-121, and Jan de Vries, The Transition to Capitalism, pp 77-80 
176
 See, more recent, Pepijn Brandon, Marxism and the ‘Dutch Miracle, and the concept of «urban-
agrarian symbiosis», pp. 121-125 
177
 See Jan De Vries, The Transition to Capitalism in a Land, pp. 81-82 and Jan De Vries and Ad van der 
Woude, The First Modern Economy, p. 207 
178
 J. Luiten van Zanden, 2001, A third road to capitalism? Proto-industrialization and the moderate nature 
of the late medieval crisis in Flanders and Holland, 1350–1550,  in P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van 
Zanden (eds.), 2001, The Transformation of Rural Economy and Society in the Low Countries (Middle 
Ages - 19th century) in light of the Brenner Debate, Brepsol: pp.85-101. Such insight is a later refinement 
of van Zanden’s thesis in J. Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy 
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179
 J. Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy, p. 31: «The process of 
commercialisation was made possible through two more or less coincidental circumstances: the 
availability of large surpluses of grain outside Holland – especially in Northern Germany and the Baltic – 
and the proximity of a flourishing market for relatively luxurious livestock products in the large, 
prosperous cities in the Southern Netherlands» 
 
180
 Ivi, 30-31: «The farmers in Holland were virtually forced to shift to cattle farming [and dairying] 
and/or to the extensive cultivation of summer grains, since it became impossible to cultivate bread grain 
(outside the clay areas and the  dunes). This forced transition […] definitively closed off the prospect of 
subsistence farming for Holland’s peasants» 
181
 J. Luiten van Zanden, A third road to capitalism?, p. 91. J. Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline 
of Holland's Economy, p. 32 «The fact that Holland's population did not die out or emigrate when 
agricultural livelihoods virtually disappeared, must undoubtedly be attributed to the successful 
development of these non-agricultural activities»  
182
 J. Luiten van Zanden, A third road to capitalism?, p.  89 
183
 J. Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy, p. 4, 8. In other words, engagingly 
van Zanden combines capitalist accumulation by way of “non-capitalist” exploitation of labor. See p. 109: 
«We must conclude that the superiority of proto-industry, with its lower wages and its greater flexibility 
in the supply of labour, results from the link between agrarian activities and industrial (side) activities in 
the "peasant's" family business. By virtue of this link, the wage paid to labour in proto-industry could lie 
structurally beneath the reproduction costs of labour» 
184
 J. Luiten van Zanden, A third road to capitalism?, p. 90, 97.  
185
 See J. Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy, pp. 35-40. Process of urban 
concentration was linked, for van Zanden, to the ecological crisis and the commercialization of lands. «As 
a result, part of the rural population was forced to look for work elsewhere or to develop other activities. 
Holland's rapid urbanisation after 1350 must be seen in this context», J. Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and 
Decline of Holland's Economy,p. 31. Cf. outstanding Bas J. P. van Bavel and J. Luiten van Zanden, 2004, 
“The jump-start of the Holland economy during the late-medieval crisis, c.1350–c.1500”, Economic 
History Review, Vol. 57, N. 3: pp. 503–532 
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186
 in fact van Zanden puts great (although not unique) emphasis on the level of nominal wages in eroding 
profit. To van Zanden, the deadline was 1670 ca. J. Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland's 
Economy, pp. 29-40, 103-140, 17.. 
187
  See also, Peter Hoppenbrouwers, 2001, Mapping an unexplored field. The Brenner debate and the 
case of Holland, in P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), 2001, The Transformation of Rural 
Economy and Society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages - 19th century) in light of the Brenner Debate, 
Brepsol: pp. 41-66 
188
 see for the concept of political accumulation Robert Brenner, 1976, The Agrarian Roots of European 
Capitalism, in T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin (ed.), The Brenner Debate Agrarian. Class Structure and 
Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: pp. 236-242; 
and Robert Brenner, 1976, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial 
Europe, in ibid.: p. 55-56 
189
 Robert Brenner, 2001, “The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism”, in Journal of Agrarian 
Change, Vol. 1, N. 2: pp. 173-188, republished in P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), 2001, 
The Transformation of Rural Economy and Society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages - 19th century) in 
light of the Brenner Debate, Brepsol: pp. pp. 275-338 
190
 See for such region … 
191
 Robert Brenner, The Low Countries in the Transition, p. 209. See p. 218: «Dutch owner-operator 
agriculturalists did not, then, freely choose to embark on the road to capitalism. They were coerced to do 
so, both coerced to become farmers and coerced to act like farmers. They were forced into market 
dependency by their forced separation from the means of subsistence under the pressure of ecological 
degradation. They were impelled by their subjection to productive competition, which resulted from their 
market dependence, to invest so as to specialize in order to survive» 
192
 Ivi, p. 210: «The fact remains that in the initial phases of the agrarian transformation probably a 
majority of the farmers were unable to muster sufficient levels of productivity to secure a full living on 
the basis of their dairy and livestock (or summer grain) production. They were therefore obliged to take 
up a wide variety of additional, complementary pursuits in their ample free time in order to make ends 
meet, including shipbuilding, freshwater fishing, brickmaking and the like. It cannot be over-stressed, 
however, that these were all, in keeping with their market dependence, commercially oriented, not 
subsistence-oriented» 
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193
 Ivi, 206-ff. 
194
 Ivi, 195-196 
195
 Ivi, 209-213 
196
 Ivi, p. 230-233 
197
 Cf. an harsh, pertinent, and from my standpoint, correct critique offered by Tom Brass, 2011, Labour 
Regime Change in the Twenty-First Century, Brill, Leiden-Boston: ch. 3, esp. pp. 86-90, 101-103, 
concerning the nationally-self-contained development of capitalism, the relationship between capitalist 
relations of power and re/production and «archaic» relations of power and re/production, and the 
relationship between systemic capital and national capital in a local context of «semi-feudal» structure 
and relations of production and exchange. 
 
Chapter 2 
1
 Peter J. Taylor, 2005, Dutch Hegemony and Contemporary Globalization, in Jonathan Friedman, 
Christopher Chase-Dunn (eds.), Hegemonic Decline: Present and Past, Routledge, London-NY: p. 118. 
Cf. Michael Mann, 1993, The Source of Social Power, vol. II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
pp. 59-63. Mann defines infrastructural power as a top-down process. Here infrastructural power is to be 
understood, in brief, as the organization of power which is both and at once a top-down and bottom-up 
process and which is of course inherent in the concept of trialectic we see below. 
2
 “Trialectic” is a term first encountered in Jason Moore, 2017, “The Capitalocene Part II: accumulation 
by appropriation and the centrality of unpaid work/energy”, The Journal of Peasant Studies: pp. 1-37, 
although contextualized and employed for different – but not so distant – aims 
3
 Robert Gilpin, 1988, “Theory of Hegemonic War”,  The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, 
No. 4: pp. 591-613 
4
 IR is an extremely variegated ensemble of approaches and perspectives involving different premises, 
methods and epistemologies. About hegemony in IR, a cartography of the several approaches has been 
essayed. See Andreas Antoniades, 2008, From ‘Theories of Hegemony’ to ‘Hegemony Analysis’ in 
International Relations, paper presented at 49
th
 ISA Annual Convention, Panel: Hegemony, Security, and 
Defense in IR, San Francisco.  For a detailed exploration of IR as academic subject, structure and history, 
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see Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, 2005, Understanding International Relations, Palgrave, 
Houndmills: ch. 1-3 
5
 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 2012 [1977], Power and Interdependence, Longman, London; Robert 
Keohane, 1984, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. Robert Cox, 1983, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An 
Essay in Method”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 12: pp.162-175; Robert Cox, 1987, 
Power and Production. Social forces in the making of history, Columbia University Press, NY. Robert 
Gilpin, 1987, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Robert Gilpin, 
1988, “The theory of hegemonic war”, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, N. 4: pp. 591-
613. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 1990, “Socialization and hegemonic power”, 
International Organization, Vol. 44, N. 3: pp 283-315.  
          See, inter alia, John Agnew, 2005, Hegemony. The new shape of global power, Temple University  
Press: ch. 1-2. See also Mark Rupert, 1995, Producing Hegemony. The politics of mass production and 
American global power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: ch. 1-3, for an engaging map of 
perspectives on hegemony in literature   
6
 Hans Morgenthau, 1948, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,  Knopf, New 
York: pp.13-27 and Part III. 
7
 Kindleberger, 1986, The World in Depression: 1929-1939, University California Press, Berkeley: ch. 
14; Kindleberger, 1996, World Economic Primacy: 1500 to 1990, Oxford University Press, Oxford: ch. 1. 
Kindleberger, 1981, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public 
Goods, and Free Rides”, p. 247. Ivi, p. 253: «the danger we face is not too much power in the 
international economy, but too little, not an excess of domination, but a superfluity of would-be free  
riders, unwilling to mind the store, and waiting for a store keeper to appear. […]  without a stabilizer, the 
system in my judgment is unstable». The collective goods version exposed in such essay assumes that all 
countries would benefit from the hegemonic framework of power. In the absence of a hegemon, they are 
in fact unable to achieve the common interest because of the institutional and strategic obstacles. The 
hegemonic lead intermeshes instead the strategy and the operations of the states towards collective goods.  
          Cf. the recent and enhanced reformulation of such perspective – although under the rubric «empire» 
– in Niall Ferguson, 2001, The Cash Nexus. Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000, Basic 
Books, New York 
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8
 C.I. consists of three general features: multiple issues, multiple channels of contact among societies, and 
inefficacy of military force for most policy objectives. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and 
Interdependence, pp. 19-25, p. 37. 
9
 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 35-54, 136-138, 184 
10
 Antonio Gramsci,1971, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, International Publisher, NY: pp. 57-58. 
Benedetto Fontana, 1993, Hegemony and Power On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-London, among others, elaborated on Gramsci’s Hegemony. 
He engagingly extols the widest notion of Gramscian egemonia as «the formulation and elaboration of a 
moral-intellectual and cultural conception of the world, whose elaboration throughout society transforms 
it into a way of life and a form of practice characteristic of an entire people». In this context, the state 
plays a peculiar role: «As a result, the state acquires an ethical content that transforms its repressive, class 
nature into one perceived as moral and universal. Thus the Gramscian state cannot rest on pure force; 
violence and coercion must always be mediated by the legitimating moments of consent and persuasion», 
p. 160 and 144. 
          By contrast, Perry Anderson, 1976, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci”, New Left Review, 100: 
pp. 5-78, elaborates on the contentious nature of the Gramscian hegemony, tracking down three forms of 
hegemony in Gramsci and their mutual repugnancy. Cf. Peter D. Thomas, 2009, The Gramscian Moment. 
Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism,  Brill, Leiden: ch. 2, 5-6 
11
 Cox argues that hegemony as dominant mode of production on world scale emerges out of a web of 
manifold production relations systematized within national structures, linked each other by variegated and 
uneven power relationships. The qualitative difference in world orders’ structure emanates from the form 
of state and of production which becomes hegemonic and therefore defines the world structure of 
accumulation, namely, the world heiarchy of power and production relations. In this inter-national 
system, production in one country becomes connected to the production of another country by way of 
networks and processes of the world economy to form «world systems of production». The state is the 
structural nodule within such web of world relations – which constitutes the international organization – 
and vector whereby the development of a specific structure of production relations becomes dominant and 
legitimate within a world order. The relationships among the states are patterned after the hegemon’s 
structure of production relations, whose nature is defined by the class structure of its own. As a result, 
world hegemony’s structure becomes the projection of the class structure and power, and the uneven 
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propagation thereof in space. The class structure in turn is patterned after the peculiar social relations of 
production that constitute it, which are «accumulated social power that determines the nature of 
production, the structure of authority as model by the internal dynamics of the production process, and the 
distributive consequences». The nature of the social relations of production defines thus the configuration 
of a social group involved in the process of power and production whose pattern is determined by the 
degree and the nature of power deployed within the process itself – the «power relation of production». 
Such hegemonic national and world infrastructure is the springboard through which hegemony comes 
established. Robert Cox, Power and Production, pp. 1-15, 17-34, 105-109. 
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 Robert Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony, pp. 171-173 
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 Robert Cox, Power and Production, p. 106  
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Studies Association (ISA) held in Washington, D.C. March 28-April 1, 1994, concerning the hegemony: 
«What is the nature of hegemony in the sense in which I use it? The problematic of hegemony is located 
in the overlapping and interactive structures of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class, and 
ideology which can be constitutive of and sustain political authorities. So I use hegemony here as a 
quality of the whole, not just a relationship among the parts. Dominance and subordination are 
relationships of the parts, and dominance is inherent in hegemony. But hegemony is more than 
dominance. Hegemony is a form in which dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of 
acquiescence to this whole as if it were the natural order of things. So dominance is there, but it is less 
visible when we speak of hegemony. To press the point a little further, hegemony is an internalized 
coherence which has most probably arisen from an externally imposed order but has been transformed 
into an intersubjectively constituted reality». Robert Cox et al., 1990, “Hegemony and Social Change”, 
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38: p. 366 
15
 Robert Gilpin, War and Change, p. 54. The more such systemic gap is ample, the more a world 
hegemony materializes itself in time and space. But Gilpin does not afford any systematic analysis and 
explanation of the dynamics that gives rise to such differential superiority. Given such an advantage, the 
scholar maintains, the state will be able to tap systemic opportunities and contradictions to advance its 
own interests and dominate the international relations. 
16
 Ivi, pp. pp. 54-105: Gilpin notes the remarkable influence of the «environmental factors and the 
modification of these factors» in the decision of a state to challenge whatever constituted order, both 
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modern and pre-modern; Gilpin says that such a decision is to be linked with the structural arrangements 
internal to the state and the societal mechanism for distributing benefits and costs to uphold the decision 
itself and to undertake overt action. Both environment factors and domestic mechanism impinge on the 
willingness and the opportunity as well as the capability of a state to challenge the international order. 
The state will be able to gain its hegemony within a scenario compounded by the favorable intermix of 
the two set of variables.  
17
 Ivi, p. 185 
18
 Ivi, p. 157: «once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of expansion is reached, the tendency 
is for the costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the capacity to finance the status quo. […] 
it becomes more difficult to generate sufficient revenues to cover the protection costs, and the protection 
costs themselves increase over time. As a consequence of the increasing costs of protection and the 
decreasing benefits of empire or hegemony, the preservation of the status quo becomes even more 
difficult, and the international system enters a state of disequilibrium» 
19
 Ivi, p. 185-187, pp. 197-203, 210; Robert Gilpin, The Theory of Hegemonic war, pp. 601-603. 
20
 Cf. reviews of Gilpin’s landmark book in G. John Ikenberry (eds.), Power, Order, and Change in 
World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
21
 John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and hegemonic power, p. 283 
22
 Ivi, 283-287 
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 Ivi, 209-292 
24
 George Modelski, 1978, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State”, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 20, N. 2: pp. 214-235; George Modelski, 1987, Long Cycles in World 
Politics, McMillan Press, Houndmills. Joshua Goldstein, 1988, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the 
Modern Age, Yale University Press, New Heaven-London.  Giovanni Arrighi, 1990, “The Three 
Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism”, Review, Vol 13, N. 3: pp. 365-408; Giovanni Arrighi, 2010 
[1994], The Long Twentieth Century Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times, Verso, London-NY; 
Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, 1999, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-London. Immanuel Wallerstein, 2011 [1980], The Modern 
World-System, II. Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750, 
University of California Press, Berkeley; Immanuel Wallerstein,1983, “The Three Instances of 
 317 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist world-economy”, International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, vol. 24, N. 1-2: pp. 100-108 
25
 Modelski conceptualizes the structure of the world as layered. It comprises three systemic levels. The 
widest one is the world system: «World systems are social systems constituted by states and processes of 
social interaction of the human species. The concept of 'world system' is an answer to the questions: How 
much, and what kind of, social interaction and institutionalisation is there when the world is looked upon 
as a whole? […] The world system is a device for viewing the world's social arrangements as a totality 
[…]». In Modelski’s theory, the so-called global system comprises and is defined by the entire set of 
human interactions put into play at global level instead: «it is a system of diverse interactions that attends 
to vital problems of international security and economic relations» as instance. In turn, the global polity, 
termed also as global political system, is defined by the political run of global interactions . All of three 
are partially differentiated in functions but utterly integrated, George Modelski, Long Cycles in World 
Politics, pp. 17-28 
26
 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, pp. 144-160, 220-225; George Modelski, The Long 
Cycle of Global Politics, pp. 230-232: we have empirical evidences «for positing a basic association 
between nation-states and world power. […].The nation-state proved to be the only organization capable 
of spearheading and then sustaining large operations at long distances and on a global scale. […]. The 
nation-state mobilized the resources and also supplied the coherence, motivation and strength of purpose 
required for such extraordinarily ambitious and far-flung enterprises. [A] process of diffusion was thus 
initiated, [and it] was the universalization of this form of political organization as the most viable and 
most obviously desirable at the intermediate level. Not only were those major powers who competed 
among themselves selected out as nation-states, but they also became models for the whole world to 
imitate, irrespective of needs, special conditions or requirements» 
27
 George Modelski, The Long Cycle of Global Politics, p. 214; George Modelski, Long Cycles in World 
Politics, p. 7-8: «The global political system (or, for short, the global polity) is a functionally specific set 
of relationships concerned with a defined range of problems, those attendant upon the organised pursuit 
of collective action at the global level. It is a management network centred on the relationship between a 
lead unit and the contenders for leadership» 
28
 George Modelski, The Long Cycle of Global Politics, p. 217 
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 Gilpin sees hegemonic war as climax of the escalation of competition and emulation which rounds off a 
hegemonic cycle of power. But, of course, the end of a cycle is the inception of a new one. 
30
 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, pp. 36-38 
31
 George Modelski, The Long Cycle of Global Politics, p. 217. The association between nation-states and 
world power runs the other way also: «Global power, in its turn, strengthened those states that attained it 
relatively to all other political and other organizations. What is more, other states competing in the global 
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was the universalization of this form of political organization as the most viable and most obviously 
desirable at the intermediate level. Not only were those major powers who competed among themselves 
selected out as nation-states, but they also became models for the whole world to imitate, irrespective of 
needs, special conditions or requirements», ibid. 
32
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superiority; it must be seen more essentially as the accomplishment of essential services that give impetus 
and example to the global polity and, eventually, to the entire world system. What are these services? 
They are, in respect of global politics: (i) agenda formation, (ii) mobilisation, (iii) decision-making, (iv) 
administration, and (v) innovation», George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, pp. 14-15 
33
 i.e. the XV-XVI century incipient global system came organized to quench the thirst of gold and spices; 
the XIX century order was essentially structured, Modelski says, for example upon oil and cotton, and so 
forth 
34
 George Modelski, The Long Cycle of Global Politics, pp. 226-230; George Modelski, Long Cycles in 
World Politics, pp. 227-228. Moreover, Modelski provides, but does not delve into, the overall features of 
a global power under the rubric of «factors of world leadership», ivi, pp. 220-225 
35
 Joshua Goldstein, Long Cycles, p. 6. In his groundbreaking book, Goldstein provides an engaging, fresh 
and comprehensive synthesis concerning the academic debate upon hegemony and long cycles. See 
Joshua Goldstein, Long Cycles, Part I, esp. ch. 5 
36
 Ivi, pp. 5-7 
37
 Ivi, pp. 1-20 
38
 Ivi, p. 288 
39
 Ivi, p. 287 
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 Ivi, p. 281 
41
 See the splendid account about Arrighi’s argument for a structurally-variant capitalism made by Jason 
Moore –  an Arrighi’s pupils – in Jason Moore, 2011, “Ecology, Capital and the Nature of our Time. 
Accumulation and Crisis in the Capitalist World-Ecology”, Journal of World-System Research, Vol. 17, 
N. 1: esp. pp. 118-126 
42
 Giovanni Arrighi, The Three Hegemonies, p. 365-366.  
43
 Ivi, p. 367-368 
44
 Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance, pp. 26-27¸ Giovanni Arrighi, The 
Three Hegemonies, p. 368 
45
 Arrighi’s perspective is theoretically and historically phased in qualitatively differentiated, temporally 
different but overlapping and intertwined cycles of accumulation and power: systemic cycles of 
accumulation and hegemonic cycles are his cases. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 5-
11, p. 89: «Systemic cycles of accumulation are defined here as consisting of a phase of material 
expansion followed by a phase of financial expansion promoted and organized by the same agency or 
group of agencies». The systemic cycle of accumulation comprises the bout of a hegemonic cycle, but it 
is analytically differentiated because premised on the investigation of the capitalist processes of capital 
accumulation at world-systemic level (regime of accumulation) rather than an investigation in state 
complexes of power properly (world hegemony). The first account is posited in Giovanni Arrighi, The 
Long Twentieth Century; the second in Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance. 
In fact, in Arrighi’s scheme, any hegemonic cycle historically intertwines with the other, but any 
hegemonic cycle is preempted by the longer systemic cycle of accumulation – that intertwines with the 
next one in turn – which sorts out the capitalist arrangements of power on which the next hegemony will 
be premised. Roughly, the agencies and structures leading a systemic cycle will be the ones that will 
constitute the future hegemonic bloc.  
        When I talk of “systemic cycles of power accumulation, change and expansion” I refer to both 
systemic cycle of accumulation and hegemonic cycle at one time. In their historical twine lies the history 
of the modern world system.  
46
 Along with the two book already cited, the last and boldest Arrighi’s volume on the lineages of the 
twenty-first century power – Giovanni Arrighi, 2007, Adam Smith in Beijing. Lineages of the Twenty-
First Century, Verso, London – rounded off  more than 25 years of organic research – from his arrival at 
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Binghamton in 1979 to his death in 2009. Here we can only put forth the outlines of such an extraordinary 
perspective. 
47
 Giovanni  Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance, pp. 26-36; Giovanni Arrighi, The 
Long Twentieth Century, p. 95 
48
 From the perspective of systemic cycle of accumulation, the conjunctural shift signals the impact of 
competitive expansion and pressures on systemic processes of accumulation and it is accompanied by the 
ensuing conjunctural restructuring and reorganization of networks of capitalist accumulation, from  being  
mostly premised on processes of value material production to being mostly premised on processes of 
financial accumulation. Within any cycle, the conjunctural world-systemic reorganization which ensues is 
heralded by the so-called «signal crisis» that marks the shift from a condition of systemic «material 
expansion» – in which an hegemony rises – to a condition of systemic «financial expansion» – in which a 
hegemony tends to decline. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 219-246 
49
 «Systemwide financial expansions are the outcome of two complementary tendencies: an 
overaccumulation of capital and intense interstate competition for mobile capital», Giovanni  Arrighi and 
Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance, pp. 31-32 
50
 Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance, pp. 33, 272 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ivi, pp. 33-34.  
53
 The overall phases of development are deployed by the intertwining of systemic cycles of accumulation 
and of hegemonic cycles, between and with each other 
54
 That is, a regime of accumulation on world scale. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 
10 
55
 Arrighi explores the relationship between the territorial logic of power and the capitalist logic of power, 
the dialectic of capitalism and territorialism, but he does not directly link the issue with the problem of the 
hegemony. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 179-218 
56
 Regardless, we can appreciate Arrighi-Wallerstein’s dialectic, general similarities and differences in the 
hegemonic function to the analysis of the capitalist world-economy through the following quotation. 
From their systemic vantage point, both interpretations are in fact interlocked, mutually completing, and 
explicative in their junction: «Hegemony is a critical mechanism in the functioning of the modern world-
system. The cycles of hegemony are crucial markers in the cyclical rhythms of the capitalist world-
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economy. In a sense, it is the rise and fall of the hegemonic powers that prevented the transformation of 
the world-economy into a world-empire – something that had happened regularly before the creation of 
the modern world-system. The mechanism of hegemony allowed the modern world-system to become the 
first world-economy in the history of humankind to survive, flourish, and expand to encompass the entire 
globe. Without it, capitalism as a historical system would not have been able to survive, and thereby to 
transform the world», Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II, p. xxvii, italics added. In 
short: whereas the American student emphasizes the necessity of hegemony if the world-economy is to 
survive, the Italian student stresses the necessity of hegemony to the historical change of the world-
economy. 
57
 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Three Instances of Hegemony, p. 107 
58
 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II, p. 113. In this sense, Wallerstein has been 
unfairly charged of Smithian circulationism. Class struggle is crucial to the world-system, both national 
and world-systemic. 
59
 ivi, p. 38 
60
 Ivi, p. 70, 113: «Class struggles in a capitalist world-economy are complex affairs and appear sinuously 
under many guises. […].a state's strength correlates with the economic role of the owner-producers of that 
state in the world-economy; but if these assertions are not to be mere tautologies, we must have some 
independent political measures of this strength. We suggest five possible such measures: the degree to 
which state policy can directly help owner-producers compete in the world market (mercantilism); the 
degree to which states can affect the ability of other states to compete (military power); the degree to 
which states can mobilize their resources to perform these competitive and military tasks at costs that do 
not eat up the profits (public finance); the degree to which states can create administrations that will 
permit the swift carrying out of tactical decisions (an effective bureaucracy); and the degree to which the 
political rules reflect a balance of interests among owner-producers such that a working "hegemonic bloc" 
(to use a Gramscian expression) forms the stable underpinnings of such a state. This last element, the 
politics of the class struggle, is the key to the others». These features, and their different amalgam, 
represent elements promoting or stymieing the formation and the development of a proper agro-industrial 
bloc and its degree of efficiency. 
61
 The “Smithian” Dutch Republic seized the hegemony «primarily because no other country showed 
such a coherent, cohesive, and integrated agro-industrial production complex»
61
. Furthermore, «The 
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technological advances of previous centuries were precisely one of the key factors in Dutch agro-
industrial efficiency», in Holland. Ivi, 66 
62
 Ivi, p. xxiii-xxvii: such process «doesn't have just two moments in time (rise and fall) but, by analogy 
with how Schumpeter conceived of Kondratieff cycles, four moments in time» that are: the moment of the 
slow decline of the hegemonic power, «during which two powers emerge as contenders for the 
succession»; the moment the absolute decline in which the balance of power in the world-system 
materializes. The third moment is the order breakdown the world war starts; the fourth moment is the rise 
of the new hegemony. 
63
 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Three Instances of hegemony, p. 101, italics added 
64
 Ivi, p. 105, italics added 
65
 Ivi, pp. 106-108. Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II, p. xxiii 
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67
 Hannah Arendt, 1979, The Origin Of Totalitarianism, A Harvest Book Harcourt Brace & Company, 
San Diego-New York-London. Such reasoning has been retrieved by David Harvey and then by Giovanni 
Arrighi, but to account respectively for Imperialism and the world expansion of the capitalist system, in 
David Harvey, 2003, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Giovanni Arrighi, Adam 
Smith in Beijing, pp. 222-234 
68
 Hannah Arendt, The Origin Of Totalitarianism, pp. 131-132 
69
 Ivi, p. 137, italics added 
70
 Henri Lefebvre,  
71
Hannah Arendt, The Origin Of Totalitarianism, p. 137 
72
 Theodore K. Rabb, 1975, The struggle for stability in early modern Europe, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; Jan de Vries, 1978, The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750I, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. As Guy Bois in general asserts: the expansion of capitalism has to be 
treated «as a by-product of the socio-economic functioning of the feudal system as a whole; it should not 
therefore be studied in isolation, but in the context of the overall development of European feudalism, the 
various elements of which are indissolubly linked. […] Variations in both the age and the degree of 
maturity of the feudal system in one place as compared with another probably play a leading and certainly 
a very complex role in the rhythms which then affect the emergence and development of the capitalist 
structures», Guy Bois, 197,  Against the Neo-Malthusian Orthodoxy, in T.H. Aston, H. E. Philip (ed.), 
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The Brenner Debate Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: pp. 114-115 
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 Immanuel Wallerstein, 2011 [1974], The Modern World-system, vol. I. Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles; Charles Tilly (eds.), 1975, The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
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 Hannah Arendt, The Origin Of Totalitarianism, p. 142 
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 Robert Brenner, 1976, The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism, in T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin 
(ed.), The Brenner Debate Agrarian. Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial 
Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: pp. 236-242; and Robert Brenner, 1976, Agrarian Class 
Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, in ibid.: p. 55-56: the centralized state 
was to develop at least in large part, «as an independent extractor of the surplus, in particular on the basis 
of its arbitrary power to tax the land […]. The state could develop, as it ultimately did, as a competitor 
with the lords, largely to the extent to which it could establish rights to extract the surplus […]"political 
accumulation" [is therefore] the build-up of larger, more effective military organization and/or the 
construction of stronger surplus-extracting machinery» 
76
 «Absolutism was essentially just this: a redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination [and] 
it was the new political carapace of a threatened nobility. It was a State founded on the social supremacy 
of the aristocracy and confined by the imperatives of landed property [whose] the irreducibly feudal 
character of Absolutism remained. It was a State founded on the social supremacy of the aristocracy and 
confined by the imperatives of landed property. […]. No 'political' derogation of the noble class ever 
occurred in the Absolutist State. Its feudal character constantly ended by frustrating and falsifying its 
promises for capital […]»,  Perry Anderson, 1974, Lineages of the Absolutist State, NLB, London: pp. p. 
18, 41-42. To account for the uneven development of capitalism and the uneven unfolding of absolutist 
process of power formation see Michael Hechter and William Brustein, 1980, “Regional Modes of 
Production and Patterns of State Formation in Western Europe”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, 
N. 5: pp. 1061-1094 
77
 Ivi, p. 143, Italics added 
78
 we can add that such «“progressive” ideology» was nothing but the heir of something else. Liberalism, 
the emblem of the nineteenth century and “progressive” corpus of ideas which the Great Britain embodied 
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and put forward world-wide by way of an ensemble of politics, economy, philosophy, science and empire, 
was nothing but the next in line to the corpus of beliefs which drove Dutch expansion and gave substance 
to the operations and strategy of the Republic. The Dutch “ideology” was encrusted in the «Grotian 
Moment» that historically provided propellant (a general model) to the next English combustion. 
79
 Karl Polanyi, 2010 [1944], The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our time, 
Beacon Press, Boston 
80
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 75-76, 137 
81
 Ivi, pp. 75-76, italics added 
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 Ivi, pp. 76-79 
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 Fernand Braudel, 1992, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Volume II The Wheels of 
Commerce, Book Club Association, London: pp. 225-229 
84
 Fred Block and Margaret S. Somers, 2014, The Power of Market Fundamentalism. Karl Polanyi’s 
Critique, Harvard University Press, Cambridge: pp. 91-95 
85
 Cf. Mark Granovetter, 1985, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”,  
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, N. 3, pp. 481-510 
86
 Fernand Braudel, 1979, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore: p. 53; ivi, pp. 112-113: «capitalism is the perfect term for designating 
economic activities that are carried on at the summit, or that are striving for the summit. As a result, 
large-scale capitalism rests upon the underlying double layer composed of material life and the coherent 
market economy; it represents the high-profit zone». 
87
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 70-71, 60 
88
 Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts, p.63-64. In the end, my interpretation of Polanyi’s thought overlaps 
Braudel’s final articulation and conclusive statement on capitalism. But what overlaps is concept not 
history. What the Industrial Revolution brought on was an intensification and a radical penetration to the 
grassroots of society of the same process of embeddedness world-wide. 
89
 I termed such bout of historical formation four centuries long as Dutch regional cycle of power 
formation and accumulation. 
90
 See Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver, Chaos and Governance; see also Immanuel Wallerstein, The 
Modern World-System II, ch. 2 
91
 Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts, pp. 64-65, italics added 
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 To be sure, the qualification of “unlimited” must be embedded in the factual conditions of human 
development in a given moment of time, and thus contextualized as a function of means and resources 
historically available 
93
 David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards and Michael Reich, 1994, Long swings and stages of capitalism, in 
David M. Kotz, Terrence McDonough and Michael Reich (eds.), Social structures of accumulation: the 
political economy of growth and crisis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: p. 13. Contrary to the 
SSA theorists however, the social environment in which accumulation takes place is here integral to 
capitalism and the processes of capital accumulation as well. Cf. ivi, pp. 14-16 
94
 And it is mere precondition because «capitalist economic growth is not simply economic growth in the 
abstract. A critical feature of the specifically capitalist accumulation process is that it takes place in an 
environment of conflict. This is not accidental; capitalist relations of production and exchange generate 
conflict», David M. Kotz, 1994, Interpreting the social structure of accumulation theory, in David M. 
Kotz, Terrence McDonough and Michael Reich (eds.), Social structures of accumulation: the political 
economy of growth and crisis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: p. 54 
95
 This is another way to express what I have previously said about the source of a world hegemony, that 
is the inner framework of institutional-economic and socio-ecological patterned relations of power, 
production and exchange. In so doing, hegemonic world expansion in the capitalist world system is to be 
understood as premised on a patterned complex of power relations which is the hegemon’s structure of 
power and embodies the source of the world hegemony in the modern world system.  
96
 Jason Moore, 2017, “The Capitalocene Part II: accumulation by appropriation and the centrality of 
unpaid work/energy”, The Journal of Peasant Studies: pp 28-30. See Terence Hopkins in a note on 
hegemony. His focus is of course on the world-system as a whole, but nonetheless it is interesting calling 
him forth to stress the relation between state and capital in the modern world-economy, a stress that 
seems appropriate for it tends to connect Polanyi with Arendt and Braudel as here construed: «The 
capitalist world-economy as organizing system was brought during British hegemony to global 
“dominion”, though exactly what this metaphor implies remains to be sketched. All other systems of 
livelihood were either eliminated, crippled, and made dependent on the capitalists' accumulation of 
capital, or driven into the hills and there fenced-in as "reservations" (enclosures). The effective reach 
(penetration?) of capitalism as morality, however, versus the system's reach situationally, remains an open 
question for many peoples of Africa and Asia. (That is, however, another matter.) And British hegemony, 
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as "moment," ensconced the institutions of, inter alia, industrialization, interstate free trade (as opposed to 
interstate mercantilism), and a world currency standard. […]. Let us assume that the interstateness and 
stateness (central authority plus civil society) that came into historical being during Dutch hegemony, and 
then was spread as idea and practice globally during British hegemony, were not "superstructure" to 
capitalist accumulation of capital but instead mechanisms (of rule) integral to the organizing process of 
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“The Capitalocene Part II: accumulation by appropriation and the centrality of unpaid work/energy”, The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, p. 21, about the difference between the «capitalist project» and the capitalist 
«historical process» thereof. 
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 Immanuel Wallerstein,1991, Unthinking Social Sciences. The Limits of Nineteenth-Century 
Paradigms, Polity Press, Cambridge: p. 264, 242. Or, put it differently, power develops because 
«conditions for capital accumulation have become institutionalized. In other words, these conditions 
become established not just as the current policy of the [state, or of a bold entrepreneur]; rather, they 
become embedded in the society's institutional structure», David M. Gordon et al., Long swings and 
stages of capitalism, p. 18 
103
 See John Ruggie, 1983, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis”, World Politics, Vol. 35, N. 2: p. 275; cf. Giovanni Arrighi, The Three Hegemonies. 
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104
 We can also rephrase this assertion by using David Held’s framework to understand democracy. Held 
asserts that modern democracy should be conceptualized and historicized as a «double-sided 
phenomenon: concerned, on the one hand, with the reform of state power and, on the other hand, with the 
restructuring of civil society. This entails recognizing the indispensability of a process […] called ‘double 
democratization’: the interdependent transformation of both state and civil society», David Held, 1992, 
1992, “Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order?”, Political Studies, vol. 40: p. 20. By the 
same token, I understand here capitalism as the movement to reform state power and the restructuring of 
civil society. Capitalism entails therefore an interdependent transformation of both state and civil society 
turned under the logic of capital accumulation. I named such transformational process “interlocking 
embeddedness”. 
105
 See an example in Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century; Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. 
Silver, Chaos and Governance  
106
 Marjolein ‘t Hart, 2014, The Dutch Wars of Independence Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands 
1570–1680, Routledge, London-NY: p. 6 
107
 Cf. Jason Moore, 2017, “The Capitalocene Part II: accumulation by appropriation and the centrality of 
unpaid work/energy”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, p. 10 
108
 That is, the strongest states in the course of the absolutist process of state-making based on the high 
density and/or intensity of militarized coercion concentration 
109
 Patrick O’Brian, 2009, State formation and the construction and maintenance of institutions for 
economic growth in the west and the east, 1415–1846, in Wolfram Elsner and Hardy Hanappi, Varieties 
of Capitalism and New Institutional Deals. Regulation, welfare and the new economy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: for instance p. 60, sums up the widespread inefficiency and incapacity of 
the European absolutist state structures to developing, before the 19
th
 century, an apposite bureaucratic-
fiscal infrastructure. See the classic overview in Douglass North and David Thomas, 1973, The rise of the 
Western world. A new economic history, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: for example p.120. 
Michael Mann, The Source of Social Power, pp. 513-514: the conflict within society «became focused on 
the fiscal extraction process of inefficient ancien regime states, struggling to withstand the military 
presence of their more advanced rivals». See Ch. 1 Part I 
110
 See ch. 1 Part I (notes notably). The basic problem in the process of state-making was, as we have seen 
in the previous chapters, to cope with the «composite» nature of the early modern society in Europe. As 
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summarized by O’Brian in in Patrick O’Brian, State formation and the construction, p. 56: «The 
‘Trajectory’ towards ‘centralization’ (proceeding falteringly along diverse routes at different speeds 
across the continent within political arenas of embryo nations loosely governed by Weberian state in the 
making) is a history marked by varying degrees of stronger and weaker opposition from estates, 
aristocracies, urban oligarchies, churches, and other networks of power. Constrained by historically 
embedded centrifugal forces, rulers of Europe’s feudal politics constructed and reconstructed several 
types of state […]». Cf. De Vries who have a different perspective, in Jan de Vries, 1976, The Economy 
Of Europe In An Age Of Crisis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: p. 242-243. 
111
 C. J. Boogman, 1982, The Union of Utrecht: it’s genesis and consequences, in J. C. Boogman (eds.), 
Van spel tot Spelers: Verspreideopstellen, The Hague: pp. 53-82. Such a secret was retained also by 
England, the next hegemony, in a more balanced relationship of power between locality and centrality, or, 
in Tilly’s word, capital and coercion. In the context, and according to the state technology headway, of 
the XVIII-XIX century, a more balanced structure, not entirely centralized and not enterily localized, was 
the proper compromise to recreate the structural condition for a new, different hegemony, in a new and 
different historical context, national and systemic. In Tilly’s, such balancing resulted in the historical 
passage from pure capital-intensive state power to capitalized-coercive state power. 
112
 Cf. Charles Tilly, 1990, Coercion, capital, and European States,  990-1990, Basil Blackwell, 
Cambridge: pp. 30, 18-30. See p.17: «Capitalists, then, are people who specialize in the accumulation, 
purchase, and sale of capital. They occupy the realm of exploitation, where the relations of production 
and exchange themselves yield surpluses, and capitalists capture them».  
113Indeed, «[…] Holland constructed and managed the bureaucracies, departments and complex 
organizations required to raise revenues, solve problems, preserve stability and deliver arrays of public 
goods, including external security, that promoted economic growth sooner and more efficiently than [all 
the] others», Patrick O’Brian, State formation and the construction, p.61. But we probe such an assertion 
in the next historic chapter. This is the nub of the great work by Marjolein ‘t Hart, The Making of a 
Bourgeois State 
114
 I would like to suggest what I mean for both in the context of a capitalist world system, with no 
pretension of completeness of course. Very shortly: “concentration” is accumulation of eco-financial 
power by means of organic expansion of trade, industry, finance and agriculture in nature; 
“centralization” is accumulation of political-economic power by way of concentration. Both together 
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embody the overt facet of the hegemony. Their inter-twine is however outcome of an internal coherence 
which allows to breed and to project the hegemonic power outward. 
115
 That is, limits to Dutch capital, to Dutch state and to Dutch society – resilience to change – along with 
external shocks – rival competition and competitors’ political-institutional and socio-economic and 
military innovation. In short: system development. See in general Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth 
Century, ch. 2; Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance; Jason Moore, 2011, 
“‘Amsterdam is Standing on Norway’ Part I: The Alchemy of Capital, Empire and Nature in the Diaspora 
of Silver, 1545–1648, Part I-II”, Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 10 N. 1-2: pp. 33-68; pp. 188-227.  
116
 We could use Brenner’s apt words, but destructuring them of their traditional Marxist significance 
inherent in his own view. Such an enforcement mechanism is so described in other words: «It is only a 
[mechanism] which is organized so that the accumulation of capital via innovation is enforced by the very 
structure of the social productive relations that can turn an accrual of potentially productive resources 
from outside to the service of economic development», Robert Brenner, 1978, “The Origins of Capitalist 
Development: A Critique of Neo- Smithian”, New Left Review, vol. 104: p. 67.   
 
Chapter 3 
1 
David S. Landes, 1969, The unbound Prometheus; Technological change and industrial development in 
Western Europe from 1750 to the present, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: pp 20. 
2 Charles Tilly, 1989, “Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800”,  Theory and Society, Vol. 18, N. 5:  pp. 
583-584 
3
 Braudel, 1979, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore: p. 110. See what Michael Mann, 1987, The Source of Social Power, vol. I, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: p. 375, says talking of transition: «we cannot equate this specific economic 
transition with the entire movement of European history. The capitalist mode of production, like all 
modes of production, is an ideal type, an abstraction. If capitalism came to dominate in actual social life, 
it was not likely to be as pure as the definition might imply. Like all modes of production, it required 
force, political institutionalization, and ideology, and its requirements were likely to result in compromise 
forms of social organization. To explain the rise of capitalism – indeed, of feudalism – we must trace the 
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interrelations of all four principal organizations of power: economic, military, political, and ideological. 
[…]. In view of this it seems unwise to use them [feudalism or capitalism] as general designations of 
either medieval or modern Europe. The process of European dynamism is not the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism», emphasis added 
4
 Cf. Giovanni Arrighi, 2010 [1994], The Long Twentieth Century Money, Power, and the Origins of Our 
Times, Verso, London-NY : pp. 5-11, p. 89 
5
 See important Michael Perleman, 2000, The invention of capitalism, Duke University Press, Durham, 
NC and Tom Brass, 2011, Labour Regime Change in the Twenty-First Century, Brill, Leiden-Boston. For 
the current reality, see variant in David Harvey, 2003, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
6
 Karl Marx, 1976, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, Penguin Books in association with 
New Left Review, Harmondsworth-NY: pp. 899-900; ivi, p. 134, quotation of  William Petty, 1667, 
Treatise of Taxes and Contributions; published anonymously, London: p. 47. Cf. Michael Perleman, The 
invention of capitalism, ch. 2 and Tom Brass, Labour Regime Change, ch. 5. See Jason Moore, The 
Capitalocene Part II, 
7
 Quoted in Michael Perelman, The invention of capitalism, p. 74 
8
 Braudel, Afterthoughts on, p. 74 
9
 The former of ecological and socio-economic sort, the latter of political-institutional kind. Here I am to 
investigate factors and vectors internal to Dutch space. But to understand history, spatially-located 
vectors and factors should be always interlocked with systemic vectors and factors. See partially ch.1 in 
Part I; and, for a general rundown, Rich and Charles Wilson, 1977, The Cambridge Economic History of 
Europe. The Economic Organization of Europe, vol. IV, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
Theodore K. Rabb, 1975, The Struggle for in Early Modern Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Immanuel Wallerstein, 1974-1980,  The Modern World-System, Vol. 1-2;  Giovanni Arrighi, The Long 
Twentieth Century; Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, 1999, Chaos and Governance in the Modern 
World System, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-London 
10
 Cf. Jason W. Moore, 2016, The Rise of Cheap Nature, in Jason W. Moore (ed.), Anthropocene or 
Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism, PM Press, Oakland: p. 101; see Jan 
Bieleman, 2009, Five centuries of Farming A short history of Dutch agriculture 1500-2000, Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, The Netherlands: p. 49: «At the end of the 16
th
 century wheat yields, for instance, 
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had already reached a level that would only be improved significantly again in the second half of the 19th 
century. Recently, it has been established that in between, for a period of more than one and a half 
centuries, the crop yields varied from a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 25 hl/ha, or approx. 1,150 to 
1,900 kg/ha». Jason Moore, The Capitalocene Part II, p. 28: «The shift from land productivity to labor 
productivity revealed a new law of value. It crystallized through a double dialectic. The first was 
premised on exploitation: abstract social labor/capital and wage-labor; the second, on appropriation: 
abstract social nature/capital and unpaid work. Through capitalization, labor productivity advances with 
the rising value composition of production; through appropriation, labor productivity advances by seizing 
Cheap Natures, reducing the value composition of production and advancing the rate of profit. If 
profitability is to rise, appropriation must advance faster – geographically and demographically – than 
exploitation».  
11
 Jessica Dijkman, 2011, Shaping Medieval Markets. The Organisation of Commodity Markets in 
Holland, c. 1200–c. 1450, Brill, Leiden-Boston: pp. 234-235, 248-249, 270, 344. The rate of urbanization 
in the 16
th
 century ranged from 45 to 55 per cent, Bas J. P. Van Bavel, 2006, “Rural wage labour in the 
sixteenth century Low Countries: an assessment of the importance and nature of wage labour in the 
countryside of Holland, Guelders and Flanders”, in Continuity and Change , vol. 21, N. 1: p.39; and Bas 
J. P. van Bavel and J. Luiten van Zanden, 2004, “The jump-start of the Holland economy during the late-
medieval crisis, c.1350–c.1500”, Economic History Review, Vol. 57, N. 3: pp. 503, 505; Ivi, p. 505-506, 
table 1 for population: from 210.000 in 1300ca. to 400.000 in 1500ca. Cf. Peter C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, 
2001, Town and Country in Holland,1350-1550, in S. R. Epstein (eds.), Town and Country in Europe, 
1300-1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: p. 57  
12
 Such a historical upshot has been explained also by the fact that Holland remained a frontier economy 
and a virgin ecology into the thirteen century, a fact that would link the feudal weakness with the ensuing 
structure of Holland economy, Bas J. P. van Bavel and J. Luiten van Zanden, The jump-start of the 
Holland. cf. H.P.H. Jansen, 1978, Holland's Advance, in H.P.H. Jansen (eds.), Acta a Historieae 
Neerlandicae. Studies on the History of the Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands: p. 16 
13
 Jan Luiten van Zanden and Bas van Leeuwen, 2012, “Persistent but not consistent: The growth of 
national income in Holland 1347–1807”, Exploration In Economic History, vol. 49: p. 128. « Growth was 
persistent: the Holland economy shows remarkable resilience in this respect; it goes through a number of 
crises, due to harvest failures and dramatic decline of arable yields between 1370 and 1440, the Revolt 
 332 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and the following civil war between 1572 and 1609, and the increased competition by its neighbors (from 
1650s onwards), but it manages to adapt its economic structure and to resume its growth path after each 
successive crisis […]. Apparently, this economy was able to adapt successfully to the situation of labor 
scarcity that emerged after 1348, and developed the right institutions and incentives to transform itself in 
a highly successful ‘high wage economy’, capable of generating positive trend growth». Jan de Vries, 
1993, The labour markets, in Karel Davids and Leo Noordegraaf (eds.), The Dutch Economy in 
the Golden Age, NEHA, Amsterdam: p. 69, against van Zanden’s account explored in chapter 1 
14
 Michael Mann, The Source of Social Power, p. 374. See p. 399: accordingly, in this respect, 
“capitalism” «is not a matter of how people acquired their own private resources from more communal 
"feudal" institutions, but rather a matter of how a few preserved them through changing circumstances – 
to appear eventually as "capitalists" – and of how the mass of the population lost their property rights to 
appear eventually as landless laborers» 
15
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, 2009, Medieval Capital Markets. Markets for Renten, State Formation and Private 
Investment in Holland (1300–1550), Brill, Leiden-Boston: pp. 27-70, 270-271: «The counts owed much 
of their success to reclamation of the peat region, a large, virtually uninhabited marshy area where 
independent lords and clerics had never gained control. When colonists had settled on the land, the counts 
could create a society very similar to a territorial state; the settlers answered directly to the counts, and 
paid taxes to them»; Bas van Bavel, 2010, Manors and Markets: Economy and Society in the Low 
Countries, 500–1600, Oxford University Press, Oxford: as instance p. 392: «His position became based 
on taxes and military service, not on manorial properties, personal connections, or arbitrary levies. This 
laid the basis for a modern-type relationship between prince and people, almost like that between state 
and citizen, without personal or feudal elements». Cf. Peter C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, Town and Country in 
Holland, p. 78 
16
 Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, ch. 4 and 10; the scholar, pp. 347-349, avers the «near 
absence of urban coercion over the countryside»; Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, 1997, The First 
Modern Economy. Success, failure, and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815,  Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: ch. 11, and pp. 509-510:  country and towns for the most «achieved a sort 
of symbiosis, or formed an economic continuum»; Jan de Vries, 2001, The transition to capitalism in a 
land without feudalism, in P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), Peasants into Farmers?: The 
Transformation of Rural Economy and Society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages - 19th Century) in 
 333 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Light of the Brenner Debate: pp. 80-82: «a crucial achievement […] was the avoidance of a polity of 
urban exploiters»; The instinct was present but came to be checked, both by the territorial lord and towns’ 
competition: Marjolein ‘t Hart, 2001, Town and Country in the Dutch Republic 1550-1800, in S. R. 
Epstein (eds.), Town and Country in Europe, 1300-1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: p. 84: 
«the high density of towns meant that urban [political] control over the countryside was strongly 
contested. Coercive moves by one town could always be hindered or mitigated by the actions of another. 
What is more, inter-urban rivalries involved several centres at the same time»; she talks of deep «rural-
urban integration» through markets, p. 87, see p. 92; Marjolein ‘t Hart, 2014, The Dutch Wars of 
Independence Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands 1570–1680, Routledge, London-NY: pp. 118-
122 and finally Wantje Fritschy, 2017, Public Finance of the Dutch Republic in Comparative Perspective 
The Viability of an Early Modern Federal State (1570s-1795), Brill, Leiden-Boston: p. 88. Such 
development was stimulated by the late occupation of land also, Bas J. P. van Bavel and J. Luiten van 
Zanden, The jump-start of the Holland: pp. 503–532;  Bas van Bavel, 2011, “Markets for land, labor, and 
capital in northern Italy and the Low Countries, twelfth to seventeenth centuries”, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 41: p. 530.  
Cf. Peter C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, Town and Country in Holland, pp. 64-69; 76-79.   
17 
Cf. extraordinary S. R. Epstein, 2000, Freedom and Growth. The rise of states and markets in Europe, 
1300–1750, Routledge, London-NY 
18
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, pp. 185 and 191: the local structure of public power were 
«pivotal points of economic exchange [and] agents of institutional change [processed predominantly] as a 
bottom-up phenomenon»; pp.183-223. Summary p. 199: « In Holland the gap between legislation and 
economy was small. Economic elites had a large say in local government; together with sheriffs, they 
were responsible for legislation and institutional change. Both government agents and economic elites 
were likely to participate», and pp. 223-225 
19
 Among others: Douglass C. North, 1974,  “Institutional Change and Economic Growth”,  The Journal 
of Economic History, Vol. 31, N.1 : p. 3; Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. 
Nonetti, 1993, Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton: ch. 6; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson , 2005, Institutions as the 
fundamental cause of long-run growth, in Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of 
 334 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Economic Growth, Eslevier: pp. 388-396;  Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007, “Whatever is, is right’? Economic 
institutions in pre-industrial Europe”, in Economic History Review, Vol. 60, N. 4: pp. 649–684  
20
 Van Bavel and Van Zanden, The jump-start; Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. 85-89.  An 
instance: «[…]. More important was probably the specific pattern of urbanization in Holland, where – in 
contrast to the southern Low Countries – urban giants were absent. The effects are highlighted in the 
process of standardisation of herring casks in the early 15th century, initiated by the Holland herring 
towns. The driving force was clearly economic necessity: customers abroad demanded uniformity. […]. 
Again, stricter regulation of rural weights and measures was in the first place a reaction to economic 
circumstances: rural trade had expanded and direct links with interregional trade networks had developed. 
[All of this] is closely related to the specific balance of powers that characterised Holland’s society», 
Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, pp. 234-235. 
21
 Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, p. 60. Cf. Peter C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, Town and Country in 
Holland, pp. 69-75. See, interestingly, Michael Mann, The Source of Social Power, p. 413, italics added: 
«The transition that saw Europe leap forward was not primarily the late-medieval transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. That process was largely the institutionalization of a leap that had occurred 
much earlier, in the period that only our lack of documentation leads us to label the Dark Ages. By A.D. 
1200 that leap, that dynamic, was already taking western Europe to new heights of collective social 
power». The institutionalization of the leap largely happened in Holland’s region, as we shall see with a 
significant level of depth. 
22
 See summarize in Bas van Bavel, Markets for land, labor, and capital, p. 510: «Proof and accessibility 
of registration in a central, public place greatly enhanced transparency and security for potential buyers, 
including villagers. The same procedure [of the land transactions] was increasingly applied to transactions 
in the capital market, such as the registration of new mortgages and the selling of real-estate rents by a 
public court, thus protecting people from unexpected rent burdens on land that they had bought. It also 
reduced both insecurity and cost, conferring an equal position on all of the participants, both urban and 
rural». C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, p. 204: «The contracts public bodies drew up and 
ratified were formalized and embedded in an extensive legal framework». Cf. Jessica Dijkman, Shaping 
Medieval Markets, pp. 249-271 and C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, pp. 185-188 and ch. 5, 
esp. pp. 200-225; for non-local orders of formalization of activities see ivi, pp. 65-67. In the end, it is 
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tenable to say that «The institutional framework that the public sector created allowed for an increasing 
accumulation of capital», ivi, p. 274 
23
 Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, ch. 4 for the case of fish and dairy sectors and the positive 
impact of the institutions on transaction costs – to quantify cf. ch. 8; ch. 6 to assess the whys of such 
institutional set of rules; see C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, pp. 200-223 for capital and 
land markets. To summarize, the whys are: to control market dynamics (against monopolies for example); 
to control quality and quantity of productions and exchanges of capital, goods and land; to check the 
problem of free-riding and the informational asymmetry issue; related to all, for a more accurate fiscality. 
Such a set of operations was largely a local affair in Holland. Institutional drivers in Holland trailed off 
transaction cost effectively. Openness was also a feature of the market structure in Holland. Popular 
savings investment was a consequence of the distinctive institutional structure of Holland, ivi, p. 240, 
247. 
24
 Peter Hoppenbrouwers and J. L. van Zanden, 2001, Restyling the transition Brenner debate Holland, in 
P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), Peasants into Farmers?: pp. 22-26, 36, according to 
whom, within a proper institutional framework and conditions, such as the Dutch ones, 
«commercialisation and specialization may therefore a self-reinforcing process», in urban and rural areas 
alike; Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, p. 393. So, Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, p. 
321-324, reckons the urban labor devoted to market-oriented activities, non-agrarian and agrarian 
combined, from 82 to 90% for the towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants, 90 to 95% for the towns with 
2,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, and 95 to 100% for the largest towns. The market orientation of the urban 
sector as a whole can thus be estimated at 88 to 94% in the middle of the 14th century and 92 to 97% 
around 1500. In the end, it is tenable to say that «around the year 1500 between 87% and 94% of the total 
labour input of Holland’s population was devoted to the production of commodities and the provisioning 
of services through the market».. See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, Institutions as 
the fundamental cause, pp. 395-396. Such theoretical perspective fits the Dutch path of advancement.  
25
 Jan de Vries, 1976, The Economy Of Europe In An Age Of Crisis, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: pp. 25-29. See for the institutional foundation of Holland’s international trades, Oscar 
Gelderblom, 2013, Cities of Commerce. the institutional foundation of international trades, 1250-1650, 
Princeton University Press, who witnessed, and thereby buttressed, the consideration aforementioned 
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about the institutional framework of Holland. His focus is on Amsterdam’s international connections and 
her institutional scaffolding that propelled accumulation.  
26
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, recap p. 184-185. See Jessica Dijkman, Shaping 
Medieval Markets, as instance Ch. 4 and pp. 347-349 in short; Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, p. 
101: the town-country correlation pivoted on «the purchasing power of urban dwellers enhanced by the 
services they provided in religion, administration, industry or trade». Cf. Peter C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, 
Town and Country in Holland, pp. 60-64: «the late medieval rural economy was already highly 
commercialized. Villages both gained and lost from the development of denser and more complex market 
networks. They gained from lower transaction costs and improved opportunities to specialise, but they 
lost because commercial integration also increased the towns' reach into the economy of the countryside» 
as we shall see. Their linkage was also owed to the process of integration of markets, by way of the 
«uniform institutional framework». A limited example of homogeneity is offered by «the small 
differences in nominal wage between town and country», Bas van Bavel, Markets for land, labor, and 
capital, 525-526. See in general S. R. Epstein, 1994, “Regional Fairs, Institutional Innovation, and 
Economic Growth in Late Medieval Europe”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 47, N. 3: pp. 459-482 . 
See below 
27
 Michael Mann, The Source of Social Power, p. 412 
28
 Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, notably ch. 4 and 6; J. Luiten van Zanden, 2001, A third 
road to capitalism? Proto-industrialization and the moderate nature of the late medieval crisis in Flanders 
and Holland, 1350–1550,  in P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), esp. p.  89; Jan de Vries 
and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, ch. 11; Marjolein ‘t Hart, Town and Country, p. 87, 
ad p. 92 talks of «high degree of institutionalised bargaining between town and country which resulted 
overall in a relatively pacific relationship», italics added; Marjolein ‘t Hart, The Dutch Wars of 
Independence, pp. 118-122.  
29
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, pp. 269-280 and Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval 
Markets; Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, ch. 11 and Jan de Vries, The 
transition to capitalism in a land, p. 81; Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. 393-394 and Bas van 
Bavel, Markets for land, labor, and capital, p. 530.  
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30
 cf. Charles Tilly, 1990, Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990, Blackwell, Oxford: pp. 
47-53, and W.P. Blockmans, 1989, “Voracious states and obstructing cities; An aspect of state formation 
in preindustrial Europe”, Theory and Society, Vol. 18: 733-755.  
31
 Van Zanden and van Bavel explains also the capital-intensive structure of Holland economy by using 
the concept of «frontier economy». In short: in a frontier economy, labor is scarce and there is plenty of 
land. As a result wages go up and a counterbalancing strategy of the employers is to invest in capital-
intensive technologies rather than in labor intensification. Van Bavel and Van Zanden, The jump-start, 
pp. 523-526 
32
 See Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, esp. p. 362-ff; Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, 
p. 234 and C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, pp 184-185, 274-280.  
33
 Jan Luiten van Zanden and Bas van Leeuwen, Persistent but not consistent, 127-128, pp. 119-130. The 
bout here questioned is indeed considered a as «a period of very rapid structural change», p. 125; Jansen, 
Holland's Advance; Bas van Bavel, 2010, “The Medieval origins of Capitalism in the Netherlands”, in 
Bijdragen en Mededelingen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 125: pp. 49-50, 53; Bas van Bavel, 
2003, “Early Proto Industrialization in the Low Countries? The Importance and Nature of Market-
Oriented Non-Agricultural Activities in the Countryside in Flanders and Holland, c. 1250 – 1570”, Revue 
belge de philologie et d'histoire, Vol. 81 N.4: p. 1144; Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, ch. 4 
and C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, ch. 4. cf. Peter C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, Town and 
Country in Holland, pp. 62-63 
34
 See Miachel Mann, The Sources of Social Power, p. 25 
35
 The eminent Italian historian Ruggiero Romano avers that only within a proper tangle of urbanity and 
rurality, economy and society as a whole could grow and thrive, Ruggiero Romano, 1971, Tra le due 
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Death. Indeed, «There are a number of reports about the low standards of pay of Holland sailors in the 
late Middle Ages», p. 19. But the hypothesis of the «frontier economy» advanced by van Bavel and van 
Zanden seems well founded, both theoretically and historically. Even more if we consider the previous 
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policies. Excessive pressure could create an exodus from the subsistence sector capable of overwhelming 
the capacity to employ wage labor. Too little pressure could allow too many people to remain in the 
traditional sector to satisfy the demands of would-be employers», Michael Perelman, The invention of 
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a lesser extent, beer. All were produced more cheaply in Holland than elsewhere because of the plentiful 
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although centered on the period starting from the 17
th
 century, see Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, 
The First Modern Economy, pp. 561–5. 
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73
 Jansen, Holland's Advance, p. 11-16.  Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, p. 229. Here 
«commodity frontier» is used without reference to the concept developed by Jason Moore. I use these 
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taverns. Beer, even heavily hopped, was a perishable good so decreasing uncertainty about outlets for 
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See in general ch.3-4-5 and Bas van Bavel, Early Proto Industrialization,  pp. 1136-137, 1126. In the 
course of urban expansion, towns came to exerted strong political influence. Rural displacement in 
brewing after the sixteenth century was also the outcome of this meddling, see Richard W. Unger, A 
history of brewing in Holland 900-1900, p. 189 
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90
 Cf. Michael Perelman, The invention of capitalism, pp. 98-100 
91
 Richard W. Unger, 1999, “Feeding Low Countries Towns : the Grain Trade in the Fifteenth Century”, 
Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, Vol. 77, N.2; Richard W. Unger, 1983, Integration of Baltic and 
Low Countries gram markets, 1400-1800, in J.M. van Winter (ed.), The Interactions of Amsterdam and 
Antwerp with the Baltic Region, 1400- 1800, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden: p. 1  
92
 The early origin of Holland’s grain “country-trade”, and its integration, in Jessica Dijkman, Shaping 
Medieval Markets, p. 284; see ch. 3 and 8. Furthermore, «this dependence on grain imports had important 
effects. It probably gave rise to a pattern of price change over the year, deviating from what was 
customary in other countries, and it is likely that it stimulated interregional market integration», ibid. . 
Integration leaps out in the comparison of adjacent jurisdictions, such as Flanders and England. 
93
 Milja van Tielhof, 2001, Grain Provision in Holland ca. 1490-1570, in P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten 
van Zanden: p. 204. See David Kirby, 1998, Northern Europe in the Early Modern Time. The Baltic 
World 1492-1772, Routledge, London-NY: p. 9: «In the summer of 1481, a Danzig shipowner recorded 
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that over one thousand ships, great and small, laden with corn, sailed westwards from the port, bound for 
Holland, Zeeland and Flanders. A century later, the port was regularly visited by over two thousand ships 
annually, carrying off quantities of grain from the Polish hinterland to the Amsterdam market. Almost 
half of the entire trade of the city of Amsterdam was with Danzig, which was also the port of origin of 
nearly 80 per cent of the rye imported into the Dutch city in the sixteenth century. So important was the 
trade that Dutch merchants refused to stop re-exporting Baltic grain to the Iberian peninsula during the 
war against Habsburg Spain. Small wonder that the Dutch saw the grain trade as ‘the source and root of 
the most notable commerce and navigation of these lands» 
94
 Milja van Tielhof, Grain Provision in Holland, p. 205 
95
 See as instance Marian Malowist, The economic and Social Development 
96
 Among others, Bas J. P. van Bavel and J. Luiten van Zanden, The jump-start of the Holland. 
97
 Milja van Tielhof, Grain Provision in Holland; See outstanding, Milja van Tielhof, 2002, The 'Mother 
of All Trades': The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century, Brill, 
Leiden-Boston: esp. pp. 40-50 and 67-112. Cf. Marian Malowist, The economic and Social Development, 
p. 184: «During the first half of the sixteenth century, this export increased only at a slow rate; but, from 
the middle of the century, it rapidly gathered strength, eventually surpassing by three or four times the 
quantities exported at the end of the fifteenth century. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the toll 
registers indicate an even faster increase in these exports which, in 1618, attained the record figure of 
75,000 lasts of rye and a considerable quantity of wheat». Not only profit from trade but also from 
speculation, sometimes of the financial sort (elementary options as instance). See ivi, p 185.  
98
 See Marian Malowist, The economic and Social Development, p. 184: «Danzig was very important for 
the Dutch in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. We have proof of this, both from contemporary 
Netherlands sources and from the calculations of Unger and Posthumus, from which it appears that in the 
sixteenth century, for the years to which the evidence refers, nearly 80 per cent of the rye imported by sea 
to Amsterdam, came from Danzig. Of this quantity, only about 23 per cent was destined for the 
population of Amsterdam; the rest either was sold in the Low Countries or was exported to Portugal and, 
at some periods, to England and, later, to Italy» See also Oscar C. Gelderblom, 2003, “From Antwerp to 
Amsterdam: The Contribution of Merchants from the Southern Netherlands to the Commercial Expansion 
of Amsterdam (C. 1540-1609)”, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 26, N. 3: pp. 250-255.  
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Provision in Holland, pp. 206-207, 214-215. See Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. 337-340. See 
Robert Brenner, 2001, “The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism”, in Journal of Agrarian 
Change, Vol. 1, N. 2: pp. 173-188, republished in P. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Luiten van Zanden (eds.), 2001, 
The Transformation of Rural Economy and Society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages - 19th century) in 
light of the Brenner Debate, Brepsol: pp. pp. 275-338. See Jansen, Holland's Advance and W. P. 
Blockmans 1993, The Economic Expansion of Holland and Zeeland in the Fourteenth–Sixteenth 
Centuries, Aerts, Henau, Janssens and van Uytven (eds.). See Marian Malowist, The economic and Social 
Development, p. 185: «the rapidly growing interdependence of the economies of Poland and Holland was 
already very great in this period. Every disturbance in the delivery of grain and timber from the coasts of 
the Baltic, that is, especially from Poland, produced a rise in the cost of living in Holland and the other 
provinces of the Low Countries […]».  
100
 Hapke R (ed.), 1913, Niederldndischen Akten und Urkunden zur Geschichte der Hanse und zur 
deutschen Seegeschichte (2 vols.). Munich-Leipzig, vol. 1. p. 200, quoted in David Kirby, Northern 
Europe p. 8. See Marian Malowist, The economic and Social Development, p. 181-183 
101
 Ivi, 201, pp.208-211; Jan Bieleman, Five Centuries of Farming, pp. 44-49; Jessica Dijkman, Shaping 
Medieval Markets, p. 284 
102
 When east flows came to be intensified and prioritized, Amsterdam became the grain warehouse of the 
Netherlands, as well as Holland for Europe, Ivi, 213-214 
103
 Ivi, 216 
104
 Jan de Vries, The European Economy, p. 32; Jan de Vries, The transition to capitalism in a land, 
pp.81-82 
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 Cf. previous references about Wallerstein, Moore, Beckert, Brass and Perleman  
106
 Jason Moore, The Capitalocene Part II, p. 30. Manuel González de Molina and Víctor M. Toledo, 
2014, The Social Metabolism A Socio-Ecological Theory of Historical Change, Springer, NY: p. 23 
107
 Paul F. State, 2008, A Brief History of the Netherlands, Facts on file, NY: p.1; Such statement signals 
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109
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severe natural discomfort and a large potential for gain» 
110
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111
 J. W. De Zeeuw, Peat and the Dutch Golden Age, pp. 4-5 
112
 See Jason Moore, 2003, “ Nature and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism”, Review (Fernand 
Braudel Center), vol. 26, N. 2: esp. pp. 105-115, assessing feudalism’s demise as a socio-ecological 
systemic crash.  
113
 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. III, p. 937: « […]. On the other hand, large landed property reduces the 
agricultural population to an ever decreasing minimum and confronts it with an ever growing industrial 
population crammed together in large towns; in this way it produces conditions that provoke an 
irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism, a metabolism prescribed by the natural 
laws of life itself. The result of this is a squandering of the vitality of the soil» 
114
 Tamara L. Whited, Jens I. Engels, Richard C. Hoffmann, Hilde Ibsen and Wybren Verstegen, 2005, 
Northern Europe. An Environmental History, ABC-CLIO: pp. 69-70. Feudalism affected environment of 
course but it did not spoiled nor degraded ecology intensively, but extensively. For feudalism was a 
system leaning toward a production for use, spatially-located reclamation and colonization were solutions 
to the ecological/economic crisis it produced on the soil.  
115
 Jason Moore, Ecology, Capital and the Nature  
116
 Jason Moore, Sugar and the Expansion; J. W. De Zeeuw, Peat and the Dutch Golden Age, p. 24 «In 
regard to heating energy the Dutch lived a style – measured to contemporary foreign criteria – as if they 
used the greater part of their territory for nothing else but energy production and distribution» 
 
117
 see an instance in G. J. Borger, Draining-digging-dredging, p. 150: «it is often supposed that the 
woods were exhausted at that time of rising population by the increasing intensity of woodland 
exploitation [in the late Middle Ages]. But it is doubtful whether the self-renewing capacity of the woods 
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The Capitalocene Part II, p. 15; Indeed, The term “landscape” in the sixteenth century Dutch strongly 
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120
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«Historical sources inform us that by the end of the seventeenth century there was virtually no woodland 
left that could be used as wood pasture or for any other purpose in large parts of the eastern Netherlands. 
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122
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the Rhine to Dutch markets reveals a fascinating picture of the scale of deforestation in the hinterland of 
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123
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124
 Tamara Whited et al, Northern Europe. An Environmental, p.81. See Fishing technology advancement 
by way of capital investment in Karel Davis, The Rise and Decline of Dutch Technological Leadership. 
Technology, Economy and Culture in the Netherlands, 1350–1800 vol. 1, Brill, Leiden-Boston: pp.  
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 J. W. De Zeeuw, Peat and the Dutch Golden Age, p. 6; for peat throughput see Charles Cornelisse, 
2006, The Economy of Peat and its Environmental Consequences in Holland during the Late Middle 
Ages, in Hilde Greefs, Marjolein 't Hart (ed.), Water management, communities and environment : the 
Low countries in comparative perspective, c. 1000-c. 1800 : pp. 95-123; Jan de Vries and Ad van der 
Woude, The First Modern Economy, pp. 37-41; peat came to be even exported, Jessica Dijkman, Shaping 
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Medieval Markets, p. 130: «at the end of the Middle Ages peat exports from Holland to the southern Low 
Countries increased significantly». 
126
 TeBrake, 2002, Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering, p. 481-485; Petra J. E. M. van Dam, 
2002, “Ecological Challenges, Technological Innovations: The Modernization of Sluice Building in 
Holland, 1300-1600”, Technology and Culture, Vol. 43, N. 3:  pp. 505-506 
127
 Petra van Dam, Ecological Challenges, pp . 505: «By the end of the fourteenth century, Dutch 
peasants had given up farming the peat lands because the groundwater level was too high, and 
commercial peat digging became an important activity in the countryside. Peat cutters dug into the peat 
cushions to a depth of four to six meters, until they reached the clay subsoil». Consequentially, «severe 
ecological crisis occurred in these wetland areas during the late Middle Ages, caused mainly by the 
subsidence of the drained peat bogs […] since drainage for agriculture and digging peat for fuel were the 
main factors causing the bogs to sink», pp. 500-501. See Tamara Whited et al., Northern Europe. An 
Environmental, p. 65 
128
 TeBrake, 2002, Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering and, p. 497. In parts of Holland region 
such as Western-Drente, Friesland, Overijssel and Utrecht, peat excavation began by 1300, and instantly 
peat became «a substantial industry» by itself in the growing network of urban markets. 
129
 As instance: lakes of increasing scale, for example, came to crowd most of the area between the rivers 
Oude Rijn, Gouwe and Hollandse IJssel and threatend the villages of Nieuwerkerk, Zevenhuizen, 
Moerkapelle and Waddinxveen around 1600.
 
«In 1630 the church of Jacobswoude, north of the Oude 
Rijn, was pulled down because by then the rest of the village had been swallowed by the waves of 
encircling man-made lakes» J. W. De Zeeuw, 1978, Peat and the Dutch Golden Age, p. 13. «The 
formation of large lakes started somewhat later, brought about principally by the commercialization of 
peat mining», Petra van Dam, Ecological Challenges, p. 506. Once eventually the pumping mills came 
into full operation during the 16
th
 century, peat extraction was further intensified through deeper dredging 
and water control whose ecological consequences came to be manifest, TeBrake, Taming the Waterwolf: 
Hydraulic Engineering, p. 497 and G. J. Borger, Draining-digging-dredging,  pp. 156-157: «the peat 
layers were dredged away to a depth of several meters below the polder water table. Such deep dredging 
greatly enlarged the volume of the available peat reserves for the making of fuel. The rural economy 
benefitted largely from investments in large-scale fuel production and in transport facilities as long as the 
turbaries flourished. But as a result of wave erosion and illegal excavation ditches were broadened into 
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small lakes and strips of water coalesced into broad meres (Dutch: 'plassen'), which menaced surrounding 
dikes, roads and even villages. So, in the long run, the excavated area changed into a large water body 
with only small strips of poor, almost worthless peatland» 
130
 van Bavel, Early Proto-Industrialization in the Low Countries?, pp. 1137-1138. Peat-digging was an 
important means of livelihood for the rural areas : «peat-digging in the Holland region developed strongly 
in the 14th century. This was partly a result of the growing demand from the urban population for heating 
and urban industries for brewing and dyeing, but also from rural industries such as brick works and lime-
kilns, both having a great need for fuel». The location of peat-digging was constantly shifting because of 
the exhaustion of the soil, but «the large-scale introduction of dredging peat below the water table with 
scoops from c. 1530 onwards, however, possibilities were created for a new round of large-scale 
extraction in Holland». Cf.  Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. 360-361 
131
 Peat was naturally abundant, see TeBrake, Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering, pp. 479-480 
132
 G. J. Borger, Draining-digging-dredging, p. 160-161 as instance: Peat «required the investment of 
large capital sums to exploit the remote, virgin peat bogs. So, the impenetrable bogs and extensive moors 
in other provinces were subject to speculative exploitation […]Large-scale peat cutting spread over the 
Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in order to supply fuel for the fast growing towns of 
Holland. At first the peat areas were co-operatively drained by groups of individuals, but early in the 
seventeenth century companies were set up in the provinces of Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe. These 
companies were in part financed by citizens of the towns of Holland and in part by the wealthy 
inhabitants of the towns and countryside of these three provinces. By the 1620s however, urban capitalists 
mainly from Holland had full control of the peat digging operations in Groningen and Friesland. The 
companies under their control dug canals, established villages to house thousands of temporary laborers, 
and shipped enormous quantities of peat to the cities of Holland» 
133
 See an instance G. J. Borger, Draining-digging-dredging, p. 156; Petra van Dam, Ecological 
Challenges; TeBrake, Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering 
134
 G. J. Borger, Draining-digging-dredging, pp. 150-157 
135
 Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. ; TeBrake, 2002, Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic 
Engineering; . W. De Zeeuw, Peat and the Dutch Golden Age; not for nothing, «During the period 1300-
1600, water management institutions in the Netherlands underwent a significant process of centralization 
and reinforcement», Petra van Dam, Ecological Challenges,  p. 502 
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 Ivi, pp.  10-15. Cf. TeBrake, 2002, Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering, pp. 481-482. 
Especially from early modern times, also the «ore deposits were systematically mined on an ever 
expanding scale. The ore was transported to iron melting works in the region […] to be processed into 
cast iron. These iron works were able to develop thanks to a unique set of specific regional circumstances, 
namely the availability of ore, cheap labour and the necessary sources of energy (charcoal and 
hydropower)», Groenewoudt, 2010, Versatile land …, p. 63; Tamara Whited et al, Northern Europe. An 
Environmental,  p. 70: «South Holland’s vast but equally artificial Haarlemmermeer, located between 
Haarlem and Leiden, not really drained until the nineteenth century, also resulted from late-medieval peat 
exports for urban energy needs». For a reckoning of energy consumption see Charles Cornelisse, The 
Economy of Peat, pp. 98-103 
137
 TeBrake, 2002,  Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering, p. 499; Jan Bieleman, Five Centuries 
of Farming, pp. 37-38  
138
 G. J. Borger, Draining-digging-dredging; Petra van Dam, Ecological Challenges, esp. pp. 506-519; 
Clè Lesger, 1993, Intraregional trade and the port system in Holland, 1400-1700, in in Karel Davids and 
Leo Noordegraaf (eds.), The Dutch Economy in the Golden Age, NEHA, Amsterdam: summarized in pp. 
208: «The most important contribution a well-functioning intraregional transport system can make to a 
regional economy is that it allows specialization on a local and sub-regional level. Indeed, in Holland the 
economy was characterized by a large degree of geographical specialization […]. Ports specialized as 
well. Because of an intraregional transport system the inhabitants of these cities could fall back on other 
centres for the goods they themselves did not produce, and for the sale of their own produce. This kind of 
specialization in Holland was tremendously important, for […] it was only possible to profit from 
economies of scale by geographically concentrating economic activities. It may also be expected that the 
concentration of specific economic activities facilitated innovations in the production of goods and 
services. […].The existence of a properly functioning intraregional transport system was a precondition 
for specialization and its positive effects on the economy» 
139
 Andrew Warheam, 2006, Water Management and Economic Environment  in Eastern England, The 
Low Countries and China. 960-1650. Comparison and consequences, in Hilde Greefs, Marjolein 't Hart 
(ed.), Water management, communities and environment : the Low countries in comparative perspective, 
c. 1000-c. 1800 : p. 11 and 26; TeBrake, 2002,  Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering, p. 498-
499; Petra van Dam, Ecological Challenges, p. 506-517; J.W. De Zeeuw, Peat and the Dutch Golden 
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Age: «Without turf and inland navigation this would again create an impossible situation: all inhabitants 
would have had to have occupied themselves with the winning and transporting of energy sources; 
nobody would have been left to apply this energy in industrial processes or to perform other social 
activities». But the capitalist logic of operation acted as a socio-ecological propellant to grew as a whole, 
socially, economically, institutionally and embedded in a framework of manipulated natures 
140
 Such circuit seizes appropriation as internal to value relation, cf. Jason Moore, The Capitalocene Part 
II, p. 12; Moore, 2012, Cheap Food & Bad Money: Food, Frontiers, and Financialization in the Rise and 
Demise of Neoliberalism, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), vol. 33, N. 2-3: pp.  225-261; Jason Moore, 
2017, “The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our ecological crisis. Part I”, The Journal of 
Peasant Studies: pp. 1-37; J. W. De Zeeuw, Peat and the Dutch Golden Age, pp. 25-30 
141
 Bas van Bavel, Manors and Markets, p. 307, 376, 404 
142
 Bas J. P. van Bavel and J. Luiten van Zanden, The jump-start of the Holland 
143
 Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, pp. 159-194 ; 509-510 – the Dutch 
title of this extraordinary collection of lifetime historical investigations and knowledge gathering arranged 
by de Vries and van der Wee was in fact «Nederland, 1500-1815. De eerste ronde van modeme 
economische groei» that is, «The Netherlands, 1500-1815. The First round of modern economic growth».  
           Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, p. 344 and 357. Moreover, in her impressive and 
painstaking archival analysis (Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, ch.7), Dijkman reasons that 
freedom and responsibility were both exactly at the roots of the institutional arrangements of both 
economy and society, «as form of self-organization». Notably, she delves into the merchant guilds and 
debt litigation: the former was «a community responsibility model»; the latter premised «on individual 
responsibilities» performed in «urban courts», ivi p. 237-249, ivi. 270-271. 
144
 Michael Mann, The Source of Social Power, ch. 1 
145
 Braudel, pp. 63-64. See next chapter for the elaboration of such insight, and note 103. See Jason 
Moore, The Capitalocene Part II,  esp. pp. 28-30. Since capitalism is value-in-motion, «Power, then, is at 
the center of every moment of value» as well as value is at the center of every moment of power. This is 
what I have argued here, and I am to argue in the next chapters as well. 
146
 See Michael Mann, The Source of Social Power, p. 15-16  
147
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, pp. 269-271. An example is offered by Dijkman herself: 
Holland almost lacked guild. Thus «urban authorities provided the rules and enforcement mechanisms 
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needed to regulate trade. Related to their late rise, the young towns in Holland enjoyed self-government 
almost from the moment they emerged. The local court provided mechanisms for individual contract 
enforcement to traders and merchants almost from the start, facilitating – in Greif ’s terminology – a  
smooth and early introduction of an individual responsibility system», Jessica Dijkman, Shaping 
Medieval Markets, p. 350. Such conditions may be well construed as a process of early 
“commercialization of political power”, or of market embeddedness within political institutions. Or, in 
other words, such necessary process of embeddedness, emanated, here as instance, from the nearly 
historical absence of the guilds, set up the conditions for the early and full involvement of local public 
authorities in the dynamics of the market.  
        See, related to the capital market, C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, p. 223: «Holland’s 
medieval capital markets depended heavily on government institutions. The county’s strong public sector 
was the natural ally of participants in the capital market seeking ways to reduce transaction costs. 
Holland’s late development and weak feudal structures allowed government institutions to create a virtual 
monopoly on voluntary jurisdiction; this was codified in the 16th and 17th centuries and survived until 
the fall of the Republic in 1795». 
148
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, esp. pp. 269-271. See ivi, p. 190 as interesting example 
of how the path of “political commercialisation” proceeded across the centuries up to the 17th century 
public administration and law in the Dutch Republic. For an overview of the three-centuries-long 
jurisdictional coagulation process see ivi. pp. 27-70. Cf. James D. Tracy, 1990, Holland under Habsburg 
rule 1506–1566. The formation of a body politic, University of California Press, Berkeley. See Marjolein 
‘t Hart, 1993, The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics and Finance During the Dutch Revolt, 
Manchester University Press; Marjolein ‘t Hart, The Dutch Wars of Independence; Pepijn Brandon, 2017, 
War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588-1795), Brill, Leiden-Boston. This reasoning shall be elaborated 
in the next part.  
149
 Michael Mann, The Source of Social Power, p. 477-481, 511-512. Peter J. Taylor, 2005, Dutch 
Hegemony and Contemporary Globalization, in Jonathan Friedman, Christopher Chase-Dunn (eds.), 
Hegemonic Decline: Present and Past, Routledge, London-NY: p. 118 
150
 Joseph Schumpeter, 1947, “The creative response in economic history”, The Journal of Economic 
History, vol.7, N.2: p. 150. Cf. Giovanni Arrighi, 2010, The Long Twentieth Century Money, Power, and 
the Origins of Our Times, Verso, London-NY: p. 12. 
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 Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, pp. 345-352: as instance, «control over market 
institutions was in the hands of local merchant elites, who had good reason to promote rules and practices 
that prevented rent-seeking by the ruler or his officials». Indeed, a balance of power among governmental 
and business agencies was at the roots of the achievements,  see pp. 157-158, 348 and 352. See also an 
example of how the balance of power mattered for the regional economy, recapped pp. 130-134; Bas van 
Bavel, Early Proto Industrialization, p. 1164; C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, pp. 268-271 
152
 Peter C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, Town and Country in Holland, p. 58, Jan de Vries and Ad van der 
Woude, The First Modern Economy, p. 165; Jessica Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets, p. 344. Also, 
ivi, ch.6, notes that, in the late middle ages, the main institutional drivers were performed largely by 
towns and by means of their polity: for example the organization of weighing and measuring as well as 
their enforcement – inspection and verification by way of bailiffs and local representatives or aldermen – 
were performed by urban authorities. The related courts since their origin in the 13
th
 century were the 
«bottom layer of the public jurisdictional system», ivi, p. 266; cf. C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital 
Markets, pp. 46-52 and ch. 3 for the management and administration of the public debt fund performed by 
local authorities. But the urban political power in space was an outcome of the spatial expansion of the 
capitalist logic of operation, not its pre-condition as we saw. See to account for this movement of power 
in the Republic, Marjolein ‘t Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State; Marjolein ‘t Hart, The Dutch Wars 
of Independence; Pepijn Brandon, War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588-1795), as instance pp. 63-64, 
table 1.2 
153
 Albeit such a 16
th
 century coagulation came co-produced with nobility. Until the eve of last decade of 
the sixteenth century, nobility played a remarkable role. In Brief, Pepijn Brandon, Marxism and the 
‘Dutch Miracle. pp. 125-128. See Henk Van Nierop, 1993, The Nobility of Holland: From Knights to 
Regents, 1500–1650, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; cf. James D. Tracy, Holland under 
Habsburg. Moreover, such a vertical strenghtening of urban politics had consequences upon the urban-
rural relations, see Marjolein ‘t Hart, Town and Country, pp. 80-106 
154
 Jason Moore,  Sugar and the Expansion, p. 411; see also Jason Moore, 2000,  “Nature and the 
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism”, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 26, No. 2: 97-172 
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rates in Europe may be also co-factors. But the improved market organization and scope almost certainly 
created safe opportunities for investing savings, and this seems the best explanation for «the profound and 
structural decline of interest rates in Holland. […] The emerging capital markets persuaded savers at 
home and abroad to buy renten and thus to increase the quantity of money in circulation. [In turn] 
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policy and offered financial services to subjects». When the economy of Holland set about expanding, its 
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30
 As instance, Amsterdam proved to be a «strong mediator between ruler and his subjects» because of the 
great portion of high political officeholders owed great share of loans market: «A significant part of the 
creditors were found among the Amsterdam political elite, yet numerous others were in a position to buy 
a bond too. The existing trust between the issuing party and potential investors was thus quite large and 
enhanced by the urban tradition in raising loans». Of course, merchants/entrepreneurs were the greatest 
part of financial investment of the state, Marjolein ‘t Hart, Money and trust, p. 6-7 
31
 Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, 1997, The First Modern Economy. Success, failure, and 
perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 139 (also 
quoted by Zuijderduijn). Indeed, private accumulation of financial capital was widely spread and 
developed among the parties. Thousands of rente contracts were negotiated from the XIV century on and 
alienated through inheritance, endowment, and resale. Alienation to third parties was common even for 
other assets, such as obligation as in Dordrecht. What Zuijderduijn underlies significantly is that on 
«average both renteniers and rente payers were not significantly wealthier than the population at large. 
 365 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
This seems to indicate that market structures were capable of reallocating savings among large segments 
of the population. In this respect the capital market of Edam and De Zeevang differed somewhat from 
markets in cities in the north of Germany and the southern Low Countries, which were more dominated 
by elites and middle groups. Perhaps the large proportion of households owning real estate they could use 
to mortgage offers the most straightforward explanation for the importance of middle groups. The vast 
majority of the households in Edam and De Zeevang owned at least a house, so nearly all households had 
the securities required to sell renten», ivi, pp 227-241. 
32
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loans secured by real property, paying annual interest until and unless the principal was repaid; b) Urban 
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revenue from the ordinaris bede, in the period 1515-1533; revenue from novel expedients, as we shall 
see, collected and disbursed by the States after 1542. See James D. Tracy, Holland Under Habsburg Rule 
33
 Mortgage was an important institution for its diffusion and its certainty, required by its own spreading. 
Local court had to ratify the deed. Indeed, later, the Dutch republic was to declare invalid mortgage 
without registration. Ivi, p 185-187 
34
 Arie van Steensel, The Emergence of an Administrative; C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, 
116-117: an instance: «In 1371 Dordrecht appointed a committee to reorganize its public debt. Perhaps 
this committee was the first step in the appointment of treasurers (tresoriers), financial specialists 
predominantly responsible for managing public debt». Another one: «Treasurers appear in smaller cities 
as well. When Rotterdam’s public debt hindered trade in 1436, the city government asked Philip the 
Good’s permission to appoint a Veertigraad, an electoral college that would appoint four treasurers, who 
were supposed to reorganize city finances “so merchants may travel safely and engage in trade”». 
Another: «Thus, public debt and the threat of reprisals forced city governments to specialize. Treasurers 
improved financial administration: to prevent fraud, they started to record the residences in city accounts 
and the age of renteniers in contracts». 
35
 «The counts of Holland did not have the authority to tax their subjects directly: taxes – jaarbede or 
schot – were first shared among cities and villages using a distribution code (schotponden), and then the 
public bodies apportioned the taxes among their subjects. Cities usually levied excise taxes on 
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commodities and incidentally used land or home ownership as the basis for apportioning direct taxes. In 
the countryside public bodies predominantly used landownership as an indication of wealth. Public bodies 
based their assessment on other capital goods as well» ivi, p. 192. Contracts and registrations allowed the 
public bodies to tax the profit on real estate more efficiently, p. 207 
36
 To these purposes, intermediation services – offered by men such as Gillis van den Wijngaerd or 
Symon Claesz, «key figures in the capital market» – were important: endowed with contacts, brokers 
contributed to lower transaction costs and timing of operation, while providing credit rating, stimulating 
the expansion of trade and sales, and affording funding in advance, C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital 
Markets, pp. 112-115; p. 185 
37
 Ivi. p. 170: «Public debt was not confined to the main cities: in the Informacie smaller public bodies 
claim to have contracted funded debt as well. The participation of smaller cities and even villages in 
capital markets is an excellent indicator of market structures» 
38
 ivi, pp. 80-86, 170-181 
39
 Ivi, ch. 5, esp. in sum pp. 181-185.   
40
 Ivi, p. 89-90 
41
 Ivi, p 97.  
42
 ivi, pp. 108-109; pp. 272-273 
43
 since 1515 most major towns had accepted to stand bail for the loans that were issued in the name of 
Holland, Marjolein ‘t Hart, Money and trust, p. 6 
44
 Charles V in 1548 had defined the Dutch region in a well-defined unit, separate from the German 
Empire. In 1549 he made this unit an hereditary component in the House of Habsburg. He continued his 
constitutional changes by reorganizing the federal councils: a Supreme Court at Mechelen – court of 
appeal for the Provincial law courts; the Privy Council and the Councils of State and Finance. These 
formed Charles’s central government which shared sovereignty with the provinces and their Estates. 
 
45
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, p. 104: indeed «the main difference was neither the 
collective character, nor the use of future tax revenues as security, but the more centralized organization 
of rente payments, which shifted to the States» 
46
 Since 1515, the Estates of Holland had started to issue public loans regularly for Charles  
47
 James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution  ¸ pp. 73-75, 86-97. Above all else, both changes had an 
important structural and a conjunctural effect: the first is about the creation of a base for a long-term debt, 
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a regular source of fiscality and creditworthiness for the future United Provinces (provincial excises), and 
the almost total management thereof; the second is about the exacerbated conflict on resources leading to 
the revolt 
48
 James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution¸ pp. 71-91; James D. Tracy, 2008, The Founding of the Dutch 
Republic, Oxford University Press, Oxford: pp. 37-45; Marjolein ‘t Hart, Money and trust, p. 6;  
49
 James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution¸ pp. 95-101, p. 221; ivi, pp. 165-ff (recap in table 20, p. 168-
170) and James D. Tracy, Holland Under Habsburg Rule, pp. 124-134 to see the stunning engagement 
and interlocking of the political-economic combines of the cities with Provincial governments – the 
fusion of state and capital – notably of Amsterdam, at both provincial and urban level, and between them, 
in the XVI century. See also Marjolein ‘t Hart, 1999, The United Provinces, 1579-1806, in Richard 
Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, C.1200-1810, Oxford University Press, Oxford: pp. 
311-315 
50
 ivi, pp. 63; Pepijn Brandon, 2011, Global power, local connections: The Dutch admiralties and their 
supply networks, in Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes Ferri (eds.), The Contractor State and its 
Implications(1659–1815), Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Servicio de Publicaciones ulpgc: p. 57-60 
51
 C. J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, p. 20 
52
 Wantje Fritschy, Public Finance of the Dutch Republic, pp. 65-73. To the purpose of servicing long-
term debt indeed, the provincial receiver was more important than royal beden receiver already in 1560, 
and increasingly so. 
53
 James D. Tracy, Holland Under Habsburg Rule, p. 211-213 
54
 James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution¸ pp. 89-97, 132-138, 165-192; James D. Tracy, The Founding 
of the Dutch Republic, pp. 42-43, shows another example of management efficiency of the States 
compared with Spain; Marjolein ‘t Hart, Money and trust, p. 6-7, James D. Tracy, Holland Under 
Habsburg Rule, p. 184-185;  ivi, p. 212: «So long as a parliamentary body retained the power of the 
purse, one would expect it in the normal course of things to develop some sort of bureaucratic apparatus 
of its own, as well as a greater sense of its dignity. For the parliaments of the Low Countries provinces, 
this natural tendency was accelerated by the enormous war debts that the government accumulated and by 
the imperious practical need to convert bankers' loans at up to twenty-two percent into funded or long-
term debt that could be supported at much lower rates. The fact that Antwerp's bankers came to trust no 
one but the provincial states to sign short-term obligations not the King, not his fiscal officials, not the 
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great lords of his council was another powerful inducement for the states to develop their own fiscal 
competency»; Marjolein ‘t Hart, 1989, Public loans and moneylenders in the seventeenth century 
Netherlands, Economic and Social history in the Netherlands, vol. 1: pp. 119-120: «Public finance in 
Holland differed from that of other states in three respects: first, the voluntary character of the loans; 
second, the stability in interest payments through regular and permanent taxation; and third, the broad 
distribution of the debt over domestic investors. The achievement of this smoothly functioning system of 
public finance was accomplished in the course of the sixteenth century. It enabled long-term credit 
planning and was based on an expanded pool of lenders»  
55
 James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, pp. 95-97, pp. 116-124; James D. Tracy, Holland Under 
Habsburg Rule, pp. 183-185; James D. Tracy, The Founding of the Dutch Republic, pp. 48-51; Summed 
up in Wantje Fritschy, Public Finance of the Dutch Republic, pp. 65-67 
56
 Henry Kamen, 2005, Spain, 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict, Longman, England: pp. 95; John H. 
Elliott, 2002, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716, Penguin Books, London: ch. 5  
57
 Marjolein ‘t Hart, Money and trust, pp. 7-8, James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, pp 
58
 Oscar Gelderblom and Joost Jonker, 2011, “Public Finance and Economic Growth: The Case of 
Holland in the Seventeenth Century”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 71, N.1: p. 4. Historical 
account of the political ceiling in Marjolein ‘t Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State, pp. 69-184 
59
 Source: James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, pp. 168-176 and Marjolein ‘t Hart, Money and trust, 
p. 6-7.  
60
 Jan Luiten van Zanden, 2009, The long road to the Industrial Revolution: the European economy in a 
global perspective, 1000–1800, Brill, Leiden-Boston: ch. 7, with Maarten Prak; p. 210. Maarten Prak and 
Jan Luiten van Zanden, 2009, Tax Morale and Citizenship in the Dutch Republic, in Oscar Gelderblom 
(ed.), The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic, Ashgate, England: pp. 143-165. Cf. Maarten Prak, 
2003, The politics of intolerance: citizenship and religion in the Dutch Republic (seventeenth to 
eighteenth centuries), in R. Po-chia Hsia (ed.), A Companion to the Reformation World, Malden, Oxford 
and Melbourne: pp. 162-167, sums up the historical practice in the Dutch cities related to citizenship. 
61
 James D. Tracy, Holland Under Habsburg Rule powerfully conveys such insight; Martin van Gelderen, 
The Political Thought, pp. 29-30 
62
 James D. Tracy, Holland Under Habsburg Rule, pp. 181-185; Oscar Gelderblom and Joost Jonker, 
Public Finance and Economic Growth, pp. 3-4. «Holland showed noticeably greater unity and cohesion 
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by the 1560s than it did at the beginning of the century. The change resulted from the pressure of external 
events, from the growth of provincial institutions and responsibilities, especially in the fiscal sphere, and 
from a common political consciousness centered on the idea of defending the privileges of the province 
and of its component members», James D. Tracy, Holland Under Habsburg Rule, p. 209. The external 
pressure to which Tracy is referring is here specifically interpreted as the movement of absolutist 
expansion that backfired instead in an absolutist reverse with a vengeance. 
63
 ivi, p. 185. To sum up p. 6: «If the United Provinces of the seventeenth century did indeed show a 
remarkable ability to govern themselves on the basis of a working consensus of their various elites, it was 
partly because elements of that consensus (such as management of a public debt) were already 
traditional, having been imposed on Holland and other provinces in the previous century. In short, 
Netherlands provinces of the sixteenth century, adapting to new circumstances partly by virtue of their 
traditional autonomy and partly by virtue of pressure from their Habsburg rulers, were undergoing what 
can be seen in retrospect as an apprenticeship in self-government». Indeed, «the Netherlands parliaments 
took a uniquely active role in managing the debt, by issuing  low-interest renten in their own name, so 
that the capital raised could be used by the  government to pay off high-interest bankers' loans. In other 
words, the  Netherlands provincial states, already distinguished by a structure that gave urban magistrates 
an unusual degree of influence in affairs of state, had fiscal responsibilities that made them even more 
indispensable to their ruler than similar bodies were in other  territories. For a variety of reasons, then, 
Netherlands town magistrates were in a peculiarly strong position to wield the power of the purse». These 
reasons took root in the fact that the urban magistrates were at same time great part of the urban capital, 
and of the rural interests as well (through investments in land and proto-industrial activities, thereby 
partially protecting also the rural landscape – not always! The urban economy came first at any rate – as 
an extension of the urban economy policy). James D. Tracy, Holland Under Habsburg Rule, p. 6, 41, 52, 
60-61 (Although Tracy’s interpretation gainsays capitalist development)  
64
 Quoted in Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469-1714, p. 146. See pp. 128-181 
65
 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp 155-220 
66
 Wantje Fritschy, 2017, Public Finance of the Dutch Republic in Comparative Perspective The Viability 
of an Early Modern Federal State (1570s-1795), Brill, Leiden-Boston: p. 86 
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Seventeenth-Century Political Thought, Rotterdam: pp. 33-66 
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Throne. 
69
 By 1968, early funds  – provided by Calvinists – were already used up, Geoffrey Parker, 2002, The 
Dutch Revolt, Harmondsworth: pp. 94-98. Furthermore, The same Orange disposed great portion of his 
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